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Abstract' 
In November 2001, the WTO members allowed the People's Republic of China, a formerly 
planned economy that is going through different stages of domestic economic and related legal 
restructuring, to accede to the WTO. This accession is believed to be necessary for the WTO to 
become a truly international organisation in the post-Cold War era, along side of the IMF and the 
World Bank, and for China to become an integrated member of the international economic 
community. Although the end of the Cold War has changed European trade policy profoundly, 
the European Community (EC)" has maintained a traditionally bifurcated trade policy, in which 
planned economies, also referred to as "non-market economies", are given treatment different 
from market economies in trade policy instruments, such as the EC emergency safeguards 
provisions and EC anti-dumping regulation. 
The EC perceives the Chinese domestic legal and economic reforms as unfinished; and, although 
the treatment of Chinese products under the EC import and anti-dumping regulations has been 
liberalised in recent years, China is still generally considered to be a non-market economy. It is 
questionable whether in light of China's WTO accession such a non-market approach vis-ä-vis 
China, as approved in the Chinese Protocol of Accession, is justified. This thesis argues that the 
non-market approach for China, as it stands today, should be adjusted for two basic reasons. First, 
this approach does not allow China to benefit fully from its WTO accession for a number of years 
to come. Second, as long as the period allowing non-market economy treatment continues, the 
danger exists that the non-market economy trade policy, especially as far as anti-dumping is 
concerned, may tend to be abused for protectionist purposes by the EC. 
Protectionist abuse would be harmful for China because its export-oriented growth is necessary to 
advance the country's domestic legal and economic reforms. Protectionism, equally, would be 
harmful for the EC because it prevents the Community industry from adjusting itself to face the 
challenge of increased Chinese competition. Because there is no satisfactory methodological 
solution to deal with the new variant of non-market economies, and because it is impossible for 
China - despite all good intentions - to implement fully the WTO accession requirements by the 
time they must phase in, the suggested approach is for the EC to show restraint in employing 
these trade policy instruments against China. As far as emergency safeguards are concerned, this 
restraint is already a fact. Nonetheless, some holdovers from the Cold War should be put up for 
change. Such adjustments will also be required for the EC anti-dumping regulation. 
* This volume speaks as of 1 August 2002, unless otherwise expressly indicated; and, it composes 98.376 
words in the text proper. 
** As indicated hereafter, "EC" is the preferred term over "EU' for purposes of this volume. 
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Introduction 
Since its creation in 1995, after the end of the Cold War, the WTO as one of the "Bretton 
Woods institutions", faces the challenge of admitting members, which under communist 
rule developed a different economic and legal systems. Although similar challenges 
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s during the then GATT era when countries like Poland, 
Hungary and Romania became contracting parties2, it is noted that many traditionally 
planned economies, which nowadays seek WTO membership, have embarked on 
profound domestic economic and legal reforms. These countries find themselves in 
different stages of "transition" and are hence often referred to as "transition economies"3. 
After fifteen years of negotiations and more than two decades of domestic economic and 
legal reform the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) became a member of the 
WTO. This accession is definitely one of the most significant events in post-World War 
II history. The Chinese accession is unprecedented, because the Chinese market is 
massive and certain economic sectors, such as textiles, have reached high levels of 
sophistication; whereas, for other sectors of the economy, China should still be 
considered as a "developing country". The Chinese accession is also unique, because the 
country, due to its past, stands culturally remote from the Western legal and economic 
values that have traditionally underpinned the WTO and because its economic structure is 
perceived to be different from that of the majority of the WTO membership base4. 
' HALE, D., "Global Economic Integration After the Cold War", in UZAN, M. (Ed. ), The Financial System 
Under Stress, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 81-131. See also BELLO, J. and HOLMER, F., "After the Cold 
War: Whither International Economic Law? ", 32 Harvard Int'l L. J., Spring 1991, n° 2, p. 323-329. 
2 See generally KOSTECKI, M., East-West Trade and the GATT System, New York, St. Martin's Press, 
1979; and KOSTECKI, M., State Trading in International Markets: Theory and Practice of Industrialised 
and Developing Countries, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 
3 See, e. g., MARER, P. and ZECCHINI, S. (Eds. ), The Transition to a Market Economy, OECD, Paris, 
1991, p. 184-201. 
On the Chinese WTO accession, see, e. g., CHANG, G., The Coming Collapse of China, London, Random 
House, 2001; STUDWELL, J., The China Dream - The Elusive Quest for the Greatest Untapped Market 
on Earth, London, Profile Books, 2001; and CLIFFORD, M. and PANITCHPAKDI, S., China and the 
WTO - Changing China, Changing World Trade, Singapore, John Wiley & Sons, 2002. 
It is a challenge for the WTO to find ways to reconcile the Chinese economy in transition 
with the economies of its predominantly capitalist membership base, such as the 
European Union5 (EU) and its member countries. In this regard it is important to build an 
"economic interface", to use a term coined by John Jackson, which can alleviate the 
possible trade friction that arises between nations when their economic systems have not 
sufficiently converged. Trade policy instruments such as emergency safeguards, 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws are among the more traditional remedies that 
can help to interface the structural differences that exist between economies. The Chinese 
Protocol of Accession7 and the Working Party Report8 on China's WTO accession 
acknowledge the structural differences that exist between the Chinese economy and that 
of other WTO members. To this end, the sections in these documents dealing with 
emergency safeguards, antidumping and countervailing duties are a strong reminder of 
China's special economic status. These sections allow WTO members to continue to 
regard China as a non-market economy (NME) or state-trading economy after its 
accession for a certain number of years to come. A purpose of this thesis is to examine 
further the treatment of China under the trade policy instruments of the European 
Community (EC)9, in particular as far as emergency safeguards and antidumping is 
concerned and to question in particular whether the special treatment of China as a NME 
or state-trading economy is justified, especially given the fact that there are no clear 
economic or legal criteria to mark China's graduation from such treatment; and, the fact 
that the decision to treat China as such is judicially non-reviewable. It seems that despite 
significant efforts made by China to gear up its economy and legal system to gain 
s It should be noted that the European Union has a limited legal personality; and, in terms of trade policy 
instruments, it is more correct to speak about the European Community and the European Steel and Coal 
Community as far as coal and steel products are concerned. In this volume European Community or EC is 
therefore the preferred term when dealing with antidumping and safeguards, also because the trade policy 
instruments considered are those of the European Community unless mentioned otherwise. 
6 See JACKSON, J., "United States Policy Regarding Disruptive Imports from State Trading Countries or 
Government Owned Enterprises", in WALLACE, D., SPINA, G. et al (Eds. ), Interface One - Conference 
Proceedings on the Application of US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws on Imports from State- 
Controlled Economies and State-owned Enterprises, The Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, 
Washington DC, 1980, p. 1. 
WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49 
a Idem. 
9 See supra note 5. 
8 
accession to the WTO, the EC still uses the ongoing, and thus unfinished, domestic 
reforms as an excuse to continue NME or state-trading features of its trade policies with 
regard to safeguards and antidumping which, especially in the case of antidumping, can 
be abused for protectionist aims. 
If China wishes to avoid being labelled a NME or state-trading economy, one of the more 
pressing reforms the country needs is to disentangle government from business10. This 
disentanglement, to be successful, should be "rule-based" and is most probably only 
possible through acceptance of the "rule of law"' 1. Much to the disappointment of many 
authors the `old' state economy has not withered away to create an entirely private 
economy in China 12. The main reason for the survival of many state-owned enterprises 
(SOE) is that ridding the economy of these inefficient enterprises involves heavy social 
costs and would jeopardise the country's political stability. Reforms are therefore bound 
to be partial, notwithstanding the serious efforts by the Chinese government to rationalise 
and to revitalise the state economy. Numerous legal measures try to establish financially 
autonomous and competitive SOEs independent from bureaucratic overreaching, and try 
to force these enterprises to make commercial decisions in line with market 
considerations as required by Article XVII GATT. Although weaknesses remain inside 
the Chinese corporate governance system, it is most probable that, because of the 
decentralisation of the state economy there no longer exists a danger for concerted 
economic policy action by the government in the state sector to undermine GATT/WTO 
obligations in view of Article XVII. However, this does not mean that, on the micro- 
economic level, all bureaucratic meddling with day-to-day management of SOEs is 
completely rooted out. 
For the divestiture of state assets and the disentanglement of the government bureaucracy 
from business, China will need to embrace a "rule-orientation" as to its economic law 
10 This will be exemplified in the second chapter. It suffices to note here that industry and commerce in 
China is tied to various layers of the Chinese administration. 
11 See further below in the next paragraph. 
12 See, e. g., WOO, W., PARKER, S. and SACHS, J. (Eds. ), Economies in Transition - Comparing Asia 
and Europe, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997. 
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infrastructure. As far as the implementation of the rule of law in China is concerned, 
many Western scholars preach vigilance 13. Creating a legal system is more than to 
increase legislative activity; the legal system should also be able to permeate the legal 
consciousness of the people living in the region undergoing reform. Moreover, Western 
influence on this point raises the question of "transplantability" of Western social and 
political institutions and laws in state-building. The last twenty-five years, China has had 
to establish a legal system from scratch and it is impossible on such a short notice to cast 
the foundations of a legal system that is suitable to implement, to monitor and to enforce 
laws and implementing regulations that are formulated and accepted along WTO 
standards. In this regard it is important to look at what guidance can be expected from 
Article X GATT and related WTO provisions, because these set out the standards to 
which the Chinese legal system will have to live up. 
At this point I would like to clarify to the reader my use of the terms "rule of law" and 
"market economy". I take a minimalist and restrictive approach to these terms, while 
recognising that there are a wide range of views as to what these principles comprise and 
that there is not full concurrence even among the major Western powers. My use of the 
term `rule of law' is limited to the issues involving the infrastructure of economic laws, 
though these issues can be interconnected with wider constitutional and human rights 
issues. In writings about Chinese law the authors will draw the attention to the difference 
between Chinese `rule by law' and Western `rule of law' to explain the Chinese 
instrumental use of law14. This instrumental use of law can also be found in `law and 
economics', for which the law is an instrument to facilitate the market' 5. The adoption by 
China of the rule of law as a Western legal-philosophical concept is not an issue 
discussed in this thesis. The compliance with the rule of law for the purpose of this thesis 
13 See, e. g., CHEN, A., "The Developing Theory of Law and Market Economy in Contemporary China", in 
WANG, G. and WEI, Z. (Eds. ), Legal Developments in China - Market Economy and Law, Hong Kong, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 3; CLARKE, D., "Regulation and its Discontents: Understanding Economic 
Law in China", 28 Stan. J. Int'1 L., Spring 1992, p. 287; COHEN, J., "Is there Law in China? ", in LEE, T. 
(Ed. ), Basic Concepts of Chinese Law, New York, Garland, 1997, p. 1; and LUBMAN, S., "Dispute 
Resolution in China after Deng Xiaoping: `Mao and Mediation' Revisited", 11 Colum. J. Asian L., Fall 
1997, p. 229. 
14 Idem. 
15 See, e. g., COOTER, R. and ULEN, T., Law and Economics, New York, Addison-Wesley, 1996. 
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is rather the compliance with minimally acceptable economic law standards of the major 
Western countries to facilitate world trade. On free `market economy' I take the textbook 
view that such an economy is primarily based on prices, which are the result from supply 
and demand, though I concede of course that most Western economies are mixed 
economies to varying degrees. For the purpose of this thesis I should add that in market 
economies enterprises should normally make commercial decisions in line with these 
price-based market considerations. 
Although the economic and legal reform efforts should advance China's integration into 
the WTO, the rise of a large powerful economy in Asia may spark new trade tensions as 
well. The constant search for new export markets may pose a central problem in this 
regard 16. The expansion of exports is often seen as the only factor in the long-run that 
determines the development prospects of any transition economy, and the low-cost 
structure of a country like China may threaten jobs in more mature economies, such as in 
the EC. These threats may eventually cause the European international cooperation to 
slow down. The Chinese export-oriented growth policy exacerbates the EC's trade 
balance, which shows a considerable trade deficit with China. However, the chances for a 
successful restructuring of the Chinese economy, improving efficiency and raising living 
standards will not be very encouraging if exports cannot be expanded. For this reason the 
protectionist abuse of trade policy instruments to prevent Chinese exports to reach the 
European market would harm the Chinese reform process. The solutions dealing with 
trade imbalances are fairly limited, but for the EC to unduly restrict imports from China 
is definitely not the correct one. It is therefore questionable whether emergency 
safeguards and antidumping actions really advance the situation of the Community 
industries involved. 
The challenge the EC has to face up to rather lies in responding to the increased Chinese 
competitiveness in certain economic sectors by allowing or inducing resources to shift 
16 See COOPER, R. and GACS, J., Trade Growth in Transition Economies, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
1997; and CRANE, K., "The Costs and Benefits of Transition", in East-Central European Economies in 
Transition, Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, Study Papers, Washington DC, 
1994, p. 25. 
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where new opportunities for more efficient use are emerging. Increased protectionism as 
a trade policy response vis-a-vis China would run the risk for the EC of being frozen in 
existing inefficiencies, whereas it would be better to continue the search and to struggle 
for remaining competitive strength. The relevant Community industries should realise 
that there is no turf that can be preserved forever for any country or group of countries17. 
Only if the EC continues to respond to change, it need not fear of being converted into an 
industrial desert. To advance this aim, it is crucial to alter trade policies such as 
antidumping legislation in ways that would make them less conducive to seizure for 
protectionist purposes. The profile of a protectionist abuser is a petitioner which has lost 
its comparative advantage in manufacturing merchandise to a respondent which makes 
the same or similar merchandise, and which is unwilling to reduce its cost structure to 
meet global competitive pressures, fails to incorporate technological innovations in his 
manufacturing process and product design, or is insensitive to changes in consumer 
tastes18. It should be the EC's aim to circumscribe the trade laws so as to minimise the 
risk of giving protectionist abusers a chance. 
Whereas the EC has shown great restraint in employing emergency safeguard measures 
under the Uruguay Round Agreements after the creation of the WTO, it has not done so 
as far as antidumping measures are concerned19. The EC is reluctant to use emergency 
safeguard measures and seems to share the same approach as the WTO Appellate Body in 
this regard, which reserves the use of emergency measures in cases where it is truly 
necessary20. What complicates matters is the multitude of safeguards clauses that exist in 
European trade law. First of all there are safeguards clauses in bilateral trade agreements 
between the EC and China. Secondly, there are the safeguards clauses in several of the 
EC's import regulations, of which some are a transposition of Article XIX GATT and the 
relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards or Article 6 of the Agreement 
17 PATEL, I., "The Adjustment Problem", in Trade Policies for a Better Future - The `Leutwiler Report', 
the GATT and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p. 87. 
18 See BHALA, R., "Rethinking Antidumping Law", 29 Geo. Wash. J. Intl & Econ, 1995, p. 1. 
19 China is the country of origin most frequently subjected to European antidumping measures. See chapters 
three and four. 
20 Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R; and 
Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R. 
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on Textiles and Clothing. Others appear to be holdovers from the Cold War and are only 
applicable to certain imports from state-trading countries or NME countries, such as 
China. It is especially the latter sort of safeguards clause that may not comply with WTO 
requirements in case it would still be invoked. Although section 16 of the Protocol of 
Accession allows for a safeguard mechanism to be invoked against China with a lesser 
injury standard, this section seems to mimic the language of section 406 of the 1974 US 
Trade Law, which deals with a market disruption clause. Because the EC has no such 
equivalent of a market disruption clause and because the safeguards clauses applicable to 
certain imports from state-trading countries such as China use a different language, they 
may not survive WTO dispute resolution, and may therefore have to be changed or 
abolished altogether21. 
As far as antidumping measures are concerned the EC has not shown reserve. Chinese 
imports have suffered much from antidumping measures and unfortunately the 
antidumping methodology as applied to NME countries such as China is rife with 
opportunities for protectionist abuse22. The WTO texts and in particular its Antidumping 
Agreement do not offer much guidance as to how to arrive at a proper price 
comparability in determining dumping from NME countries. Usually, as is also the case 
for EC antidumping legislation, the normal value in dumping investigations concerning a 
NME country is based on information from companies located in a third market economy 
country, referred to as the analogue country. Section 15 of the Chinese Protocol of 
Accession explicitly allows for this methodology to be used in the fifteen years after 
China's accession. However, since 1998, the European antidumping regulation gives, on 
a case-by-case basis, the right to individual Chinese companies to prove that they operate 
along market economy conditions in accordance with certain criteria contained in the 
regulation. Where they can prove this to be the case, dumping allocations for the 
company are based on their own domestic prices and costs, instead of making reference 
to information from an analogue country. Although this amendment did not grant full 
market economy status to China nor disallows the NME methodology, the position of the 
21 See chapter three for the full argumentation. 
22 These opportunities will be identified in chapter four. 
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country's imports has improved somewhat. Similarly, the position of Chinese imports has 
improved because European antidumping authorities have agreed in certain cases to 
calculate individual antidumping margins for cooperating Chinese exporters. This is a 
departure from the general rule by which antidumping authorities would not establish 
individual antidumping margins, referred to as individual treatment. The general refusal 
to grant individual treatment has been justified on the grounds that companies from NME 
countries have a limited degree of independence in their relationship with importers as 
they are unable to establish export prices and any other conditions or terms of sales by 
themselves, which may lead to circumvention of antidumping duties by channelling them 
through the trading company or NME producer with the lowest antidumping duty rate. 
Notwithstanding these improvements there still is scope for better treatment of Chinese 
imports into the EC. 
To expand the foregoing paragraphs this thesis is divided into five chapters. The first 
chapter deals with the challenge the WTO faces in integrating transition economies such 
as China. It also points out how remote China is from some of the cultural, economic and 
legal underpinnings of the WTO. It also argues that, although each accession is unique 
and that the initial conditions of Chinese membership are different from other transition 
economies, there also exists a "thin consensus" in how these countries should step up 
economic and legal reforms in order to integrate successfully. The second chapter focuses 
on some of the important geo-political stages of Chinese accession. It discusses at great 
length the more than two decades old Chinese domestic economic and legal related 
reforms in light of Articles X and XVII GATT. And, in so doing, it asserts that if China 
wants to shed its state-trading label to become accepted as a true market economy it 
needs to convince WTO members that by embracing the rule of law it can disentangle the 
government from business in the form of SOEs. Subsequently the third and fourth 
chapters focus on the European trade policy in dealing with the special nature of the 
Chinese economy. In the third chapter quantitative restrictions and emergency safeguards 
are examined as a response to increasing competition of Chinese imports. The fourth 
chapter looks more specifically at the antidumping policy of the EC vis-ä-vis China. 
Finally, the fifth chapter draws some conclusions. 
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It may come as a surprise that this thesis, although dealing with safeguards and 
antidumping, would not look into subsidies and countervailing measures. The reason is 
simply because traditionally subsidy cases were never brought against NME countries, 
because the determination of a subsidy or bounty in a planned economy was practically 
impossible in a country where every detail of the economy seemed to depend on 
government funding or subsidisation 23. It can therefore be argued that the use of 
antidumping measures against these countries is a substitute for the lack of possible 
countervailing duty cases. This situation may be turned around sooner or later when 
domestic economic reforms will allow subsidies to be better defined and determined. 
It should further be noted here that although this thesis deals with European law, 
sometimes references are made to relevant US law and practice; and, finally, I wish to 
note that the research for this thesis was completed in July 2002 and therefore speaks as 
of 1 August 2002. 
Jan Hoogmartens, 
London, 1 August 2002 
23 See, e. g., HORLICK, G. and SHUMAN, S., "Nonmarket Economy Trade and US 
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws", 18 Int'1 Lawyer, Fall 1984, p. 807; and LANTZ, R., "The Search 
for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in Transition under United States Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws", 10 Am. Univ. J. Intl L. & Poly, Spring 1995, p. 993. 
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Chapter One: Of Bretton Woods, The WTO and The 
Integration of Transition Economies - Background 
1. Bretton Woods, Free Trade and the World 
A. Managing the World Economy 
B. Post-Cold War Challenges 
II. Role of the WTO 
A. Purposes of WTO Rules and Main Principles 
B. Communist Trade Legacy 
C. WTO Membership for Transition Economies 
III. Market Economy 
A. Different Types of Market Economy 
B. Different Types of Therapy 
C. Towards Integration in the World Economy 
IV. Legal System 
A. Capitalism and the Rule of Law 
B. Integration into the International Legal System 
C. China's Legal Culture 
V. Final Observations 
In 1944 Allied Forces met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to discuss an international 
monetary and economic system to rebuild and maintain economic and financial order to 
establish long-term peace. Today the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (or hereafter Bank) and their long-lost sister the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
are influential in allocating financing, capital, trade and economic growth. The monetary 
affairs and trade policies under their influence go hand in hand. More than half a century 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter One 
later these organisations still play an important role in balancing the world's economic 
system. 
Since its creation in 1995, after the end of the Cold War, the WTO as part of the Bretton 
Woods institutions faces the challenge of admitting members, which under communist 
rule developed a different economic and legal system. Similar challenges occurred in the 
1960s and 1970s during the then GATT era when Poland, Hungary and Romania joined 
its predominantly capitalist membership base24, except that nowadays the large majority 
of these formerly planned economies have embarked on profound domestic economic and 
legal reforms modelled on the - all be it illusive - principles of free market economy and 
rule of law. These countries find themselves in different stages of transition, and hence 
are often denominated as economies in transition or transition economies. Although the 
reasons for these profound domestic reforms may differ from country to country, these 
restructuring processes can be seen as an important step in improving their economies' 
integration in the Bretton Woods monetary and economic system. In this regard the 
recent Chinese WTO accession and integration is a hotly debated topic in international 
economic law and explored further in this thesis. 
In integrating these transition economies, the WTO plays a crucial role because IMF and 
World Bank membership normally do not require domestic policy reforms as profound as 
are required for WTO membership. This chapter discusses the domestic reforms these 
countries have embarked on, and it is argued that for the integration of transition 
economies to work well, there ought to be created by these countries some regulatory 
framework to support the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable 
economic environment conducive to efficient private sector activities, which comes close 
to what the Bretton Woods institutions understand to be an important facet of good 
economic governance. Furthermore, a transparent legal system with judicial access 
advances and helps the integration into the Multilateral Trading System (MTS). At the 
same time the MTS will also need rules to cabin the risks and the costs of integration, 
with a sufficient amount of flexibility to make swift adjustments to changing 
24 Of the original 23 Contracting Parties in GATT 1947 Cuba, the Czech Republic and China later came 
under Communist rule, but by far the GATT consisted of a group of capitalist countries. 
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Jan Hoogmartens Chapter One 
circumstances and to find compromises when necessary. In this regard WTO emergency 
safeguards and antidumping might have an important role to play. 
This chapter will begin with a sketch of the Bretton Woods international economic and 
financial order and the challenges ahead caused by transition economies joining the 
WTO's Multilateral Trading System. It will then move on to discuss briefly the role of 
the WTO in integrating these economies into the global economy. Subsequently much 
time is devoted to the process of domestic restructuring, which involves the adoption of 
market economic principles and a functioning legal system. Throughout this chapter 
special attention is paid to these issues in light of the Chinese WTO accession. However, 
it will not be until the next chapter that the Chinese domestic reforms are discussed in 
much greater detail to develop the main argument that the European Community (EC) 
and the United States (US) still use the ongoing domestic Chinese economic and legal 
reforms as an excuse to maintain special trade policies with regard to safeguard and anti- 
dumping measures inherited from the communist era to treat China differently. As will be 
argued in subsequent chapters, these policies should be amended or abolished, in so far as 
they are outdated, abusive and inadequate. 
Bretton Woods, Free Trade and the World 
At the end of World War II, two worlds, ideologically and militarily, confronted each 
other, thereby espousing two different approaches to achieve prosperity and social 
change. Each side was drawing its own lessons from the terrible consequences of the 
economic disasters of the inter-war years. On one side of the spectrum, liberals 
considered economic interdependence to create positive bonds among peoples and to 
promote harmony of interest among societies. On the other side nationalists and Marxists 
regarded trade as pernicious, because economic specialisation and interdependence would 
make states insecure and vulnerable25. The memory of this event impresses upon us how 
closely the fortune of free trade remains tied to prospects for peace and how international 
25 About these two theories of international trade, see GILPIN, R., The Political Economy of International 
Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 172ff. See also the discussion at the beginning of 
the book at p. 25ff. 
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politics affects international trade26. A glance along the horizon from Korea to the 
Balkans to Rwanda and the Middle East will remind us how far we still are from the ideal 
of an international civil society, and how important it is that steady, sustained efforts in 
that direction be made27. According to liberals the promotion of peace should encompass 
the promotion of international trade28. 
As a result of this ideological split between a liberal capitalist and a socialist bloc, 
international economic law reflected for many years a bipolar character to guarantee 
international stability29. Since the end of the Cold War the current international system is 
described by one commentator as: 
"[A] liberal international order, which comprises a degree of order, but no over-arching 
governmental structures; a continued diversity of types of States and political systems; a 
broad consensus, but not unanimity, on market economies; and a degree of consensus on 
democracy, but without general agreement on the forms and true content that it should 
assume". 30 
Within this international system the pace of international economic activity and the 
interdependence of national economies is head spinning. Because this activity often 
26 See, e. g., DELORS, J., "The Future of Free Trade in Europe and the World", 18 Fordham Intl L. J, 
March 1995, p. 715-725. 27 See, e. g., ALBRIGHT, M., "International Law Approaches in the 21" Century: A US Perspective on 
Enforcement", 18 Fordham Int'l L. J., May 1995, p. 1595-1606; UL HAQ, M., JOLLY, R., STREETEN, P. 
and HAQ, K. (Eds. ), The UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions - New Challenges for the 213` Century, 
New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995 and BOARDMAN, R., Post-socialist World Orders: Russia, China 
and the UN System, London, St. Martin's Press, 1994. About the direct role of Bretton Woods institutions 
in international peace and security, see CIORCIARI, J., "A Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the 
Bretton Woods Financial Institutions in International Peace Operations", 22 Fordham Int'l L. J., December 
1998, p. 292-354. 
28 GILPIN, o. a., supra note 25, p. 172. See also FABRICIUS, F., "The Universal and Regional 
Harmonisation of International Trade Law as a Means of Maintaining World Peace", in SCHMITTHOFF, 
C. and SIMMONDS, K. (Eds. ), International Economic and Trade Law - Universal and Regional 
Integration, Leyden, Sijthoff, 1976, p. 201-225. 
29 See, e. g., FABRICIUS, o. c., supra note 28, p. 202-3. The author notes that international trade law must 
harbour the germ of conflicts and that to maintain peace is the dominant aim of a legal system. This delicate 
balance in international trade law can also be found in LOWENFELD, A., Trade Controls for Political 
Ends, New York, Matthew Bender, 1983 (dealing with the controls on trade with communist countries and 
the patterns of evolution in East-West trade). For further reference, see also WOLF, T., US East-West 
Trade Policy, London, Lexington Books, 1973 and POLLARD, it, Economic Security and the Origins of 
the Cold War 1945-1950, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985. 
30 HIGGENS, R., "International Law in a Changing International System", 58 Cambridge L. J., March 
1999, n° 1, p. 78-95, at p. 81-82. 
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crosses borders it escapes the reach of much of national government control31. This 
phenomenon is often referred to as globalisation32. A broad inventory of subjects as 
diverse as insurance, brokerage, product health and safety standards, environmental 
protection, banking, securities and investment, professional services such as medical and 
legal, and many more, can be covered by international economic law. Notwithstanding 
this very broad inventory, the core aspects of international economic regulation are found 
in the three Bretton Woods institutions33: the International Monetary Fund34 (IMF), the 
World Bank Group35 (World Bank or Bank) and the World Trade Organisation36 (WTO), 
31 See, e. g., JACKSON, J., "Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: International 
Economic Law: Reflections on the `Boilerroom' of International Relations", 10 Am. U. J. Intl L&Pol'y, 
Winter 1995, p. 595-606, at p. 595. Illuminating in this regard is also STEWART, M., The Age of 
Interdependence, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1984, p. 28-29 (discussing the impact of greater 
interdependence). See also SCHACHTER, 0., "The Erosion of State Authority and Its Implications for 
Equitable Development" in WEISS, F. et al. (Eds. ), International Economic Law with a Human Face, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law, 1998, p. 31-44 (noting that capitalism and global markets may be stateless, but that 
markets in one way or another need regimes that may go beyond the province of the state. Nevertheless, 
states will continue to play a major role in the creation and application of these legal and quasi-legal 
regimes); and MALANCZUK, P., "Globalisation and the Future Role of Sovereign States", in WEISS, F. et 
al. (Eds. ), International Economic Law with a Human Face, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1998, p. 45-65 
(noting that sovereignty still is the cornerstone of international law). 
32 For some meanings of globalisation, see WALKER, G. and FOX, M., "Globalisation: An Analytical 
Framework", 3 Global Legal Studies J., n° 2, at www. law. indiana. edu/glsj/vol3/no2/walker. html (last 
visited 4 August 2000). Authors note that globalisation differs from internationalisation because the erosion 
and irrelevance of national boundaries in markets only underlies the former concept. Because of 
technological progress geographical constraints recede and this adds to a sense of increased 
interconnectedness. For similar views see also DELBRUCK, J., "Globalisation of Law, Politics, and 
Markets - Implications for Domestic Law: A European Perspective", 1 Global Legal Studies J., at 
www. law. indiana. edu/glsi/voll/delbruck. html (last visited 4 August 2000). For further reference, see also 
RODRIK, D., Has Globalisation Gone too Far?, Institute for Int'l Econ. L., Washington DC, 1997; 
FOREMAN-PECK, J., Historical Foundations of Globalisation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
1998; and TILLY, R., WELFENS, P. (Eds. ), Economic Globalization, International Organizations and 
Crisis Management, Berlin, Springer, 2000. 
33 Called after the conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. See United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22,1944, Department of 
State, Vol. I-II (proceedings and documents). See also VAN DORMAEL, A., Bretton Woods - Birth of a 
Monetary System, Hong Kong, Macmillan Press, 1978. 
34 See, e. g., GOLD, J., Membership and Nonmembership, IMF, Washington DC, 1974, and GOLD, J., 
Interpretation: The IMF and International Law, London, Kluwer Law, 1996. See also GOLD, J., Legal and 
Institutional Aspects of the International Monetary System: Selected Essays, IMF, Washington DC, 1984; 
and DE VRIES, M., The IMF in a Changing World, 1945-1985, IMF, Washington DC, 1986. 
35 The World Bank Group comprises the IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA and ICSID. See e. g. WORLD BANK, 
World Bank Operations, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1972; MASON, E. and ASHER, R., 
The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1973; SHIHATA, I., 
The World Bank in a Changing World, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1995; KAPUR, D., LEWIS, J. and 
WEBB, R. (Eds. ), The World Bank - Its First Half Century, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 
Vol. 1-2,1997. 
36 The charter establishing the World Trade Organisation was signed at a ministerial meeting in Marrakesh 
on 15 April 1995. See JACKSON, J., The World Trading System - Law and Policy of International 
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which emerged from a transformed General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
and was originally conceived as the International Trade Organisation (ITO)37. Of course 
the WTO or the three Bretton Woods institutions cannot deal with all these matters in a 
comprehensive way. Consequently initiatives have emerged from diverse sources such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
A. Managing the World Economy 
International lawyers and scholars have helped elucidate the crucial compromises during 
the formative era of Bretton Woods institutions, the institutions' evolution through post- 
war reconstruction, economic recovery, and the trend toward more equal collaboration 
among developed countries, allied in the OECD, and developing countries38. The recent 
Economic Relations, Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 2"d ed., 1997, p. 45-46. The same story line can also 
be found in the beginning chapters of JACKSON, J., The World Trade Organisation - Constitution and 
Jurisprudence, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999. The WTO was designed after 
negotiations were launched with the ambitious Punta del Este Declaration in the Uruguay-Round (1986- 
1995). By 1990 Canada proposed a new institution bearing the present name. The European Community 
supported the idea of a "Multilateral Trade Organisation" (MTO). This proposal ended up in the Dunkel 
Draft, called after then GATT director-general Arthur Dunkel, and led after intense negotiations in 1993 to 
a draft charter acceptable to the US as well. See also DILLON, T., "The World Trade Organization: A New 
Legal Order for World Trade? ", 16 Mich. J. Intl L., Winter 1995, p. 350-402; and VERNON, R., "The 
World Trade Organisation: A New Stage in International Trade and Development", 36 Harv. Int'l L. J., 
Spring 1995, p. 329-340. 
3 This history starting with the Bretton Woods system in 1944 is clearly depicted in Ch. 2 of JACKSON, 
o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 31-46; and JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1999, Ch. 1-2, p. 1-35. Next to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the Bretton Woods system, devised to safeguard 
monetary and economic stability after the disaster of World War II, was supposed to comprise a third leg 
viz, the International Trade Organisation (ITO). Basically because the war momentum had faded away by 
1947, only the precursor to the ITO, the GATT, came into existence. This temporary solution provided for 
in the Provisional Protocol of Accession (PPA), became a permanent de facto organisation until the 
Marrakesh meeting (see supra note 36). About the GATT, see also DAM, K., The GATT Law and 
International Economic Organisation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970; LONG, 0., Law and its 
Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987; and HUDEC, R., 
The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, New Hampshire, Butterworths, 2"d ed., 1990. 
Interesting literature in this regard is also BRONZ, G., "An International Trade Organization: The Second 
Attempt", 69 Harv. L. Rev., January 1956, p. 440-482; HANSEN, M. and VERMULST, E., "The GATT 
Protocol of Provisional Application: A Dying Grandfather? ", 27 Colum. J. Transnat'I L., 1989, p. 263-308; 
DEMARET, P., "The Metamorphosis of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade 
Organisation", 34 Colum. Transnat'1 L., 1995, p. 123-171; and MOORE, P., "The Decisions Bridging the 
GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement", 90 Am. J. Intl L., April 1996, p. 317-328. 
38 See generally VAN DORMAEL, o. c., supra note 33; DE VRIES, o. c., supra note 34; MIKESELL, R., 
The Bretton Woods Debates, Princeton, Essays in International Finance, n° 192,1994; HELLEINER, E., 
States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1994; BORDO, M. and EICHENGREEN, B. (Eds. ), A Retropspective on the Bretton 
Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1993; 
SHELTON, J., Money Meltdown: Restoring Order to the Global Currency System, New York, Free Press, 
1994; CAVANAGH, J. et al. (Eds. ), Beyond Bretton Woods: Alternatives to the Global Economic Order, 
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post-Cold War era has caused scholars to focus on challenges including uneven economic 
development, wide income disparities, growing environmental concerns, extensive 
underemployment, expanding global investment and trade, exchange rate instabilities, 
trade imbalance-current account problems etc39. 
Our story of managing the world economy starts in the first heydays of Bretton Woods 
when the world benefited from a fixed dollar-gold exchange standard (1945-71). But 
when the US no longer was the most stable and predominant economy, the IMF soon 
became a crucial forum for managed floating40. Major OECD countries comprising the 
US, UK, Germany, Japan, France and later also Italy and Canada informally gathered in 
the G-5, enlarged to G-7. This group of strong economies gave some general leadership 
and guidance to the world economy. IMF and World Bank provided essential adjustment 
assistance and `soft' loans to many developing countries (and to some developed 
countries until twenty-five years ago) with no access to commercial banks and capital 
markets41. Notwithstanding the IMF `s controversial conditionality discipline42, its co- 
operation with the OECD nations and its major international banks fostered responsibility 
Amsterdam, Transnational Institute, 1994; BANDOW, D. and VASQUEZ, I. (Eds. ), Perpetuating Poverty: 
The World Bank, The IMF, and the Developing World, Cato Institute, Washington DC, 1994; KENEN, P. 
(Ed. ), Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, 1994; JAMES, H., International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; KIRSHNER, O. (Ed. ), The Bretton Woods - GATT System - 
Retrospect and Prospect after Fifty Years, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1996; GRIESGABER, J. and 
GUNTER, B. (Eds. ), Rethinking Bretton Woods, London, Pluto, Vol. 1-5,1996; and Bretton Woods: 
Looking to the Future, Bretton Woods Committee, Washington DC, 1994. For an introduction to public 
financial management see STEPHAN, P., WALLACE, D. and ROIN, J., International Business and 
Economics - Law and Policy, Charlottesville, Michie, 1993. 39 See, e. g., CRAFTS, N., "Globalisation and Growth in The Twentieth Century", IMF, March 2000, p. 10 
(noting mainly that the gap between rich and poor has widened enormously). 
40 See, e. g., GOLD, J., Selected Essays, l. c., supra note 34; and DE VRIES, M., The International Monetary 
Fund, 1966-1971: The System under Stress, IMF, Washington DC, 1976. 
"' See generally "The IMF at a Glance" at www. imf. org, which lists the available IMF financial facilities. 
Similar development information on soft loans, usually a responsibility of the International Development 
Association (IDA) and an overview of World Bank Group activities can be found at www. worldbank. ore. 
See, for further reference, also DRISCOLL, D., What is the International Monetary Fund?, IMF, 
Washington DC, 1992; DRISCOLL, D., The IMF and the World Bank - How Do They Differ?, IMF, 
Washington DC, 1992; GUITIAN, M., The Unique Nature of the Responsibilities of the International 
Monetary Fund, IMF, Washington DC, 1992; SHIHATA, I., "Development Policies and Strategies - With 
Emphasis on the World Bank Group" in SHIHATA, o. c., supra note 35, p. 33-69; and other publications 
like the World Bank Information Briefs, World Bank, Washington DC. 
42 On IMF conditionality, see generally WILLIAMSON, J. (Ed. ), IMF Conditionality, Cambridge MA, 
MIT Press, 1983; DENTERS, E., Law and Policy of IMF Conditionality, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1996; 
and QURESHI, A., International Economic Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, chapter 10. See also 
GOLD, J., Selected Essays, l. c., supra note 34. 
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to creditors and broader capital markets. Hence the system encouraged international 
investment, trade and the development of a global marketplace. The foundation for a 
more stable reliable economic regime and more market-friendly state practices among 
developing nations was cast. 
OPEC oil and other price shocks hurt many economies in the 1970s43. Worldwide flows 
of petroleum dollars, recycled through expanding Euro-currency banking and capital 
markets, were used to expand loans and international debt leading in turn to a worldwide 
inflationary surge. To crack down on inflation, interest rates increased greatly, bringing 
widespread recession and rising unemployment. Latin American countries suffering from 
serious debt overloads failed to service increased interest obligations by the early 1980s44. 
The IMF, the World Bank and the Paris Club of private multinational banks responded 
with a mix of rescheduling, additional credits and limited relief. Creditworthiness was 
gradually restored by accepting stronger fiscal discipline, emphasising export expansion, 
and stressing productivity improvement45. Successful rescheduling called for confidence 
in expanding global trade. Yet a rising trend of protectionism, subsidies and trade barriers 
could abort the recovery process by the mid-1980s. , 
To fight a greater slump in the global economy the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was launched in 1986. Its multifaceted agenda 
comprised additional tariff reductions, especially among newly industrialised 'countries 
(NIC), market opening for agriculture, services and financial markets and stronger 
intellectual property rights. It hoped to limit protectionism on trade flows by addressing 
antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, safeguard relief and such other 
equivalents in national law. The negotiations were difficult and slow, but nonetheless by 
accepting most of the Dunkel Draft provisions in late 1993 the world accepted a stronger 
version of the WTO than many had expected. 
43 See, e. g., SPERO, J. and HART, J., The Politics of International Economic Relations, London, 
Routledge, 5s' ed., 1997, p. 172tß 
44 Idem, p. 179-182 and 186ff. 
as See, e. g., SPERO and HART, o. c., supra note 43, p. 189; see also, STEPHAN et al, o. c., supra note 38, 
p. 283-287. 
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B. Post-Cold War Challenges 
Chapter One 
Adding three billion people, who currently live in formerly planned economies or 
transition economies, to the international system, in which the Bretton Woods institutions 
operate, is rightly called a challenge46. There probably will never be a successor 
conference to the Bretton Woods one of 1944 to deal with this challenge. Instead 
international governance is taken up by the existing international organisations and ad 
hoc meetings such as the G-7, which with the support of Russia continues its work47. 
In the post-Cold War era the Bretton Woods institutions face a wider range of 
controversies. The IMF, the World Bank and the WTO are on the one hand appreciated 
and on the other hand criticised for influencing the allocation of financing, capital, trade 
and economic growth among nations during recent crises such as in Latin America and 
Asia48. However, the rational for Bretton Woods institutions has not changed 
fundamentally. Sustained trade/current-account imbalances have long been a concern49, 
and still need to be addressed in emerging markets. The lessons prescribed for deficit 
countries have remained and emphasise fiscal discipline, budget retrenchment, improved 
competitiveness, export enhancement, and devaluation or import restrictions, if 
necessary. Surplus nations can expect currency appreciation and reduced exports50. These 
concerns will be addressed further at the beginning of Chapter Three. 
But what have changed since 1944, are the composition of the world and the process of 
international economic law. Whereas Bretton Woods was very much a dialogue between 
United States' Harry Dexter White and the British Empire, with ideas represented by 
John Maynard Keynes, today's world counts many voices more. More members 
46 HALE, D., "Global Economic Integration After the Cold War", in UZAN, M. (Ed. ), The Financial 
System Under Stress, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 81-131. See also BELLO, J. and HOLMER, F., "After 
the Cold War: Whither International Economic Law? ", 32 Harvard Intl L. J., Spring 1991, n° 2, p. 323- 
329. 
" See, e. g., Report of G-7 Finance Ministers to the K61n Economic Summit, Cologne, Germany, 18-20 
June, 1999 (discussing inter alia the strengthening and reforming of international financial institutions and 
arrangements, strengthening macroeconomic policies in emerging markets, debt management and crisis 
prevention). 
8 See, e. g., CANOVA, T., "Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion", 
14 Am. U. Intl L. Rev., Fall 1999, p. 1571-1645; and also EICHENGREEN, B., Toward a New 
International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 1999. 
49 See, e. g., FELLNER, W., MACHLUP, F. and TRIFFIN, R. (Eds. ), Maintaining and Restoring Balance 
in International Payments, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966. 
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classified according to stereotypes such as Less Developed Countries (LDC), Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NIC) and divisions between North-South and East-West, means 
different needs". This has caused Bretton Woods institutions to pay more attention to 
development. Therefore many believe the interests of poorer nations deserve more 
sympathetic attention and that environmental and population concerns demand more 
respect internationally52. But also the process of international economic law has changed 
dramatically. International economic law, especially in the case of the WTO, has become 
more rule-oriented. 
This process of international economic law weighs heavily on the integration of transition 
economies and needs a mix of rigidity and flexibility. Rigidity meaning the need for a 
firm foundation based on rules to cabin the risks and the costs of the integration. At the 
same time a sufficient amount of flexibility is needed to make swift adjustments to 
changing circumstances possible and to find compromises when necessary 53. The WTO 
definitely has the advantage of being a rule-based organisation, but does it still have 
enough flexible muscle to manoeuvre54? This will in large part depend on its safeguard 
and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
It is against this background of rule-based international economic law and flexible 
safeguards that the WTO accession of transition economies must be depicted. Because of 
its size and possible precedent value for a future Russian accession, the accession of the 
Chinese transition economy to the WTO is a hot topic. The accession is not only complex 
because of its political sensitiveness, but also because it requires profound economic and 
legal reforms. Without these reforms the Chinese legal and economic system may cause a 
so MACHLUP, F., "In Search of Guides for Policy", in FELLNER et al, o. c., supra note 49, p. 33-84. 
51 For definitional matters and an overview of the heterogeneous developing world, see SARKAR, R., 
Development Law and International Finance, London, Kluwer Law, 2000, p. 1 ff. 
52 See, e. g., DANAHER, K. (Ed. ), 50 Years is Enough - The Case Against the World Bank and the IMF, 
Boston, South End Press, 1994; more moderate are WEISS, F., DENTERS, E. and DE WAART, P. (Eds. ), 
ox., supra note 31; and BHAGWATI, J. and HUDEC, R. (Eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonization, 
Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1996, which pay attention to labour, environmental and human rights concerns 
in the international economy. These issues played an important role in the streets outside the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference of WTO in December 1999. See GANTZ, D., "Failed Efforts to Initiate the 
`Millennium Round' in Seattle: Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations", 17 Arizona J. Int'1 & Comp 
L., Spring 2000, p. 349-369. 
53 See, e. g., PATEL, I., "The Adjustment Problem", in Trade Policies for a Better Future - The `Leutwiler 
Report', the GATT and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p. 87-94. 
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severe culture shock to the system. Nevertheless China needs to be integrated after the 
Cold war, if the WTO wants to legitimise itself as a truly global organisation next to the 
financial Bretton Woods institutions to enhance a global marketplace. Finally, policies of 
engagement are necessary to guarantee long-term peace, security, and hence economic 
stability in the world. China's integration into the world trading system will therefore be 
of concern during the next couple of decades. China understands this and has since 1986 
stepped up its domestic economic and legal reform process. The next section deals with 
the importance and functions of the WTO in embracing economic stability and 
integration. 
II. Role of the WTO 
The previous sections have already explained in part how international monetary affairs 
and trade are intertwined, because monetary and fiscal discipline is also interconnected 
with export and productivity growths". This section now examines what crucial role the 
WTO, as a long-lost sister of the two other Bretton Woods institutions, plays in light of 
the post-Communist challenges. The integration of transition economies into the 
international economy drives up the competition for capital and aid. This proves the large 
flow of capital finding its way through expanding financial markets by private investors, 
commercial banks and multinational enterprises. As recent financial crises have made 
54 A dose of flexibility is needed to serve economics and economists. QURESHI, o. c, supra note 42, p. 102 
(noting that sometimes an `imaginative approach' is preferred in international economic law). 55 See WTO, Decision of the General Council, 18 November 1996, Doc. WT/L/-194 (about the co- 
operation of IMF - World Bank - WTO). For further reference on the crossroads between international 
finance and trade, see, e. g., SARCEVIC, P., "Impact of the International Monetary System on World 
Trade", in SARCEVIC, P. and VAN HOUTTE, H. (Eds. ), Legal Issues in International Trade, London, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, p. 207-219; ROESSLER, F., "The Relationship Between the World Trade Order 
and the International Monetary System", in PETERSMANN, E. and HILF, M. (Eds. ), The New GATT 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Deventer, Kluwer Law, 2d ed., 1991, p. 363-386, and 
commented on by GIRARD, P., at p. 387-393; and BENEDEK, W., "Relations of the WTO with other 
International Organisations and NGOs", in WEISS, et al., 1. c., supra note 31, p. 479-95 (who notes that the 
relationship between WTO - IMF - World Bank is not without problems). See also QURESHI, o. a., supra 
note 42, p. 103 (noting that monetary problems are related to trade and development. International trade 
liberalisation is impossible without international financial payments, sufficient liquidity and currency 
exchange control regulations). See further BERGSTEN, F., "Effect on Trade of Exchange Rates and 
Policies", in NORTON, J. (Ed. ), World Trade and Trade Finance, New York, Matthew Bender, 1985, p. 
1/1-1/17; GOLD, J., "Aspects of the IMF's Activities in Relation to International Trade", in NORTON, J. 
(Ed. ), World Trade and Trade Finance, New York, Matthew Bender, 1985, p. 8/2-8/71; and KAMPF, R., 
"Commitments in the WTO and their Impact on International Trade in Securities", in VAN HOUTTE, H. 
(Ed. ), The Law of Cross-border Securities Transactions, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, p. 277-312. 
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clear there are risks involved in this process as well. Therefore the IMF and the World 
Bank play an active role either as financier/trouble shooter or as surveyor/watchdog. The 
WTO plays a crucial role in attracting capital through trade and foreign investment 
liberalisation. International trade has been recognised as an important component of 
economic growth56 and this explains why emerging economies such as transition 
economies accelerate economic reforms. 
The liberalisation of world trade at the end of the Cold War, however, is not without 
possible danger. The rise of potential new and large economies in Asia, Latin America 
and the former Soviet block may create new trade tensions with mature economies such 
as the US and the EC. Low costs combined with technological changes in China, India 
and Brazil might revive 1980s protectionism focused on Japan and South Korea. Even 
when the completion of the Uruguay Round has ruled out the comeback of Orderly 
Market Arrangements57 (OMA) or Voluntary Export Restraints58 (VER) less confident 
European and American States such as France, Germany, UK, US and Canada may 
slowdown the pace of international co-operation. 
A. Purposes of WTO Rules and Main Principles 
The most important objectives that the WTO, as well as its predecessor the GATT, keeps 
in mind are: (1) to provide a forum to negotiate trade liberalisation, and to monitor and 
improve policy transparency; and (2) to settle trade disputes between members59. But 
principal objectives include also raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, 
expanding production and trade, and allowing optimal use of the world's resources60. 
56 See GILPIN, o. a., supra note 25, p. 171 (noting that apart from technological diffusion, economies of 
scale, increased consumer choice and reduced costs of production international trade stimulates economic 
growth and enhances the overall efficiency of the economy). 
See, e. g., MURPHY, C., "Orderly Market Arrangements", in NORTON, J. (Ed. ), World Trade and Trade 
Finance, New York, Matthew Bender, 1985, p. 11/1-11/12. 
58 See, e. g., LOWENFELD, A., Public Controls on International Trade, New York, Matthew Bender, 
1983, p. 195ff; and JONES, K., "Voluntary Export Restraint: Political Economy, History and the Role of 
GATT", 23 J. World Trade, n° 2,1989, p. 125-140. 
59 See, e. g., LOWENFELD, A., "Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT", 88 
Am. J. Int'1 L., July 1994, p. 477-488; NICHOLS, P., "GATT Doctrine", 36 Va J. Int'1 L., Winter 1996, p. 
379-466; and JACKSON, J., "The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding - Misunderstandings on the 
Nature of Legal Obligations", 91 Am. J. Int'l L., January 1997, p. 60-64 (noting that the WTO has teeth to 
enforce international legal obligations); and PETERSMANN, E., The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
SSstem, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1997. 
Read the preamble of the Marakesh Charter, Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 36. 
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To realise these objectives, the technical purpose of GATT/WTO is to remove or limit the 
effects of trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas, customs procedures, state trading and 
subsidies, and to pave the way for liberal trade61. Tariffs are generally believed to distort 
competition and to attribute monopoly rents to producers in countries that uphold them62. 
Quotas are also believed to distort competition, but usually do not yield more profit for 
domestic producers. Furthermore, their administration may yield corruption63, just as 
discriminatory licensing may6. 
According to Article II GATT, tariff concessions65 are formalised in tariff bindings after 
negotiation rounds66. Sometimes countries are permitted to depart from bindings, called 
waivers, or may decide to withdraw certain concessions, in which case compensation and 
renegotiation must be offered to trading partners in an attempt to rebalance67. 
Apart from tariffs, there exist plenty of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). It is the purpose of 
Article XI GATT to eradicate these trade-restricting measures68. But human creativeness 
61 See generally GILPIN, o. c., supra note 25. Since Medieval times countries tried to amass as much gold 
and silver by selling more than buying from neighbouring empires. This mercantilism came under attack 
from Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, 1776. His theory of the "absolute advantage" 
was refined by David Ricardo in The Principles of Political Economy of 1817, who introduced the notion 
of "comparative advantage", meaning that each country, in order to increase overall prosperity, should 
produce and trade in those sectors of the economy, which have more abundant factors. See also 
TREBILCOCK, M. and HOWSE, R., The Regulation of International Trade, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 
2-4. 
62 JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 140. 63 Although arguably bribes can also be considered as tariffs or tariff surcharges, see NICHOLS, P., 
"Corruption in the World Trade Organisation: Discerning the Limits of the World Trade Organisation's 
Authority", 28 N. Y. U. J. Int'1 L. & Pol., Summer 1996, p. 711-784. 64 JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 140, p. 153ff and 164. Concerning quantitative restrictions it is 
important that not only imports of a certain product from all countries is restricted, but that it is also done in 
a non-discriminatory manner, see HUDEC, R., "Tiger, Tiger in the House: A Critical Appraisal of the Case 
Against Discriminatory Trade Measures", in PETERSMANN, E. and HILF, M. (Eds. ), o. c., supra note 55, 
p. 177ff. Article XIII GATT thereto states that licensing must happen either on a first-come-first-serve 
basis or with global licenses to local importers or with country-specific quotas based on historic market 
shares or expected market share. Article XIV GATT, however, provides for discriminatory quantitative 
restrictions in case of Balance of Payment difficulties. 
65 WTO, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, WTO, Geneva, 1995 (hereinafter GATT Analytical Index), p. 
63-119. See also TARULLO, D., "Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History", 34 UCLA L. 
Rev., December 1986, p. 285-370. 
66 See JACKSON, o. a., supra note 36,1997, p. 142ff. See also DAM, o. c., supra note 37, p. 79fß On the 
negotiation process, see also MCRAE, D. and THOMAS, J., "The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: 
The Tokyo Round", 77 Am. J. Intl L., January 1983, p. 51-83. 
67 Article XXVIII GATT, see JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 143. 68 GATT Analytical Index, o. c., supra note 65, p. 313-353. 
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seems to be boundless here69. Efforts to remove these have proven to be more difficult70. 
Important is also that these NTBs are not always in line with National Treatment (NT) 
required by Article III GATT. Once goods have entered the internal circuit of commerce, 
imported goods should not be treated differently from national products, unless this equal 
treatment would provoke de facto or implicit discrimination7l. This might be true for 
taxes, licensing requirements, technical standards, inspections etc. 
For most commentators rules governing international trade protect the welfare of small 
and weak nations against discriminatory trade policy actions of large and powerful 
nations. They believe that rules such as Article I GATT, the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) clause72, and Article III GATT, the NT clause73, are fundamental to instil 
confidence in the world trading system and to support the evolution towards more legality 
in global markets. Large economies have the potential to exploit their monopoly power 
by taxing their trade, but make the world worse off by such trade taxes. Multilateral rules 
disciplining trade policy are also beneficial in that they help governments to ward off 
domestic interesting groups asking special favours74. However, many commentators75 do 
not naively believe in the increase of WTO authoritativeness. They question inter alia the 
exceptions fashioned in agriculture76 and textiles, two domains in which subsidies and 
69 Human creativeness is boundless in many policies trying to evade international obligations to liberalise 
trade. See again JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p 139ff and 229ff. 
70 Again JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 153. 
71 Ibidem, p. 216. 
72 See GATT Analytical Index, o. c., supra note 65, p. 23-61. See also JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, 
p. 157ff; and TREBILCOCK, HOWSE, o. c., supra note 61, p. 27. See also UN, "First Report on the Most- 
favoured-nations Clause", 18 April 1969, Document A/CN. 4/23 and UN, "Second Report on the most- 
favoured-nations clause", 9 March and 18 May 1970, Document A/CN. 4/228 and Add. 1. For an analysis, 
see also SCHWARTZ, W. and SYKES, A., "The Economics of the Most-favoured-nations Clause", in 
BHANDARI, J. and SYKES, A. (Eds. ), Economic Dimensions in International Law, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 43-79. 
" GATT Analytical Index, o. c., supra note 65, p. 121-207. See also JACKSON, o. a., supra note 36,1997, 
213ff; and TREBILCOCK, HOWSE, o. c., supra note 61, p. 29. 
On the debate for and against free trade, see generally GILPIN, o. c., supra note 25; BHALA, It, 
International Trade Law, Charlottesville, Michie, 1996, Chapter I; and JACKSON, J., DAVEY, W. and 
SYKES, A., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, St. Paul, West Publishing, 1995. 
75 These commentators point out the immanent and inherent objections to free trade like the impact on 
wages and employment. They argue that free trade may hurt domestically vulnerable industries, even if the 
overall net effect is positive. However, if trade liberalisation increases overall prosperity, it will also enable 
social policies to redistribute wealth. Other objections raised include the impact on cultural diversity with 
the creation of homogeneity and materialism and the impact on domestic sovereignty. See TREBILCOCK, 
HOWSE, o. c., supra note 61, p. 11-14. 
76 See TREBILCOCK, HOWSE, o. c., supra note 61, p. 191-214 for more details. 
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protectionism have survived. They also draw our attention to many escape routes that 
lead away from basic free trade principles, such as antidumping. 
When it comes to the escape routes many good reasons can be found in national security, 
health and welfare, balance of payments difficulties and currency obligations to name the 
most important ones77. The Uruguay Round78 came up with an ambitious new safeguard 
agreement79. If liberal trade policies and practices did not exist, then there perhaps would 
not exist any need to consider safeguards as such. Economic adjustment needs and 
practical politics, however, demand otherwise80. The reality of comparative advantage 
may sometimes provide little consolation to a suffering economy81. The economic costs 
of liberalisation are usually immediately felt by the industry affected, while the gains 
over time are often diffuse. 
China's accession to the WTO cannot drag us away from this constant tension between 
the further institutionalisation and rationalisation over the creation of free trade, and the 
empirical reality of global protectionism by devising exceptions to address domestic 
concerns. In support of safeguard mechanisms some authors contend that an economy 
like China may create stress vis-ä-vis other trading partners82. Or as one leading scholar 
77 On Safeguards, see BRONCKERS, M., Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilateral Trade Relations, 
The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1985. See also JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 175ff and p. 241 for 
Balance-of-Payments exceptions. See in this regard GATT Article XXVIII, as the main provision to free 
oneself from tariff bindings. See GATT Article XIX, the escape clause, also at GATT Analytical Index, p. 
515-539, and GATT Article XII, for restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments, also at GATT 
Analytical Index, l. c., supra note 72, p. 355-391. General exceptions can be found in GATT Article XX, 
GATT Analytical Index, o. c., supra note 65, p. 561-597. On the recent controversy whether unilateral 
measures to protect life and health in the context of sustainable development should be considered by 
Article XX, see e. g. DE WAART, P., "Quality of Life at the Mercy of WTO Panels: GATT's Article XX 
an Empty Shell? ", in WEISS, et al., o. c., supra note 31, p. 108-131. 
78 On the achievements of this trade negotiations round, see e. g. BELLO, J. and FOOTER, M., 
"Symposium: Uruguay Round - GATT/WTO", 29 Intl Law., Summer 1995, p. 335-343 (which gives a 
good chronology of events and sums up the American perspective). See also LEEBRON, D., "An 
Overview of the Uruguay Round Results", 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L., 1995, p. 11-35. A more elaborate 
study is from KENNEDY, K., "The GATT-WTO System at Fifty", 16 Wisconsin Int'l L. J., Summer 1998, 
421-528. 
See TREBILCOCK, HOWSE, o. c., supra note 61, p. 172-173 on the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Safeguards. Article 5 states that safeguard measures apply to a product regardless the country of origin. 
80 JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 175. 
81 See TRUBEK, D., "Protectionism and Development: Time for a New Dialogue? ", 25 N. Y. U. J. Intl L. & 
Pol., p. 345-366, at p. 353. For some of the objections against free trade, see also supra note 75. 
82 See, e. g., CAI, W., "China's GATT Membership: Selected Legal and Political Issues", 26 J. World 
Trade, n°1,1992, p. 44 (who contends that China's potential competitiveness in international markets and 
its volume of low-cost labour-intensive products might constitute a threat to developed domestic 
industries). 
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comments, that, by the very different nature that exists between certain domestic 
economic systems, parties may interpret certain behaviour as unfair. GATT safeguards 
might therefore serve as a buffer zone between opposite economic systems83. The risk of 
damage to liberal trade in employing these safeguards, however, always remains 
immanent. In light of China's and other transition economies' WTO accession, the WTO 
should nonetheless put more effort in becoming an interface for all trading nations; and 
safeguards may be helpful in this regard. This will be examined more closely in 
subsequent Chapters. 
B. Communist Trade Legacy 
The Soviet Union and the communist countries of Europe were minor participants in 
world trade and finance84. Before the collapse of communism none of these states had 
attracted significant amounts of foreign direct investment. The most significant form of 
economic interaction with the international economy was borrowing. Several Eastern 
European countries encountered severe balance of payments difficulties beginning in the 
late 1970s. Both Poland and Romania were forced to ask for a rescheduling of their 
external convertible currency debt in 1981. Western banks, under the influence of the 
Reagan administration, withdrew from further lending to Eastern Europe. Since the early 
1990s, these countries have regained access to private international capital markets only 
gradually85. 
83 See JACKSON, o. c., supra note 36,1997, p. 319ff. The urgency to improve GATT rules for trade 
between the nonmarket economies and other Contracting Parties was already noted in 1986 by 
PATTERSON, E., "Improving GATT Rules for Nonmarket Economies", 20 J. World Trade L., n° 2, 
March-April 1986, p. 185-205. However, PATTERSON still emphasises one-way compliance with 
GATT/WTO standards, whereas it may be necessary for the WTO to adapt itself also to the accession of 
nonmarket economies. 
84 International trade in these countries was limited and usually confined to other members of the Council 
of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). On the history of the CMEA, the organisational structure, 
institutional principles, and the emergence of awareness of the need to reform the system, see SCHRENK, 
M., "The CMEA System of Trade and Payments: Initial Conditions for Institutional Change", in 
HILLMAN, A. and MILANOVIC, B. (Eds. ), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe - Domestic 
Restructuring and Foreign Trade, World Bank, Washington DC, 1992, p. 243-262. 
85 See LARDY, N., China in the World Economy, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 
1994, p. 5. On international trade and nonmarket economies, see generally KOSTECKI, M., East-West 
Trade and the GATT System, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979 and KOSTECKI, M., State Trading in 
International Markets: Theory and Practice of Industrialised and Developing Countries, New York, St. 
Martin's Press, 1982. 
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The largest of these economies, the Soviet Union, had no relations with the IMF, the 
World Bank or GATT, even though it had been a participant in the Bretton Woods 
conference86. Poland and Czechoslovakia were founding members of the Fund and the 
Bank in 1946. But this happened shortly before they became centrally planned 
economies. The former country withdrew in 1950 and the latter was expelled in 1955. In 
1972 Romania was the first communist country to become a member of the IMF and the 
Bank. Hungary and Poland followed respectively in May 1982 and May 1986. However, 
Romania discontinued all borrowing from the Bank after 1983 and the World Bank never 
approved any loans for Poland prior to the collapse of the Communist regime87. 
The only significant borrower of IMF and World Bank was Hungary with two stand-by 
loans of almost a billion dollar from latter institution by 1984. Together with 700 million 
dollar co-financing from commercial banks, Hungary could stave off a formal debt 
rescheduling at that time. Later in the decade Hungary scaled back it's borrowing. At the 
end of the fiscal year in June 1989 the combined cumulative borrowing of Romania and 
Hungary was a little more than two percent of the Bank's outstanding loans88. 
The participation of these countries in the GATT was slightly more complex. 
Czechoslovakia, as a founding member of GATT in 1948, participated unobtrusively. 
Poland, Hungary and Romania became contracting parties in 1967,1973 and 1971 
respectively. Yugoslavia became GATT observer in 1962 and a full member in 196689. 
Poland's accession was unusual since it was based not on reciprocal tariff reductions, but 
rather a promise to increase imports from other Western market economies by seven 
percent per year. Poland's economic reform had not yet begun and was the first traditional 
centrally planned economy ever to join the GATT. Romania's entry was conditional on 
its use of planning to ensure that imports from market economies grew at least as fast as 
total imports during its then-current five-year plan. Hungary's accession came after it had 
launched its reform, the so-called "new economic mechanism". Although all three of 
96 VAN DORMAEL, ox., supra note 33, p. 169ff and 191ff about Russia at the Bretton Woods conference. 
See also JACOBSON, H. and OKSENBERG, M., China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank and 
GATT: Towards a Global Economic Order, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1990, p. 26-27. 
87 See LARDY, o. c., supra note 85, p. 6. JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 86, p. 26-27. 
88 LARDY, o. c., supra note 85, p. 6. 
89 It should be noted that at the moment of writing WTO membership of the Former Yugoslav Republic is 
still under consideration since the end of the civil war in the region. 
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them participated in the GATT, the nature of their trade regimes made it very difficult, if 
not impossible, to implement the basic principles of the GATT: reciprocity and non- 
discrimination. Therefore their participation was severely constrained90. The examples of 
these nonmarket economies91 acceding to GATT showed, however, that tariff cuts were 
meaningless instruments of trade control in such countries at the time. Commitments 
other than tariff cuts are therefore necessary to achieve an acceptable level of imports 
from WTO members92. 
China's role in the world economy has already far surpassed that played by Russia and 
(post-)communist states. Prior to the late 1970s, China was not a borrower either in 
international commercial markets or from international financial organisations such as the 
World Bank93. However by the early 1990s China's role in the international economy had 
been totally transformed94. In both 1992 and 1993 it was the single largest borrower from 
the World Bank and sold large quantities of bonds on international credit markets, and 
China was already attracting substantial inflows of foreign direct investment since the 
1980s9s. In Chapter Two China's relationship with IMF and World Bank, as well as its 
original membership of GATT is discussed in greater detail. 
90 LARDY, o. a., supra note 85, p. 7. 91 For a more detailed account, see the works of KOSTECKI, l. c., supra note 85. The principal documents 
can be found in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD). Yugoslavia 8 BISD, 17,18, 
64ff; 9 BISD, 56ff; 10 BISD, 61ff; I1 BISD, 52,79,50ff; 14 BISD, 15,16,49ff; 15 BISD, 53ff, 63. Poland 
8 BISD, 12,61; 11 BISD, 72ff; 12 BISD, 62ff; 13 BISD, 33ff; 14 BISD, 46ff; 17 BISD, 96ff; 18 BISD, 
188ff, 201ff, 19 BISD, 109ff; 20 BISD, 209; 21 BISD, 112; 22 BISD, 63ff; 24 BISD, 139ff. Romania 18 
BISD, 5ff, 23,94ff; 20 BISD, 217ff; 24 BISD, 149ff; 27 BISD, 166ff; 30 BISD, 194ff. Hungary 20 BISD, 
3,17,34ff; 22 BISD, 54ff; 24 BISD, 4; 25 BISD, 155ff; 27 BISD, 156ff, 29 BISD, 129ff; 31 BISD, 156ff. 
See on the accession of these countries and their parallels with China: FENG, Y., "China's Membership of 
GATT: A Practical Proposal", 22 J. World Trade L., n°6,1988, p. 60-62 and LI, C., "Resumption of 
China's GATT Membership", 21 J. World Trade L., n°4,1987, p. 34ff. 
92 PATTERSON, G., "The GATT: Categories, Problems and Procedures of Membership", Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev., 1992, p. 7-17, at p. 11. He notes that the Polish and Romanian accession formulae proved to have 
many weaknesses. JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. a., supra note 86, p. 27-28 also note the disappointment 
in trade performance of these countries. Imports did not increase as expected, but neither did their exports 
increase greatly. See also KOSTECKI, East-West Trade, l. c., supra note 85 (noting that the removal of 
trade barriers in these accession protocols were little and that as a result no leverage existed for these 
countries to force market access to the West). 
93 LARDY, o. a., supra note 85, p. 1. See also JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 86, p. 27-28 
(noting that these countries received relatively favourable treatment in World Bank and IMF, and also that 
they were not always diligent in fulfilling obligations). 
94 LARDY, o. c., supra note 85, p. 2. 
95 Ibidem, p. 3. 
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C. WTO Membership for Transition Economies 
It is advocated here that WTO membership advances the integration of countries in 
transition in the global economy and ends the isolation of these countries from the 
economies of their historical enemies. The integration of transition economies in the 
WTO represents nonetheless challenges, but one of the more complex issues is the 
relationship between the WTO system of multilateral rules and the domestic regulatory 
and economic systems of its members96. It is true that transition economies have started 
profound domestic economic and legal reform modelled on the, all be it illusive 
principles, of "free market economy" and "rule of law". Governments differ widely in 
the practical application of these principles97. This is even true for different governments 
in Western economies, but it is especially true also for those governments who previously 
adhered to a centrally planned economy. There are e. g. fundamental differences regarding 
the extent of government intervention in markets and the kinds of goods to be provided 
by state-controlled enterprises, as well as their governance. These differences may be 
rooted in ideologies, or may be related to the interests of the powers that determine 
economic policies or just reflect the preferences of society at large. 
Ideally the integration of transition economies into international organisations should be 
as reciprocal and beneficial for all member countries, leading to a more peaceful, stable 
and equitable world98. But what would a successful process of engagement involve? 
What standards should be met? And what impact will the integration process have on the 
neo-liberal economic and legal order that these institutions serve? Of course a fruitful 
interaction depends on the immediate resolution of contentious issues, regular contact, an 
effective network for transmission of information, and institutionalised relationship, 
which must survive political reversals of leaders and administrators, and of course 
nothing should disrupt the international organisation". In what follows I will concentrate 
on the domestic economic and legal reforms that transition economies have generally 
undertaken to integrate their economies. I will also try to answer what standards 
% See VAN DUCK, P. and FABER, G. (Eds. ), Challenges to the New World Trade Organisation, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law, 1996. 
" See generally ALBERT, M., Capitalism vs Capitalism, New York, Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993. 
98 JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. a., supra note 86, p. 8. 
99 Ibidem, p. 57-58. 
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transition countries have to live up to, as part of their engagement. Although these 
standards and principles are most illusive indeed, a thin consensus on these principles 
exists. However, there are no clear graduation criteria by which the transition from 
centrally planned economy to a full-fledged market economy is considered to come to 
completion. Instead economists only depend on a long list of preconditions, which they 
demand to be in place. The clear graduation from the state trading or nonmarket economy 
label is important, however, because the practice of using state-trading methodologies in 
safeguard and antidumping legislation depends on it. In the absence of such clear criteria 
by which these countries can demonstrate their graduation, the risk exists that WTO 
members will continue these methodologies unnecessarily. 
Market Economy 
Countries of transition seem to have accepted that the creation of a market economy is the 
best way to improve their economic performances. And although there is no agreement 
among economists as to how this market economy should look like and how to achieve it, 
because e. g. the initial economic conditions in these countries may be different, it should 
be acknowledged that there are also clear similarities' 00 Therefore a loose consensus 
exists as to what the ingredients of a market economy should be and for the transition to 
be successfullol. In the next paragraphs, I will proceed discussing this cocktail of 
ingredients, firstly by focussing on the different types of market economy and the 
difficulty in finding an economic interface. Secondly, I will discuss the methods and 
10° See FISCHER, S. and GELB, A., "Issues in Socialist Economy Reform", in MARER, P. and 
ZECCHINI, S. (Eds. ), The Transition to a Market Economy, OECD, Paris, 1991, p. 184-201. '0' In this respect the "Washington consensus" is a term often used to refer to the dominant paradigm in 
development thinking among the three Bretton Woods institutions. This development paradigm has 
changed profoundly over the last decades, since Law and Development was first articulated in the 1960s. 
At that time the emphasis was placed on import substitution industrialisation, state trading and central 
planning. Nowadays the "Washington consensus" promotes markets as allocative institutions, favours 
privatisation and promotes closer linkages to the global economy. See WAELBROECK, J., "Half a Century 
of Development Economics", 12 World Bank Econ. Rev., 1998, n° 2, p. 323-52; TRUBEK, D., "Law and 
Development: `Then and Now', Am. Soc. Intl L. Proceedings, 90th Ann. Meeting, 1996, at p. 223-224; see 
also ROSTOW, W., The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 3`d ed, 1990, at p. 4-16. More recently the Washington consensus as coined by 
Williamson has triggered a debate of its own. See BURKI, S. and PERRY, G., "Beyond the Washington 
Consensus: Institutions Matter", World Bank, Washington DC, 1998; STIGLITZ, J., "More Instruments 
and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus", The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture, 
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therapies of restructuring former centrally planned economies. Finally, I will assess the 
impact of the economic engagement of these countries on free trade liberalisation. 
A. Different Types of Market Economy 
Most of the countries of Eastern Europe, having attempted various reforms, and having 
failed102, have set their sights on a transition from command socialist economies to 
genuine market economies after the Western pattern 103. A market involves the exchange 
of goods and services in a public way. A market entails such exchanges on the basis of 
economic freedom that both parties enjoy in the transaction. It simply means that both 
parties can and do decide whether or not to give away what she or he has in exchange for 
what the other party offers, only on the economic merits each perceives. If one or both 
parties think otherwise, the deal is off. 
Schematically there are three "market models" such as the social market economies of 
Western Europe, the consumer-directed market economy of the US, and the Japanese 
administratively-guided market economy. Although there are vast differences among 
countries in Western-Europe, the social market economy is characterised not only by its 
commitment to the predominance of market forces, but also to the responsibility of the 
state for sound monetary and fiscal policies, for efficient infrastructure, the environment, 
adequate health care, education and housing to help the unemployed and the poor. The 
Helsinki, Finland, January 7,1998; and WILLIAMSON, J., "What Should the Bank Think about the 
Washington Consensus? " at www. iie. com/TESTMONY/Bankwc. htm (last visited 21 January 2001). 
102 See, e. g., KAMINSKI, B., "The Legacy of Communism", in East-Central European Economies in 
Transition, Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, Study Papers, Washington DC, 1994, 
p. 9-24, at p. 14 (noting that during the last few years before the collapse of communism, the Hungarian 
and Polish authorities introduced changes effectively overhauling some important components of the 
central planning system and indicating their willingness to move to a market economy). 
103 GABRISCH, H. and LASKI, K., "Transition from Command to Market Economies", in HAVLIK, P. 
(Ed. ), Dismantling the Command Economy in Eastern Europe, The Vienna Institute for Comparative 
Economic Studies Yearbook III, Oxford, Westview, 1991, p. 11-29, at p. 15. 
104 See generally FRIEDMAN, M., Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
See also BUCHANAN, J., "General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics", in BUCHANAN, J. 
(Ed. ), What Should Economists Do?, Indianapolis, Liberty Press, 1979, p. 81-91 (who notes that the most 
important central principle in economics, is the principle of spontaneous order. It is the idea that individuals 
seeking their own gain in a system of private ownership and free markets bring about mutually beneficial 
exchanges, and that competitively determined prices co-ordinate economic decisions without central 
planning). 
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basic idea is a humane capitalism sustained by social democratic values, but not to 
interfere with market forces as to lose too many efficiency gains'05. 
The US model thrives on a vigorous entrepreneurial spirit and the mobility of the factors 
of production is high. The efficiency of the market is praised and government 
interference widely criticised. Corporations often think short-term, and regulation and 
deregulation by the government target the consumer as the beneficiary. There generally is 
an underprovision of social investment. A large underclass, with no stake in the 
prevailing social and economic order, has emerged and is being perpetuated106. 
In Japan, another blend of features exists, rooted in intense domestic competition for 
greater market shares rather than for short-term profits. Long-term thinking and 
continuous improvements in efficiency, productivity and cost-competitiveness are 
counted among the results. Domestic markets have been protected from foreign 
competition until firms in an industry have matured and become competitive 
internationally. Japan has allowed the rate of growth of consumption to lag behind its rate 
of growth of production 107 . 
Whatever interpretation of market economy former centrally planned economies may 
follow, the assimilation of their economies into the world economy crucially depends on 
a radical change of their previous systems into a market system. A third road, in between 
plan and market, a `socialist market economy'108, seems unrealistic to some observers 
109 
. 
However, on their way to a non-socialist economy, a shorter or longer transitional period 
105 See MARER, P., "Models of Successful Market Economies", in MARER and ZECCHINI, o. c., supra 
note 100, p. 108-113, at p. 108. 
1°6lbidem, p. 109. 
107 Ibidem, p. 110. 
108 This term is specifically relevant for China. On the notion of a `socialist market economy', see GAO, S. 
and CHI, F., Theory and Reality of Transition to a Market Economy, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 
1996, p. 19 (noting that China's socialist market economy is an operating system, which integrates both 
planning and the market, with the market mechanism mainly playing a regulatory role in micro-economic 
sectors. Planned regulation must continue to play its role in the macroeconomic sphere). 
109 See DORN, J., "China's Future: Market Socialism or Market Taoism", in DORN, J. (Ed. ), China in the 
New Millennium: Market Reforms and Social Development, CATO, Washington DC, 1998, p. 101-117, at 
p. 101 (who notes that building a socialist market economy is a grand illusion. The market and its 
supporting institutions, notably private property and the rule of law, cannot be grafted onto socialism. 
Markets are based on voluntary exchange. Socialism, however, destroys the spontaneous nature of markets 
and substitutes government control for individual responsibility. Market socialism, even with Chinese 
characteristics, is an unnatural and artificial system and therefore destined to fail like the Yugoslav 
experiment. In citing Alexander Tsypko p. 103, the author notes that there is no third way between modern 
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of cohabitation of state enterprises and market mechanisms is inevitable110. But these 
countries can still retain distinctive features in the structure and operation of their 
economic systems, while strengthening their economic ties with the West by interacting 
more closely through trade, or labour and capital movements, or technology transfers. " 
In China the 14th Party Congress' 12 clearly defined the country's reform objective as 
being the establishment of a `socialist market economy'. The market is established as the 
main instrument for resource allocation, as is enshrined in the Constitution113. However, 
what constitutes a socialist market economy is a much-debated subject. It seems to be 
generally agreed that a socialist market economy, while allowing market forces to play 
the major role in market allocation"4, additionally incorporates two fundamental socialist 
principles'". First, public ownership would be the mainstay in the economy, 
supplemented by private ownershipl1b. Second, it would adopt measures to prevent 
`unfair' income distribution, and emphasise the elimination of remaining poverty"7. 
Apparently China's economic approach points out some parallels with the modem market 
economy in France. However, France's large public sector and state planning have 
always operated in the context of a competitive private sector. State enterprises have been 
civilisation and socialism as it is. The five wasted years of perestroika have shown that the market cannot 
be combined with public ownership of the means of production). 10 GAO and CHI, o. c., supra note 108, p. 15-18. 111 See ZECCHINI, S., "Assimilating Central and Eastern Europe into the World Economy", in MARER 
and ZECCHINI, o. c., supra note 100, p. 27-37, at p. 27. 
112 The 13`s Congress in 1987 characterised the new economic system as one in which the state regulates 
the market, and the market guides the enterprises, but it did not indicate whether planning or market should 
be the main method of resource allocation. See also HARROLD, P. and LALL, R., "China: Reform and 
Development in 1992-93", World Bank, Washington DC, 1993, p. 30. 113 The constitutional amendment of 29 March 1993 replaced the text "Planned economy under public 
ownership" with the words "socialist market economy". 
114 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 18 (who define market socialism as a market economy 
with prevailing collective (mostly state) ownership of the means of production but without any form of 
directive planning). 
115 GAO and CHI, o. c., supra note 108, p. 18 (noting that the market economy does not only exist under the 
capitalist system where it plays its due role in economic regulation, but also exists and plays the same role 
under socialism. Therefore the socialist market economy is in fact a market economy operating under 
socialist conditions). 
116 Ibidem, p. 18 (noting that the socialist economy is characterised by the public-owned economy and is 
better equipped than capitalism to amass quite a large proportion of GNP under state control. On page 19- 
20 they continue to say that the question what a socialist market economy in fact means, is a simple one, 
but that the reality is quite the opposite. So to a certain extent, the Chinese themselves seem not to know 
what it should mean in practice). 
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expected to be competitive, and have always operated under contractual relations with the 
state118. Second, the French planning system has been neither complete nor compulsory, 
but rather has been principally a process within which the public and private sectors have 
co-ordinated their expectations and plans. Pervasive state interventionism was rejected 
from the beginning, but important is the process of building a social consensus, the 
attempt to develop a common view among civil servants, business leaders and labour 
groups' 19. Parallels probably also exist between China and the economies of Japan and 
South Korea where managed trade plays a large role in the development strategy. 
The main question remains, whether the Chinese market approach represents a practical 
and functional market economy that can survive WTO membership'20. It provides an 
underlying philosophy for the design of economic reform, but can it be considered a 
coherent whole rather than just a collection of efficiency-enhancing measures? In 
understanding the market in China, the parties to the exchange do not always have an 
adequate sense of economic freedom, or due respect for the economic freedom of the 
other party. It is going to take time for the basic rules of a free market to develop and 
mature in China, but the awareness is certainly building up121. In Chapter Two the 
Chinese efforts in this regard are studied in greater detail. 
It is clear that in obtaining a Western-type market economy, different scenarios exist. In 
any event, China and the other transition economies in their engagement to embrace the 
free market will have to duplicate those basic features and policies that seem to account 
for much of the successes of the well-performing market economies 
122. Only practice can 
prove whether China's scenario with enterprises, mostly state-owned and instructed to act 
117 HARROLD and LALL, o. c., supra note 112, p. 30. And also GAO and CHI, o. c., supra note 108, p. 19 
(agreeing and holding that the socialist market economy means a combination of social fairness and market 
efficiency). 
118 HELLIWELL, J., "Creating Market Economies in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons from the West", 
in MARER and ZECCHINI, o. c., supra note 100, p. 115-131, at p. 119. 
1" Ibidem, p. 119-120. 
120 HOOGMARTENS, J., "Can China's Socialist Market Survive WTO Accession? Politics, Market 
Economy and Rule of Law", VII L. & Bus. Rev. Am, Winter-Spring 2001, p. 37-83. 
121 See further ZHOU, D., "A True Market Economy for China", in DORN, o. c., supra note 109, p. 95-100, 
at p. 98. 
122 See ZECCHINI, o. c., supra note 111, p. 27. Those features comprise according to MARER, o. c., supra 
note 105, p. 111-13, the rule of law; private ownership; competition and trade; sound currency; savings, 
taxation, financial intermediation; infrastructure and the environment; political and economic freedom to 
seek personal fulfilment. 
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in a market-conforming manner next to private entrepreneurship, would represent a 
viable solution 123. To some the results of such cohabitation may sound uncertain, even if 
it is assumed that the Chinese government shows enough perseverance in creating a 
functioning market mechanism. 
B. Different Types of Therapy 
The experience of transition economies indicates that to ensure a successful transition 
from a centrally planned to a market economy, governments must take several steps. 
These steps are discussed here in a seemingly logical order, but as will be noticed further 
on, the right sequence and timeframe for these steps to be implemented is vigorously 
debated among economists. 
Price liberalisation provides consumers and businesses with the signals and incentives 
necessary to create markets. However, to derive full benefits from markets, governments 
have to dismantle barriers to entry for would-be entrepreneurs, so as to ensure a supply- 
side response to market signals, for as lower barriers to entry foster competition, and 
force loss-making enterprises to restructure 124. Hence foreign trade must be liberalised to 
provide competition for producers in these sectors. Freer trade requires, that importers be 
able to freely convert domestic currency to foreign currencies, so as to make purchases. 
Consequently current account convertibility must succeed 
125. To keep exchange rates 
123 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 18. And also GAO and CHI, o. c., supra note 108, p. 19 
(also asking the question whether socialism can coexist with the market economy. Viewed in a traditional 
way, socialism is incompatible with the market economy. Socialism can be regarded as a social system, a 
policy, or a moral. Nevertheless, the final objective is to attain social fairness combined with market 
efficiency). 
124 See, e. g., FISCHER and GELB, o. c., supra note 100, p. 184-201, at p. 190-191. 125 MARER, P., "Pitfalls in Transferring Market-Economy Experiences to the European Economies in 
Transition", in MARER and ZECCHINI, o. c., supra note 100, p. 38-55, at p. 52-53; and DORNBUSCH, 
R., "Strategies and Priorities for Reform", in ibidem, p. 169-183, at p. 177-178. Particular questions as to 
when to introduce, what type of convertibility, under which kind of exchange rate regime, and at what 
exchange rate level appear here. Some advocate a pegged exchange rate as an anchor for expectations and 
thus in helping to control inflation. Among those advocates there are differences of judgement about how 
firmly such a rate should be defended and for how long. If no credible defence of a pegged rate is possible, 
a flexible rate (temporary or permanent) may be more appropriate. Costs of such defence can be high in 
terms of lost reserves, import controls etc. Others believe a floating rate is the best. Regarding the type of 
convertibility, some advocate that it should be guaranteed only for some, such as only on transactions by 
enterprises, or all current account transactions. Others advocate full convertibility because the difference 
between current and capital transactions is impractical. As to timing some believe some preconditions must 
be in place, such as freeing of most prices, macroeconomic stabilisation and a strong balance of payments 
position. Concerning the exchange rate level, some are concerned about excessive initial depreciation. On 
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stable, when inflation is high, is impossible. Especially capital markets work less well 
under high inflation. Therefore inflation should be controlled 126. Another step, 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises127, is more complicated and in China heavily 
debated. In privatisation, the formal and informal property rights have to be transferred 
from one set of institutions or people, to others, and thus entail substantial transfers of 
wealth. Most economic assets that remain in state hands are found to be used less 
efficiently than those under private ownership128. Instead of outright privatisation, it may 
be less controversial to speak about enterprise restructuring. Restructuring may range 
from a simple cleanup of the balance sheet, to substantial closures, and layoffs, replacing 
management and possibly privatisation, or bankruptcy 129. The Chinese enterprise 
restructuring as an important step to adapt its economy to the standards of WTO 
membership is discussed in Chapter Two. 
The breakdown of the old economy of central planning, and the lack of a new consistent 
system of market co-ordination, often compounds to a confused situation in transition 
countries. Usually the transition results in a dysfunctional mixture of bureaucratic and 
market principles130 leading to losses in production and inflationary pressures. The 
stabilisation programmes accompanying the steps and targets indicated in the previous 
paragraph comprise elements such as the hardening of the budget constraints131 on the 
firms. That will mean that over a longer run the enterprises may only spend what they can 
earn, and that they bear full financial responsibility for their decisions. State enterprises in 
a command economy are characterised by a tendency towards expansion and lack of cost- 
and profitability consciousness. This is caused by the `soft budget constraint', Janos 
Kornai's term to denote the expectation of enterprises to be supported by the state in case 
the choice and function of exchange rate regimes, see also DRABEK, Z. and BRADA, J., "Exchange Rate 
Regimes and the Stability of Trade Policy in Transition Economies", WTO, July 1998. 
126 On inflation and macroeconomic imbalances, see e. g. MARER, o. c., supra note 125, p. 41-42. 
127 See, e. g., DORNBUSCH, o. c., supra note 125, p. 176-77. 
128 CRANE, K., "The Costs and Benefits of Transition", in East-Central European Economies in 
Transition, Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, Study Papers, Washington DC, 1994, 
25-48, at p. 27. 
U9 MARER, supra note 125, p. 44. 
"o NOLAN, P., "The Chinese Puzzle", in FAN, Q. and NOLAN, P. (Eds), China's Economic Reforms - 
The Costs and Benefits oflncrementalism, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 1-20. 
131 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 19. 
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of economic difficulties, which results in a lack of financial discipline 132. However, some 
economists question whether through appropriate budgetary and monetary policies the 
behaviour of state-owned enterprises can be changed in the desired direction while they 
still constitute a majority of all enterprises 133. 
Reducing deficit spending134 plays a weighty part as well in stabilisation programmes. 
These budget deficits should be financed via the money market, but never by 
unrestrained, free-of-interest borrowing from the central bank. Because command 
economies subsidise many consumer goods, basic inputs (such as coal), services and 
tariffs, a balanced budget requires the cutting of these excessive expenditures. Cuts of 
subsidies are necessary to make the price structure more transparent and more dependent 
on costs of production. Expenditures, however, are difficult to control as long as a large 
state sector exists, because of the soft budget constraint and the social benefits, such as 
housing and education provided by the state sector. To modernise the earning side of the 
budget, a value added tax as well as income tax system is necessary t35. An increased tax 
burden, however, could slow down the badly needed expansion of private firms136 
It is also necessary to control the demand of private households'. Voluntary savings 
may reduce excess purchasing power. These surplus funds must be taken out of 
circulation and invested in privatisation such as participation in state enterprises or in the 
sale of bonds138. The fight against inflation also requires control over current incomes, 
132 KORNAI, J., "The Soft Budget Constraint", 39 Kyklos, 1986, p. 3-30. He defines the soft budget 
constraint as including cases of soft subsidies, soft taxation, soft credit, soft prices, and more. These are the 
consequence of an overloading demand of society on the state to become a protector, responsible for 
welfare, growth and national economic interest. See also GAO, S. and SCHAFFER, M., "Financial 
Discipline in the Enterprise Sector in Transition Countries: How Does China Compare? ", in COOK, S., 
YAO, S. and ZHANG, J. (Eds. ), The Chinese Economy under Transition, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, p. 
64-86. 
13 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 20; see also FISCHER and GELB, o. c., supra note 
100, p. 185 about macro-imbalances. 
134 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 20-21; and MARER, o. c., supra note 125, p. 48 (about 
the problems of cutting expenditures and balancing the budget. Sales of state enterprises and housing 
generate nonrecurring revenue. Therefore the money should be used to reduce the government's foreign or 
domestic debt). 
"s Important in this regard is the problem of tax arrears in transition economies, which is different from 
problems concerning tax evasion. Tax arrears usually only becomes a problem if these countries try to 
harden the budget constraint. See, e. g., GAO and SCHAFFER, o. c., supra note 132, p. 80. 
'36 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 20. 
137 Ibidem, p. 21. 
138 Ibidem. 
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and keeping the rise of money wages below the increase in labour productivity, and when 
necessary, even below the increase of consumer prices 139. 
A necessary precondition for a successful stabilisation of the economy in transition is an 
effective monetary and credit policy'40. Reforms of the banking system involve the 
separation of specialised banks from the central bank. The former are expected to become 
real commercial banks and hence to act as independent profit-oriented institutions. The 
central bank's task is to adjust the money supply to the requirements of the economy, 
while at the same time to maintain price stability. This often means a restrictive monetary 
policy to end the irresponsible monetary expansion of the past. The credit policy should 
take care of the borrowers' credit standing and maintain a real positive rate of interest for 
savers. Often a reorganisation of the credit system is necessary to prevent that the new 
commercial banks will be burdened by old debts. 
Important also is the creation of better competitive conditions'41. The dismantling of the 
monopolistic structure of the state sector may help in creating a competitive environment 
in which state-owned firms would react in a market conforming manner to the lifting of 
price controls, increased interest rates and tightening of the terms of credit, new forms of 
taxation etc. The new behaviour of these enterprises is absolutely necessary to respond to 
market signals and to make decisions according to market considerations as is required by 
article XVII GATT. 
Serious consideration should also be given to an active labour market policy and social 
policy measures142. To safeguard the transitional programme socially and politically, the 
stabilisation of the economy must be accompanied by an adjusted social policy. An 
efficient system of social benefits should compensate the price rises, the housing 
1391bidem. 
140 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 21-22; MARER, o. c., supra note 125, p. 50 (about 
mobilising savings and the improvement of financial intermediation). To encourage private saving and to 
improve the efficiency of intermediation a couple of necessary reforms are necessary, such as the 
compilation of financial information in accordance with definitions and standards customary in market 
economies; a sound legal and regulatory framework to let financial markets operate; procedures must be 
established to handle current and future losses of commercial and other banks; the ownership of banks and 
the competition between them must be studied; expertise and resources to service small private business 
ventures must be found; equity markets must be nurtured to play more than a marginal role in mobilising 
and allocating savings. On financial system evolution, see also, THIESSEN, U., Aspects of Transition to 
Market Economies in Eastern Europe, Avebury, Aldershot, 1994, p. 11 7ff. 
141 GABRISCH and LASKI, o. c., supra note 103, p. 22. 
142lbidem, p. 23. 
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shortages etc., so as not to stop general consumption. Also workers' interests should be 
advanced by the protection against (unlawful) dismissal, introduction of unemployment 
insurance and genuine trade unions, by defining workers' rights in management 
participation, and by taking also consumer protection measures. Of course these social 
values will depend heavily on the type of market economy these countries' leaders wish 
to implement. But let us not forget that politically a government should enjoy society's 
full confidence. 
Although most economists agree with the several steps governments should take to 
restructure their economy, the sequencing, and especially the pace of the reforms is 
subject to more debate. '43 The determination of the proper sequence and timetable for the 
successive reform measures is one of the key issues, because shortages, inflation, deficits 
in the trade balance, the growing burden of indebtedness, liquidity bottlenecks, and many 
other types of tension, and unhealthy disequilibria, often serve as ready excuses for a 
return to centralist methods. While a gradualist approachl44 may cause less social 
tensions, a long period of moderate reform entails the danger that both reformers and the 
population will resist further reforms, as they do not always immediately improve the 
143 See generally WAPENHANS, W., "Is there a Consensus on the Scope, Sequencing and Pace of 
Transition? ", in MARER and ZECCHINI, o. c., supra note 100, p. 280-282; and BUNCE, V., "Sequencing 
of Political and Economic Reforms", in East - Central Economies in Transition, 
l. c., supra note 128, p. 
49-61. As for pace and sequencing, HELLIWELL, o. c., supra note 118, p. 128, notes that the evidence of 
transition countries is mixed, so that there is no clear message. There is much framework building to be 
done before a market economy can function well. These countries are being forced by the pace of political 
events to react almost on a day-to-day basis and thus not much freedom to plan the sequencing of reforms. 
Whatever the chosen sequence and speed of reforms, the improvements in standards of living will in most 
cases come about slowly and the gains unevenly distributed. This suggests that heavy investment in 
political stability and consensus should have a high priority, coupled with finding ways to keep 
expectations realistic. DORNBUSCH, o. a., supra note 125, p. 170-71 notes that transition needs to be 
accomplished extremely fast because the ice is melting, the distance to go is far, and the task is 
overwhelming. Countries that drag their feet risk falling into deep poverty, where even the unsatisfactory 
living standards of the past decade can no longer be maintained because the organisation of the economy 
has vanished. Gradualism may seem a low risk strategy in that day-to-day events seem under control. But 
this appeal is only superficial, because it seems to take away the harshness of adjustment, whereas it is only 
appropriate if going slowly promises better results at a lower cost. See also FISCHER and GELB, o. c., 
supra note 100, p. 194ff; and TARDOS, M., "Sequencing the Reform", p. 202-207. GANG, F., 
"Development of the Nonstate Sector and Reform of State Enterprises in China", in DORN, o. c., supra 
note 109, p. 75-85, at p. 75 (noting that the high cost for maintaining the inefficient state enterprises may be 
justified by the opportunity costs of social unrest and reduction of GDP caused by radical changes). 
44 The so-called gradual or incremental approach to reform refers to the way of institutional transition in 
which the first step toward the market economy is not restructuring the existing old economic sectors, but 
developing the new system outside the old ones through economic growth. See GANG, o. c., supra note 
143, p. 75. 
44 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter One 
individual situation of the people. The Chinese experience is often called a successful 
case of gradualism145 A compact and radical reform or shock therapy146 is not free from 
dangers either. Moreover such a therapy may become uncontrollable, unless it is very 
skilfully managed by an able political leadership 147. It imposes not only a heavy burden 
on the population in terms of a sudden reduction of real wages and consumption, but a 
severely restrictive fiscal and monetary policy may set off a chain of enterprise 
bankruptcies, while only a small proportion of the resources thus set free, such as capital, 
material inputs and labour, can be absorbed into other sectors of the economy. Secondary 
effects, such as a decline in demand for goods produced by the efficient sectors, may 
exacerbate recessive tendencies and lead to a drastic increase in unemployment 148. Given 
the primary comparative advantage of wage costs in transition economies, the question 
145 See GAO and CHI, o. c., supra note 108, p. 7 (defending gradual reform as a successful experience for 
China, as a practice that is in line with the actual conditions of the country. The Chinese advocate that the 
best use of the situation is, to gradually expand in line with the given conditions and possibilities. On page 
10 the authors stress that gradual reforms are built on public awareness, involving every member of the 
social community, and that reform must win the understanding of people from all walks of life. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese authors warn that gradualism may cause contradictions within an economic 
system and lead to disorder in economic performance. They continue to explain why Chinese gradualism is 
more successful than trials of gradual reform in other transition economies, such as Hungary in 1968). See 
also FUKASAKU, K. and SOLIGNAC LECOMTE, H., "Economic Transition and Trade Policy Reform: 
Lessons from China", in BOUIN, 0., CORICELLI, F. and LEMOINE, F., Different Paths to a Market 
Economy - China and the European Economies in Transition, OECD, Paris, 1998, p. 63-86, at p. 63 
(noting, however, that Chinese gradualism stems from political constraints on policy makers under a 
communist regime, rather than from a clear economic policy option). This will be discussed further in 
Chapter Two. See also, e. g., CHEN, K., JEFFERSON, G. and SINGH, I., "Are There Lessons from China's 
Economic Policies? ", in HILLMAN, A. and MILANOVIC, B. (Eds. ), The Transition from Socialism in 
Eastern Europe - Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade, World Bank, Washington DC, 1992, p. 105- 
129; SALVINI, G., "Private Sector and Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union and China", in 
FRATESCHI, C. and SALVINI, G. (Eds. ), A Comparative Analysis of Economic Reforms in Central and 
East Europe, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1992, p. 127-142; and HU, X., "What Can Be Learned from China's 
Transition", in Problems in China's Transitional Economy - Property Rights and Transitional Models, EAI 
Occasional Paper, n° 6, Singapore, University Press, p. 39-69. 
146 In general, a shock therapy consists of almost simultaneously or in rapid succession implemented price 
liberalisation, trade liberalisation, adoption of non-inflationary macroeconomic policies and legalisation of 
the private economic activity and privatisation. 
147 But a sceptical DORNBUSCH, o. c., supra note 125, p. 171, notes that the administrative capacity for 
successful gradual reform simply does not exist either. Nothing has changed with new and highly 
committed talented personnel joining the ranks, because they too will be unable to mastermind an 
economy-wide soft landing. 
148 On unemployment, see, e. g., THIESSEN, o. c., supra note 140, chapter 2, p. 89ff. The author on page 
108 notes that the primary comparative advantage of transition economies may be given by wage costs. 
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remains whether these economies will come to an unemployment rate compatible with 
society's values 149 . 
Despite some difficulties China has had considerable success in expanding the role of the 
market for goods. Markets for factors of production, such as land, labour and capital, 
have developed more slowly'50. In Chapter Two, the Chinese economy, and especially 
the country's enterprise restructuring process, will be discussed against the background of 
article XVII GATT. 
C. Towards Integration in the World Economy 
Once transition economies have chosen the kind of market-economy they wish to pursue, 
the price liberalisation inside the country should sooner or later be linked with foreign 
trade liberalisation'51, to adjust the internal price and output structure to the world market 
conditions. Liberalisation is normally accompanied by a full convertibility of the 
currency, the abandonment of the central foreign exchange control, the foreign trade 
monopoly and the introduction of appropriate tariff policies. Governments may opt to 
assist some exporting industries and to protect some sectors, so as not to expose the 
economy to the pressures of world competition all too sudden152. 
A central problem to be mastered in the search for new ways towards integration in the 
world economy and world trade is the expansion of exports'53. The expansion of exports 
is the only factor in the long run, which determines the import prospects of any 
economy'54. The chances for a successful restructuring of the economy, improving 
efficiency, and raising living standards, are not very encouraging if exports cannot be 
149 THIESSEN, o. c., supra note 140, p. 108. See also HUSSAIN, A. and ZHUANG, J., "Impact of Reforms 
on Wage and Employment Determination in Chinese State-owned Enterprises, 1986-91", in COOK, et al, 
o. c., supra note 132, p. 87-109. 
150 LARDY, o. a., supra note 85, p. 8. 
's' CRANE, o. c., supra note 128, p. 40 (noting that the centrally planned economies suffered from the most 
complete trade protection in the world. Despite the rapid change in trade policies, trade liberalisation has 
been only partial). 
152 Ibidem (noting that transition economies continue to employ high tariffs, strict quotas, and other 
nontariff barriers to trade to protect domestic industries. These protectionist measures impose all the 
attendant associated costs on the economy). Also inappropriate exchange rate policies have led to 
protectionist pressures, as noted by DRABEK and BRADA, o. c., supra note 125, p. 9. 
53 The success of most transition economies in increasing exports to the West has been one of the most 
pleasant surprises of transition, as is noted by CRANE, o. c., supra note 128, p. 41. 
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expanded. This expansion is difficult given the outdated production structures, the lack of 
investment funds, and the old management lacking entrepreneurial acumen and 
experience. In this regard foreign direct investment is absolutely necessary, what in turn 
presupposes the removal of barriers to the entry of foreign capital. Integration in the 
world economy thus necessitates also integration into the international capital flows. 
The Bretton Woods institutions and their Western members are faced with the question 
how to support the transition economically, and also in other respects, such as technical 
assistance, training, counselling, and know-how155. It would be a mistake for Western 
countries to take the opening of the East to be nothing but an opportunity for increasing 
exports. Of course only corresponding import earnings can assure the servicing of credit 
by the West. But the West must also open its markets to imports from transition 
countries'56. The attitude of the European Community and the United States vis-a-vis 
transition economies is sometimes dangerous for further trade liberalisation, as will be 
discussed in Chapters III and IV. These Chapters will focus on the bifurcated trade policy 
instruments Western countries employ against transition economies. However, let us first 
turn to the importance of the rule of law in the transformation process of these transition 
economies. 
IV. Legal System 
Apparently the development of a market economy in countries of transition also entails 
the creation of a legal system. If we agree that some form of market economy is an 
essential underpinning of integration, integration into the WTO will also require the 
154 See, e. g., COOPER, R. and GACS, J., Trade Growth in Transition Economies, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 1997 (noting that Eastern and Central Europe are a reference to prove that exports are necessary to 
pay for imports. Good export performance is necessary for general economic progress). 
55 See generally AZIZ, A., "The Role of International Financial Institutions", in East - Central Economies 
in Transition, l. c., supra note 128, p. 191-201. See further GUITAN, M., "The International Monetary 
Fund", in MARER and ZECCHINI, o. c., supra note 100, p. 236-239 and on the role of the World Bank 
WAPENHANS, W., "The World Bank", in ibidem, p. 241-246. Finally, on the role of the West, see 
ZECCHINI, S., "Economic Reform and `Western' Assistance", in ibidem, p. 256-269; and ASSAF, G., 
"Technical Assistance toward Restructuring and Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe", in East - 
Central Economies in Transition, Lc., supra note 128, p. 239-258. 
156 DORNBUSCH, o. c., supra note 125, p. 179 (noting that if reform fails, citizens of Central and Eastern 
Europe will start migrating to the West. Free trade with these countries is hard to accept, but the prospect of 
massive, unstoppable migration should lead to second thoughts on this issue. Economic integration 
therefore should mean opening doors with a far easier flow of resources, technology, education, and 
capital). 
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adoption of the necessary legal infrastructure to support the free market economy. The 
need for legal institutions can be found in several articles of different WTO texts. The 
WTO Agreements cover a large number of provisions requiring the availability of 
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals and independent domestic review 
procedures157. Some of the covered agreements provide specific means for the 
enforcement of WTO rules by national administrative and judicial bodies 158. The general 
. 
159 principle of legal transparency, however, is reflected in Article X GATT 
The last ten years have seen an enormous investment in legal reform efforts in transition 
and developing economies to facilitate emerging markets. This often involves the 
importation of legal models from mature economies to speed up these reforms. Important 
in this respect is also the relationship between domestic and international economic law. 
It is one process to formulate the national foreign policy acceptance of international 
economic law. But this should then be followed by a process of implementation, Le. of 
policing and enforcing international economic law at the national level. And finally, what 
is needed is legal scrutiny depending on the status of national law at the international 
level and vice versa 160. In the course of these processes being formed, it is always 
necessary to remain vigilant, because the adoption of WTO texts could be window 
dressing only, and therefore misguide foreign investors. 
Whatever system a state adopts, monism or dualism, incorporation or transformation, the 
presumption in all states should exist that domestic legislation is to be interpreted in such 
161 a manner so as to avoid conflict with international law and thus WTO law. 
's' Article X GATT, Article 13 Antidumping Agreement, Article 11 Agreement on Custom Valuation, 
Article 2 (j) Agreement on Rules of Origin, Article 4 Agreement Pre-shipment Inspection, Article 23 
Subsidies Agreement, Article VI GATS, Article 41-50 and Article 59 TRIPS, and Article XX Government 
Procurement. 
158 See, e. g., Article 70.8 (a) TRIPS. 
159 See OSTRY, S., "China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue", 3 UCLA J. Intl L. & For. Af. ', 
Summer 1998, p. 1-19. 
160 QURESHI, o. c., supra note 42, p. 80. Also relevant in this regard is PETERSMANN, E., "Strengthening 
the Domestic Legal Framework of the GATT Multilateral Trade System: Possibilities and Problems of 
Making GATT Rules Effective in Domestic Legal Systems", in PETERSMANN and HILF, o. c., supra note 
55, p. 33-113. 
161 QURESHI, o. c., supra note 42, p. 85-88. On monism and dualism, see DICKE, D., "Public International 
Law a New International Economic Order", in SARCEVIC and VAN HOUTTE, o. c., supra note 55, p. 23- 
51, at p. 29f. 
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The next paragraphs will first explain the intricate relationship between the capitalist free 
market and the rule of law, to conclude with many great thinkers that markets need legal 
institutions. However, just as different attitudes exist towards the adoption of a market 
economy, also different cultural attitudes towards law exist, which need to be interfaced, 
as the Chinese example will illustrate at the very end of this Chapter. Notwithstanding 
these different attitudes to the law in different parts of the world, integration into the 
global economy will also need a certain degree of legal convergence. Therefore, 
harmonisation and standardisation of legal rules may be a solution to smoothen the 
process of change from commercial institutions in transition countries based on relational 
orientation to institutions based on formal orientation. A formal orientation allows 
businesses and businesspersons in emerging economies to enter into commercial relations 
with persons and entities outside of their own polity'62. Nonetheless the adoption of 
foreign legal models and the process of harmonisation itself are not without difficulty. 
Therefore tensions will remain between the international and domestic level. Foremost it 
should be taken into account that building a legal framework to interface the different 
trade policies cannot escape an environment that is replete with existing institutions 163. 
A. Capitalism and the Rule of Law 
With the economic failure of communism, it also became clear that the socialist legal 
system was ill prepared for the changes needed to suit an open market economy'TM. In 
"New Institutional Economics", 165 it is generally accepted that law plays a fundamental 
162 See in this regard NICHOLS, P., "A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies", 39 Va. J. Intl L., Winter 
1999, p. 229-300. 
163 Ibidem. For the meaning of institutions, see below note 165. 164 The aim of socialist law is not to define standards of conduct in the private or public sphere, and 
therefore laws need not be clear or accessible to ordinary citizens. Structural limits on governmental entities 
are considered artificial and contrived. The communist ideal is the development of a society in which 
government and law are completely unnecessary. In practice, socialist law operates according to the 
dictates of political expediency. See Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2"d rev. ed., 
1985, p. 706. For discussion of the development of the rule of law in the Soviet Union, see 
KARATASHKIN, V., "Human Rights and the Emergence of the State of the Rule of Law in the USSR", 40 
Emory L. J., 1991, p. 889ff, BERMAN, H., "Counterrevolution of Transition: A Response to Human Rights 
and the Emergence of the State of the Rule of Law in the USSR", 40 Emory L. J., 1991, p. 903ff. 
165 New Institutional Economics is built upon inter alia the ideas of both the Chicago and Virginia Schools 
of law and economics (Coase, Demsetz, Posner, Buchanan, Tullock, Krueger), the Austrian theory on 
institutions and entrepreneurship (Hayek, Menger and Kirzner), and the new economic history of Douglas 
North. These ideas are amplified in subsequent paragraphs. In short it defends the position that the 
emergence of markets and entrepreneurship is promoted by institutions, such as for the protection of 
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role in facilitating the development of markets and entrepreneurship. To this end the 
implementation, acceptance and legitimacy of a new legal system has to take place 
alongside the creation of a market economy in transition countries. 
According to neo-classical economists of the "Chicago School", a link exists between 
economic returns and the autonomy in using and operating property, because a legal 
system is the necessary complement of an open market economy. This link depends on 
legal rights, especially ownership. Therefore in neo-classical economics it is thus 
believed that institutions of formal and well-defined property rights are the precondition 
for economic prosperity and are set up to reduce transaction costs 166. Because the true 
owners have the power and incentives to stop losses and encourage profitability, true 
private property blocks the inefficiency, which is characteristic of the old socialist 
economic system 167 
Also the "Virginia School of Law and Economics" defends that the emergence of markets 
and entrepreneurship depends on the creation of formal laws and institutions for the 
protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. In their approach 
laws/legal norms of the state conceptually emerge endogenously via a public choice or 
property rights and the enforcement of contracts. It is relevant for our discussion here, that post-communist 
market building should coincide with the creation of an appropriate legal system. Sociological 
institutionalism offers perhaps the broadest definition of institutions of any of the new forms of 
institutionalism. The definition includes formal and infomal rules, symbols, cognitions, norms, and any 
other templates that organise or give meaning to the human condition. International law scholarship in 
particular has embraced two iterations of institutionalism. See, e. g., SLAUGHTER-BURLEY, A., 
"International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda", 87 Am. J. Intl L., April 1993, p. 
205-239; SETAER, J., "An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory 
and International Law", 37 Harv. Intl L. J., Winter 1996, p. 139-229; KEOHANE, R., "International 
Relations and International Law: Two Optics", 38 Harv. Int'l L. J., Spring 1997, p. 487-502; and 
SLAUGHTER, A., TULUMELLO, A., and WOOD, S., "International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A new Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship", 92 Am. J. Int'l L, July 1998, p. 367-397. For 
the most part institutionalism as used by legal scholars either borrows from other disciplines or refers to the 
judiciary and other political entities. It is not just courts and political agencies, but also the law itself, which 
are considered to be an institution. 
166 See, e. g., COASE, R., "The Nature of the Firm", 4 Economica, 1937, p. 386-405; COASE, R., "The 
Problem of Social Costs", 3 Journal of Law & Economics, 1960, p. 1-44. Transaction costs, unlike costs of 
production, are defined as those costs that are incurred in the process of exchange, such as the costs of 
searching for prices and/or trading partners, the costs of negotiation and enforcement of contracts, and the 
costs of breach. Coase argues that, in a real world with positive transaction costs, institutions, including the 
state, have important roles to play in economising on transaction costs. 
167 See, e. g.. BARZEL, Y., Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1989. 
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contractarian process 168. Property rights and contracts in a market economy should 
therefore be protected by the `protective state' 169. Other prominent economists, such as 
Williamson, emphasise the importance of different forms of private ordering 
170, of which 
relational contracting is a prime example. Williamson emphasises the importance of ex 
post monitoring of contracts, that is, how contracts are to be protected from 
`opportunism' 171. 
The intricate connection between market and legal infrastructure is also studied by 
Douglas North'72, Friedrich Hayek'73 and Max Weber, just to name a few others. North 
argues e. g. that, traditional economic history has been preoccupied with the development 
of technology, but has neglected the emergence of the legal structure that facilitates the 
exchange and the development of markets. Therefore capitalism requires a rational and 
autonomous legal system. Without secure legal rules there is no confidence to make 
investments or commitments for the future, and of course independent organisations and 
institutions are needed to give advice and guidance to the economy. 
Profit making needs predictability and calculability, according to sociologist Max 
Weber'74. This is enhanced by clear rules of property and ownership. The more property, 
capable of being privately owned, becomes alienable, the more transactions in the market 
will take place. And exchange is the key of capitalism. Rules of contract, especially the 
168 See, e. g., BUCHANAN, J. and TULLOCK, G., The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962; BUCHANAN, J., The Limits 
of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975. 
169 BUCHANAN, J., The Limits of Liberty, l. c., supra note 168, at p. 95-96. 170 Unlike the Chicago and Virginia Schools, which follow the Hobbesian legalist centralist tradition 
emphasising the importance of the state in achieving social order via its role in protecting property rights 
and enforcing contracts, Williamson emphasises `private ordering'. See WILLIAMSON, 0., The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, New York, The Free Press, 1985. See 
also RUBIN, P., "Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies", 27 Cornell Int'1 L. J., 
Winter 1994, p. 1-47 (demonstrating that private ordering and government involvement are complementary 
in growing a legal system). 
171 WILLIAMSON, o. c., supra note 170, p. 61. 
172 NORTH, D., Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
173 See HAYEK, F., Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948. 
Hayek and others provide a "spontaneous order" to explain the emergence of social institutions. In this 
spontaneous order, institutions evolve as a result of market processes and other forms of spontaneous 
individual action. They emerge in an invisible-hand manner, without any conscious will, directed toward 
their creation by the individuals concerned. 
174 See, e. g., RHEINSTEIN, M. (Ed. ), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1954. 
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freedom of contract, take a very important place. Fairness, impartiality and equality also 
become overly important, because they are necessary to manage and to calculate 
commercial risks. 
The need for the development of a legal system in transition countries can be looked at 
from the economic and social angles depicted above. However, it is not the purpose of 
this Chapter to necessarily equal the development of the legal system in these transition 
economies with the transplantation and implementation of the Western rule of law. The 
rule of law is a Western politico-philosophical concept with the objective to establish 
individual freedoms and to protect against any manifestation of arbitrary power by the 
public authorities 175. This concept has enabled certain basic conditions and principles 
such as the separation of powers, judges' independence, respect for individual 
fundamental rights and freedoms, the legality of administrative action, control of 
legislation and administration by the independent judiciary and other legal professions176. 
Weber argued that the formal, rational and logical characteristics of the Western legal 
system provided the basis for creating a steady, predictable system, which supported 
capitalism. In this light democracy and freedom are also often viewed as a proper basis 
towards marketisation177 . 
175 See, e. g., Aristotle's dictum that: "The rule of law (... ) is preferable to that of any individual. On the 
same principle, even if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians 
and ministers of the law. " Politics, ch. 3.16. In ROSS, D., Aristotle, London, Methuen, 1949. Official 
behaviour must be constrained by sound legal institutions and law is one of the few available mechanisms 
to curb arbitrary power. For further discussion of the rule of law in the US legal system, see TRIBE, L., 
"Revisiting the Rule of Law", 64N. Y. U. L. Rev., 1989, p. 726. For a discussion of the differences between 
Western concepts of law and communist ideology, see DAVID, R., "On the Concept of `Western' Law, 52 
Cin. L. Rev., 1983, p. 126. 
176 See, e. g., DIENG, A., "Role of Judges and Lawyers in Defending the Rule of Law", 21 Fordham Int'I L. 
J., December 1997, p. 550-557, at p. 551. For a discussion of the relationship between the rule of law and 
judicial decision-making, see SCALIA, A., "The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules", 56 U. Chi. L. Rev., 1989, 
p. 1175. On the relevance of the principle of separation of powers, see THORNBURGH, D., "The 
Separation of Powers: An Examplar of the Rule of Law", Wash. U. L. Q., 1990, p. 485. On the Rule of Law 
as an analytic framework for legal reform programmes, see SARKAR, o. c., supra note 51, p. 28ff. 
177 GHAI, Y., "The Rule of Law and Capitalism: Reflections on the Basic Law" in WACKS (Ed. ), Hong 
Kong and China 1997, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1993, p. 343. See also in this respect 
PREWORSKI, A., Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. See also in following Buchanan's economic 
constitutionalism QURESHI, o. c., supra note 42, p. 82 (noting that national constitutions should provide 
effective means to safeguard transnational economic rights related to an open liberal international economic 
system. These rights comprise e. g. the right to export-import, to remit and exchange currencies, the right to 
be involved in IMF and World Bank conditionalities, to repatriate profits etc). See also HILF, M. and 
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However, the rule of law may be inextricably linked with, but is more than just an 
operational and workable infrastructure that promotes foreign direct investment and 
international trade and, in so doing, enhances the functions of the Bretton Woods 
institutions 178. The legal system that serves the purpose of integration into the WTO may 
be limited to a regulatory framework supporting the development and maintenance of a 
transparent and stable economic environment conducive to efficient private sector 
activities, which comes close to what the IMF understands to be an important facet of 
good economic governance 179. Nevertheless the socio-cultural legacy of the three Bretton 
Woods institutions gives away all the characteristics of the Western rule of law, also 
because it is very difficult to separate the economic aspects of governance from the 
political aspects. This is true also for the WTO. 
Creating a legal system is more than legislative activity; it should also permeate the legal 
consciousness of the people living in the region under transition. Western influence raises 
the concern of "transplantability" of Western social and political institutions, and post- 
communist state building180. Moreover economic troubles often compound the problem 
of popular acceptance to establish a rule of law in transition economies181. It is, however, 
not questioned that the economic transformation of transition economies inevitably 
entails legal reform and legal system development. 
According to some, the industrialised democracies have an essential, indispensable role in 
determining the policies and programs for globalisation that will promote common 
values, balance competing values, solidify respect for the rule of law, and increase 
PETERSMANN, E. (Eds. ), National Constitutions and International Economic Law, The Hague, Kluwer 
Law, 1993. 
178 In this regard it is often referred to economies, such as Singapore and Hong Kong. See on the link 
between politics and economics in the so-called "little dragons": JOHNSON, C., "Political Institutions and 
Economic Performance: The government-business relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan" in 
SCALAPINO, R., SATO, S. and WINANDI, J. (Eds. ), Asian Economic Development - Present and 
Future, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1985. 
179 See Good Governance - The IMF's Role, IMF, Washington DC, 1997. 180 CHUA, A., "Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development", 
108 Yale L. J., p. 1, at p. 5 (noting that entrenched ethnic divisions permeate most developing countries, and 
these divisions bear a distinctive and potentially subversive relationship to the project of marketisation and 
democratisation). 
181 STORIN DOTY, K., "Economic Legal Reforms as a Necessary Means for Eastern European Transition 
into the Twenty-first Century", 33 Int'1 Law., Spring 1999, p. 189-225, at p. 195-97. For a discussion, see 
also Recent Development Symposium, 26 September 1996, in "Constitutional `Refolution' in the Ex- 
Communist World: The Rule of Law", 12 Am. U. J. Int'1 L. & Poly, 1997, p. 45-143. 
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empathy among nations182. Although this view to others sounds paternalistic 183, it cannot 
be denied that the harmonisation of business practices and the accommodation of 
competing values is a major issue raised by the integration in a global economy. Without 
common rules to govern trade, companies from one country might compete at a 
disadvantage against those of another, because each country could have dissimilar rules 
for acceptable practice in international business. Setting up the 'rules of the game' in 
international business is important not just to promote economic competition under fair 
conditions, but also to determine the proper balancing of competing values184. It can 
therefore be argued that the integration process of transition economies also requires a 
certain degree of convergence in accepting WTO standards. This will be explored in 
more detail below. 
B. Integration into the International Legal System 
Integration into the WTO, as part of the larger international legal system in the Bretton 
Woods order, is not just an economic process, but also presupposes profound domestic 
law reform. At the same time, integration may need some degree of legal convergence on 
the international level, to foster the domestic law reform process. So basically there are 
two interrelated forces at work. On the one hand there is the restructuring of the world 
economy on a regional and global scale through transnational legal co-operation from 
above. On the other hand and simultaneously, there are domestic social and legal forces 
working from below. It is important, however, that each level is receptive of what 
happens at the other level. 
Yet, the implementation of international WTO obligations in a domestic legal system is 
influenced by the different political systems, constitutions and legal traditions of member 
states, and continues to be widely regarded as a domestic matter 185. 
182 SEITA, A., "Globalization and the Convergence of Values", 30 Cornell Int'l L. J., 1997, p. 429-491, at p. 
471. 
183 ANGHIE, A., "Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the 
Third World", 32 N. Y. U. Int'1 L. & Pot, Winter 2000, p. 243-290, at p. 245 (criticising the civilising 
mission whose extension results in the entire globe being governed by a single international law with 
European origins). 
184 SEITA, o. c., supra note 182. 
185 PETERSMANN, E., "Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the GATT Multilateral Trading 
System: Possibilities and Problems of Making GATT Rules Effective in Domestic Legal Systems", in 
PETERSMANN and HILF, o. c., supra note 55, p. 33-113, at p. 37. 
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The international level can be quite useful to tackle the domestic problems'86 , which in a 
global context push nations towards greater co-operation. These co-operative efforts raise 
several general questions, such as whether this co-operative approach should be 
voluntary, or binding 187; whether the emphasis should be on procedural rather than 
substantive rules; and whether with respect to substantive rules some sort of minimum 
standards as the basis of a rule should apply 188. 
Globalisation and interdependence will definitely influence the techniques of this co- 
operation and integration. Harmonisation is a first technique that gradually induces 
nations towards uniform approaches to a variety of economic regulations and 
structures189. A second technique is a system of continuous `trades' or `swaps' of 
measures to liberalise (or restrict) trade, which is referred to as reciprocity. Finally, what 
is termed `interface' by John Jackson is a technique, which recognises that different 
economic systems will always exist in the world, and tries to create the institutional, legal 
means to ameliorate international tensions caused by those differences, perhaps through 
buffering or escape clause mechanisms'90. These techniques are of course not mutually 
exclusive, but the question exists as to what the appropriate mixture is191. 
It should further be considered that, tensions exist between globalisation and the law that 
also influence the integration into the international order. The very concept of law 
traditionally and historically has been associated with national sovereignty and therefore 
186 A common argument is that the international level may help countries to commit to their reform efforts 
and, in so doing, in the case of transition economies ideally provide guidance for the domestic social forces 
working from below. 
187 See JACKSON, J., "Global Economics and International Economic Law", 1 J. Int'1 Econ. L., 1998, p. 1- 
23, at p. 21. See in this regard also, e. g., CHINKIN, C., "The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and 
Change in International Law", 38 I. CL. Q., October 1989, p. 850-866. 
188 See JACKSON, o. c., supra note 187, p. 21. 189 An example in the WTO context could be the uniformity of procedures for applying countervailing 
duties or escape clause measures. On harmonisation, see LEEBRON, D., "Lying Down with Procrustes: An 
Analysis of Harmonisation Claims" in BHAGWATI and HUDEC, o. a., supra note 52, p. 41-117 (noting at 
p. 62 that harmonisation is at best a crude tool to deal with systemic and structural trade imbalances, and 
that harmonisation raises significant resource allocation and efficiency questions). See also ROESSLER, F., 
"Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration" in ibidem, p. 21-56 (noting that GATT 
focuses on the reduction of trade barriers and not on the harmonisation of competitive strategies or 
conditions in the market. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is a first effort to harmonise, and 
demands are increasing; and p. 37 questioning how an agreement on minimum standards can be achieved 
among so many countries with different values and resources without a clever mix of carrots and sticks). 
190 ROESSLER, o. c., supra note 189, p. 41 (noting that the more safeguards and impairment procedures are 
adopted, the less need will be felt for domestic policy harmonisation and vice versa). 
191 See JACKSON, o. c., supra note 187, p. 21. 
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to a certain extent inherently contradicts globalisation192. A close analysis of sovereignty 
turns out to be very complex, and the subject can be `decomposed' into dozens of more 
specific issues193 Nevertheless national regulatory reforms must be connected to an 
emerging global regulatory order of which the Bretton Woods institutions are the key 
representatives. I therefore do not agree with those, who associate globalisation only with 
deregulation and regulatory meltdown. But it is fundamental that in this relationship 
between international economic and domestic law, law reformers in countries of 
transition stress the effectiveness of the law and the policies they implement. 
The integration of transition economies into the WTO and the larger international and 
global environment, in which the Bretton Woods institutions operate, also raises a series 
of very basic legal questions that are not new to international legal scholars. In the 
context of the WTO and John Jackson's research in international economic law, these 
questions involve rule-making at the international level (rule-oriented system) and 
whether scientific and moral concerns should be taken into due consideration in 
international trade'94 . They involve questions of 
international dispute settlement 
resolution and to what extent they should adequately consider opposing policy goals, or 
provide for appropriate advocacy from interested authorities and citizen groups. This also 
leads to questions of transparency and democratic processes. Also important is the 
relationship between international rules and domestic constitutional and other laws, and 
problems of regulatory competition. 
WTO integration is not just about the formulation of international economic law and the 
acceptance of international, liberal trade policies, but it is in the case of transition 
economies at this stage enormously important to cast the foundations suitable to 
192 See SCHAUER, F., "The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation", CID Working Paper, n° 44, 
AAril 2000. 
19 See JACKSON, o. c., supra note 187, p. 18 and p. 20. To a great extent these issues concern the 
`allocation of power' as between a nation-state and an internationally regulatory system. For example there 
are questions whether a product safety standard should be controlled by an international body, or a nation- 
state government, or even by sub-federal government units. Sovereignty is not a magical wand to ward off 
any `entanglement' in the international system, but is rather a policy-weighing process. See also 
BHAGWATI, J., "The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations" in BHAGWATI 
and HUDEC, o. a., supra note 52, p. 9-40 at p. 12 about the loss of sovereignty and philosophical arguments 
against diversity. 
194 See in this regard the question whether any country can afford a moral foreign trade policy. See KOH, 
T., The Quest for World Order: Perspectives of a Pragmatic Idealist, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 
1998. 
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implement, monitor and possibly enforce the WTO legal standards'95 . Any law reform 
process should take this into account. In the absence of such foundations a transition 
economy could formally accept norms with sincere intent to follow them except in the 
case of danger to the national ideology or to its political system. This is certainly true in 
the case of China. But also in other countries of transition many domestic stumbling 
blocks may hinder the effective implementation of WTO legal standards, such as the lack 
of legal transparency and the defective ownership rights of state enterprises'96. The latter 
may upset sound commercial decision making in the global economy and the former adds 
higher risks to foreign investment and uncertainties to market access commitments. These 
issues again stress the importance of profound domestic law reform to convince other 
nations that these countries are receptive to international legal standards. 
Most law reform today aims to foster the healthy expansion of market-driven economies. 
In principle these law reform initiatives, to induce the desired results, should be tailored 
to local circumstances. But notwithstanding the commitment to tailoring law to local 
circumstances, this law should fit in with the international economic law system, to cater 
to international investors, as much as possible national laws likely to affect them 197. 
Besides, post-communist countries have looked at Western models as a ready supply for 
legislative convergence198. 
It can be inferred from the previous paragraphs that the integration of transition 
economies into the international legal system requires standards from the top down, but 
also that transition economies have already pre-existing regulatory systems in place; and, 
for their legal reform plans to work, it is necessary that existing domestic frameworks are 
195 Or in the words of PETERSMANN, o. c., supra note 185, p. 37: "The proper functioning and 
effectiveness of international trade rules depend on the degree to which the rules are actually observed by 
the legislative, administrative and judicial branches of governments within the member states and enable 
individual producers, investors, traders and consumers to act in accordance with the rules". 
196 The effective judicial review of trade restrictions should be available not only in technical, rule-oriented 
areas such as customs valuation and antidumping procedures, which are administered according to detailed 
rules, but also in more discretionary, policy-oriented areas, such as escape-clause proceedings. 
197 See SEIDMAN, A., SEIDMAN, R. and WAELDE, T., "Good Governance and Legislative Reform: 
Making Development Work: Introduction", available at www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/htmi/article4- 
LhtmI (last visited May 2001). 
198 See AJANI, G., "By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe", 43 Am. J. 
Comp. L., Winter 1995, p. 93-117; and DELISLE, J., "Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, 
American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond", 20 U. Pa J. Int'1 
Econ. L., Summer 1999, p. 179-308. 
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receptive of the international standards. The section below briefly discusses the Chinese 
social and legal institutions that traditionally and historically are in place. Any Western or 
international legal influence to reform these institutions will have to take these pre- 
existing social institutions into account. 
C. China's Legal Culture 
China carries the difficult burden to prove that it has cast the domestic fundaments not 
only to accept WTO legal standards as formulated on the international level, but also that 
it will be able to make these WTO legal standards effective in the domestic legal order. 
This exercise methodologically brings us first to China's legal history, because the 
emergence of law as an institution in China cannot escape the typical Chinese cultural 
and historical environment replete with pre-existing social institutions. 
To apply universal economic and legal models to all transition or emerging economies is 
an obvious mistake'99. As to the legal component, a sound understanding of the historical 
and current environment is necessary before one can start to graft a legal or regulatory 
model, such as the WTO's, onto an emerging or transition economy. This is also true to 
fully understand the interaction between the multilateral trade system and its reception in 
the domestic legal order. This urge is even felt more in the case of China, which is 
culturally remote from the Western concepts behind the Bretton Woods institutions. The 
Chinese system has already shaped many important legal notions, which will influence 
inescapably the carving out of the content, form and implementation of the legal reform 
in this country. This system should first be fully appreciated. In terms of WTO accession 
it should be held that the fabric of traditional Chinese law, and the role of law in the lives 
of the political and administrative institutions within China, is of the utmost 
importance200. This leads one inevitably also to the political dimensions of economic 
policy formulation and implementation. 
Although Western influence in the development and creation of economic law in 
transition countries is heavy, and Western laws have shaped the content and practice of 
199 There is no consciously comprehensive strategy to replicate Western legal development. See KEITH, R., 
China's Struggle for the Rule of Law, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1994, p. 1. 200 See POTTER, P., "China and the WTO: Tensions between Globalized Liberalism and Local Culture", 
32 Canadian Business Law Journal, 1999, p. 440-473. 
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Asian economic regulation in many ways, transition countries, such as China, do not 
necessarily accept Western law as a universal standard. Western law is only selectively 
adopted as part of a strategy to facilitate certain aspects of foreign trade and investment 
while protecting other national and local interests. Resistance in the form of cultural and 
political values and practices modify and shape Western models201. 
On the assumption that commerce also is powerfully shaped by culture, scholars have 
come up with the notion of "Chinese capitalism"202. This capitalism in Asia does not 
draw so much from the rule of law but from autocracy, paternalism and personalism 
(guanxi). It is the motivation to succeed and to control its own destiny, to implement 
social order via micro-units headed by a pater familias, and to institute business by means 
of reliable connections. To this end the rule of law only plays a more limited role 
203. it 
requires a different framework, one of social relationships, more than impersonal laws204. 
On the other hand Chinese culture and Asian values in economy and law, though a force 
to be taken into account, should not be overemphasised. Basically the role of these values 
is similar to the 19t' century Protestant ethics, which also impacted the market economy 
and the legal systemlos. 
Modem Western law, as it is found in democratic countries, is based on the rule of law, 
and primarily upon the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual206. This can 
be traced back to Roman law and theories developed in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century philosophy until today. This is one of the reasons why Western law developed 
201 See KAMARUL, B., "Western Economic Law and Asian Resistances", 5 Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law, 1995, p. 84-99. See also PISTOR, K., WELLONS, P. et al, The Role of Law and Legal 
Institutions in Asian Economic Development 1960-1995, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 280 
(noting that persistent differences in Asian law are not so much substantive, but procedural legal 
differences such as in the role of the courts and the function of administrative agencies). 
202 See HAMILTON, G. et al, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications, 1997; REDDING, G., The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, Berlin, Walter De Gruyter, 1990 and 
WONG, "Chinese Entrepreneurs and Business Trust" in HAMILTON, G. (Ed. ), Business Networks and 
Economic Development in South and South East Asia, Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1991, p. 13-29. 
203 See JOHNSON, o. c., supra note 178, p. 121. See also generally TURNER, K., FEINERMAN, J. and 
GUY, K. (Eds. ), The Limits of the Rule of Law in China, Seattle, University of Washington, 2000. 
204 Of course, personal and social elements are to a certain extent also important for the law as well. 
205 See LOCKETT, M., "The Nature of Chinese Culture", in CAMPBELL, N. (Ed. ), Advances in Chinese 
Industrial Studies, London, JAI Press, Volume I, Part A, 1990, p. 269-276. 
206 Of course I should note here, and I repeat from previous paragraphs, that differences between `rule of 
law' notions exist even within Western countries; and, I acknowledge that I am oversimplifying the notion 
here. 
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mainly as a contractual model of obligations and rights that were important to a society 
based on agriculture and trade. 
The Chinese have not developed this horizontal contractual model like in the West 
because there is no pertinent concept of the individual207. In traditional Chinese law, 
public law, such as penal law, is emphasised208. According to the Legalist school fa, 
meaning law, is the only reliable bureaucratic tool for government. To be effective, 
however, xing, meaning punishment, should be severe209. Also the Chinese planned 
economy was characterised by the priority of power by superior administrative authority 
and of duties by economic units to whom commands were issued, duty-bound to perform 
according to the plan21o. 
The Chinese individual is traditionally moulded by Confucianism 211. According to this 
important School of thought a person does not exist as an isolated entity, but as a father to 
his son, a son to his father, a younger brother to his elder brother, a husband to his wife, a 
ruler to his subject and vice versa. It is in the fulfilment of these reciprocal obligations 
and responsibilities that the individual realises his or her personal fulfilment. For this 
reason, it is difficult to extract from Confucianism a concept of an abstract individual, 
207 See MA, H., "The Chinese Concept of the Individual and the Reception of Foreign Law", 9 J. Chinese 
Law, n° 2, Fall 1995, p. 207; and HOOK, B. (Ed. ), The Individual and the State in China, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996. For further reference, see BODDE, D. and MORRIS, C., Law in Imperial China, 
Harvard Studies in East Asian Law, 1971; CHEN, P., Law and Justice - The Legal System in China 2400 
B. C. to 1960 A. D., New York, Dunellen, 1973; CHU, C., Law and Society in Traditional China, Westport, 
Hyperion, 1980 (reprint 1961); LIU, Y., Origins of Chinese Law - Personal and Administrative Law in its 
Early Development, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998; and CHEN, J., Chinese Law - Towards an 
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1999. See also 
COHEN, J., "Is there Law in China? ", p. 1-14; LUBMAN, S., "Studying Contemporary Chinese Law: 
Limits, Possibilities and Strategy", p. 14-41; JI, W., "The Sociology of Law in China: Overview and 
Trends", p. 109-119; LIANG, Z., "Explicating Law: A comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western 
Legal Culture", p. 121-157; TURNER, K., "Rule of Law Ideals in Early China", p. 231-274; ALFORD, W., 
"'Seek Truth from Facts' - Especially when They are Unpleasant: America's Understanding of China's 
Efforts at Law Reform", p. 295-314; and YU, X., "Legal Pragmatism in the PRC", p. 315-337 in LEE, T. 
(Ed. ), Basic Concepts of Chinese Law, New York, Garland, 1997. 
208 E g. in the Code of the Tang Dynasty (618-905 AD). 
209 See MA, o. c., supra note 207, p. 211. 210 See CHEN, A., "The Developing Theory of Law and Market Economy in Contemporary China", in 
WANG, G. and WEI, Z. (Eds. ), Legal Developments in China - Market Economy and Law, Hong Kong, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 3-20 at p. 10. See also CHEN, A., "Toward a Legal Enlightenment: 
Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law", 17 UCLA Pac. Bas. L. J., Fall/Spring 1999-2000, 
125-165. ý" 
Confucius (551-470 BC) and Mencius (371-289 BC). To Confucius and his disciples human nature is 
good and the cultivation of a person's own virtue is the basis of regulating one's family, the state and the 
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entirely separate from other individuals. The traditional Chinese individual is an ethical 
concept. The rules each individual should follow in this duty-oriented structure are called 
li, referred to as mores212. 
Another traditional Chinese School of thought is relevant as well. The Yin-Yang School 
interconnects nature and mankind. Because man is a part of nature, the justification of his 
behaviour should be found in nature's behaviour. Dominating in this School is the idea 
that yang is superior and yin is inferior. Hence the ruler is yang, the subject is yin; the 
father is yang, the son yin; the husband is yang, the wife is yin, just like earth is beneath 
heaven213. 
When Emperor Wu214 of the Han Dynasty215 made Confucianism the official state 
teaching, the state doctrine gave a proper sphere of application to all three Schools. The 
Legalists provided the instrument of government, the content of the law and the 
punishment was provided for by Confucianism, and Yin-Yang ideas helped to uphold the 
superiority of the Emperor and the vertical structure of society216. 
Following the forced opening of China by Western powers, China changed its laws and 
legal system to meet Western standards, based on individual rights and equal protection 
before the law. In a social structure that demanded each person to behave in a certain 
manner as became his or her status in the family or society, this foreign law, at least 
according to one Chinese scholar, cannot be entirely successfu1217. 
Although Confucian ethical doctrines and the traditional concepts are almost completely 
expelled by the legal codes as formulated in the late 1920s and early 1930s, some 
obstacles in the implementation of modern Westernised Chinese law possibly remain. 
The existence of modern laws in China does not mean that there is a Western rule of 
whole world. Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity. Nonetheless, the cultivation of the 
person is not achieved by oneself alone. One must feel natural affection for those who are related. 
1Z MA, o. c., supra note 207, p. 208ff. 
213 Ibidem, p. 211-212. 
214 WU (140-87 BC). 
215 Han Dynasty (206 BC - 220 AD). 216 This is referred to as the "legalisation of Confucianism". 217 MA, o. c., supra note 207, p. 214ff. What already makes things more difficult is the Chinese translation 
for the word "right", which is quan U. It literally means "power" and "profit", which Chinese people are 
taught to despise by Confucianism. There is not exactly a positive connotation like in German Recht or 
French droit. 
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law218. But it is also surprising that Chinese thinkers increasingly have acknowledged the 
autonomy of the will of private parties. Striking is the growing affirmation of values of 
freedom, autonomy and equality that was denied and suppressed by the planned 
economy. Hence individuals have become liberated human beings, autonomous subjects, 
and equal status subjects exercising free will219. And so economic participants should be 
treated equally too. More and more Chinese legal scholars argue that the market economy 
demands rational law in the sense of Weber220. 
International collaboration, foreign economic exchanges and foreign investment all 
require legal protection. When China first re-opened in 1978, there was hardly a legal 
system to speak of. Gradually laws were adopted to orchestrate foreign investment and 
economic exchanges. But according to Western China specialists the legal values and the 
legal consciousness have grown less rapidly than the amount of legislation221. Values like 
openness, fairness and justice are legal guiding principles, which obviously need time to 
settle in. So far China has predominantly looked at pressing economic advantages of 
implementing foreign law. A good number of Chinese companies are listed in foreign 
securities markets, and only by ensuring that its securities regulations are compatible with 
those jurisdictions enables China to reap the benefits. Some critics might argue there is 
much window dressing and that the fundament of Chinese legal culture is not appropriate 
to the legal institutions and instruments the Chinese hastily erect. They argue that 
Chinese Westernised law only leads to a common vocabulary without bridging, however, 
the profound differences between historical and current concepts of rule and government. 
They also argue that the law is nothing but a tool to guide, regulate, safeguard and control 
eis Ibidem, p. 215. 
219 See CHEN, o. c., supra note 210, p. 9. The transition from a planned economy to a market economy 
brings about the restoration of rights and freedoms, which were originally subsumed within the state power. 
220 CHEN, J., "Market Economy and the Internationalisation of Civil and Commercial Law in the People's 
Republic of China", in JAYASURIYA, K. (Ed. ), Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia - The Rule of Law 
and Legal Institutions, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 69-94 at p. 75-76. For a discussion, see SHEN, Y., 
"Conceptions and Receptions of Legality - Understanding the Complexity of Law Reform in Modern 
China", in TURNER et a!, o. c., supra note 203, p. 20-44. 
u' LUBMAN, S., "Dispute Resolution in China after Deng Xiaoping: `Mao and Mediation' Revisited", 11 
Colum. J. Asian L., Fall 1997, p. 229-391, at p. 248 (suggesting that popular behaviour in China could be 
changing faster than in other countries because the government does have the ability to persuade the 
populace. China's cultural tradition facilitates the acceptance of ideas sown by an authoritarian system of 
education). 
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the development of the socialist market economy222. In developing its law as an 
instrument China may boldly learn, experiment and borrow from the legislative 
experience of the economically advanced nations of the West223, because such experience 
belongs according to the Chinese to the common heritage of human civilisation; and, 
globalisation requires Chinese law on trade and investment to be compatible with foreign 
and international practice 224. Many Chinese scholars stress the importance of 
international conventions and practices in the process. Their emphasis is not on 
Westernising Chinese law, but on the internationalisation of Chinese law determined by 
the goals of structural and economic reforms and the liberalisation of productive forces as 
required by the market225. 
Some observers indicate that traditional values and values promoted during decades of 
Communism are being threatened by the effects of economic reforms in China226. The 
increase in personal freedom and the improvement in material living standards have 
caused also changes in the social fabric. There is rural discontent at the exploitation by 
local cadres, crime has risen, corruption has increased and the Chinese are gradually 
losing their faith in Marxism-Leninism as adapted by Mao Zedung. The Party's 
legitimacy might increasingly be questioned, and China is ideologically adrift227. 
222 The Chinese state is in command of socio-economic change and laws have been used to promote 
economic development. See ZHENG, Y., "From Rule by Law to Rule of Law? -A Realistic View of 
China's Legal Development", East Asian Institute, Working Paper n°l, 18 March 1998. For further 
reference, see WHITE, G. (Ed. ), The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: The Road to Crisis, 
London, Macmillan Press, 1992; and WHITE, G. (Ed. ), Development States in East Asia, London, 
Macmillan Press, 1988. 
223 CHEN, o. c., supra note 220, p. 81 (noting that what is transplanted is not the will of a particular country 
or that of a particular historical period or of a particular ruler, but a scientific management system. The 
market economy has its own rules and mechanisms, technical and managerial norms). On Western legal 
transplants, see EPSTEIN, E., "Codification of Civil Law in the People's Republic of China: Form and 
Substance in the Reception of Concepts and Elements of Western Private Law", 32 U. B. C. Law Review, 
1998, p. 153-197. 
224 CHEN, A., o. c., supra note 210, p. 4. See also CHEN, J., o. c., supra note 220, p. 74 (noting that also the 
market economy is a result of human wisdom and not a privilege of the West and that establishing a market 
economy in China demands a revolution in legal thought and legal theory). 
'as CHEN, o. c., supra note 220, p. 81 (noting also that the legal reform is to liberate productive forces). 226 See LUBMAN, o. c., supra note 221, p. 241-243. See also ZHENG, S., Party vs State in Post-1949 
China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 4 (noting that China is facing a deep institutional 
crisis, and p. 6 saying that no magic formula exists to revitalise the Communist Party); and CHANG, G., 
The Coming Collapse of China, London, Random House, 2001. 
2271dem. 
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As this section shows, legal systems are influenced by culture, history and tradition, and 
this is not different for the Chinese legal system. As a result legal systems may diverge, 
notwithstanding the growing internationalisation of markets resulting in the development 
of law and legal institutions that, if not identical in language, perform largely similar 
functions around the world. However, economic convergence does not necessarily imply 
convergence of legal systems228. The shift to the market paradigm may have caused 
economic convergence, but many other forms of control, such as the form of negotiation 
between the state and private business, state guidance about the use of economic 
resources, bargained policies between the state officials and the business community to 
look for common interest, and essentially to shelter the domestic market against too much 
foreign intrusion, are usually not part of any convergence. The WTO in this regard 
demands a transparent legal system in article X GATT to partly resolve the uncertainty. 
How China complies with article X GATT will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
Apart from the general transparency requirement of article X GATT, the government 
should be separated from enterprises, and the economic functions of the government 
should be distinguished, so that enterprises can become truly independent civil law 
subjects, capable of resisting undue intervention from state administrative authorities. In 
this respect China has started to acknowledge the autonomy of private law and the 
precedence of private law over public law in a market economy during the last couple of 
decades229. China's progress during these decades in building a functional and 
operational legal system is astonishing. So has, contrary to mainstream predictions, a 
vaguely defined system of property rights in China resulted in rapid economic growth 230 . 
However, in the eyes of Western economists, China may still need an ownership 
228 PISTOR and WELLONS, o. c., supra note 201, p. 264. 
229 CHEN, o. c., supra note 220, p. 75. 
230 See HU, X., "Transformation of Property Rights in Reforming China", EAI Occasional Paper n° 6, 
Problems in China's Transitional Economy, Property Rights and Transitional Model, Singapore, Singapore 
UP, 1998, p. 3-35; and NEE, V. and SU, S., "Local Corporatism and Informal Privatisation in China's 
Market Transition", in NEE, V. and LYONS, T. (Eds. ), The Economic Transformation of South China: 
Reform and Development in the Post-Mao Era, Ithaca, Cornell University East Asia Program, 1994. On 
property rights in China, see also HOOGMARTENS, J., "Establishing a Market Economy: 
Commercialisation of Land-Use Rights in China", in NORTON, J. (Ed. ), Yearbook of International 
Financial and Economic Law 1999, London, Kluwer Law, 2001, p. 445-470; and HOOGMARTENS, J., 
"Taking and Enforcing Mortgages in China: A Lender's Perspective", 30 Hong Kong Law Journal, 
December 2000, p. 520-537. 
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transformation with a combination of privatisation, denationalisation, and pluralisation as 
discussed in Chapter Two, to really convince trading powers such as the EU and the US. 
To ease criticism from these countries, China may also need to establish an effective 
corporate governance regime231. This idea will be elaborated further in Chapter Two. 
V. Final Observations 
The integration of transition economies into the economic and legal international order 
presents challenges to the Bretton Woods institutions. One such challenge represents the 
implementation of the WTO's multilateral trade rules in the domestic regulatory 
framework of these transition economies, such as China, which has its own set of initial 
conditions and cannot escape its own historical and cultural environment replete with pre- 
existing social institutions. Because governments differ widely in the practical application 
of legal and economic principles at home, it will be necessary to interface the WTO 
system of multilateral rules and the domestic regulatory systems of its members, 
especially if they previously adhered to a planned economy. Transition countries are 
currently in the process to create a regulatory framework to support the development and 
maintenance of a transparent and stable economic environment conducive to efficient 
private sector activities and a transparent legal system with access to the judicial system. 
These reform efforts help the integration into the Multilateral Trading System, which in 
turn will also need rules to cabin the risks and the costs of integration, with a sufficient 
amount of flexibility to make swift adjustments to changing circumstances, and to find 
compromises when necessary. It is against this background that flexible safeguards come 
into play to ward off the possible risks and dangers of integration. The rise of potential 
new and large economies in Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet block may create 
new trade tensions with mature economies. The constant search for new export markets 
in an integrated world economy may pose a central problem. The expansion of exports is 
often seen as the only factor in the long-run, which determines the development of any 
economy; and, the low cost structure of emerging and transition economies, as a threat to' 
more mature economies, may slow down international co-operation. China's accession in 
231 See, e. g., QIAN, Y., "Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control", 4 
Economics of Transition, 1996, p. 427-447. 
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this regard draws our attention to the tension between, on the one hand, the 
institutionalisation and rationalisation of world trade, and the empirical reality of global 
protectionism, on the other hand. WTO safeguards might therefore serve as a buffer zone 
between opposite economic systems. 
The WTO as a "rule-oriented" institution has certain safeguards, such as Articles VI and 
XIX GATT in place to alleviate part of this tension. But the risk of damage to liberal 
trade in employing these safeguards always remains immanent. The transformation 
process from centrally planned * economy to market economy is built on illusive 
principles, which use long lists of preconditions for economic and legal guidance. 
Because there are no apparent and clear graduation criteria that mark the successful 
completion of the transition to a market economy, the risk exists that WTO members will 
continue to use state-trading or nonmarket economy methodologies for protectionist 
purposes. It would be a mistake for Western countries to take the opening to the Chinese 
market to be nothing but an opportunity for increasing exports. The West also should 
open its markets to imports from transition economies, such as China's. The next Chapter 
will show how China's critics in Europe and America may use China's domestic legal 
and economic reforms as an excuse to maintain state-trading methodologies in 
safeguards, which can be used to their protectionist advantage. 
Finally, it should be noted that Western countries and Bretton Woods institutions, in their 
response to integration, should be receptive of the domestic reforms in transition 
economies and appreciate the cultural underpinnings of these reforms 
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c. Management Responsibility System 
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China's WTO Accession and Domestic Reforms 
A. Policy versus Law 
B. Administrative System 
C. Legal Redress and Law Enforcement 
a. Legal Redress 
b. Law Enforcement 
IV. Final Observations 
The previous Chapter made clear that adding three billion people from transition 
economies to the Bretton Woods institutions puts a challenge to the WTO in integrating 
these new entrants. It was also noted that these countries have taken on the challenge 
themselves by introducing profound domestic legal and economic reforms. This Chapter 
focuses on some aspects of the Chinese domestic restructuring process. China faces the 
daunting task to convince WTO members that it can implement the WTO requirements. 
Coming to terms with the expected competition from China, WTO members are allowed 
to use trade policy instruments especially designed in the Chinese Protocol of Accession. 
These trade policy instruments, which are dealt with separately in subsequent Chapters, 
are to a certain extent based on the assumption that China still is a state-trading country 
or nonmarket economy. Therefore the success of China's domestic economic and legal 
reform is directly relevant for the use of these specially designed trade policy 
instruments, because if China can graduate from its state-trading or nonmarket economy 
label, the employment of these trade policy instruments will become largely superfluous. 
Although no clear graduation criteria exist, the first Chapter identified many different 
preconditions that involve the reform to a full market economy. However, it is argued 
here that the disentanglement of government from business is one of the more pressing 
reforms needed if China wishes to avoid the label of still being a state-trading country, 
and to avoid being the target of nonmarket trade policies. This disentanglement of 
government from business is most probably only possible through acceptance of the rule 
of law in China. 
Whereas it is the ultimate purpose for both China and its trading partners to be better off 
economically, it is also important to look at the broader foreign policy concerns that 
68 
China's WTO Accession and Domestic Reforms 
surround China's WTO accession. Therefore the first part of this Chapter will look at the 
geopolitical complexities of China's WTO accession, because after all, the decision 
whether a party can join as a WTO member is not a legal or economic decision, but a 
political one. The second and third parts of this Chapter will focus on the domestic 
economic and legal reform process in China respectively. The success of these domestic 
reforms is directly relevant for the use of state-trading or nonmarket trade policy 
methodologies. 
I. Socio-political and Historical Background 
Undoubtedly China's entry into the WTO is of great political significance. Over the years 
many stumbling blocks had to be cleared from the road of China's accession. As one 
author put it, the story about China joining the WTO is "an epic saga", and no country 
currently seeking WTO membership could possibly raise a more complex array of issues 
than the PRC232. China's accession does not only presuppose profound domestic 
economic and legal reforms, it also presupposes engagement policies from other WTO 
members to receive the new entrant. 
A. China and the World Community 
Although it is the wish of many politicians now, that China's accession to the WTO, in 
the words of President Bill Clinton, will ensure the country to become a "constructive 
member" of the global community233, these policies of engagement, however, are of the 
recent past. The position of China in the international political community is explored 
somewhat further in the paragraphs below. 
a. Early International Relations 
Apart from trade along established routes, the Chinese Empire had no significant political 
relationship with the West prior to the Opium Wars beginning in 1839. The Chinese, as 
232 See BHALA, R., "Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga", 15 Am. Univ. Int'1 L. 
Rev., 2000, p. 1470-1538, at p. 1470. 
23' See GESTELAND, L., "Clinton Says WTO Will Make China `Constructive Member' Of Global 
Community", www. chinaonline. com, 29 January 2000, quoting from President Clinton's State of the Union 
Address: "We must continue to encourage our former adversaries, Russia and China, to emerge as stable, 
prosperous, democratic nations". 
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the Japanese, were very much reluctant to open doors for Westerners, who they believed 
were Barbarians234. Traditionally, Chinese foreign relations did not fully recognise 
foreign countries as sovereigns. Only when a country paid tribute to appreciate the 
superiority of the Chinese culture, China allowed it the opportunity for trade235. 
The attitude of China that it did not need anything from other countries sparked conflicts 
with nineteenth century imperial powers, such as France and Great Britain. These 
conflicts caused the "Tributary System" to give way to the "Treaty System". Through the 
"Unequal Treaties" of the 19th and early 20th centuries, these Western powers finally 
forced themselves a way in. China was compelled to conclude treaties with many 
countries that provided for extraterritoriality (also known as consular jurisdiction) for the 
nationals of those countries in China, restrictive tariff regulations, territorial cessions and 
leases, the right to station foreign troops in China, and other humiliating infringements on 
sovereignty236. Pursuant to these treaties and the initial hostile contacts, which accounted 
for the xenophobia in the age of imperialism237, China was treated, like a semi-colonial 
country. 
While China had manipulated tributary countries under the tribute system, China became 
the subject of manipulation under the unequal treaties. Foreign powers rushed to obtain 
234 See BRANDT, C., SCHWARTZ, B and FAIRBANK, J., A Documentary History of Chinese 
Communism, New York, Athenaeum, 1952, p. 17: "Ethnocentrism was inbred in Chinese language and 
institutions, with the assumption that outer barbarian states, however strong in arms, were always inferior in 
the attributes of strong civilisation". According to the authors anyone taking a quick look at Chinese history 
should agree that nationalism has not yet by any means realised its full potentialities in Modern China. The 
Chinese people thought and acted as the centre of the known world in a recorded history for 3000 years. 
China viewed itself as superior, not just materially, but culturally. Barbarians could come to appreciate the 
superiority of the Chinese culture, if they recognised the unique position of China as the central kingdom 
exercising the mandate of heaven. 
235 On the tributary system from the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) through the Manchurian Qing dynasty 
(1644-1912), see generally FAIRBANK, J., Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast - The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842-1854, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953 and MANCALL, M., China At the 
Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy, London, Macmillan, 1984. For its relevance in present day China, see 
HARDERS-CHEN, G., "China MFN: A Reaffirmation of Tradition or Regulatory Reform? ", 5 Minn. J. 
Global Trade, Summer 1996, p. 381-413. 236 See CHIU, H., "Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties", in 
COHEN, J. (Ed. ), China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies, Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1972, p. 239-267, at 243. 
237 On anti-foreignism in China, see LIAO, K., Anti foreignism and Modernisation in China 1860-1980, 
Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press, 1984. See also DENG, Y., "The Chinese Conception of 
National Interests in International Relations", The China Quarterly, n° 154, June 1988, p. 308-329. 
According to DENG (p. 311) the "Realpolitik Thinking" of China is still profoundly conditioned by the 
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the advantages. However, the MFN principle, introduced as a bargaining tool for China, 
created the opposite effect of destroying China's bargaining power 238. 
A weakened country, China lost the imperial monarchy in the 1911 revolution led by Sun 
Yat Sen. The following decades were rare times at which China was actively involved in 
world politics239. Soon after, it was divided by civil warfare between the communists and 
the capitalist Kuomintang government. When the Communist Party came to power in 
1949 and established the People's Republic of China, the country fell prey to the Cold 
War politics of isolationism. China was involved in the two hot spots of Korea and 
Vietnam and therefore put under embargo by the US between 1953 and 1972240. Both the 
international and domestic situation had limited any further expansion of economic 
relations with China. 
According to at least one author, these early psychological and material sufferings under 
Western treaty rule explain China's insistence on reciprocity to bring home fairness and 
equity in multilateral trade241. 
b. Present International Relations 
Notwithstanding the grim past of early international relations, Western governments have 
adopted policies of engagement vis-ä-vis China since recent decades. In an effort to 
isolate the Soviet Empire by driving it apart from other Communist allies, President 
Nixon and his policy advisor, Kissinger, adopted normal diplomatic relations with 
historical memory of the "one hundred years of sufferings and humiliations" at the hands of Western 
powers and fascist Japan. China suffered both materially and psychologically. 
38 The MFN clause proved to be a one-way street - any concession or privilege gained by one Western 
power, at once, accrued to all. China could never reverse the tide and, by abolishing the privileges of one 
power, eliminate those of others. Treaty privileges steadily accumulated against her interest, thus 
weakening Chinese institutional structure. See HARDERS-CHEN, o. c., supra note 235, p. 390ff. 
239 China was represented, e. g., at the Congress of Versailles where it signed the 1919 peace treaty, and in 
the League of Nations, where it objected to the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese in 1931. For further 
reference, see COHEN (Ed. ), o. c., supra note 236. 240 As a result of the deterioration of the political atmosphere at the beginning of the 1950s, normal trade 
relations between China and many of the GATT Contracting Parties ceased to exist, but since the 1960s the 
share of trade with GATT Contracting Parties gradually acquired more importance. See LI, C., 
"Resumption of China's GATT Membership", 21 J. World Trade, n° 4,1987, p. 28. Despite the U. S. 
embargo, trade and barter arrangements with the UK, France and Denmark were concluded and in the early 
1960s China purchased a number of industrial plants from EC Member States. See YUE, X., Current EC 
Legal Developments - The EC and China, Brussels, Butterworths, 1993, p. 4. 241 See HARDERS-CHEN, o. c., supra note 235. 
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China242. The European Community (EC) soon followed243, notwithstanding that some 
EC Member States already had established individual diplomatic relations long before the 
Americans 244 . 
Notwithstanding the repeated US commitments to support China's WTO accession in 
almost every bilateral negotiation, the Chinese accession process suffered from the 
unpredictable nature of its US relationship. 45. Issues like human rights246, the Taiwan 
channe1247 and nuclear proliferation, 248 to name the more important ones, strained the 
Chinese accession. US President Clinton once explained this `pragmatic policy of 
engagement' as "expanding our areas of co-operation with China while confronting our 
differences openly and respectfully"249_ 
The overall aim of the European policy is to foster a greater European presence in the 
Asia Pacific region. Political-strategic matters thereto are reviewed in an EC 
242 The official visit by Nixon led to the Shanghai Communique in 1972. On 1 January 1979 the 
relationship was bolstered in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (79 
Dep't St. Bull., Jan. 1979, p. 25), followed by People's Republic of China, Consular Relations, 31 January 
1979 (U. S. -P. R. C., 30 U. S. T. 17). Soon thereafter on 7 July 1979 the Agreement on Trade Relations 
between the two countries was signed (U. S. -P. R. C., 31 U. S. T. 4651). See also BUTTERFIELD, F., "US 
and China Mark Resumption of Ties in Peking Ceremony", N. Y. Times, 2 January 1979, at Al, A10. 
243 Official relations between the European Economic Community and China were initiated in 1975; in 
1983 the relationship was officially expanded to include also the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). A trade agreement was signed in 1978, 
followed by the 1985 Trade and Co-operation Agreement (OJ L250,19 September 1985, p. 1). In 1995 a 
Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations was adopted (Corn (95) 0279-C4-0288/95). For a rundown 
on China - Europe relations see VAN DER GEEST, W., "Bringing China into the Concert of Nations - An 
Analysis of its Accession to the WTO", 32 J. World Trade, n° 3, June 1998, p. 99-114 and YUE, o. c., supra 
note 240, p. 4ff. For the latest details on EU - China relations see "Report from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on the Implementation of the Communication `Building a 
Comprehensive Partnership with China"', available from www. europe. org, (COM (2000) 552,08.09.2000). 
The latest document in the European engagement policy is a Country Strategy Paper on China, issued in 
March 2002 (working document). 
244 Among the earliest were Denmark (11 May 1950), United Kingdom (17 June 1954), Netherlands (19 
November 1954) and France (27 January 1964). A number of EC Member States took the opportunity to 
establish diplomatic relations during the 1970s. These are inter alia: Italy (6 November 1970), Belgium (25 
October 1971), Greece (5 June 1972), Germany (11 October 1972), Luxembourg (16 November 1972), 
Spain (9 March 1973), Portugal (8 February 1979) and Ireland (22 June 1979). 
2T5 ZHAO, W., "China's WTO Accession - Commitments and Prospects", 32 J. World Trade, n° 2, April 
1998, p. 51-75, at p. 65. 
246 See further below, p. 81ff. 
247 See infra Taiwan's WTO Accession, p. 79ff. 
248 E. g. the proposal to add weapons non-proliferation language to the Permanent Trade Relations Bill. See 
SNYDER, C., "US Senate rejects Thompson amendment, virtually assuring passage of PNTR", 
www. chinaonline. net, 13 September 2000. On Permanent Trade Relations, see further below, p. 82. 
249 Remarks by President in Address on China and the National Interest, Voice of America, Washington 
D. C., 24 October 1997. 
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Communication. The EC approach of "engagement" focuses on increasing the likelihood 
that China will act as a "responsible" member of the international community. This 
encompasses the degree of economic openness, the reliability of the judicial system and 
the protection of individual, human and social rights250. Although the European demands 
during Chinese accession did not differ much from the American ones, at least one author 
noticed that the Europeans introduced division in the allied ranks by playing the "good 
cop1125 i. 
As a result of engagement policies, the People's Republic of China replaced capitalist 
rival Taiwan in the United Nations Organisation (UN) and took a seat in its Security 
Council in 1971252. By 1980, China joined the IMF and the World Bank253 and, after it 
gained observer status to the GATT in 1984, it applied for resumption of its original 
membership in 1986. It renewed this application in 1995 to become a member of the 
newly established WT0254. Further, China developed good relations with its trading 
partner Japan; strong relations with Vietnam, India and Nepal; and diplomatic ties with 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were also 
. established255 
Because of the difficult beginnings in establishing international relationships and the 
Cold War legacy, many Western observers are interested in how China will develop as a 
member of international organisations and the international community at large. As a 
growing economic power China understands the need of participating in international and 
250 See COM (1998) 181 and COM (2000) 552, supra note 243. See also VAN DER GEEST, o. c., supra 
note 243, p. 101. 
ZS' BHALA, o. c., supra note 232, p. 1496. 
252 On 25 October 1971 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 (XXVI) to restore 
the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China and to expel the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek's 
Republic of China (Taiwan) from the UN. See General Assembly Official Records, 26th Session, 
Supplement No 29 (A/8429) p. 2. 
253 See JACOBSON, H. and OKSENBERG, M., China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank and 
GATT. " Towards a Global Economic Order, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1990, p. 59 if. IMF 
and World Bank were, just like the UN, initially not open to communist Beijing but to capitalist Taipe. In 
1950 Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and India already asked the PRC to replace Taiwan. 
254 For full details, see infra under China's Road to WTO Accession, p. 78ff. 
255 WANG, G., "Economic Integration in Quest for law - The Chinese Experience", 29 J. World Trade, no 
2, April 1995, p. 10. 
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regional affairs256, and its domestic economic reforms require this kind of participation257. 
This participation in the Bretton Woods institutions is evaluated below. 
c. China's Participation in IMF and World Bank 
China's participation in the Fund and the Bank might reveal us something about the 
possible course China will take in the WTO. However, the policy vis-a-vis IMF and 
World Bank is distinct from an envisaged WTO membership, because neither IMF nor 
World Bank membership involved such large economic reforms in China as the WTO. 
WTO membership is therefore quite different from Chinese membership in Fund and 
Bank. The only requirement for China beyond meeting the financial obligations in its 
IMF quota and in its subscription to the Bank was the publication of substantial data258. 
IMF and World Bank have never been the source of ambitious economic reforms in 
China, but rather inspired a convergence of views. 
The importance of lending by the World Bank and the International Development 
Agency (IDA) should not be underestimated 259. These loans serve as a sign of security to 
private investors and help to divert foreign capital and technology to China260. Several 
Chinese bureaucrats highly praise the technical assistance that they have received from 
the Bank and the Fund261. Not only financial assistance, but also competitive bidding, 
256 See, e. g., KIM, S., "Mainland China in a Changing Asia-Pacific Regional Order", 30 Issues & Studies, 
n° 10, October 1994, p. 1 ff. China must play a role in global economic management. Some Western authors 
therefore believe China should participate in the finance G-7, the club of finance ministers and central bank 
governors. See, e. g., BERGSTEN, F., "The New Agenda with China", International Economics Policy 
Briefs, May 1998, (also available at www. iie. com). 
257 WANG, o. a., supra note 255, p. 7. Specific steps to participate in multilateral organisations were taken 
almost immediately after China started economic reforms. 
258 JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 253, p. 105. 259 China is a major recipient of multilateral official lending. The US has recently questioned whether China 
should continue to receive concessional finance through the International Development Agency (IDA), the 
World Bank soft loan window. IDA funds have accounted for about a quarter of China's $22 billion in 
World Bank loans since 1980, and China has been receiving approximately $1 billion annually from IDA 
for the last several years. See NOLAND, M., "China and the International Economic System", Institute for 
International Economics, Working Paper 95-6, (also at www. iie. com). 
260 See LING, B., "China and International Institutions", 90 Am. Soc y Intl L. Proc., March 1996, p. 397. 
Since China's membership of the World Bank, the latter has approved many projects. China has been the 
Bank's biggest borrowing member country since 1993, and has one of the best project implementation 
records. To attract more loans the country joined the Asian Development Bank without the pre-condition of 
Taiwan's leaving in 1986. See WANG, o. a., supra note 255, p. 8. On China's membership in the Asian 
Development Bank, see MURRAY, B., "Prospects for Prosperity", available at www. chinaonline. com, 19 
October 2000. 
261 JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 253, p. 141-142. 
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foreign consultants, and training of personnel have changed the Chinese mind about how 
to undertake certain projects, and how to reduce costs and improve quality262. 
But according to some, China wants to get rid of its image as a passive receiver of capital, 
technology or economic and social values from other nations. Gradually developing its 
economic power, China also would wish a share of mercantile diplomacy to influence 
decisions at the international level263. In this sense the incorporation of China into the 
IMF, the World Bank and WTO, on terms that preserve and advance the neo-liberal 
international economic order, is not easy. It is a test to the capacity of these institutions to 
adjust to a changing environment2M. So far China is not seeking to make incremental 
changes in the rules of the Bretton Woods institutions so that Chinese traditions and 
practices would be incorporated into the operations of these institutions. But this does not 
reassure those who think that in future the existing arrangements could come under 
challenge if China gets the political power it searches to gain via its economic 
nationalism. Therefore some authors contend that bringing China into the rule-based 
world trading system might cause a clash of cultures - with different systems and 
different objectives having to be accommodated within the context of the WTO and the 
final act of the Uruguay Round. Indeed it may shock the WTO and the multilateral rule- 
based system at large265. 
By and large World Bank and IMF have not treated China as an exceptional case, but 
they have treated China sympathetically266. China, however, knows that special treatment 
might come at a discernible cost for other transition economies or developing country 
members267. Countries like Poland, Romania, Hungary, former Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia received relatively favourable treatment especially in IMF and World Bank. 
However, they were not always diligent in fulfilling obligations and at times there was 
262 The US administration regards technical assistance as the primary channel through which it can 
influence economic reform in China. See NOLAND, o. c., supra note 259. 263 DENG, o. c., supra note 237, p. 314 (noting that China's foreign policy is still very much pulled back by 
rower politics formed by the school of Realpolitik thoughts). 
64 JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 253, p. 4. 
265 VAN DER GEEST, o. c., supra note 243, p. 113. 
266 Instances of special treatment at the margin do exist: but similar allowances existed for other large 
developing countries like Egypt and Indonesia. See JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. a., supra note 253, p. 
138. 
267 JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 253, p. 133. India e. g. has been concerned that Chinese 
claims would restrict Indian access to Bank and Fund resources, see idem, p. 137. 
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disappointment in the trade performance of these countries. So did imports not always 
increase as expected, but neither did their exports increase greatly268. 
There is no doubt that the involvement in these Bretton Woods institutions noticeably 
affects the structures and policies of the Member State. Placed in an optimistic 
perspective, the interaction between international organisation and state should be 
reciprocal and beneficial for all members, hence leading to a more peaceful, stable and 
equitable world269. Many institutional changes and policy modifications have occurred 
both within China, and within the IMF and World Bank, to facilitate co-operation. It is 
difficult to measure the exact influence and sort out the cause and effect, because in the 
search for mutual adjustment each international player seeks to protect an image of 
independence 270. 
As an active member of the Fund and Bank, China's executive directors and their 
deputies have received wide praise for their competence. They have sought to maintain 
the effectiveness of the organisations. They have not been ideological and have not 
introduced extraneous political considerations into the debates271. The Chinese value the 
meetings as occasions to broaden their contacts in the international financial community 
. and to acquire additional knowledge 
272 
China's membership of the IMF and World Bank blunted the charge that they were 
instruments of Western imperialism. It has weakened the UNCTAD and strengthened the 
present position of the WTO. China's coming into the Bank has helped other developing 
countries to look more realistically at development. The debate about the "New 
International Economic Order" has been pushed into the background by the realities of 
economic difficulties. Developing countries therefore sometimes contend that China has 
adopted the rhetoric of the developed world273. Other critiques include that China's 
participation in multilateral organisations has been very limited and that its attitude to 
268 Idem, p. 28. 
269 Ideen, p. 8. 
270 Ideen, p. 129. 
2711dem, p. 131. 
272 Idem, p. 132. 
273 Ideen. P. 132. 
76 
China's WTO Accession and Domestic Reforms 
such bodies has been marked by scepticism274. And in China the government's soft policy 
towards the US has been criticised over time275. 
Nevertheless, China's involvement in the World Bank and the Bank's involvement in 
China today reflect a normal and appropriate partnership between a borrowing member 
country and an international institution 276. China's membership in IMF and World Bank 
has further demonstrated a cautious approach to building a relationship277. 
By joining the international economy, China tries to enhance its national 
aggrandisement278. China's WTO membership brings the country international acclaim 
and prestige. The international investor confidence resulting from WTO membership 
determines its attractiveness and allows the country to amass foreign capital to pay for 
sound domestic reforms and hence further industrialisation. The momentum of this drive 
may advance the Chinese economic powerhouse279. 
But according to some, China has taken the protective coloration of a market economy 
while at the same time retaining an overall mercantilist policy280. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that with China joining the "citadels of capitalism" and with the 
transnational issues in the age of globalisation, certain political views have been put in 
281 the defensive in favour of some more liberal rhetoric in China. In making WTO 
274 See the so-called McMillan-Scott report. VAN DER GEEST, o. c., supra note 243, p. 110-111. China's 
response to this report prepared by McMillan-Scott in the European Parliament 1997, was decidedly 
negative as it denounced the debate as "Anti-China clamour". See European Parliament, 1997: Report on 
the Communication from the Commission on a Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations (Com (95) 
0279-C4-0288/95) session document A4-040198/97, PE 221.588/fm; 29 May 1997. 
275 WANG, o. c., supra note 255, p. 24-25. 
276 LING, o. c, supra note 260, p. 398. 277 JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. a., supra note 253, p. 197. The authors recognise different stages in the 
incorporation process of a member. First, there is the engagement policy followed by initial participation. 
Second, tests of compatibility occur in the phase of mutual adjustment to see whether organisation and 
regular participant can really join harmoniously. Finally, this stage is followed by a mature partnership. 
278 See HSIAO, M., "China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy Explaining China's Desire 
for Membership in the GATT" 12 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J., Spring 1994, p. 431 ff, at p. 437. Illuminating in 
this regard is also the article by DENG, o. c., supra note 237. 
279 See in general HSIAO, o. c., supra note 278, p. 439ff. 
280 JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 253, p. 10. 
281 Read, e. g., Jiang Zemin's speech at the quasi-summit on 15 November 1994, talking about how nuclear 
proliferation, AIDS prevention etc. are all of an interdependent nature and require co-operation and 
commonly observed standards. So do trade contracts and market development. FBIS-China, 15 November 
1994, p. 2. See also DENG, o. c., supra note 237, p. 320 and 329, who acknowledges a liberal undercurrent 
in the dominant realist paradigm. 
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commitments, China is devoted to economic efficiency, maximisation of economic 
growth and improvement of living standards282. 
WTO accession helps local leaders to reinforce their domestic reforms283. These reforms 
are the focal point to improve domestic performance, if they achieve success, then China 
might seek greater voice and power and a more assertive China could begin to express 
itself. In any case, WTO membership legitimises China's stance in the world community 
and the country can no longer be singled out. It will also confirm China's further 
economic integration in the world economy by adopting a free market economy and legal 
system. 
B. China's Road to WTO Accession 
Any state or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its external 
commercial relations may accede to the WTO on terms agreed with WTO Member 
States. The process of accession begins when a country submits a request for 
accession284. In 1986, after having gained observer status in 1984285, China applied to 
resume its original membership of the GATT 286, and in 1987 a working party was 
292 See again HSIAO, o. c., supra note 278, p. 446ff. 
283 See, e. g., JACOBSON, OKSENBERG, o. c., supra note 253, p. 93. 284 WTO Secretariat, Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Procedures for Negotiations under 
Article XII, WT/ACC/1 (24 March 1995), available at www. wto. org [hereinafter Accession Procedures]. 
See also JACKSON, J. and RHODES, S., "United States Law and China's WTO Accession Process", J. 
Intl Eco. L., 1999, p. 497-510. The process of Accession can be divided into an introductory phase of 
formalities and three substantive phases involving: (1) the applicant's preparation of a Memorandum on the 
Foreign Trade Regime describing in detail its policies and institutions that have a bearing on the conduct of 
international trade; (2) the members' fact finding phase that allows questions and answers; (3) the 
negotiation phase. For the accession process and strategy of transition economies, see 
MICHALOPOULOS, C., "WTO Accession for Countries in Transition", on file with author. For the 
accession procedures under GATT, see also PATTERSON, G., "The GATT: Categories, Problems and 
Procedures of Membership", 1992, Colum. Bus. L. Rev., p. 7-17. 
285 GATT Activities 1984 (1985), p. 55. Before that, the PRC had already been accepted as an observer to 
the GATT Textile Committee. By unanimous consent of all Contracting Parties, China attended the 
meetings of the GATT Council and other specialised agencies within the GATT in 1984. See GATT 
Activities 1983 (1984), p. 35. For secondary literature, see WANG, o. c., supra note 255, p. 8; FENG, Y., 
"China's Membership of GATT: A Practical Proposal", 22 J. World Trade, n° 6,1988, p. 53 (stating that 
the Chinese government submitted to the GATT a formal application requesting the restoration of China's 
status as a Contracting Party in the organisation on I1 July 1986) and LI, o. c., supra note 240, p. 39 
(contending that the Chinese ambassador in his statement on 17 June 1986 at a GATT Special Council 
Meeting indicated that China wished to participate in the Uruguay Round, leading to a Chinese government 
communication informing the Contracting Parties of its candidacy on 11 July 1986). 
286 See footnote above for secondary literature. See also GATT Activities 1986 (1987), p. 76-77. 
Membership would be negotiated under Art. XXXIII of the GATT. 
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established to consider its entry287. China renewed its application under the WTO in 
1995, when it had missed the opportunity to accept the WTO Agreement as an original 
WTO Member State, 288 and requested that the GATT working party continue its work as 
a WTO working party289. 
The accession process is conducted at both the multilateral and the bilateral level. At the 
multilateral level, a, working party prepares a Report, a Protocol of Accession, and 
Schedules of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and Services. The Protocol of 
Accession contains the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO. China acceded to the 
WTO when both the WTO members by a two-thirds majority decision and the 
Government of the PRC accepted the Protocol of Accession290. 
At the bilateral level negotiations resulted in market access for all WTO members. The 
PRC engaged in bilateral market access negotiations with WTO members on concessions 
and commitments on goods and commitments on services291. Although these bilateral and 
multilateral market access negotiations advanced very well, some political hurdles had to 
be taken along the road. The more important ones are described below. 
a. Taiwan's WTO Accession 
International organisations are created by states to serve the needs of states292. Becoming 
a member of the WTO is a political decision and for many years international politics 
overshadowed China's membership. A key factor in the delay was Taiwan's bid to join 
287 GATT Activities 1986 (1987), p. 75,108-109. 
288 Although the PRC wanted to obtain GATT membership in time for it to become an `original member' of 
the WTO, the US and other WTO members failed to agree on terms for the PRC `s entry before the 
December 1994 deadline. See GATT Activities 1993 (1994), p. 105 and "China Delay on Trade Pact", 1 N. Y 
Times, 15 December 1994, D7. 
289 Communication from China, WT/ACC/CHN/1 (7 December 1995), requested that the GATT working 
party on China's status as a Contracting Party be converted to the Working Party on China's Accession to 
the WTO. The WTO General Council agreed. See WTO Secretariat, General Council (31 January 1995): 
Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/1W1 (28 February 1995). 
290 See JACKSON, RHODES, o. c., supra note 284, p. 498; and the Accession Procedures, supra note 284. 
See also the declaration of China's membership at the Doha summit in Qatar on 10 November 2001, 
WT/L/432. 
291 See, e. g., the Sino-US Bilateral Trade Agreement of 15 November 1999, the Sino-Canada Bilateral 
Trade Agreement of 23 November 1999, and the Sino-EU Bilateral Trade Agreement of 19 May 2000. 
292 FISLER DAMROSCH, L., "GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China and the 
Former Soviet Republics, Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 1992, p. 19-38, p. 20. 
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the WT0293. Since the early 1980s the Republic of China, or Taiwan, has been eager to 
gain admission to the WT0294. As for international politics, the entrance of a regime, 
which is neither a member of the UN, nor recognised by most of the world's nations, is a 
troubling prospect295. But the candidacy for WTO membership of the PRC presented a 
further obstacle296. The position'of Taiwan and its relationship with China297 became 
evident again prior to Taiwan's presidential elections in 1996 and 1999, when the 
Chinese threatened with a military takeover of Taiwan and were launching missiles close 
to Taiwan's north and south seaports. 
Though Taiwan's Protocol of Accession was substantially completed in May 1999298, the 
PRC made clear that only after it would be admitted to the organisation, that it would be 
willing to help Taiwan joining under an appropriate name 299 . Both Hong Kong and 
Macao became members of WTO through the sponsorship of Great Britain and Portugal 
after China consented to their respective handover300. In the case of Taiwan the PRC 
always feared that allowing Taiwan into the WTO would allow it a back door entry as a 
recognised member of the world community. 
It should further be mentioned that China was a founding member of GATT 1947. It 
participated in the negotiations in 1947 and became a party to the Protocol of Provisional 
Application, which came into force in 1948. In the aftermath of the October 1949 
Communist coup, the government of the Republic of China, from its new home base in 
293 Taiwan applied to join the GATT under Art. XXXIII in September 1992 as the autonomous customs 
territory of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu (referred to as Chinese Taipe). See GATT 
Activities 1992 (1993), p. 95. 
294 See for further reference, CHAN, S., "Taiwan's Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with the 
Conclusion of the Uruguay Round", 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud., Fall 1994,275-299; and FEINERMAN, 
J., "Taiwan and the GATT', Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 1992, p. 39-60. 
295 See for further reference, HENCKAERTS, J. (Ed. ), The International Status of Taiwan in the New 
World Order: Legal and Political Considerations, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996. This work 
explains Taiwan's past and present political and legal positions in the international community. For the 
same reasons, see CHEN, L., "Taiwan's Current International Legal Status", New England Law Review, 
Spring 1998, p. 675-683. 
296 See the elaborate discussion in CAI, W., "China's GATT Membership: Selected Legal and Political 
Issues", 26 J. World Trade, n° 1, February 1992, p. 35-61, at p. 51 ff. 
297 On the relationship between China and Taiwan, see JOYNER, C., "The Spratly Islands Dispute: What 
Role for Normalizing Relations Between China and Taiwan", New England Law Review, Spring 1998, p. 
819-852. 
298 See JACKSON, RHODES, o. c., supra note 284, p. 501. 
299 The PRC is afraid to lose face in its 'one China policy' if Taiwan were to become a member first. 300 Macau was granted full membership of the GATT on I1 January 1991 and Hong Kong on 23 April 
1986. See CAI, o. c., supra note 296, p. 37. 
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Taiwan, gave notice of withdrawal from the GATT in 1950. The PRC does not 
acknowledge this withdrawal, but neither did it contest the legality at the relevant time, in 
the 1950s. Nor did the PRC observe the obligations of membership from the 1950s 
onwards301. This historical event created the difference over China's accession than well 
its resumption of membership. The Chinese Protocol of Accession starts with recalling 
that China was an original Contracting Party to GATT 1947. 
b. Human Rights Concerns 
Since 1989 there are pressing demands on China to improve its human rights record. 
These demands have overshadowed the Chinese accession debate as well. Some legal 
scholars therefore propose a "single basket approach", i. e. linking all political and 
economic dealings with China to human rights, including its WTO accession302. 
The Tiananmen massacre in June 1989303 left some wounds in the political relationships 
with major trade powers304. The US had negotiated some of its bilateral terms for the 
PRC 's accession to the GATT, but withdrew its support for accession after the June 
protests and the June meeting of the working party was cancelled due to the political 
upheaval305. The EC also condemned the Chinese Government's suppression of the pro- 
democracy demonstration 306 
301 See, e. g., FISLER DAMROSCH, o. c., supra note 292, p. 21. See also JACKSON, J., The World Trading 
System - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1997, p. 
329; and TAIT, A. and LI, K., "Trade Regimes and China's Accession to the World Trade Organisation", 
31 J. World Trade, 1997, p. 93ff, at p. 98. 
302 See, e. g., STIRLING, P., "The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human 
Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization", 11 Am. U. J. Int'1 L. & Pol 'y, 1996, p. 
1-46 (she proposes that the multilateral enforcement of human rights should be made possible through the 
investigative and dispute settlement procedures already in place within the WTO). See also GREEN, R., 
"Human Rights and MFN Tariff Rates for Products from the People's Republic of China", 17 U. Puget L. 
Rev., Spring 1994, p. 611-636; ORENTLICHER, D. and GELATT, T., "Public Law, Private Actors: The 
Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China", 14 Nw. J. Int'1 L. & Bus., Fall 1993, p. 66-129; 
and MORRIS, J., "Human Rights Violations During the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the Precedents 
Obliging United States Response", 13 Cardozo L. Rev., December 1991, p. 1375-1411. 
303 See, e. g., KRISTOF, N., "Troops Attack and Crash Beijing Protest; Thousands Fight Back, Scores are 
Killed", NY Times, 4 June 1989, p. Al. 
30' On the US response, see MORRIS, o. c., supra note 302. See also CHENEY, M., "Trading with the 
Dragon: A Critique of the Use of Sanctions by the United States against China", 8 J. Int'1 L. & Practice, 
Spring 1997, p. 1-28. 
305 JACKSON, RHODES, o. c., supra note 284, p. 500. See further ROSS, R., "Enter the Dragon", 104 
Foreign Affairs, 1996, p. 18ff., at p. 22. See also CHAN, o. c., supra note 294, p. 279 and FEINERMAN, 
o. c., supra note 294, p. 43, who both mention that the student massacre in June 1989 caused a set back in 
the WTO accession negotiations. See also CAI, o. c., supra note 296, p. 35-36 (who notes that due to the 
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But already in September 1989 GATT decided to resume consideration of the Chinese 
accession, and the working party met in December of that year307. By 1992, foreign 
investment was roaring again, and following a period of inactivity, the working party 
resumed its task in February 1992308. 
c. China's Nonmarket Economy 
Because of the ideological differences that exist between the capitalist West and the 
communist East, US statutes sometimes still constrain the ability to enter into a 
commercial agreement with a nonmarket economy3o9. With respect to China's accession 
these statutes come into play as well. Theoretically China could have become a member 
of WTO without the support of the US as soon as a two-thirds majority approved the 
accession31o. But if the US voted in favour of China's entry, it would have had to opt out 
and could not have extended permanent, unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment to 
the PRC311. So this hurdle had first to be considered by US Congress. 
Pursuant to Title IV of the in 1974 enacted Trade Act, it is required that the US President 
denies non-discriminatory treatment to products of any country whose products were not 
eligible for such treatment on 3 January 1975312. It involved products of communist 
June 1989 political disturbance the Uruguay Round did not become a success for the Chinese). Nonetheless 
the GATT working party on China's accession had reached a relatively advanced stage. See thereto GATT 
Activities 1989 (1990), p. 130. 306 On 6 June 1989, the then 12 Member States issued a joint statement of condemnation. See EC Bull. 6- 
1989, point 2.4.1. During the Madrid Summit in the same month, the EC announced sanctions against 
China. The US, Japan and other industrialised countries acted likewise. 307 JACKSON, RHODES, o. c., supra note 284, p. 500 and GATT Activities 1989 (1990), p. 130. See also 
"GATT Weighs China's Entry", NY Times, 15 September 1989, p. D2. 308 GATT Activities 1992 (1993), p. 94. 309 Particularly useful in this regard are JACKSON, RHODES, o. c., supra note 284, and McLARTY, T., 
"MFN Relations with Communist Countries: Is the Two-Decade Old System Working, or should it be 
Revised or Repealed? ", 33 Richmond L. Rev., March 1999, p. 153-226. 310 See BORICH, J., "China, The WTO, And Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China", 
www. chinaonline. com, 24 March 2000 (noting that China's bid to join the WTO is now on its own 
trajectory, and cannot be blocked by US legislative action). 311 The US would be obliged to invoke the "non-application" clause of WTO Article XIII, and China would 
certainly reciprocate. 
312 See Trade Act of 1974 § 401,19 USC § 2431 (1994). According to the legislative history of section 401 
non-discriminatory treatment should be denied to the products of communist countries except Poland and 
Yugoslavia. S. Rep. No. 93-1293 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 7186,7333. The following countries 
were ineligible to receive non-discriminatory treatment: Albania, Bulgaria, the PRC, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, those parts of Indochina under communist control or 
domination, North Korea, the Kurile Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Romania, Southern 
Sakhalin, Tanna Tuva, Tibet and the USSR. Idem. 
82 
China's WTO Accession and Domestic Reforms 
countries that deny its citizens the right to emigrate, or impose conditions on emigration. 
This Section 402, the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, contains a complicated 
scheme for determining when the US will grant non-discriminatory treatment to 
communist countries. In 1998, the term `most-favoured-treatment', which was 
interchangeably used with the term non-discriminatory treatment, was changed to 
`normal trade relations'313. 
Under Jackson-Vanik the President may extend normal trade relations status to the PRC 
only if the PRC permits free emigration. It requires him to submit a report to Congress 
twice a year certifying that the PRC is in full compliance with the freedom of emigration 
requirements. The President may waive the freedom of emigration requirements if he 
determines that the PRC is making certain progress toward the goal of free emigration. 
Presidential waivers are subject to a joint resolution of disapproval by the two Houses of 
Congress. The President can veto the joint resolution, but Congress has the authority to 
override it. To override each House must vote such action by a two-thirds vote314. 
Following the 1979 US-China bilateral trade agreement, the US first granted MFN 
treatment in 1980 and extended it every year since. The issue became controversial, 
however, after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. President Bush senior continued to 
renew MFN treatment altogether315. In 1993 Bill Clinton, a critic of the Bush 
administration, renewed MFN treatment and declared his intent to link MFN status to 
improvements in the PRC `s human rights performance. Despite some views that progress 
on human rights was limited, President Clinton renewed MFN again in 1994. At the same 
time his administration announced the intention to break the link between MFN treatment 
and human rights issues316. After passing through the US House of Representatives and 
the Senate, a historic trade bill, granting permanent normal trade relations to China, was 
signed by President Bill Clinton317. The hurdle was taken. 
313 JACKSON, RHODES, o. c., supra note 284, p. 502-503. 
3141dem, p. 503. 
315 Determination No. 90-21,55 Fed. Reg. 23,183 (1990). 
316 JACKSON, RHODES, o. c., supra note 284, p. 504. 31 See "Clinton Signs PNTR Bill into Law", www. chinaonline. com, 10 October 2000, and SNYDER, C., 
"PNTR given green light by US Senate", Ibidem, 19 September 2000. See also BERGSTEN, F., "The Next 
Trade Policy Battle", International Economics Policy Briefs, www. iie. com, January 2000, and 
HUFBAUER, G. and ROSEN, D., "American Access to China's Market: The Congressional Vote on 
PNTR", International Economics Policy Briefs, Ibidem , April 2000. For trade policy views on China's 
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Although permanent normal trade relations definitely was an issue in the US during the 
Chinese accession debate, the Jackson-Vanik amendment is not the only reminder of 
China's communist legacy in Western trade policy. More important nowadays are the 
antidumping methodologies318 both the EC and the US employ against China, based on 
the country's state-trading record. The Chinese Protocol of Accession approves of the 
continuation of these methodologies until fifteen years after China's accession. The same 
Protocol of Accession also allows for selective safeguards to be used in case of market 
disruption until twelve years upon accession. The term "market disruption" is a reminder 
of section 406 of the 1974 Trade Act, and allows for a special safeguard to be invoked 
against nonmarket economies to prevent them from flooding Western markets with cheap 
subsidised imports. Unfortunately the Protocol of Accession does not provide for detailed 
graduation criteria, but it is obvious that the success of China's domestic economic 
reforms based on the rule of law would make these antidumping and safeguard 
methodologies largely superfluous. Chapters Three and Four will discuss these issues in 
great detail. Below some aspects of these reforms are highlighted; and, it is argued that to 
avoid the state-trading or nonmarket economy label, which serves as a rational for the use 
of these discriminatory safeguards and special antidumping methodologies, and tactics, 
approved by the Protocol of Accession, China should disentangle government from 
business to convince WTO members that its enterprises are governed solely by market 
considerations. This disentanglement is most probable, only if China embraces the rule of 
law. 
Domestic Economic Reform 
The previous sections dealt with issues that are almost exclusively political and/or 
procedural and have nothing to do with the substantive economic and legal concerns of 
WTO membership. Because WTO membership impacts on so many different areas of 
economic activity, profound reforms are necessary to implement the delicate policy 
PNTR, see GROOMBRIDGE, M., "China's Long March to a Market Economy - The Case for Permanent 
Normal Trade Relations with the PRC", Trade Policy Analysis, 24 April 2000, No. 10 (CATO); and 
FAUX, J., "PNTR With China - Economic and Political Costs Greatly Outweigh Benefits", Briefing 
Paper, May 2000 (Economic Policy Institute). 
318 It should be noted that also countervailing methodologies are included, but they have not yet been 
employed so far. 
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decisions surrounding it. It should also be noted that many of these reforms take place 
through the law; and, that since reform began in China, law has played a very important 
role in the economic restructuring process. Notwithstanding this interconnection between 
economic and legal reform, this Chapter deals with them separately. 
It is about these domestic economic and legal reforms that much controversy over 
China's accession exists though. China faces the daunting task to convince fellow WTO 
members that it can comply with WTO requirements. Much of the literature is divided on 
this issue with authors usually arguing along their own partisan lines. However, most 
Western authors agree that China is ready to join the WTO, but many make reservations 
to various degrees over the reform of the economy and the legal system. Significant 
delays have occurred in China's accession because WTO members' fact finding about 
Chinese domestic reform policies merged into the negotiations about how existing 
policies needed to be changed to ensure conformity with the WTO. Therefore some 
factions within major trading partners are not entirely reassured that the Chinese 
transition economy can comply with WTO standards. As a result the Protocol of 
Accession retained some of the discriminatory trade policy instruments that traditionally 
were used on nonmarket economies or state-trading countries. The success of China's 
reform policies is of great importance to instil confidence in the Chinese economy and its 
compliance with WTO requirements. China's continued efforts in this regard should 
make it possible to graduate from its nonmarket or state-trading label. Therefore China's 
performance in restructuring its economy is directly relevant for trading partners' use of 
the specially drafted trade policy safety valves in the Protocol of Accession. 
Chapter One identified many of the steps economists regard as important in moving 
towards a full market economy including the disagreement among economists over 
sequencing reforms in order to be successful. It seems that many authors have formulated 
valuable advice for China and transition economies in general to reform their economy 
and legal system, but no author will ever tell when these reforms are really accomplished. 
In other words, all of the conditions, or prerequisites these economists have formulated 
and which were identified in the First Chapter, should certainly be part and parcel of an 
economic restructuring programme, however, as the disagreement over sequencing of 
these prerequisites shows, the question is - should they come first? Having too 
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exhaustive a list of firm preconditions before letting China graduate from its nonmarket 
economy or state-trading status, may make reformers balk due to the difficulty. 
Moreover, with such a long list of preconditions, entrenched interest groups opposed to 
increased competition from China or opposed to trade liberalisation will always say some 
prerequisites have not been met. With the fundamental question in mind of when Chinese 
reforms will allow the country to graduate from its nonmarket or state-trading label, this 
section will look at China's trade regime, and the reform of the state-enterprise sector, to 
allow indirect regulation through market-determined prices, and to replace direct 
regulation of enterprise output through the planning system319. It will ultimately become 
clear that state trading is a principle just as illusive as the rule of law and the free market. 
Nonetheless, the main criterion to determine graduation from the nonmarket economy 
label should be, whether China's state enterprises are organised along market 
considerations and are disentangled from government interference. However, this 
disentanglement will not be achieved by employing protectionist market strategies aimed 
at the discrimination of certain Chinese industries. Instead it should be achieved in an 
open dialogue and through co-operation and engagement with China. In so far as this 
entanglement of government and business creates obstacles to trade, negotiations should 
be opened to expand trade with respect for the WTO's rule orientation. 
A. State Trading and Article XVII GATT 
Article XVII GATT addresses the concerns that state trading raises. However, its 
provisions are not rigorous. Article XVII only tackles the concerns by requiring 
notification 320 and the supply of information 321. It does not prevent any member from 
establishing or maintaining state enterprises, but it demands that such enterprises shall 
319 That a link between state enterprise reform and China's trade regime exists, is proven by 
IANCHOVICHINA, E., MARTIN, W. and FUKASE, E., "Assessing the Implications of Merchandise 
Trade Liberalisation in China's Accession to WTO", World Bank, 23 June 2000. 
320 See §4 (a) of Article XVII. Members must notify all the products, which are imported or exported by 
state enterprises. On this notification requirement, see also WTO, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, WTO, 
Geneva, 1995 (hereinafter GATT Analytical Index) p. 481-482 and the Understanding on the Interpretation 
of Article XVII of GATT 1994, which tries to improve notification. Notification is done through an 
established questionnaire. 
321 See §4 (b), (c), (d) of Article XVII. 
86 
China's WTO Accession and Domestic Reforms 
respect non-discriminatory treatment322 and take into account commercial 
considerations 323. The obstacles to trade, which these enterprises can create, must 
therefore be limited in negotiations to expand international trade324. China's commitment 
to address state trading is addressed in Section 6 of its Protocol of Accession. 
Article XVII makes an important exception for government procurement, 325 which is 
addressed separately in the relevant plurilateral agreement326. The US-China Bilateral 
WTO Agreement, however, explicitly clarifies that purchases of goods or services by 
state-owned and state-invested enterprises, are not government procurement and are thus 
subject to Article XVII and WTO rules327. 
The central concern for WTO trading partners is that the Chinese government could act in 
indirect ways to influence world trade in an uneconomic direction328. Acting through state 
enterprises, it could provide protection against imports or advance exports, to the 
detriment of foreign producers. Bringing these state enterprises within the realm of 
322 According to GATT Analytical Index this involves only MFN and no National Treatment (p. 475, 
referring to early Geneva discussions). Recent case law from 1984 and 1988 did not answer the issue 
decisively. See 1984 "Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act", U5504, adopted 
on 7 February 1984,30S/140,163, para. 5.16.; and 1988 "Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of 
Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies", U6304, adopted on 22 March 1988, 
35S/37,90, para. 4.27. See also DAVEY, W., "Article XVII GATT: An Overview", in COTTIER, T. and 
MAVROIDIS, P., State Trading in the Twenty First Century, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan 
Press, 1991, p. 17-36, at p. 26. For further reference, see also KOSTECKI, M., East-West Trade and the 
GATT System, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1979, chapter 3; and State-Trading Enterprises in 
Africulture, OECD, Paris, 1998. 
32 Such as price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation etc. The idea is to afford enterprises of 
other members to compete for participation. See §1 (b) of Article XVII. 
324 See §3 of Article XVII. 
325 See §2 of Article XVII, stating that §1 shall not apply to imports of products for immediate or ultimate 
consumption in governmental use. 326 The Agreement on Government Procurement, 1994, does not come under the single package of WTO 
accession and applies only to parties, which explicitly have ratified the agreement. For further reference on 
government procurement and China, see DODDS, F., "Offsets in Chinese Government Procurement: The 
Partially Open Door", 26 L. & Poly in Int'l Bus., Summer 1995, p. 1119-1145; and LINARELLI, J., 
"China and the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement", 8 J. Chinese L., Fall 1994, p. 185-226. 
On government procurement in transition economies, see also LAIRD, S., "Transition Economies, Business 
and the WTO", WTO, May 1998. 
327 See Sino-US Bilateral WTO Agreement, 15 November 1999. It must further be noted that accession to 
the WTO by nonmarket economies that have State-trading practices is addressed in the US 1988 Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418,102 Stat. 1107. Section 1106 provides that before 
any major country with significant State-trading enterprises can enter, the US President must determine 
whether trade between the US and that country is significant, and if the trade unduly burdens the US. If so, 
WTO rules will apply only if the State trading is conducted on a commercial basis. See also § 47 of the 
Working Party Report, WTO/ACC/CHN/49. 
328 See § 44 and § 208ff of the Working Party Report, WTO/ACC/CHN/49. 
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private industry competition is therefore the main focus. In other words, State enterprises 
should learn how to behave as private competitive traders329. 
The most prominent negative effects of uncontrolled state trading are violations of market 
access obligations, and the use of proprietary directions to evade the elimination of 
quantitative measures. The disciplines on state trading, however, are contained in other 
Articles of GATT. Market access can be harmed by setting resale prices of imports at 
very high levels, and thus negate tariff concessions bound in WTO Schedules conforming 
Article II GATT330. The other prominent effect, the creation of quantitative restraints, is 
addressed in Interpretative Notes to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII. Governments 
might abuse ownership in enterprises to give directions that limit the amount of trade and 
thereby protect the domestic market, without having to issue trade-distorting legislation. 
In doing so governments create quantitative restrictions 331. It is therefore important that 
the government disentangles itself from day-to-day management in business and that 
corporate laws implement the necessary checks and balances with regard to state 
involvement. 
It is a nuisance that for its purposes Article XVII does not define `state-trading 
enterprises'. But it is clear from the text that various types of enterprises come within its 
scope: (1) a `State enterprise' or `any enterprise' that has been granted `formally or in 
effect, exclusive or special privileges' (paragraph 1(a)); (2) `Marketing Boards' 
329 However, this aim may be narrower than it appears at first blush. It may mean that behaviour along 
commercial lines is only applicable if the action at issue falls within the scope of the general principles of 
non-discriminatory treatment. This interpretation obviously reduces the potential of Article XVII to prevent 
state-trading enterprises from engaging in market access limiting activities. See DAVEY, o. c., supra note 
322, p. 27 
330 See JACKSON, J., "State Trading and Nonmarket Economies", 23 Intl Law., Winter 1989, p. 891-908, 
at p. 892. Even if there is a tariff binding for the product in question, a mark up could effectively evade the 
tariff binding. After all the provision of Article II §4 in case of monopolised state trading is hard to police, 
and furthermore many products could be unbound anyway. 
331 See LAIRD, o. c, supra note 326 (noting that state-trading countries and state-trading enterprises are 
perceived as making purchasing and sales decisions which need not be determined on the bases of the best 
price for equal quality of products or services, duplicating the effects of quantitative restrictions). See also 
JACKSON, o. c., supra note 330, p. 892 (noting that Article XI can easily be evaded by proprietary 
directions from the State owner). 
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(interpretative note to paragraph 1); (3) `any enterprise' under the jurisdiction of a 
contracting party (paragraph 1 (c)); and (4) an `import monopoly' (paragraph 4 (b)332. 
A clarification of what is considered to be a state-trading enterprise for notification 
purposes is provided in the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII. 
Members shall notify state-trading enterprises in accordance with the following working 
definition: "Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing 
boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including 
statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their 
purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports"333. 
Even without a clear definition of what constitutes a State enterprise334, it is clear that 
Chinese SOEs could come under the umbrella of Article XVII, and be scrutinised for 
their uneconomic behaviour. To fully understand state trading in China some knowledge 
about the foreign trade system in China is required. 
B. China's Foreign Trade System335 
Although Chinese WTO accession has caused a sweeping change in China's trade 
system, which will continue to be liberalised, it is fair to say that the trade system is strict 
because Chinese law imposes limitations on the capacity of Chinese enterprises to engage 
in foreign trade. Only those enterprises that have permission from the government are 
qualified to import or export goods. The ability to enter into foreign trade contracts is 
proscribed by an agency system336 and complicated procedures exist to license337 Chinese 
332 The Working Party on State trading has worked on an illustrative list showing the kinds of relationships 
between governments and State trading enterprises, and the kinds of activities engaged in by these 
enterprises. 
333 Citation taken from BHALA, R., International Trade Law - Documents Supplement, Charlottesville, 
Michie, 1996, p. 97. 
334 The US Draft Charter of GATT 1947 contained a definition of state enterprise in the section on state 
trading: "For the purposes of this Article, a State enterprise shall be understood to be any enterprise over 
whose operations a Member government exercises, directly or indirectly, a substantial measure of control". 
See for further reference GATT Analytical Index, o. a., supra note 320, p. 473. 
335 Substantial economic research concerning the reform of the foreign trade system was done by LARDY, 
N., Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1991; and 
MAN, T., "National Legal Restructuring in Accordance with International Norms: GATT/WTO and 
China's Foreign Trade Reform", 4 Ind J. Global Legal Stud, Spring 1997, p. 471-507. 
336 Under this system a Foreign Trade Corporation (FTC) enters into a contractual relationship directly with 
a production enterprise or other entity to serve as its agent in conducting purchasing and selling in the 
international market. The FTC will sign on behalf of the entity and charge a commission, but the principal 
will bear the responsibility of all of the profits and losses of the transaction. See PRC, Foreign Trade Law 
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businesses to legally contract with foreigners338. The Chinese rationale justifying these 
restraints on foreign trade is the necessity to maintain order in the foreign trade system339. 
There exists a whole range of Foreign Trade Operators (FTO) permitted to conduct 
import and export business, but apart from Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIE) and maybe 
Sino-Foreign Investment Foreign Trade Corporations (SFIFTC), the bulk of trading 
companies remain state-owned or involve state capital. These entities comprise National 
Foreign Trade Corporations (NFTC) and Local Foreign Trade Corporations (LFTC), 
Production Enterprises with Foreign Trade Rights (PEFTR), Commercial and Material 
Enterprises with Foreign Trade Rights (CMEFTR), and Science Research Institutes with 
Foreign Trade Rights (SRIFTR)340. 
This diversification of FTOs is a recent phenomenon and definitely indicates that China is 
gradually releasing its tight hold on the capacity of Chinese enterprises to engage in 
foreign trade. In this regard a 1984 landmark report from the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) ended the 30-year monopoly over foreign trade 
by NFTC and LFTC341. It has therefore become possible for a wider spectrum of Chinese 
(FTL), 12 May 1994, Art. 13; see also WANG, B., "China's New Foreign Trade Law: Analysis and 
Implications for China's GATT Bid", 28 John Marshall L. Rev., Spring 1995, p. 495-538, at p. 505-506. 
337 Art. 9 FTL, supra note 336. See WANG, o. c., supra note 336, p. 502 (also dealing with import and 
export licensing). Apart from a positive list for trading companies, there also exists a negative list for 
commodities that these companies can trade. The negative list is used to reserve a list of commodities for 
trading by specified enterprises. Firms wishing to trade in other products are required to be on a positive list 
of firms with trading rights for those particular goods. See IANCHOVICHINA, MARTIN and FUKASE, 
o. c., supra note 319. 
338 The sanction is that parties end up with a void, thus unenforceable contract if the Chinese contracting 
party has no FTR. See WILLIAMS, M., and ZHONG, J., "The Capacity of Chinese Enterprises to Engage 
in Foreign Trade: Does Restriction Help or Hinder China's Trade Relations? ", 8 J. Trans. L. & Pol'y, 
Spring 1999, p. 197-230, at p. 217ff. 
339 WILLIAMS, ZHONG, o. c., supra note 338, p. 197-98 (further arguing that this system does not support 
an orderly trade system but rather sustains disorder, leading to the separation of these enterprises from 
international markets). 
340 See WILLIAMS, ZHONG, o. c., supra note 338, p. 203ff. 341 The full text appeared in A Collection of Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China, 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fagui Huibian), Law Department of the General Office of the State 
Council of the PRC, ed., 1986. The report concluded that SFTC would remain the principal force of foreign 
trade, they should, however, not enjoy a monopoly over foreign trade operations. MOFTEC therefore 
recommended that a limited number of small- and medium-sized enterprises should be allowed to enter the 
market as complementary traders to revitalise China's foreign trade. See WILLIAMS, ZHONG, o. c., supra 
note 339, p. 201. Furthermore, it should be noted that around the same time MOFTEC had approved a 
profound decentralisation of foreign trade authority. In the beginning only 12 NFTC existed. By the mid 
1980s national production ministries created their own FTCs, and secondly provincial governments 
established hundreds of FTCs. See LARDY, o. c., supra note 335, p. 39ff (noting also that the monopoly 
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enterprises to get actively involved in international competition. In recent years China has 
begun an experimental registration system in several Special Economic Zones (SEZ). In 
the opinion of some authors, however, the partial replacement of the licensing system 
does not indicate that China's practice fully reflects the principle of free trade342. 
An important aspect of China's foreign trade system reform was the grant of Foreign 
Trade Rights (FTR) to individual SOEs. These SOEs were traditionally separated from 
international markets343. So neither could they directly import what they needed for their 
production, nor export what they produced until the 1984 MOFTEC report changed this. 
Nowadays large and medium SOEs are qualified to apply for FTR344. But the 
departments in charge of foreign trade will consider applications according to a certain 
order of priority345. Further, the application for FTR cannot be approved unless a number 
of administrative conditions are fulfilled346. Additional requirements exist when the 
applicant is a local production enterprise347. 
position eroded slowly since 1981). On decentralisation and the two-tiered foreign trade management, see 
also WANG, o. c., supra note 336, p. 497ff. 
342 WILLIAMS, ZHONG, o. c., supra note 338, p. 198-99. 
343 While prices in international markets continue to respond to changes in supply and demand, China's 
price structure appears to have diverged increasingly over time from world prices. See LARDY, o. c., supra 
note 335, p. 20 (who calls it an "airlock" system, Ibidem, p. 41). 
344 See State Council, Regulations on Transformation of the Operating Mechanism of the State-owned 
Industrial Enterprises (Transformation Regulations), promulgated 23 July 1992, and later that year State 
Council, Opinions of Granting Production Enterprises Foreign Trade Rights (FTR Opinion); see also 
MOFTEC and State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), Joint Circular on Further Promoting the 
Work of Granting the Production Enterprises FTR (Joint Circular), 30 January 1997. Similar requirements 
exist for CMEFTR. See thereto State Council, Opinion on Experimentally Granting FTR to CME (CME 
Opinion), 4 November 1993. CMEs are differentiated because they deal either with consumer goods or 
extractive products, petro-chemical products, and mechanical and electrical equipment. See WILLIAMS, 
ZHONG, o. c., supra note 338, p. 207-211. 
345 See Art. 1 FTR Opinion, supra note 344. First come priority enterprises, i. e. technology intensive 
enterprises or enterprises, which produce machinery and electrical equipment and need to provide after-sale 
services abroad or enterprises that produce and export machinery and electrical equipment. Second come 
strictly-controlled enterprises, which are enterprises mainly producing primary materials, products subject 
to quota control, or products with only a single market. Third are the flexibly-controlled enterprises, which 
are granted by evaluating the nature of demand and supply in both domestic and international markets if the 
enterprises do not produce machinery or electrical products but rather technology-intensive products or 
products with a short commercial life span. Finally there is a category of disqualified enterprises, which 
shall not be granted FTR, including core enterprises in an enterprise group that has been granted FTR, large 
SOE groups that have established a subsidiary specialising in import and export operations, or enterprises 
which have joined any export combine or joint export corporation. 
346 See Joint Circular § 1, supra note 344. An application for FTR cannot be granted unless the enterprise 
(a) is an independent economic entity which enjoys the autonomy to manage, and has separated its business 
from administration by government; (b) has its own premises and facilities for operations, funds, and other 
materials necessary for import and export operations; (c) has personnel qualified for foreign trade 
operations; and (d) produces its own products for export and meets the set export value. However, as of 
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The reform process gradually increased both the numbers of firms allowed to trade and 
the different types of firms eligible for trading rights. Moreover the traditional State- 
trading enterprises or FTCs have been awarded independent legal status and SOEs of this 
type now appear to operate very strongly along commercial lines348. Consumers and 
producers wishing to purchase imports or sell exports will typically have a range of 
enterprises through which they can undertake these transactions, because China has 
dismantled most of its national foreign trade monopolies as part of its WTO 
commitment349 
However, according to Article XVII state trading goes beyond the operation of traditional 
FTC monopolised trade. It could well encompass the production and commercial SOEs, 
either because the Chinese government directly controls the enterprise through ownership 
and, in so doing, influences the level or direction of imports or exports, or because the 
FTR it grants through a complex administrative licensing system, might be considered a 
special privilege, a statutory power350. Therefore SOEs, which have been granted FTR, 
could fall within the realm of Article XVII GATT. As a result it is important that the 
Chinese government can convince its trading partners that these enterprises operate along 
commercial lines as specified by Article XVII. 
According to some authors the administrative licensing of the capacity to engage in 
foreign trade, still has the potential to seal off SOEs from international markets and 
competition, in so far the commercial decision making is preoccupied by administrative 
decision making351. They argue that the licensing of FTR might also be regarded as a 
January 1997 the set export value requirement no longer applies to large SOEs, see WILLIAMS, ZHONG, 
o. c., supra note 339, p. 209. 
347 See FTR Opinion, supra note 344, Arts. 3 and 4. 
349 IANCHOVICHINA, MARTIN and FUKASE, o. c., supra note 319. 
349 Products still subject to state trading are listed in Annex 2A1 of the Protocol of Accession with regard to 
imports, and Annex 2A2 with regard to exports. Products subject to designated state trading are listed in 
Annex 2B of the Protocol and will be liberalised three years after accession. 
350 It is considered that the government conferring the exclusive or special privileges assumes the 
responsibility of exercising effective control over operations affecting the external trade of such enterprise. 
See GATT Analytical Index, o. c., supra note 320, p. 473 (based on the London report of the Preparatory 
Committee). 
351 WILLIAMS, ZHONG, o. c., supra note 338, p. 228. The strict control on the capacity of enterprises to 
engage in foreign trade has led to the separation of enterprises from international markets, and, 
consequently, their ignorance of international practices and rules. 
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form of quantitative trade restriction in so far it still can restrict the number of FTOs352. 
These authors also believe that the numerical surge of FTOs and the differential treatment 
amongst them erodes the uniformity in which foreign trade should be administered 353. 
However, as a result of WTO accession, China is stepping up reforms of its Foreign 
Trade regime354 and further liberalisation thereof is expected for the years to come. 
Section 5 of China's Protocol of Accession stipulates that the country will progressively 
liberalise the availability and scope of the right to trade in all goods, except for the goods 
explicitly listed to be subject to state trading. The same Section affirms the commitment 
to accord National Treatment with regard to the right to trade. 
For these SOEs with FTR to be really capable of independent commercial decision- 
making in view of Article XVII GATT, the following section will explore whether they 
are independent economic entities as required by the FTR Joint Circular3ss. 
C. State-owned Enterprise Reform 
Although statistics and figures may vary, SOEs are, in belief and fact, still the backbone 
of the Chinese economy. These enterprises produce a variety of products and do involve 
more than heavy industry. The state sector is a major institution affecting millions 
directly and the entire population indirectly. The SOEs traditionally feed, clothe, and tend 
from cradle to grave a large portion of the population, and its products and revenues 
provided to the state benefit the entire population. Therefore the function of these SOEs 
traditionally has been welfare enhancement instead of profit maximisation. 
The qualification of China as a state-trading or nonmarket economy is inextricably linked 
with the success of China's profound domestic SOE reform and the question whether 
Chinese SOEs are capable of independent commercial decision-making to satisfy WTO 
trading partners' concerns, or whether these SOEs are merely instruments of government 
policy. In this regard, China should convince trading partners that its government is 
sufficiently disentangled from day-to-day enterprise management. It appears that 
scholarly opinion is still divided concerning this issue. 
352 WANG, o. c., supra note 336, p. 504-05. 333 WANG, o. c., supra note 336, p. 521-22. ssa See, e. g., "Guangdong steps up development of foreign-trade-related private enterprises", 
www. chinaonline. com, 12 September 2000. 
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a. Initial Reform 
From the foundation of the People's Republic in 1949 to the inauguration of the 
"Economic Reform and Open Door policy" in 1978, the economy was based on public 
ownership356. Apart from state ownership, there was also state management regulating all 
personnel, finance, physical assets, production, supply and marketing affairs under the 
guidance of centralised state plans357. Therefore the enterprises did not enjoy independent 
legal status nor did they have any autonomous decision-making power358. It should be 
noted, however, that China's highly centralised command economy was not as rigid as its 
supermodel in the neighbouring Soviet Union359. Whilst the plan played a major role in 
the national economy, the state had begun to supplement it by market adjustments at the 
end of the 1970s. 
The liberalisation of the agricultural economy was the first systematic effort to 
incorporate market forces into the Chinese economy360. It allowed farmers to provide 
food products that the agricultural markets were demanding. In addition, the first step for 
enterprise reform had to readjust the management relationship between the state and the 
sss See §1 of FTR Joint Circular, note 346. 
356 See JIANG, Q., "Like Wading Across a Stream: Law, Reform and the State Enterprise", in BACHNER, 
B. and FU, H. (Eds. ), Commercial Law in the People's Republic of China: Regulation and Reform 
Affecting the Market, Hong Kong, Butterworths, 1995, p. 1. By 1978 the public sector was responsible for 
98% of the GNP and accounted for almost 100% of the industrial output, of which 77.6 % was produced by 
SOEs and 22.4 % by other Collectively-Owned Enterprises (COE) in the economy. 
35' In a traditional command economy the state is viewed as one giant vertically integrated productive firm: 
"China Inc". See CLARKE, D., "Regulation and its Discontents: Understanding Economic Law in China", 
28 Stan. J. Intl L., Spring 1992, p. 287. At the top of the system stood the State Planning Commission 
(SPC). The SPC set initial rough targets, then sent to various industrial ministries under the State Council 
and to provincial planning commissions. The ministries and provinces then disaggregated these targets and 
added requirements of their own before passing them on to particular enterprises. See CLARKE, D., 
"What's Law Got to Do With It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China", 10 UCLA Pac. Basin 
L. J., Fall 1991,1-76, at p. 5. See also DODDS, R., "State Enterprise Reform in China: Managing the 
Transition to a Market Economy", 27 Law & Pol y Int'l Bus., Spring 1996, p. 695-753, at p. 704-705. 
358 See JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 2; and ART, R. and GU, M., "China Incorporated: The First 
Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China", 20 Yale J. Intl. L, 1995, p. 273-308, at p. 277. 
Decision power rested with the Department in Charge, the so-called mother-in-law of the enterprise. 
Factory managers were responsible to the relevant ministry's bureaucracy. According to enterprise 
guidelines set out in the Seventy Policy Points for State Industries, Promulgated September 1961, the duty 
of the enterprise was strictly limited to the fulfilment of the task quotas stipulated by the state plans. 
359 See CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1992, p. 287 and CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1991, p. 6. 
360 See JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 2; and BLUMENTAL, D., "'Reform' or `Opening'? Reform of 
China's State-owned Enterprises and WTO Accession - The Dilemma of Applying GATT to Marketizing 
Economies", 16 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J., Spring 1998, p. 198-262, at p. 228. Reform spread rapidly from the 
few areas in Anhui and Sichuan provinces, the Party leaders from those provinces, Wan Li and Zhao 
Ziyang, were soon thereafter promoted to central leadership positions. 
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enterprise by delegating independent management authority to, and sharing profits with, 
the enterprise 361. 
b. Main Approaches 
The reform strategy that has been implemented is best described as a gradual dual-track 
approach362 (shuang gui zhi), characterised by the coexistence of a `new' market track363 
and `old' plan track3M. It caused some ideological difficulty to legitimise profit-seeking 
private enterprises365. But as a result of the reforms, the private, new track economy soon 
started to supplement the state industry. Today large numbers of private medium and 
small businesses operate in China's economy, such as the Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs)366. The Chinese government now even encourages individuals and 
private firms to buy smaller SOEs to become full owners. Usually it concerns enterprises 
the government deems itself unable to manage367. This obviously has an impact on 
361 Agriculture was essentially decollectivised, with each household making its own decisions on 
production. See CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1992, p. 285-286. About rural collectives, see DODDS, 
sura note 357, p. 701, and about agricultural reform at p. 706. 
362 See CAO, Y., FAN, G. and WOO, W., "Chinese Economic Reforms: Past Successes and Future 
Challenges", in WOO, W., PARKER, S. and SACHS, J. (Eds. ), Economies in Transition - Comparing Asia 
and Europe, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997, p. 20. This dual-track approach pervades almost every aspect of 
policy making. One encounters it in sectoral reform, price deregulation, enterprise restructuring, regional 
development, trade promotion, foreign exchange management, central-local fiscal arrangements, and 
domestic currency issuance. See also LARDY, N., China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington DC, 1998, p. Iff(about China's Economic Reform Strategy). 
363 The `new' track is the non-state sector, which consists of private and semi-private enterprises, 
community-owned rural industrial enterprises (often referred to as township and village enterprises, TVEs), 
and foreign joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises. 
364 The `old' track consists of the state sector. 
363 Because private business conflicts with socialist ideology, it was resolved by distinguishing at first 
between "individual" enterprises (geti jingji) and "private" enterprises (siying fing: ). The former are 
essentially based on a person's own labour and may employ a few workers without really changing its 
nature, the latter, however, relied on hired labour and hence raised issues of worker exploitation. In 1987, 
the then General Secretary of the party, Zhao Ziyang, advanced the notion that China was in the "primary 
stage of socialism". This means that in a predominant public sector, the private sector may contribute 
production and employment. See ART and GU, o. c., supra note 358, p. 286; and BLUMENTAL, o. c., 
supra note 360, p. 221. Last author therefore calls China "a strange hybrid in which diverse forms of 
ownership coexist, often in tension with each other. " See also DODDS, o. c., supra note 356, p. 703-704. 
366 See "Most of China economy not state-owned, International Finance Corp. says", 
www. chinaonline. com, 26 October 2000. This requires also new law reforms, see "One size does not fit all: 
New laws tailored for private sector", www. chinaonline. com, 18 October 2000, noting that China will draft 
new business laws to fit private enterprises. 
367 These enterprises mainly fall into three categories: enterprises that are insolvent or near bankruptcy; 
businesses suffering from losses or earning only minimal profits over an extended term; or those selected 
for sale "to perfect the structure of industry". See ART and GU, o. a., supra note 358, p. 287. See also 
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competition with private companies competing with SOEs causing the latter's profits to 
decline368. 
As some authors point out, a gradual reform was adopted, not because there were no 
proposals for more radical reforms, but because at the end of the 1970s most ordinary 
people had not yet totally lost their trust in the old system369. It was popularly believed 
that the economic problems came from the implementation of the political struggle370 and 
not from the defects of the central planning system. Gradualism was more of an ex post 
facto description of an unintended evolutionary process 371 
To many authors, politics still is at the centre of gradualism. The transition to a market- 
oriented economy invariably produces dislocation and social stress, causing uncertainty 
and discontent. The possibility of unrest372 is a political problem for the Chinese 
government, which fears massive restructuring will have devastating political 
consequences for the Party bureaucracy 373. The lack of political willingness to carry out 
ZHANG, L., "Forms and Legal Application of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Restructuring and Merger 
& Acquisition by Foreign Investors", China Law, February 2001, p. 97. 
368 About the structure of the market in China, see SONG, B., "Competition Policy in a Transitional 
Economy: The Case of China", 31 Stan. J. Int'1 L., Summer 1995, p. 387-422. See also DODDS, idem note 
361, who notes that large numbers of rural workers were able to leave farming to set up small private 
businesses and to work in township and village enterprises. They began to compete with the SOEs for 
investment, goods and funds, which caused the latter's profits to decline. The increase in agricultural prices 
also eroded SOE profits and caused the urban costs of living to rise. 
369 CAO, FAN, WOO, o. c., supra note 362, p. 31. Authors note that the majority of the society and the 
leadership in 1978 were not in favour of a radical reform package because the economic situation then was 
improving rapidly. 
370 Crucial here was the end of the decade-long Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping returned quickly to 
power after the ultra-leftist Gang of Four was arrested by Mao's would-be successor Hua Guofeng, hereby 
ending the Cultural Revolution. Groundbreaking herein was the Communique of the Third Plenary Session 
in late December 1978. See also BLUMENTAL, o. c., supra note 360, p. 226. 371 CAO, FAN, WOO, o. c., supra note 362, p. 31. Authors note that very few people knew what to do in 
1978. Participants might have known what the first "piece" should be, but might not know what the next 
one should be. They also note the absence of a common vision at the elite level. China's gradual reform has 
been characterised by gradual changing of its reform objectives. China has proceeded through a lengthy 
path of readjusting its reform objectives from "a planned economy with some market adjustment", to "a 
combination of plan and market" and now to "a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics". 
The last vision has apparently resolved the issue. See also YANG, D., Calamity and Reform in China - 
State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine, Stanford, Stanford UP, 1996 
(arguing that next to the role of plans by revisionist leadership and the Cultural Revolution rural reforms 
incubating later reforms, are also due to the Great Leap Famine). 
372 E. g. after a trial bankruptcy experiment of a large state-owned knitting mill in Chongqing, 2000 laid-off 
workers marched on city hall in protest and government leaders were only able to avoid riots by going to 
extraordinary lengths to reassign workers to other jobs. See DODDS, o. c., supra note 356, p. 723. See also 
AUGUST, 0., "5,000 Chinese protest over unpaid wages", The Times, 18 May 2000. 
373 See BLUMENTAL, o. c., supra note 360, p. 202. 
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painful reforms of inefficient, unprofitable enterprises is believed by these authors to 
cause China's marketisation efforts to stagnate374. 
This view is reinforced by words of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who emphasised that 
maintaining political stability is of primary importance375. Because of the political risks376 
involved, China may hesitate to implement far-reaching and necessary economic 
reforms377. Seemingly a considerable number of reformers in the PRC still believe in the 
old track economy, and that it should be revitalised. 
Apart from these political consequences, gradualism raises the issue among economists, 
whether the two tracks, state and private, should be merged as rapidly as possible378. The 
state has used the revenue from the more productive new sectors not only to cover the 
losses of the SOEs in the old sector but also to upgrade these SOEs. Some authors 
therefore regret that the old track has not shrunk proportionately as rapidly as it should 
have. The most important challenge for these authors is not how to speed up the growth 
of the new track, but how to ensure that the old track does not grow as well. 
c. Management Responsibility System 
At the end of 1986, China adopted a management responsibility system (MRS), which 
enabled the management to contract out state assets, and to keep the earnings above the 
34 BLUMENTAL, o. c., supra note 360, p. 209. 
375 At the 15th Party Congress, Jiang stated that "[1lt is of the utmost importance to maintain a stable 
political environment and public order (... ). We must uphold the leadership of the Party (... ) eliminate all 
factors jeopardising stability, and guard against (... ) subversive (... ) domestic hostile forces. " Cited by 
BLUMENTAL, o. c., supra note 360, p. 216. 
376 See CHAN, V., "Exterminate foes of reform: Jiang - President tries to balance `leftists' and rightists"', 
South China Morning Post, 23 August 2000; and JOUNG, J., "Zhu Rongji Pushes China to an East 
European-style Moment of Truth", www. chinaonline. com; both noting a dangerous political conflict in 
China between pro-reform and conservative forces. 
37 Such as implementing the Bankruptcy Law. See infra note 381. 
376 See CAO, FAN, WOO, o. c., supra note 362, p. 32. LARDY, o. c., supra note 362, p. 3. He notes that the 
economic cost of postponing fundamental transformation of the state sector is overlooked. On the pace of 
reforms, see also THOMAS, V. and WANG, Y., "East Asian Lessons from Economic Reforms", in WOO, 
PARKER, SACHS (Eds. ), l. c., supra note 362, p. 217-241; and CASS, R., "Macro-Economic Changes 
from Centralized to Market Economies: Big Bang v. Gradual Change: The Optimal Pace of Privatisation", 
13 B. U. Int'1 L. J., Fall 1995, p. 413f. On the issue of privatisation, see further BAKER, M., "Privatisation 
in the Developing World: Panacea for the Economic Ills of the Third World or Prescription Overused", 18 
N. Y. L. Sch. J. Int'1 & Comp. L., 1999, p. 233ff; and HAVRYLYSHYN, O. and McGETTIGAN, D., 
"Privatization in Transition Countries: Lessons of the First Decade", IMF, August 1999. See also note 392. 
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level it contractually owed the state, in order to provide money for expansion, 
reinvestment, higher wages and more fringe benefits for the employees379. 
This resulted from the growing intention in the 1980s to create an enterprise that was 
relatively independent, a socialist commodity producer, and an independent business 
manager380. If such an enterprise conducts its own business, it would be responsible for 
its own profits and losses381, and be capable of reforming and developing itself according 
to law. 
To succeed, power had to be delegated to the management of the enterprises to determine 
production schedules, purchase supplies, marketing strategies, investment decisions, 
hiring, firing, rewarding, and pricing, on the condition that the enterprises respect the 
state plans and regulations382. It also enhanced the recognition that SOEs, like other 
enterprises, should have the status of legal person383. Gradually, planning decreased while 
pricing for commodities was liberalised. 
To make enterprises sensitive to the difference between costs and revenues, the 
government required since 1981 that capital construction projects for SOEs had to obtain 
379 This is sometimes also referred to as "contract responsibility system" (CRS). See JIANG, o. c., supra 
note 356, p. 4. ART and GU, o. a., supra note 358, p. 279. See also DODDS, o. c., supra note 357, p. 707- 
708 and 724ff. In 1979 the government began allowing some firms to retain a portion of their profits after 
meeting their obligations under the state plan, by 1980 it had implemented profit retention plans 
nationwide, and it began introducing work-related pay and bonuses. After meeting their plan targets, SOEs 
could make purchases and sales on the market. A dual track system emerged under which most goods had a 
plan price and a market price. See further also XU, L., "Determinants of the Re-partitioning of Property 
Rights between the Government and State Enterprises", World Bank, March 1997. 
380 JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 3; ART and GU, o. c., supra note 358, p. 278-279. 381 An example is the introduction of the PRC Bankruptcy Law, enacted by the 6`h NPC on 2 December 
1986. See in this regard MONTFORT, M., "Reform of the State-owned Enterprise and the Bankruptcy Law 
in the People's Republic of China", 22 Oklahoma City U. L. Rev., Fall 1997, p. 1067-1123. 
382 Decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of china on the Reform of the Economic 
System ('1984 Decision'), passed on 20 October 1984. Another milestone, the State-Owned Industrial 
Enterprise Law of the PRC (SOIEL) was enacted on 13 April 1988, by the First Session of the 7t' NPC. It 
formally restricted many of the powers of the Department in Charge (See note 358), but it provided these 
rights only subject to "regulations of the State Council". This left the limits of SOE autonomy vague and 
open to official arbitrariness. See JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 3-4. See also BLUMENTAL, o. a., supra 
note 360, p. 229-230 and ZHENG, H., "Business Organization and Securities Laws of the People's 
Republic of China", 42 Bus. Law., February 1988, p. 549-619, at p. 558ff. 
383 Article 41, General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC (GPCL), 12 July 1986, Effective 1 January 
1987. Article 48 sets forth that the enterprise must meet its civil obligations and Article 82 states that the 
enterprise enjoys the right to manage the assets as authorised by the State. See also ZHENG, o. c., supra 
note 382, p. 553ff. 
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their funds through interest-bearing bank loans instead of from government sponsored 
interest-free capital appropriations384. 
The management responsibility system had its shortcomings, though385. The management 
contracts encouraged short-term behaviour and neglected long-term investments in order 
to maximise profits during the contract period. Managers were not always punished for 
failure. The contract system was also too rigid for China's rapidly changing economic 
environment, causing the government to adopt a policy of lowering contract targets when 
external events made it difficult for enterprises to fulfil their contractual obligations. It 
made the enforcement of contracts discretionary and weakened their incentive effects. So 
in January 1994 the government stopped initiating responsibility contracts, with existing 
contracts expiring in 1996-97. The new system that would have to establish independent 
enterprise management was corporatisation. 
d. Corporatisation 
In the early 1990s, the southern tour by Deng Xiaoping and his remark that the "planned 
economy is not equivalent to socialism, nor is the market economy equivalent to 
capitalism" reaffirmed the commitment of the state to economic reform. In October 1992, 
the 14'h Chinese Communist Congress declared that the party would strive to establish a 
"socialist market economy"386. Around the same time new laws tried to radically reshape 
the financial composition of the state enterprise as a budgetary unit of the state's financial 
plan, with the objective of course to achieve a balance of enterprise funds rather than to 
384 CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1992, p. 296. 
385 See in this regard XU, L., "The Productivity Effects of Decentralized Reforms: An Analysis of the 
Chinese Industrial Reforms", World Bank, s. d. (noting p. 30 that adopting the Management Responsibility 
System and raising profit retention rates, probably the most important reforms as viewed by the Chinese 
government and many scholars, did not improve productivity much; in fact, there is weak evidence that 
MRS even might have reduced productivity growth). 
386 JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 5. These reforms were legally consolidated in inter alia the 1992 
Regulations, which redefined the SOIEL (supra note 382) in terms of meeting the needs of the market. See 
State Council, Regulations for the Transformation of Management Mechanisms of the State Industrial 
Enterprises (1992 Regulations), Promulgated on 23 July 1992. The decrease in government intervention 
impacted areas such as product pricing, mandatory planning, business operations, technical innovations, 
labour and personnel affairs and the internal income distribution. See also BLUMENTAL, o. c., supra note 
360, p. 231. Only the right to negotiate foreign trade contracts had not been delegated to the enterprises. 
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reimburse costs to the state. Accountancy laws improved, to some degree, the fiscal 
responsibility and accounting of assets and capital387. 
To clarify the separation of the right to own from the right to manage in the public 
economic sector the constitution was changed388. The 1993 Communist Party Decision389 
called for further renovations of the state enterprise system to effectively separate the 
government administration from enterprise management, and to end the dependency by 
state enterprises on bureaucratic government agencies 39o This policy document inspired 
the 1993 Company Law391. 
The Company Law reaffirms China's commitment to socialism, and China's reform 
programme therefore is different from the kind of privatisation experienced by the 
nations of Eastern Europe392. What has happened in China is preferably called 
387 See, e. g., Ministry of Finance, General Provisions for Enterprise Finance (GPEF), and the Regulations 
for Enterprise Accounting (REA), Promulgated with the approval of the State Council, on 30 November 
1992, Effective 1 July 1993. See also JIANG, o. a., supra note 356, p. 6. For further reference, see YANG, 
J. and YANG, J., Handbook of Chinese Accounting, Hong Kong, Hong Kong UP, 1999 and TANG, Y., 
CHOW, L. and COOPER, B., Accounting and Finance in China, Hong Kong, Pearson, 3`d ed., 1996. China 
is apparently planning to bring its accounting systems in line with international practice, see "China to 
overhaul accounting system", www. chinaonline. com, 14 November 2000. 
388 The First Session of the 8t' NPC amended Article 16 to change "state-run enterprise" into "state-owned 
enterprise". See also JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 8. 
389 Decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on a Few Issues in Establishing 
the Socialist Market Economic System, adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Chinese 
Communist Party Congress ('1993 Decision'), on 14 November 1993. See JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 
8-9. The 1993 Decision goes further than the 1984 Decision (supra note382), which only assured the 
separation of the right to own an enterprise from the right to manage one. According to the 1993 Decision 
the state changes its role from the administrative authority in charge of the enterprise to the investor, or 
shareholder of the company. The State is only entitled to normal shareholder rights and cannot interfere 
directly in the management. The enterprise acquires the legal rights to dispose of the assets of the 
enterprise, which it must manage independently and assume sole responsibility for profits and losses. 
Shareholders are only responsible for the liabilities to the extent of their investment. See also DODDS, o. c., 
s ra note 357, p. 710-711. 
3 For a clear picture of initial bureaucratic involvement and Communist Party involvement in these 
enterprises, see ZHENG, o. c., supra note 382, p. 559f 
391 PRC, Company Law, adopted at the 5th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th NPC, on 29 
December 1993, Effective 1 July 1994. See ART and GU, o. c., supra note 358, p. 280; and HAN, A., 
"China's Company Law: Practising Capitalism in a Transitional Economy", 5 Pac. Rim L. & Poly J., July 
1996, p. 457-507. 
392 These economies, together with the former Soviet Union, experienced shock treatment economic 
programmes in which transfer of ownership stood central. To date some members of the Chinese leadership 
are still convinced that expanding the autonomy of SOE `s without changing ownership is the way to solve 
the current problems in SOE `s. For a comparative view with China, see DODDS, o. c., supra note 357, p. 
746ff, see generally also WOO, W., PARKER, S. and SACHS, J. (Eds. ), Economies in Transition - 
Comparing Asia and Europe, Lc., supra note 362. It is generally argued that China has achieved its 
economic boom by applying a policy of gradual reform, rather than large-scale privatisation. Gradual 
reforms have provided a stable environment for investment and allow time for the development of laws and 
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corporatisation or stockification, which entails the restructuring of enterprises, adopting 
the corporate form, and instituting stock ownership, and, consequently, stock trading 
without necessarily relinquishing the state's controlling interest in the means of 
production393. The idea is still that the state continues to regulate the economy, but as a 
sovereign implementing policies of general application rather than as an owner micro- 
managing individual enterprises39a Most authors agree that China's stock markets, 
however, have not replaced the role of the state with a capital market system395. They 
facilitate financing, however, by channelling consumer savings into productive 
enterprises. 
Since the 1993 Decision, the Chinese government has encouraged break ups and mergers 
to reshuffle enterprises to conform them to required norms396. This was done in the first 
place to avoid major bankruptcies. Other SOEs have been put together to form groups to 
organise strategic alliances meant to create economies of scale397. 
institutions essential to both a properly functioning market economy and a privatisation programme. On the 
importance of institution building see KOLODKO, G., "Ten Years of Postsocialist Transition: the Lessons 
for Policy Reforms", World Bank, April 1999. According to CAO, FAN, WOO five factors generated 
growth in China: 1) initial economic structures, 2) integration into the global economy, 3) saving 
behaviour, 4) two disastrous leftist campaigns, and 5) overseas investment. See CAO, FAN, WOO, o. c., 
supra note 362, p. 28ff. 
39 The opening of securities exchanges in Shanghai in December 1990, and Shenzhen in June 1991, may 
have created a structure, whereby state agencies no longer manage the details of day-to-day operations, but 
government administrative agencies have retained controlling rights through ownership of key state and 
legal person shares. See hereto BLUMENTAL, o. c., supra note 360, p. 223. See also DODDS, o. c., supra 
note 357, p. 712. He calls the Chinese strategy a strategy of marketisation, introducing markets and 
competition without relinquishing control over SOEs. On the explanation of corporatisation, see also p. 
727ff. 
39" See in this regard CLARKE, D., o. c., supra note 357,1992, p. 289. 395 See DODDS, o. c., supra note 357, p. 709. He writes that already in the mid 1980s local authorities and 
entrepreneurs set up small, unofficial securities markets in a number of cities around the country. On capital 
markets in China, see further, e. g., ZHANG, J., "Securities Markets and Securities Regulation in China", 22 
N.. C. J. 1nt'1 L. Com. Reg., Winter 1997, p. 557-630; DALY, B., "Of Shares, Securities, and Stakes: The 
Chinese Insider Trading Law and The Stakeholder Theory of Legal Analysis", 11 Am. U. J. Intl L. & 
Pol 'y, 1996, p. 971-1026; QIAN, A., "Why Does Not the Rising Water Lift the Boat? Internationalization 
of the Stock Markets and the Securities Regulatory Regime in China", 29 Intl Lawyer, Fall 1995, p. 615- 
632; HOLMES, W., "China's Financial Reforms in the Global Market", 28 L. & Poly in Int'1 Bus., Spring 
1997, p. 715-777; KONG, K., "Prospects for Asset Securitization Within China's Legal Framework: The 
Two-tiered Model", 32 Cornell Int'1 L. J., 1998, p. 237-271; and YAO, C., China's Financial System under 
Transition, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998. See also PRC, Securities Law, Adopted by the Sixth Session of 
the Ninth National People's Congress Standing Committee on 29 December 1998. 
3% See, e. g., "International mergers and acquisitions will attract foreign capital, says MOFTEC", 
www. chinaonline. com, 11 October 2000 (noting that M&A has been an important focus of research). 
397 See DODDS, o. c., supra note 356, p. 735-737. See also HUCHET, J., "The Hidden Aspect of Public 
Sector Reforms in China", 32 China Perspectives, November-December 2000, p. 37-48. 
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e. Social Costs 
Despite these reforms, the state-run system has suffered chronically from losses, 
inefficiency, and insufficient productivity. A substantial portion of workers is xia gang398. 
According to some economists, the government's use of state enterprises, for both 
production and delivery of welfare services, constitutes a further structural 
impediment399. 
Many of the difficulties in creating a market economy by downsizing the SOE track are 
associated with accounting for the irrational debt liabilities, employees' support 
programmes, and extensive social commitments. Because the state's social security 
reform40° lags behind enterprise reform, the insurance funds for retirement, 
unemployment"', medical care and labour casualties must be generated from diminishing 
enterprise resources and state funds402. The Chinese government recognises these 
problems, and agrees to make additional investments in a social safety net independent 
from SOEs. The absence of a proper social safety net eventually leads to the 
postponement of fundamental reforms causing in turn severe damage to the Chinese 
financial system as one renowned China observer has noted403. 
398 See ART and GU, o. c., supra note 358, p. 277. Xia gang or off-post is a euphemism for workers who are 
employed on paper but are not expected to report for work and thus are paid only a fraction of their 
? revious income. 
99 Chinese enterprises routinely provide their workers with housing, medical care, pensions and a host of 
other social services as part of the "iron rice-bowl" or lifetime employment and social benefits. See ART 
and GU, o. c., supra note 358, p. 278. This is an important reason why bankruptcies of inefficient 
enterprises are so few. 
400 See, e. g., LEE, P., "Reforming the Social Security System in China", in NAGEL, S. and MILLS, M. 
(Eds. ), Public Policy in China, London, Greenwood Press, 1993, p. 33-52; and SUN, G., "Health Care 
Administration in China", Ibidem, p. 53-62. 
401 See, e. g., "Bank of China to layoff 15,000 employees", www. chinaonline. com, 19 October 2000. 
Nevertheless WTO is generally believed to create new jobs in the private sector, see MARLOW, K., "WTO 
Deal to Bring China Jobs, Says Economist", www. chinaonline. com, 16 November 1999. 
402 JIANG, o. c., supra note 356, p. 12-13. On the social costs of market reform, see GRAHAM, C., 
"Strategies for Addressing the Social Costs of Market Reforms: Lessons for Transition Economies in East 
Asia and Eastern Europe", in WOO, PARKER and SACHS, o. c., supra note 362, p. 325-355. China is 
apparently serious about beefing up its social security programmes; see "China earmarks US$ 652 million 
for social security", www. chinaonline. com, 1 August 2000. 
403 See especially LARDY, o. c., supra note 362, p. 4-5. Unwilling to tolerate urban employment that would 
accompany the widespread bankruptcy of loss-making firms, the state assumed the burden of subsidising 
growing losses through fiscal subsidies and, increasingly, through so-called policy loans from the state- 
owned banks. This resulted in huge financial liabilities on the part of Chinese firms. The reason for 
borrowing such large sums is that they are obligated to provide a broad range of social services that should 
be financed from the government budget. On financial reform, see also YANG, H., Banking and Financial 
Control in Reforming Planned Economies, Macmillan Press, London, 1996. 
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D. Compliance with Article XVII GATT 
Let us now return to the main concern of Article XVII GATT, viz. that maintaining 
China's large State-owned economic presence could enable the country to evade the 
effective responsibilities and policies of GATT/WTO even though such an economy can 
be in complete conformity with the technical rules of GATT404. It appears that scholarly 
opinion is divided on the question whether Chinese SOEs can operate according to 
commercial business practice. Some scholars doubt that China's corporatisation efforts 
have disentangled the government from business, whereas others argue that there is a lack 
of transparency regarding government involvement, which makes it difficult to gauge the 
effects. 
a. Transparency and State Trading 
As was discussed earlier, China has thoroughly decentralised foreign trade beyond the 
original handful of centrally controlled FTC405. And China has made further 
commitments to liberalise foreign trade in its Protocol of Accession. The large number of 
existing trading firms engaging in import and export make it therefore very difficult to 
subject these FTC to deliberate government policies preventing them from operation 
along commercial business practice. Besides, these FTC are subject to competition from 
FIE and other private-invested FTC, which forces them to adjust for their own survival. 
Broadly there are only two groups of commodities for which the number of firms entitled 
to engage in trade is tightly restricted406. These products are typically handled by one or a 
few designated FTO, making direct control of the quantities imported and exported very 
practical. This regime is an important special feature of the Chinese trade system, but 
very much a minority part of the overall system. Furthermore, it should be stressed that 
404 JACKSON, o. c., supra note 330, p. 892. 
405 In mid 1999, MOFTEC reported that there were around 9,000 FTC. The number of SOEs and private 
firms with trading rights for their own products had risen to 12,000 and around 300,000 FIEs had trading 
rights for their own products. See IANCHOVICHINA, E., MARTIN, W. and FUKASE, E., o. c., supra note 
319. 
406 These involve on the one hand grain, vegetable oils, sugar, tobacco, crude oil, refined oil, chemical 
fertiliser, cotton and on the other hand rubber, timber, plywood, wool, acrylics, and steel products. See 
Annexes 2A and 2B of the Chinese Protocol of Accession. 
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China is not the only WTO member employing state trading. The heavy reliance on it for 
agricultural trade in many major trading partners raises general concerns407. 
The main problem with state trading, however, seems to be Article XVII GATT itself. 
This Article calls for transparency without exactly defining the scope of what is 
considered to be state trading, except for notification purposes. Depending on how wide 
one interprets its scope, the broader the concern will be. Because Article XVII is rather 
open-ended, state trading runs the risk of becoming a stopgap for all the sins of China's 
enterprise reform. Critics and opponents of China's WTO accession might use the state- 
trading label for all what they see as flaws in the process of domestic reform and lacks 
private initiative. Notwithstanding the mystery that surrounds Article XVII GATT, it 
should be argued that China, in order to let its SOEs make decisions along the lines of 
normal commercial business behaviour, should continue its efforts, especially in the field 
of corporate governance. 
b. Corporate Governance 
Many authors agree that getting the government out of business has proven to be a 
persistent problem from the outset of SOE reform408, despite clear language in the 1993 
Decision, inspiring the Company Law, that the state is only entitled to normal shareholder 
rights and cannot interfere directly in the management409. The Company Law may be a 
legal milestone to corporatise SOEs by converting them into shareholding companies, the 
changes it specifies, however, are cosmetic according to some scholars, who especially 
criticise Articles 4 and 58 of the PRC Company Law41o. They would argue the law falls 
407 See generally State Trading Enterprises in Agriculture, OECD, Paris, 2001. 
408 BLUMENTAL, o. c., supra note 360, p. 228, but see also SUN, X., "Reform of China's State-Owned 
Enterprises: A Legal Perspective", 31 St. Mary's L. J., 1999, p. 19-47; and WANG, W., "Reforming State 
Enterprises in China: The Case for Redefining Enterprise Operating Rights", 6 J. Chin. L., Fall, 1992, p. 
89-135. 
409 See note 389. 
410 Article 58 unambiguously holds that "any government official may not hold the position of chairman of 
the board of directors, or supervisor or president of a company". SUN, o. c., supra note 408, p. 31-32, 
argues that, through packing and restructuring, many SOEs have changed only in name and that in the list 
of company management, one still finds the names of government officials. Article 4 is criticised for 
contradicting international practice, for it states, "the ownership of state property in a company is vested in 
the state". An investor who contributes his property to the company conveys ownership rights over the 
particular property to the company; in return, the investor receives an equity interest. If an investor, such as 
the government, is allowed to retain ownership rights over the property already invested into the company, 
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short of providing enterprises and managers with the corporate tools they need to build 
modem companies and maximise efficiency, because administrative agencies holding 
controlling shares can still interfere directly in the day-to-day management and affairs of 
the company411 -a feature earlier reforms already tried to bring to extinction without 
success. 
Another scholar notes that, under the Company Law, the state and the company (with its 
investors) receive certain legal rights that are ambiguous and at odds412. While enterprises 
obtain the right of autonomous operations, the state retains legal ownership of state- 
owned assets, according to Article 4 Company Law, and the internal governance system 
causes to raise conflicting interests and rights between the state, the company, private 
shareholders, and labour representatives. Of concern is the notion that enterprises must 
operate under government and CCP supervision413. 
Corporatisation can only be called a success if it achieves two levels of separation, viz. 
first, when the state's regulatory and administrative powers would be separated from its 
enterprise ownership rights; and, second, when ownership and management rights would 
be separated414. The critics contend that the State with its highly concentrated ownership 
is unlikely to play the role of a passive investor and with the continued fears of social 
unrest will continue to intervene in SOE operations. A proper separation between, and 
balance of, ownership and control is by no means determined by law directly. It is rather 
achieved through the owner's voluntary avoidance of interfering in the exercise of 
ownership functions415. 
that ownership will conflict with the company's ownership of its own property. SUN at p. 33 rightly 
believes that this prevents a clear definition of ownership rights in the company. 
411 Articles 66 and 67, PRC Company Law. It should be noted, however, that it concerns only wholly state- 
owned enterprises. 
42 NIKKEL, M., "'Chinese Characteristics' in Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's 
Company Law", 80 Minn. L. Rev., December 1995, p. 503-542. 
413 See in this regard the excellent study of the tension between the enterprise's right of autonomous 
operations and the government's right of supervision, by MATIAS, J., "From Work-Units to Corporations: 
The Role of Chinese Corporate Governance in a Transitional Market Economy", 12 NY Int'! L. Rev., 
Winter 1999, p. 1-54. 
414 DODDS, o. c., supra note 357, p. 730ff. 
415 DODDS, o. c., supra note 357, p. 731-733 (noting that many questions in the Company Law remain 
unanswered, such as, what percentage of ownership the state reserves, who will represent the State, or how 
will the ownership claims of multiple supervisory government units be handled. The law does not explain 
how a conflict between State and private shareholders should be handled, and does not protect minority 
shareholders. Finally, not much is known about fiduciary duties). 
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Many authors therefore believe that only privatisation can save SOE reform, and it should 
be noted that the Chinese government has acknowledged these calls for the divestiture of 
state-owned assets. On September 22,1999, the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee reaffirmed the goal of state-owned enterprise reform in its Decision on Major 
Issues Concerning State-Owned Enterprise Reform and Development. The decision 
indicated that various reforms should be adopted for medium and small enterprises, 
which basically mean their privatisation, but also allows for the government to sell off 
more state shares in large SOEs416 
Despite the criticism from Western as well as Chinese scholars, who point out some 
weaknesses in Chinese corporate governance, to the extent that proprietary directions by 
the government meddling with business are possible, it should be concluded that, for the 
purposes of Article XVII, it is unlikely that unwanted government interference on the 
microeconomic level will amount to concerted policy action by the central Chinese 
government on the macroeconomic level, simply because China's economy is far too 
decentralised. As far as corporate governance is concerned, and the fine-tuning of its 
Company Law, I believe that China's efforts to create a transparent legal system will also 
pay off its company reforms, and will contribute to the government's disentanglement 
from business. 
III. Domestic Legal Reform 
Chapter One mentioned the importance of building a legal system to accommodate free 
market principles and economic reforms in this regard. The instrumental approach China 
takes in view of the law means that much of its economic reforms have been initiated 
through legislation. As with creating a free market, building a legal system according to 
the rule of law encounters a list of preconditions, which the previous Chapter tried to 
identify as the separation of powers, judges' independence, respect for individual 
fundamental rights and freedoms, the legality of administrative action, control of 
legislation and administration by the independent judiciary, and other legal professions. 
However, the rule of law as well as the free market economy are illusive principles and 
remain Western philosophical concepts from which China stands culturally remote. 
416 See, e. g., ZHANG, o. c., supra note 397. 
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China's WTO membership, nonetheless, requires the country to apply and administer in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other measures of 
the central and local governments. China also has to maintain impartial and independent 
tribunals, contact points and procedures for the prompt review of all administrative 
actions relating to the implementation of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application417. In this regard China's Protocol of 
Accession provides for a number of detailed clauses. A linchpin article as far as legal 
system requirements are concerned is Article X GATT418, which is sometimes referred to 
as the "transparency clause". 
At the time Article X GATT was drafted, transparency had not the `veil dropping' 
meaning it has in the present WTO, but replicated very much the American approach to 
emerging administrative law in the 1920s and 1930sa19. Since the establishment of the 
WTO, however, transparency of the legal system has become a vastly expanded concept 
and now requires e. g. publication of laws, regulations, and the mode of administration in 
tradable services or, to a more limited extent, investment regimes420. 
To satisfy the transparency requirement China's accession to the WTO obliges the 
Chinese government to make China a more rule-based society than it has ever been. 
Significant efforts in the last decade have improved China's situation greatly421, and more 
reforms are still underway. 
417 See Article 2(A), 2(C) and 2(D) of the Protocol of Accession. 418 The need for legal institutions can be found in several articles of different WTO texts. The WTO 
Agreements cover a large number of provisions requiring the availability of judicial, arbitral or 
administrative tribunals and independent domestic review procedures, such as in Article 13 Antidumping 
Agreement, Article 11 Agreement on Custom Valuation, Article 2 (j) Agreement on Rules of Origin, 
Article 4 Agreement Pre-shipment Inspection, Article 23 Subsidies Agreement, Article VI GATS, Article 
41-50 and Article 59 TRIPS, and Article XX Government Procurement. 
419 See OSTRY, S., "China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue", 3 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Af', 
Summer 1998, p. 1-19, at p. 4-5. 
420 Idem, p. 9-10. 
421 See Art. I Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Market Access, 10 October 1992,31 I. L. M. 
1274 (hereafter MOU). The 1992 MOU substantially improved the transparency of China's foreign trade 
regime and the full implementation of it should bring China in conformity with GATT Article X. See HU, 
P., "The China 301 on Market Access: A Prelude to GATT Membership? ", 3 Minn. J. Global Trade, 
Spring 1994,132-158, at p. 14445. One of the major improvements was the adoption of the PRC, Foreign 
Trade Law (FTL), enacted by the 8`h NPC on 12 May 1994. This law prescribes that foreign trade policy 
and regulations must be published freely and bans or restrictions on imports and exports must conform to 
GATT rules and be transparent. The FTL addresses the issues of unified national trade policy, transparency 
and conformity with GATT principles and international practices with respect to NTBs, market access, 
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Yet a number of legal scholars have pointed out some remaining concerns as we11422. 
These concerns comprise the unpredictability of the legal system through policy laws, the 
lack of transparency due to the bureaucratic heavy hand, and the problems surrounding 
judicial review and lack of enforcement. According to these authors these shortcomings 
may undermine Chinese market access obligations, because foreign traders and investors 
must struggle their way through administrative regulations, and find it hard to seek legal 
redress. It should be noted, however, that in the Protocol of Accession China has renewed 
its commitment to alleviating these concerns. The issues addressed in Article X GATT, 
and the relevant provisions in the Protocol, go to the very heart of China's legal 
infrastructure, and more precisely to the nature and enforcement of its administrative law 
regime423. 
A. Policy versus Law 
Several authors contend that, in order to understand the position of the law in China, it is 
necessary to understand the position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)424. Despite 
the erosion of the ruling ideology, which caused the discipline and the cohesion of the 
CCP to decline425, legislation remains according to many observers dependent on the 
Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) formulation of specific policies426. Sometimes, 
antidumping, subsidies and safeguard issues. On these improvements, see MAN, o. c., supra note 335, p. 
493 and WANG, o. c., supra note 336. 
422 For a recent account of such criticism, see, e. g., MASTEL, G., "China and the WTO: Moving Forward 
Without Sliding Backward", 31 Law & Poly Intl Bus., Spring, 2000, p. 981-997 (noting compliance 
problems). 
23 OSTRY, o. c., supra note 419, at p. 2. 
424 On the role of the CCP in law and society, see, e. g., CHEN, A., An Introduction to the Legal System of 
the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Butterworths, 1998. 
425 See in this regard ZHENG, S., Party vs. State in Post-1949 China, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1997, p. 
4 (noting that China is facing a deep institutional crisis because of the disarray in the CCP, and that the 
country is faced with the challenge of providing an alternative). On the erosion of Party control over 
lawmaking see, TANNER, M., The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and 
Democratic Prospects, Oxford, Clarendon, 1999, p. 51f 
426 LUBMAN, S., "Dispute Resolution in China after Deng Xiaoping: `Mao and Mediation' Revisited", 11 
Colum. J. Asian L., Fall 1997, p. 229-391, at p. 257. Or more extensively, see the same author's book, Bird 
in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao, Stanford, Stanford UP, 1999. See further CLARKE, o. c., 
supra note 357,1991, p. 17-18. Although the National People's Congress (NPC) is a weak parliamentary 
body, it is no longer a rubber stamp and is constitutionally the supreme sovereign body of the PRC. The 
NPC elects a Standing Committee, which exercises the authority of the NPC when the NPC is not in 
session. However, major pieces of legislation must still receive prior Party approval and much of their 
content is decided before the NPC becomes involved. On the rise of the NPC system, see TANNER, o. c., 
supra note 425, p. 72ff. 
108 
China's WTO Accession and Domestic Reforms 
important policies are announced in laws that are accompanied by statements by the CCP, 
and CCP directives are still used to modify policies, previously given legislative 
expression427. Therefore these authors argue that the distinction between law and policy 
in China is blurred, and the result is a gap between the law on its face and the norms that 
are actually applied. 
The Party regime can thus revise legal policy anytime according to practical experience, 
and can still intervene and resume total control whenever it deems the foundation of the 
regime as under threat428. In this line of argument the supremacy of party policy over the 
law cannot guarantee a stable legislative environment to deal with foreign trade issues 
involving investment, banking, finance, tax, etc., as long as foreign investors and China 
traders remain exposed to the "legendary" arbitrariness of Chinese policy makers. 
Moreover, as some authors point out, laws are drafted in vague terms so their 
interpretation can change overnight to suit any sudden policy change429. It is further 
argued that the importance attached to underlying policies creates a legal system that is 
fluid and very changeable, and hence not reliable. It allows the current regime to maintain 
the appearance of a viable legal system while retaining within its actual operation many 
facets of policy implementation, namely, changeability and adaptation to local normative 
structures and conditions430. As professor Chen notes, many Chinese scholars explain 
that the rule of law does not detract from the principle of Party leadership in the state 431 
It is the Party's role to organise and lead the people in forming their common will, and 
then elevating such will into law through the democratic procedure of legislation. It is 
also the Party to lead the people in observing the law and in supervising the exercise of 
legal powers by state organs432. However, even at the theoretical level not all Chinese 
scholars believe that the issue of the relationship between the Party and the law has been 
completely resolved. Chen continues that it has been pointed out that, although the 
427 LUBMAN, o. c., supra note 426, p. 244. 
als Ibidem. 
429 See CORNE, P., "Lateral Movements: Legal Flexibility and Foreign Investment Regulation in China", 
27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L., Spring/Summer 1995, p. 247-299. On legislative drafting, see SEIDMAN, A. 
and SEIDMAN, It (Eds. ), Legislative Drafting for Market Reform: Some Lessons from China, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997. 
430 CORNE, o. c., supra note 429, at p. 263. 431 See CHEN, A., "Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussion in Contemporary China on the Rule of 
Law", 17 UCLA Pacific Basin L. J., Fall 1999/Spring 2000, p. 125-165, at p. 148. 
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personnel and operations of Party organs are financed by the state budget, these organs 
are not regulated by state law433. 
Although Western scholars may have concerns about the position of the CCP in law and 
fact as far as they understand the rule of law, it is also hard to expect from China's WTO 
membership that it will change its governing and political institutions overnight. 
Continued conceptual or ideological renewal by Chinese reformers to win widespread 
acceptance of the doctrines, values and culture of the rule of law among officials, will 
most probably lead to institutional innovation to alleviate the concerns in future. For the 
time being, Western trading partners will have to content themselves with China's 
obligation to apply and administer all its laws, regulations, and other measures in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner434. 
B. Administrative System 
The administrative nature of the Chinese legal system has also caught the attention of the 
literature. The executive centred state apparatus headed by the State Counci1435 supervises 
many departments including ministries, commissions, administrations and offices436. 
These central administrative agencies all possess authority to issue regulations to 
implement specific legislation under a grant of such power by a legislative body, and also 
a technically distinct type of authority to execute their general administrative 
responsibilities to issue any rule that is necessary to carry out their functions437. Until 
recently, no procedural rules existed to govern the enactment of these important rules438. 
432 Ibidem. 
433 Jbidem. 
434 Art. 2(A) of the Protocol of Accession. aas The State Council is considered to be an administrative organ, not a legislative, and hence can pass only 
administrative rules (xingzhengfagui). See CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1991, p. 18. 
436 LUBMAN, o. c., supra note 426, p. 254 and 257. Most legislation originates in the State Council and 
those ministries, commissions and bureaux which are subordinate to it. The boundary between 
administrative legislation that is the proper subject of the executive branch, the State Council, and the pure 
legislative activity that is reserved to the NPC, is often obscured. In its legally mandated role, the State 
Council enjoys too much power. 
437 On the State Council lawmaking system, see TANNER, o. c., supra note 425, p. 120ff. 
436 This has recently changed somewhat under the PRC, Lawmaking Law, 15 March 2000, enacted by the 
3rd plenary meeting of the 9`s NPC. See also LI, Y., "The Law-making Law: A Solution to the Problems in 
the Chinese Legislative System? ", 30 HKLJ, 2000, p. 120-140. 
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Although a formal hierarchy of norms exists439, several observers conclude that the 
confusing range of documents and the blurred distinction between primary and 
secondary, implementing, legislation create a disorderly hierarchy of rules 440. 
China has therefore agreed to set up an enquiry point where, upon request, information 
relating to measures affecting WTO trade may be obtained. Replies to WTO members 
will represent the authoritative view of the Chinese government441. Next to the other 
transparency commitments, this should definitely advance the situation of foreign traders 
and investors in China. 
C. Legal Redress and Law Enforcement 
Article X GATT, which, as mentioned above, goes to the heart of a country's legal 
infrastructure 442, as well as the Sino-US Bilateral WTO Agreement and China's 
Accession Protocol mention the importance of legal redress and law enforcement°43. This 
is particularly relevant in the Chinese context where `bureaucratic overreaching' may 
cause administrative interference with foreign investors' business4. 
439 CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1991, p. 26 notes that rules promulgated by hierarchical bodies have 
corresponding degrees of authority, but the Chinese legal system still has to come up with a definitive 
hierarchy that would enable rules to be ranked according to such features as label and promulgating body. 
See also note 440. 
440 LUBMAN, o. c., supra note 426, p. 258. CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1991, p. 26-27 (noting that 
regulations issued by the State Council or one of its ministries may be given greater weight than laws 
issued by the NPC, because the latter are often vague statements of general principle that explicitly 
contemplate subsequent implementing rules). See also LI, o. c., supra note 438, p. 122. CORNE, o. c., supra 
note 429, p. 252 (according to whom the hierarchy goes as follows: The NPC and its Standing Committee 
issues various enactments that can loosely be categorised as `law'; the State Council issues administrative 
regulations (xinzheng fagui'), the organs under the State Council, on the other hand, issue what are known as 
administrative rules (xingzheng guizhang); local people's congresses issue local administrative regulations 
(difang xingzheng fagui), and local people's government of provinces, municipalities, and quite big cities 
may issue local administrative rules (difang xinzheng guizhang); other normative documents (gita de 
guifanxing wenjian), formulated by national or local administrative organs, for the purpose of regulation, 
are not enforceable as law). 
44' Art. 2(C) of the Protocol of Accession. 
442 OSTRY, o. a., supra note 423, p. 2. 
443 Art. 2(D) of the Protocol of Accession. 
"4 See WELLER, D., "The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for Foreign Investors to 
Challenge Agency Action", 98 Colum. L. Rev., June 1998, p. 1238-1282. 
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a. Legal Redress 
The principles set forth in Article 41 of the PRC Constitution, 45 as reaffirmed in Article 
121 of the PRC General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), 446 as well as the 1989 
Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), 447 are among the legal milestones dealing with the 
requirement of legal redress. Moreover, many Chinese laws and regulations specifically 
provide for the right to appeal against administrative agencies and to call on People's 
Courts 448. 
The GPCL assert the basic tenet that the State can incur liability to citizens or entities as 
is recognised in the PRC Constitution449. But it is the passage of the ALL that rendered 
these rights more concrete. It both strengthens general checks against governmental 
control in China and offers foreign investors a legal means to challenge intrusive agency 
action4so. 
The ALL does impose two explicit limits, however. First, it does not permit a plaintiff to 
challenge the inherent validity of abstract regulations and rules under which a particular 
administrative act is implemented, instead, it only allows reviewing the lawfulness of 
concrete acts451. Hence a court can e. g. only refuse to apply a conflicting lower-level 
regulation, if it conflicts with say the Constitution, national law, or a State Council 
regulation. It may not strike down such abstract rule, but will refer the matter for 
resolution to the State Council. Alternatively, an injured party may seek administrative 
reconsideration, through which the applicable agency may modify, or declare void, a 
concrete administrative act. However, the agency reconsidering the administrative act and 
445 See PRC, Constitution, 1982, Article 41. 
446 See General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC (GPCL), 12 July 1986, effective 1 January 1987, 
Art. 121. 
447 See PRC, Administrative Litigation Law, 1989, effective 1 October 1990. On Administrative Law in 
China, see generally FENG, L., Administrative Law - Procedures and Remedies in China, Hong Kong, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996. See also WANG, X., "Administrative Procedure Reforms in China's Rule of Law 
Context", 12 Colum. J. Asian L, Fall 1998, p. 251-277. 
°48 This is e. g. the case in the PRC, Customs Law. 
449 WELLER, o. c., supra note 444, p. 1255-1256. 
450Idem, p. 1257. 
451 Article 12 ALL. "Concrete acts" have been construed by the Supreme People's Court as "unilateral acts 
or conduct, relating to specific matters and the rights and interests of specific citizens or legal persons". The 
general regulation itself, however, may not be struck down. See WELLER, o. c., supra note 444, p. 1259- 
1260. 
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relevant regulation may be in the same hierarchy as the original deciding agency and may 
have drafted the regulation itself452. 
The second limitation on causes of action in Article 12 ALL permits certain concrete acts 
to be immunised from judicial challenge453. This limitation is understandable, because it 
immunises laws and regulations promulgated by the legislative branch of the government 
only as distinct from the administrative branch. 
Apart from these limits, however, some critics of China's legal system argue that an 
injured party's frustration may arise from other deficiencies in the Chinese legal system, 
such as insufficiently developed procedural law and the general inefficacy of the 
courtsasa Although the law permits a challenge of administrative actions, these critics say 
its effectiveness is limited by constraints on the power of the courts. Since 1979 the court 
system has been extensively rebuilt, 455 but as some scholars point out, the usefulness is 
restrained by some systemic weaknesses of the Chinese legal system, as is shown further 
below. 
b. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement appears to be a serious concern in China456. Official statistics indicate 
significant problems with the enforcement of verdicts457. 
452 WELLER, o. c., supra note 444, p. 1260-126 1. 453 Idem, p. 1261. 
454 Idem, p. 1262. 
455 On the Chinese judicial system, see, e. g., CLARKE, o. c., supra note 357,1991, p. 19ff; and LUBMAN, 
o. c., p. 306ff. There exist courts of general jurisdiction as well as specialised courts like railway, forestry, 
maritime and military courts. The latter type's jurisdiction is not limited by administrative territorial 
boundaries like the former type. General jurisdiction courts are organised hierarchically. At the top stands 
the Supreme People's Court, followed by Higher Level People's Courts (Provincially and in Municipals 
directly under the Central Government, as well as in Autonomous Regions like Tibet), Intermediate Level 
People's Courts (Prefectural Levels, as well as provincially larger cities directly beneath the Provincial 
Government), and Basic Level People's Courts (rural and urban counties or districts). The pyramid is not 
very neat, because higher courts sometimes exercise primary jurisdiction over cases that would have an 
"influence" on their territory. Courts of general jurisdiction have separate divisions for criminal, 
administrative, civil and economic matters, and enforcement. 
456 See CLARKE, D., "Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of Civil 
Judgements", 10 Col. J. Asian L., 1996, p. 1-93; CLARKE, D., "The Execution of Civil Judgements in 
China", China Quarterly, n° 143,1995, p. 65-81; and more recently YANG, D., "Can China Overcome 
Legal Balkanisation? ", www. chinaonline. com, 24 March 2000. 
'`s' According to YANG, o. c., supra note 456, who quotes the vice-president of the Supreme People's 
Court, Li Guoguang, between 1995 and 1998 higher provincial, prefectural and municipal people's courts 
reported 3,473 serious cases of refusing to comply with court rulings. 
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There are a variety of reasons why judgements may be unenforceable. There are factors 
within the judicial system itself that make enforcement of decisions unlikely. For 
example, Chinese courts in general are reluctant to use coercive means to enforce; 
instead, traditional Chinese society emphasises and prefers mediation458. Another societal 
and judicial factor is that courts traditionally were considered to involve in predominantly 
criminal adjudication and sentencing459. An important factor is also the lack of finality of 
the judgement460. 
The most important reason for judgements being unenforceable, however, is "local 
protectionism", which testifies so strongly to the fragmentation of the legal system461. 
Courts are extremely reluctant to enforce judgements against local enterprises, local 
citizens or authorities, because local governments depend on local enterprises and local 
banks for income and employment and courts depend on these governments as well. They 
ass See, on this topic, LUBMAN, S., "International Commercial Dispute Resolution in China: A Practical 
Assessment", 4 The American Review of International Arbitration, 1993, p. 107-177. Among the masses 
education and persuasion is to be used whereas coercion in Maoist view is reserved for the enemy. See 
excerpts from "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", 
and "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", in MAO, Z., Selected Works, Vol. 1, 
4 and 5, Beijing, Langs Press, 1965,1969, and 1977. 
459 See CLARKE, "Power and Politics... ", l. c., supra note 456, p. 37. Apart from divorces there was not 
much civil work to do in a planned economy. This used to be reflected in the court's hierarchy where the 
president was involved in criminal adjudication, the vice-president in civil adjudication, and the assistant 
vice-presidents monitored the execution. 
460 See also CLARKE, "Power and Politics... ", l. c., supra note 456, p. 38. A judgement should be final to 
be legally effective, defendants have in fact numerous opportunities to relitigate the merits of the case, or at 
least to pose further procedural obstacles in the way of execution. Similar thoughts can be found in LIU, N., 
"A Vulnerable Justice: Finality of Civil Judgments in China", 13 Colum. J. Asian L., Spring 1999, p. 35-98. 
461 See CLARKE, "Power and Politics... ", l. c., supra note 456, p. 41-42 on local protectionism, or difang 
boahuzhuyi. But not only courts reason that way, also other institutions in Chinese society, such as local 
banks think in the same pattern. If an outside court demands a bank to freeze an account it is very likely the 
bank will refuse to do so until a local court has authorised it to do so. An often-secret contact between local 
courts and the debtor make it possible for that party to shift funds and property because is was warned. In 
Shenzhen internal rules of the bank may require this, although such requirements are prohibited in notices 
by the Supreme People's Court and the People's Bank of China (Supreme People's Court, People's Bank of 
China, Joint Notice on Investigating, Freezing and Levying on Bank Accounts of Enterprises, Institutions, 
Organs and Organisations, Dec. 28,1983; and, Supreme People's Court, People's Bank of China, Supreme 
People's Procuratorate and Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Investigation, Freezing, and Levying on 
Bank Accounts of Enterprises, Institutions, Organs and Organisations, Dec. 11,1993). Banks are forbidden 
to transfer or unfreeze frozen funds, or to warn the depositor in advance of freezing, while courts for their 
part are told that, when there is a difference of opinion with a bank, the matter should be resolved through 
consultation between the superiors of both court and bank, instead of detaining bank personnel. In one case 
a judge entrusted with enforcement replied that the government would not let him finish the construction of 
his house if he executed what was demanded. In another case the daughter of a judge was transferred to a 
remote place after her father executed a judgement. 
114 
China's WTO Accession and Domestic Reforms 
are all part of the same bureaucratic family, and every member must respect its local 
relatives. 
As Dali Yang notes, the Chinese government acknowledges the problems, and the 
situation has changed after the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, where judicial fairness 
received far more attention than before462. To this end, a variety of initiatives were 
launched, including important institutional reforms. First, all law enforcement 
departments were asked, along with the military and the armed policy, to divest 
themselves of commercial operations in 1998-99. Second, the Supreme People's Court 
(SPC) directed local courts to thoroughly investigate major cases of local protectionism, 
and to review local regulations that affect law enforcement; those regulations that conflict 
with national law are to be declared null and void. The Ministry of Justice, in 1999, 
launched a three-year programme to retrain all staff in China's judicial administrations, 
and also introduced entrance exams for new recruits. Third, to reduce the backlog of 
rulings awaiting enforcement, the SPC carried out a campaign to enforce court rulings in 
the last four months of 1998, and then made 1999 the year of enforcement. Nevertheless, 
more than 850,000 court rulings involving 259 billion yuan were still awaiting 
enforcement as of June 1999, which prompted the Party leadership to marshal the Party's 
disciplinary mechanisms to promote enforcement463. Fourth, the government, especially 
since 1998, has placed much more emphasis on judicial fairness. These efforts have 
included opening most court trials to public scrutiny, tightening restrictions on admissible 
evidence and court procedures. Fifth, the SPC now authorises higher courts (gaoji 
fayuan) to provide unified management and co-ordination over enforcement. Sixth, co- 
operative pacts between legal aid centres across provinces were signed, so that those who 
need legal services outside their native places can be assisted. 
Although Western trading partners may wish to conclude with China observers that there 
are still flaws in the rule of law as they understand it should ideally operate, it is 
important to acknowledge also that China is still making efforts to comply with high 
demands. These efforts comprise also the possibility to allow foreign investors judicial 
462 YANG, o. c., supra note 456. 
463 YANG, o. a, supra note 456, notes that in October 1999, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission 
and the Ministry of Supervision directed officials to make the enforcement of verdicts an "urgent political 
task" and investigate cases of administrative interference in and obstruction of court enforcement. 
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review in the form of a "just, open, efficient, and clean and honest judicial system that 
ensures fair and independent trials"4M. One should remember that lofty goals just might 
take considerable time to implement. 
IV. Final Observations 
In order for China to accede to the WTO, it is generally accepted that the country should 
comply with rules, formulated with a particular economic and legal structure in mind. 
According to many Western, but also some Chinese scholars, China's economic, legal 
and political structures do not seem to operate as yet in a manner the WTO contemplates 
how a country's economic, legal and political institutions should ideally operate. To the 
disappointment of some authors, the `old' state-track economy has not withered entirely 
away to create an entirely private economy due to the heavy social costs involved and the 
danger of creating political instability in such a process. Nonetheless, in its continued 
efforts to create a socialist market economy, the Chinese government tries hard to 
rationalise the remains of its state economy. Numerous legal measures try to establish 
financially autonomous and competitive SOEs, independent from bureaucratic 
overreaching, and which must make commercial decisions in line with market 
considerations as required by Article XVII GATT. In this process it was pointed out that 
some weaknesses in China's corporate governance remain, but that because of the 
decentralisation in the Chinese economy there no longer exists a danger for concerted 
economic policy action to undermine GATT/WTO obligations in view of Article XVII 
GATT. This does not mean, however, that bureaucratic interference is rooted out on the 
micro-economic level, because various levels of government still have vested business 
interests. For the divestiture of state assets and to disentangle the government 
bureaucracy from business interests China should embrace the rule of law. 
As far as the implementation of the rule of law in China is concerned, a review of 
Western authors has revealed that it is necessary to remain vigilant. In Chapter One it was 
already argued that creating a legal system is more than legislative activity; it should also 
permeate the legal consciousness of the people living in the region under transition. 
464 Words of SPC President Xiao Yang commenting on the five-year plan (1999-2003) for comprehensive 
court reforms, and quoted by YANG, o. c., supra note 456. 
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Moreover, economic troubles often compound the problem of popular acceptance of the 
rule of law. And Western influence on this point also raises the concern of 
"transplantability" of Western social and political institutions in post-communist state 
building. Likewise, WTO integration is not just about the formulation of international 
economic law and the acceptance of international, liberal trade policies, but it is for China 
enormously important to cast the foundations suitable to implement, monitor and possibly 
enforce the WTO standards. In this sense Article X GATT and related WTO provisions 
are important to show the way for China's implementation process. 
International norms, like those created in the WTO framework, have played a 
tremendously important role in guiding the remodelling of the legal and economic system 
in China. The question remains, however, when and how the country is going to mark the 
end of its transition. This is directly relevant for the discriminatory treatment of China 
under the Protocol of Accession, which allows for special safeguard actions and 
nonmarket economy methodologies as a result of China's unique economic status. There 
are no clear criteria to let China graduate from this discriminatory treatment other than 
the limited duration of these discriminatory measures. Nonetheless, the success of 
China's reforms is directly relevant for the application of these special trade policies. It 
would be wrong for WTO members to apply nonmarket or state-trading methodologies to 
China over the next decade, if the country has completed its transition in the meantime. 
The absence of such clear criteria should not mean that the employment of such trade 
policies could happen light-heartedly. The next Chapters will be a closer study of the use 
of these special trade policies as a response to China's unique economic position. 
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and Market Disruption 
1. Reasons for Concern 
II. WTO Adjustment Mechanisms 
III. Emergency Safeguard Clause 
A. WTO Safeguards Agreement 
B. EC in the Field of Trade 
C. EC Regime on Imports and Safeguards 
D. Imports from State-Trading Countries and China 
a. EC Quotas on Products from China 
b. EC Emergency Safeguards and Products from China 
C. Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism 
IV. Textiles Regime 
A. WTO Textiles Regime 
B. EC Textiles Regime 
C. Quantitative Restrictions on Textiles from China 
D. Transitional Textiles Safeguard 
V. Note on Agricultural Products and ECSC Products 
VI. Final Observations 
So far previous Chapters have dealt with the Bretton Woods institutions and have 
identified the two, all be it illusive, principles, a `free market economy' and `rule of law', 
which these institutions assume to be in place. In order for transition economies to 
become successfully integrated into these international organisations, and especially the 
WTO, it is believed that these countries have to undertake profound reforms to move in 
the direction of these principles. In applying this development process to China and its 
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much-debated WTO accession, it was revealed that building market and legal institutions 
in China should be considered an important condition for that country to be able to 
comply with the standards of the WTO multilateral trading rules. However, the Chinese 
adaptation of these reforms, earmarked by gradualism and administrative involvement, 
has presented the country with difficulties in losing its state trading or nonmarket 
economy label. These difficulties are reinforced, in turn, because there are no clear 
graduation criteria with which China has to comply to claim overall market economy 
status. State trading and nonmarket economy status are, after all, principles as illusive as 
the preconditions of establishing a market economy. 
In their belief that China, despite its massive two decades of reform, still should be 
treated as a nonmarket economy, and to cabin the externalities this may cause, WTO 
members have opted to allow special trade policy instruments to be employed selectively 
against China. The use of these instruments is limited in time, supposedly until China is 
ready with its process of implementing economic and legal reforms. It is the focus of this 
Chapter to discuss the trade policy instruments that market economies have adopted 
under the WTO framework in the belief that China's unfinished reforms, may challenge 
their markets. 
The first section of this Chapter addresses the possible reasons for concern that mature 
economies have raised over transition economies, and China in particular, joining the 
WTO. These concerns are incarnated by the huge trade deficit that these economies, the 
EC and the US, have developed with China and the fear of being inundated with cheap 
Chinese products, which in turn may disrupt markets. The second part will subsequently 
deal with the safeguard mechanisms, and as a part thereof the quantitative restrictions, 
employed against transition economies and China in particular. Many of those restrictions 
will have to be phased out vis-a-vis China. The third part exclusively deals with the Sino- 
European textiles trade, and the integration of Chinese textiles and its safeguard 
provisions. 
Despite the welcome trade liberalisation, the Chinese Protocol of Accession approves of 
the use by WTO members of a transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism. This 
selective safeguard mechanism is based on the notion of "market disruption"; a term 
coined by US trade law with a Cold War connotation. It will be argued here that the legal 
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notion of market disruption has lost its relevance, because it is highly unlikely that WTO 
members will suffer from a concerted central policy action to target their industrial 
markets, because state-owned enterprises (SOE) in China are too decentralised. Instead, it 
would have been far better if the Protocol of Accession had expanded Article 5(2)(b) of 
the Safeguards Agreement and allowed for specific quota modulation with regard to 
China. 
The second argument this Chapter wishes to make is that China faces the burden of 
stepping up its reform policies to meet WTO standards and to shed its state-trading label, 
but that developed countries too, will have to adjust and accept their share of the burden 
in a globalised economy. European industries in particular should therefore not count too 
much on the employment of market disruption or other safeguard mechanisms. These 
safeguards are to be invoked only in rare cases of emergency. The EC therefore rightly 
shows restraint in applying safeguard measures, but there still exist provisions in some 
Regulations, which should be adjusted in light of China's accession. 
I further wish to note that this Chapter very much narrows its focus on the trade policy 
instruments as they are currently in use by the EC. Reference to US practice will be made 
when thought relevant. This Chapter is not concerned with coal and steel products and 
neither with agricultural products, but there are some useful references towards the end of 
the Chapter. 
I. Reasons for Concern 
The integration of transition economies, and in particular China, raises many concerns 
among more mature WTO members, such as the EC and the US. These concerns include 
also a number of non-trade issues impacted by trade policy, such as the environment, 
poverty, labour rights, and human rights465. Notwithstanding that trade is unmistakably 
linked with sustainable development, it would, however, require a different thesis to deal 
with all these issues. For our purposes it suffices to focus on the Chinese trade surplus 
that resulted in serious trade deficits with the US and the EC. China, like other emerging 
465 Useful in this regard is the EC Directorate General for Trade's informal discussion paper, "The Non- 
Trade Impacts of Trade Policy - Asking Questions, Seeking Sustainable Development", 8 January 2001. 
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economies466, has embraced an export-oriented growth policy467. It is possibly this 
development strategy that set China on a collision course with the international markets. 
Because, as some view it, China seems to be eager to target international markets to 
amass foreign exchange to pay for its further development, and at the same time to seal 
off its domestic market468. The trade surplus that China now runs with the EC469 and the 
US is often criticised as the result of a mercantilist and expansionist export-oriented 
growth policy470. 
The Chinese government support for export development can cause externalities471. And 
the question remains whether developed countries can still absorb a major expansion of 
466 Often similarities between China and the high performing emerging economies of East Asia are drawn. 
But there are important differences as to the extent public ownership plays a role in the economy. Further, 
China has been far more dependent on foreign capital to generate exports, which are generally produced by 
FIE, or Chinese firms with close ties to foreign firms, or which engage in export processing. See LARDY, 
N., China in the World Economy, Institute for International Economics, Washington D. C., 1994, p. 23. 
467 See generally WORLD BANK, The East Asian Miracle - Economic Growth and Public Policy, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1993; WORLD BANK, World Development Report, World Bank, 
Washington D. C., 1991, Chapter 2; DRABEK, Z. and LAIRD, S., "The New Liberalism - Trade Policy 
Developments in Emerging Markets", 32 J. World Trade, n° 5,1998, p. 241-269; and TRUBEK, D., 
"Protectionism and Development: Time for a New Dialogue? ", 25 N. Y. U. J. Intl L. & Pol., 1992, p. 345- 
366. About earlier Chinese development attempts, especially China's self-reliance strategy and import 
substitution industrialisation, see ECKSTEIN, A., "The Chinese Development Model", in JOINT 
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Chinese Economy Post-Mao, Congress of the United States, Washington 
D. C., 1978, p. 80-114. 
468 See WALL, D., JIANG, B. and YIN, X., China's Opening Door, London, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1996, p. 103 (noting that foreign exchange earnings to be remitted to the government 
was one of the main targets of reform in China). For further discussion of Chinese trade barriers, see 
MASTEL, G., The Rise of the Chinese Economy - The Middle Kingdom Emerges, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 
1997, p. 103ff. Accounts of how China seals off its domestic market can be found in: INDUSTRIAL 
STRUCTURE COUNCIL, 2000 Report on the WTO Consistency of Trade Policies by Major Trading 
Partners, MITI, Japan, 2001, p. 289ff; UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 National 
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, USTR, Washington D. C., 2001, p. 42ff.; and see also 
http: //mkaccdb. eu. int following Council Decision 98/552/EC of 24 September 1998 on the implementation 
by the Commission of activities relating to the Community access strategy, OJ L265,30 September 1998, 
31. 
469 Estimated by Eurostat at 44.7 bn EUR in 2001,44.6 bn EUR in 2000, and 30.3 bn EUR in 1999. 470 China is often accused of vigorous export promotion in combination with restricting access to its own 
markets. See LARDY, o. c., supra note 466, p. 35. The author continues p. 110ff with examining the 
openness of the Chinese economy. The World Bank notes that China has developed a very sophisticated 
system of producer protection. See WORLD BANK, China - Internal Market Development and 
Regulation, World Bank, Washington D. C., 1994, p. 155. See also supra note 468. 
471 WORLD BANK, China - Foreign Trade Reform, World Bank, Washington D. C., 1994, p. 110ff. Such 
government support creates an export growth dynamic and may offset disincentives to exports. The study 
continues to discuss the various forms of public support for export marketing and the less healthy effects it 
may have. Bottom line is that, if the government does not support export industries along comparative 
advantage, its support will end in a misallocation of resources. 
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developing country exports, such as the Chinese472. Although authoritative sources see no 
reason for a general protectionist response473, except perhaps for export development in 
specific industries where the import penetration is very high474, a protectionist backlash 
depends on the industrial countries' willingness and ability to provide supporting 
adjustment measures in the regions or industries affected475. China's exports are 
vulnerable to trade barriers in developed countries, and the conditions of access to 
international markets are in a state of flux. To reduce its vulnerability to trade barriers, 
China will have to diversify export markets along its comparative advantage476. 
According to some, China does not seem to be ready yet to develop a comparative 
advantage in heavy industrial equipment or in high technology products that cannot easily 
be assembled477, though others have argued there exists reasonable potential for 
upgrading China's exports478. 
Although China's level of output is uncertain and controversial, it should be said that 
China has transformed, as a result of the change in its development strategy, since the late 
1970s479. And different prognoses are made by economists as to where this may leave the 
472 Analysis of the World Bank addresses fears that exist over the achievement of rapid growth and 
integration into the world economy by Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Russia as a result of policy 
reforms undertaken in recent years. These research results are summarised in WORLD BANK, Global 
Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, World Bank, Washington D. C., 1997. It should further 
be noted that, whether China really should be considered a developing country is a debated issue. See, e. g., 
BROOKS ROSEN, J., "Twenty-Eighth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Note: China, Emerging 
Economies, and the World Trade Order", 46 Duke L. J., April 1997, p. 1519-1564. 
473 WORLD BANK, o. c., supra note 471, p. 143; and OECD, China in the 21s` Century - Long-term 
Global Implications, OECD, Paris, 1996, p. 23. 
474 There still seems to be ample room for export development, but specific industries in which import 
penetration is high include footwear, toys and clothing. See WORLD BANK, o. c., supra note 471, p. 144- 
146. 
4751dem, p. 146. China's exports of clothing, footwear, and textile yams and fabrics are vulnerable to trade 
barriers in developed countries, because they account for more than 25% of Chinese exports, a 
"disproportionately large share" (Idem, p. 148). 476 Idem, p. 158. A similar conclusion is reached by the OECD, o. c., supra note 473, p. 23 (noting that 
China's expanding economy cannot succeed by churning out more textiles, toys and the like). 47 Idem, p. 161-163. According to the World Bank, China's export performance depends largely on its 
low-cost labour force and the reasonable skills levels it has developed. Electrical equipment exports 
therefore depend on assembly operations of products, such as radio receivers, telecom equipment, electric 
space heaters, and domestic electric appliances. 
4s See LARDY, o. c., supra note 466, p. 40 (noting that China has demonstrated an ability to move up- 
market, exporting higher quality, higher value-added products, over time). 
49 LARDY, o. c., supra note 466, p. 14. Reason for the controversy is that no good statistics are available. 
On many occasions the asymmetric role of Hong Kong as a transit country, makes adjustments absolutely 
necessary (see Idem, p. 74-75 and 77-79). Therefore nobody can exactly assess the Chinese surplus. See 
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global economy in the twenty-first century480. Notwithstanding the controversy that 
surrounds these predictions, the pressure on countries' balance-of-payments as a result of 
China's export-led growth may spark protectionism481. 
When trade between countries remains chronically unbalanced, deficit and/or surplus 
nations must make adjustments482. One of the architects of the 1944 Bretton Woods 
conference, John Maynard Keynes, believed that an International Clearing Union, which 
would assess an interest charge on excess reserves above a country's quota, could 
pressure adjustment on "any country whose balance of payments with the rest of the 
world is departing from equilibrium in either direction"483. However, this proposal was 
rejected at the conference in favour of the US plan for the IMF, which lacks an explicit 
mechanism for assessing charges against chronic surplus countries484. In theory pressure 
could be brought to bear on surplus countries to recycle their surpluses through the IMF 
Articles. Article VII is the so-called "scarce currency clause", which permits the IMF to 
identify a chronic surplus country, declare its currency as a scarce currency, and allow the 
rest of the world to discriminate against that country's imports485. The scarce currency 
clause has never been invoked. Consequently, the IMF places the burden of policy 
change and adjustment on the deficit countries486. When a country's balance of payments 
is chronically in deficit and its reserves are declining, IMF consultations result in a 
classic austerity programme under which the deficit country deflates its economy by 
raising interest rates, constraining the growth of the money supply, cutting back on 
also FUNG, K. C. and LAU, L., "The China-United States Bilateral Trade Balance: How Big Is It Really? ", 
3 Pacific Economic Review, 1998, p. 33-47. 
480 See OECD, o. c., supra note 473, p. 9-10; 30-34; and 47-49. 481 See generally JACKSON, J., DAVEY, W. and SYKES, A., Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations, St. Paul, West Publishing, 1995, p. 1010-1061, at p. 1021. 
482 See, e. g., GILBERT, G., "International Clearing Union", in CATE, T. et al (Eds. ), An Encyclopaedia of 
Keynesian Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1997, p. 256,257. 
483 GILBERT, o. c., supra note 482, p. 258; see also CROTTY, J., "On Keynes and Capital Flight", 21 J. 
Econ. Literature, 1983, p. 59, at p. 62-63, 
484 GILBERT, o. a., supra note 482, p. 258 (noting that this was not surprising, given the fact that the US 
was a surplus country at that time, and enjoyed a "commanding political and economic position"). 
485 See Article VII, sec. 3(a) (providing for the authority to declare a general scarcity of a particular 
currency); Article VII, sec. 3(b) (authorising any member, after consultation with the Fund, to temporarily 
impose limitations on the freedom of exchange operations in the scarce currency); See also BLOCK, F., 
The Origins of International Economic Disorder, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, p. 52. 
ash See STEWART, F., "Back to Keynesianism: Reforming the IMF", IV World Poly J., 1987, p. 465ff, at 
p. 472. 
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government spending, and raising taxes. Its citizens will then lose the means to continue 
to demand imports. 
Japan is a good example of a surplus country. Japan has out-traded the rest of the world, 
but it is sitting on a mountain of foreign reserves, and it is now choking on those 
surpluses487. Instead of recycling its vast surplus, like the US did through the Marshall 
Plan, the country sunk those funds into speculation in stock and real estate markets and 
created financial bubbles that burst488. Assuming China can avoid trade surpluses of that 
magnitude and prevent financial bubbles489, the principal question remains whether the 
world trading system in general remains as open as it has been over the past five decades, 
and whether world trade in general continues to grow faster than world GNP490. Some in 
the Chinese government bureaucracy would like to see a system patterned on that of 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the 1960s and 1970s, or 
Korean industrial policy under President Park in the 1970s491. But there are also those 
who might argue that the government-led industrial policies in Japan and Korea did not 
work that we11492. The Chinese economy, however, has run both a trade deficit and 
current account deficit at several occasions since 1978. And relatively high rates of 
growth might continue to absorb high domestic savings and large import volumes, the 
vast bulk of which will continue to be industrial goods. Machinery and transportation 
equipment, particularly items embodying higher, levels of technology than China can 
produce domestically, are the fastest-growing imports. There is also huge potential for 
high-value services493. 
487 See TURGEON, L., State and Discrimination: The Other Side of the Cold War, New York, M. E. 
Sharpe, 1989, p. 98 (an early explanation of Japan's economic weakness). See also ABRAHAMS, P., 
"Japanese Trade Surplus Climbs to Record $122bn", Fin. Times, 26 Jan. 1999; and ANGELL, W., "How to 
Save Japan from Oversaving", Wall St. J., 22 June 1998. 
488 Some distrusted the Asian miracle and predicted its bubble to burst. See KRUGMAN, P., "The Myth of 
Asia's Miracle -A Cautionary Fable", available at http: //web. mit. edu/krueman/www/myth. html. 489 China's trade surplus dropped in 2001. See "Trade Surplus Drops in First 10 Months to US$ 17.33B", 
available at www. chinaonline. com 14 November 2001. This represented a year-on-year decrease of 25%. 
490 OECD, o. c., supra note 473, p. 23. 
4911dem, p. 26. 
492 See WONG, J., "Will China be the Next Financial Domino? ", in EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE, China's 
Economy and the Asian Financial Crisis, EAI, Singapore University Press, 1998, p. 25-41. See also 
KRUGMAN, o. c., supra note 488. 
493 OECD, o. c., supra note 473, p. 16. 
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The GATT/WTO implicitly recognises the right of a member to pursue its own domestic 
policies, even if they give rise to balance-of-payments problemsa94. The GATT allows 
Members in balance-of-payments difficulty to introduce trade restrictions as one of the 
major exceptions to the basic principles of tariff bindings. GATT Articles XII and XVIII 
(b) set out the conditions that have to be met, by developed and developing country 
Members respectively495. If a country running a deficit could not devalue, or not do so 
easily496, and if prices on labour markets were relatively inflexible as well, there could be 
a case for allowing the imposition of temporary import restrictions497. The move towards 
flexible, more easily adjustable exchange rates reduces the rationale for resorting to trade 
restrictions to safeguard a country's external financial position. Furthermore, experience 
indicates that quantitative restrictions are not the right instrument to deal with balance-of- 
payments problems. The IMF and World Bank routinely obtain agreements with 
borrowing governments, not to introduce import restrictions for balance-of-payments 
purposes in their adjustment lending to developing countries498. 
The solutions dealing with a big trade imbalance are fairly limited. If devaluation is not 
feasible, a different reciprocity-based trade policy should enable the enforcement of a 
reasonable balance, boosting technology, manufacturing, and export expansion499. And, 
although the impact of traditional labour-intensive exports on OECD markets may be 
relatively limited, as some economists state, because the affected sectors only account for 
a small proportion of output in most OECD members, there could be import resistance 
from some countries perceiving a greater amount of "catch-up" adjustmentsoo. The 
challenge thus lies in responding to the change by allowing or inducing resources to shift 
494 See VAGTS, D., Transnational Business Problems, New York, New York Foundation Press, 1998, p. 
45. 
495 JACKSON, J., The World Trading System - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 
Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 2°d ed., 1997, p. 241. See also MAH, J., "Reflections on the Balance of 
Payment Provisions in the WTO", 21 World Comp., September 1998, p. 139. 496 This might be because surplus countries do not want to appreciate their currency sufficiently. See 
LOVETT, W, ECKES, A, and BRINKMAN, It, US Trade Policy - History Theory and the WTO, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 138 (referring to the 1985-87 Plaza Agreement to bring down the overvalued 
dollar). 
497 See HOEKMAN, B. and KOSTECKI, M., The Political Economy of the World Trading System, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 187. 
498 Ideen, p. 188. 
499 LOVETT, ECKES and BRINKMAN, o. c., supra, note 496, p. 138ff. 500 OECD, o. c., supra note 473, p. 17. 
125 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Three 
where new opportunities for more efficient use are emerging. As is stated in the 
Leutwiler Report: 
"(.. ) [TJhe choice is between being frozen in existing inefficiencies in each line 
or industry or continuing the search and struggle for maintaining competitive 
strength all along the line knowing full well that success can only be limited in 
each sector with no defined frontiers or turf that can preserved for ever for any 
country or group of countries. (... ) [N]o country that continues to respond to 
change need fear being converted into an industrial desert even in particular 
sectors "sot 
The US and the EC traditionally pursue different strategies with respect to this 
adjustment. Whereas in the former, displaced workers are often expected to disappear 
without receiving much, if any, compensation for their loss, the European workers are not 
viewed as immediately substitutable or disposable. European governments, traditionally, 
play a more active role in managing the social costs of adjustment imposed on certain 
groups of society. There may be less emphasis on economic efficiency, but more on 
socio-political cohesion502. However, it may also produce a false sense of tranquillity for 
those workers who have attained a high standard of living and somehow feel that they 
can afford the luxury of continuing to enjoy this high standard through adjustment 
assistance. 
The discussion will now focus on whether the employment of WTO-based adjustment 
mechanisms or safeguards is of any use in the challenge that the developed world faces 
regarding the integration of a large export development country such as China. Whilst 
China faces the burden of stepping up its reform policies to meet the WTO standards, and 
to shed its state-trading label, developed economies too, will have to accept their share of 
the burden and adjust. However, where there is a clear need to cabin the risks and costs of 
Chinese WTO integration, it would be unfair to amount the use of safeguard mechanisms 
to blunt protectionism. At the same time a sufficient amount of flexibility is needed for 
501 See PATEL, I., "The Adjustment Problem", in Trade Policies for a Better Future - The Zeutwiler 
Report', the GATT and the Uruguay Round, Boston-Dordrecht-Lancaster, Markus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1987, p. 90. 
502 See OSTRY, S., The Post-Cold War Trading System, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 83, 
235. 
126 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Three 
markets to make swift adjustments to changing circumstances and to find compromises 
when necessary. Flexible safeguards usually form a very thin line in this regard, and 
some scholars are concerned about the future direction of Western trade policy and 
possible trade friction that the use of these safeguards may cause503. 
Below this Chapter will discuss WTO trade policy instruments and particularly how some 
of them are applied to trade with transition economies and China. Subsequently the 
question will be raised here, how these instruments will continue to exist after China's 
WTO accession. The emphasis is limited to EC trade policy, but some reference to US 
policy will be made when thought relevant. i 
II. WTO Adjustment Mechanisms 
From the previous section it has become clear that the export-led growth of China may 
create unease in mature Western economies. These economies are alarmed by their 
balance-of-payments deficit with Asian countries and China in particular. To restrain the 
losses in certain industrial sectors the EC and the US have resorted to certain trade policy 
instruments. These instruments are believed to help these trading partners in their efforts 
to adjust to the rising Chinese competition. In the largest sense these trade policy 
instruments are referred to as safeguards. The GATT/WTO safeguard provisions can be 
separated into several categories504. There are safeguard provisions that allow for the 
temporary suspension of obligations505 and those that allow for permanent exceptions506. 
There are safeguards allowing for the protection of a specific industry, and there are 
safeguards with an economy-wide rationale. In sum, there are at least eight GATT 
safeguard provisions, which could be used with the following objectives: (1) facilitating 
adjustment of an industry (Art. XIX); (2) establishment of an industry (Art. XVIII (a) and 
503 See, e. g., KRUEGER, A., American Trade Policy -A Tragedy in the Making, Washington D. C., The 
AEI Press, 1995, p. 102ff (on the issue whether there is reason to believe that trade friction is on the 
increase). 
304 See HOEKMAN and KOSTECKI, o. a., supra, note 497, p. 161. Further, it should be noted with 
Hoekman and Kostecki that GATS does contain safeguard provisions, similar to those of GATT, except the 
one on modification of schedules. CATS does not have provisions allowing for Antidumping, 
Countervailing Duties, or Infant Industry protection (Idem, p. 162). See also below note 508. 
sos These include Antidumping and Countervailing Duties (Art. VI), Balance-of-Payments restrictions (Art. 
XII and XVIII (b), Infant Industries assistance (Art. XVIII (a) and XVIII (c)); Emergency Protection (Art. 
XIX); and General Waivers (Art. XXV). 
506 These include the General Exceptions (Art. XX and XXI) and the Tariff Renegotiation (Art. XXVIII). 
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(c); (3) combating "unfair" trade (Art. VI); (4) allowing for a permanent change of mind, 
through renegotiating of tariff concessions (Art. XXVIII); (5) seeking a derogation or 
waiver from specific GATT rules with the agreement of a majority of members (Art. 
XXV); (6) dealing with macroeconomic (balance-of-payments) problems (Art. XII and 
XVIII (b)); (7) achieving health, safety, and related objectives (Art. XX); and (8) 
maintaining national security (Art. XXI)507. Apart from GATT safeguard provisions there 
also exist safeguards in a number of other WTO Agreements, such as the Agreement on 
Agriculture (Art. 5), the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) (Art. 6) and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Art. X)508. Moreover, there are many 
regional and bilateral agreements providing similar instruments. 
It will not be possible to discuss in great detail all of the above safeguard mechanisms, 
and to discuss the possible role they might fulfil in the Western adjustment process. 
Instead, the discussion here is limited to the few trade policy instruments that are most 
relevant for the US and especially the EC in relation to the People's Republic of China. 
These instruments are the emergency safeguard clause (Art. XIX GATT), the product- 
specific transitional safeguard mechanism (Section 16 Chinese Protocol), and the 
transitional safeguard mechanism for textiles (Art. 6 ATC). The unfair trade clause (Art. 
VI GATT) is the subject of Chapter Four. 
Ill. Emergency Safeguard Clause 
The systemic approach to WTO trade remedies should recognise the renegotiation of 
commitments in Article XXVIII GATT as the ultimate trade remedy - the only one based 
on the WTO principle of reciprocity. It should be taken into account, however, that if 
trade remedies were necessary only for a limited period, renegotiations would be a 
disproportionate instrument. Hence a cost-efficient use of renegotiations requires a less 
permanent safeguard provision - an emergency safeguard clause509. 
507 HOEKMAN and KOSTECKI, o. c., supra, note 497, p. 162. 508 On the analogue provision to GATT Article XIX in CATS, see LEE, Y., "Emergency Safeguard 
Measures under Article X in GATS - Applicability of the Concepts in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards", 33 J. World Trade, August 1999, p. 47-59. See also note 504. 509 See MESSERLIN, P., "Antidumping and Safeguards", in SCHOTT, J., The WTO Aj? er Seattle, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 159-183, at p. 162. 
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Therefore, notwithstanding the strict prohibition of quantitative measures by Article XI 
GATT, or to increase a tariff rate bound according to Article II GATT, a WTO member is 
allowed to restrict imports of a product temporarily to protect a specific domestic 
industry from an increase in imports of any product which is causing, or which is 
threatening to cause serious injury to that domestic industry. This emergency safeguard 
action is regulated in Article XIX GATT, and since the completion of the Uruguay Trade 
Negotiations Round also in the WTO Safeguards Agreement. 
A. WTO Safeguards Agreement 
Under GATT 1947, emergency safeguards were only regulated by Article X1X510. 
Because governments preferred to protect their industries through "grey area measures", 
such as voluntary export restraints (VER)511, to escape costly compensation and possibly 
retaliation, Article XIX was infrequently used512. So-called grey area measures did not 
come under the multilateral disciplines of GATT, and the legality of such measures under 
the agreement was doubtful. The WTO Safeguards Agreement broke new ground in 
prohibiting these measures513 and to rejuvenate the use of the Article XIX safeguard. The 
Agreement clarifies and reinforces GATT disciplines, re-establishes multilateral control 
510 This is, apart from the Tokyo Round's Safeguards Code, the predecessor of the current WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards. For a full account on how Article XIX operated and its implementation in selected 
Contracting Parties of GATT 1947, see PEREZ-LOPEZ, J., "GATT Safeguards: A Critical Review of 
Article XIX and Its Implementation in Selected Countries", 23 Case W. Res. J. Intl L., Summer 1991, p. 
517-582. On the use of GATT Article XIX, see also Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical Index, 
WTO Secretariat, Geneva, 6t' ed., 1995, (hereinafter GATT Analytical Index), p. 515-539. On safeguards 
in the EC, see VAN BAEL, I. and BELLIS, J., Anti-Dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws of the EC, 
Brussels, CCH Europe, 3`d ed., 1996, p. 423f. For a US perspective, read BHALA, R. and KENNEDY, K., 
World Trade Law - The GATT-WTO System, Regional Arrangements and US Law, Charlottesville, Lexis, 
1998, p. 897. 
511 See generally BRONCKERS, M., Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilateral Trade Relations, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law, 1985. And more specifically LOWENFELD, A., Public Controls on International 
Trade, New York, Matthew Bender, 1983, p. 195ff; and JONES, K., "Voluntary Export Restraint: Political 
Economy, History and the Role of GATT", 23 J. World Trade, n° 2,1989, p. 125-140. 
512 Other reasons for making little use of safeguards under Article XIX were analysed by the GATT 
Secretariat at the start of the Uruguay Round, see document MTN. GNG/NG9/W/l of 7 April 1987 (they 
are identified as lack of a widely-accepted definition of serious injury; lack of domestic procedures' 
transparency in determinations; inadequacy of GATT notification and consultation procedures; and failure 
to respect the short-duration objective for safeguard measures). Apart from these reasons also non- 
selectivity could be added to the list. 
513 Art. 11 Safeguards Agreement. 
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over safeguards514, and encourages structural adjustment on the part of the industries 
adversely affected by increased imports, thereby enhancing competition in international 
markets515 
The conditions under which safeguard measures may be applied are spelled out in Article 
2 of the Agreement. These conditions are (i) increased imports and (ii) serious injury or 
threat thereof caused by such increased imports516. It also spells out the general 
requirement that such measures must be applied on an MFN or non-selective basis 517. it 
is long argued that this non-selectivity comes within the logic of Article XIII GATT. 
Since concessions are granted erga omnes their withdrawal should similarly happen in a 
non-discriminatory way518. This non-selectivity was again the focus of debate during the 
Uruguay negotiations. In particular the EC considered as essential the pursuit of its policy 
514 A Committee on Safeguards, open to any member's participation, is established to monitor the 
Agreement's general implementation (Art. 13). 
s1 Structural adjustment must be proved in case the initial safeguard is to be extended beyond its initial 
four-year duration. 
316 These conditions were also part of GATT 1947's Article XIX, but some differences are worth noting. 
First, it was not enough that imports were increasing and causing serious injury; these events had to be a 
result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party, 
including tariff concessions. This language is absent from the current Safeguards Agreement, nonetheless at 
two occasions the WTO Apellate Body ruled that Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement requirements 
must be applied cumulatively and that as such "unforeseen developments" remains as a condition for the 
implementation of safeguards (See Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy 
Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, and Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, 
WT/DS121/AB/R). A second difference is the identity of the entity charged with making the requisite 
factual determination. In contrast with GATT 1947, the Safeguards Agreement makes clear that it is the 
responsibility of the member imposing the safeguard measure, consistent with the procedure, standards and 
other requirements set forth in the Agreement. On this burden of proof, see Korea - Dairy Products, quoted 
above. A third difference is that the increase in the quantities of imports may be measured either in absolute 
terms or relative to domestic production. Finally, by substituting the term "industry" for the term 
"producers", the new Agreement clarifies that the injury should be to domestic producers as a whole, not 
merely one, or some domestic producers. See also, NUZUM, J., "The Agreement on Safeguards: US Law 
Leads Revitalisation of the Escape Clause", in STEWART, T. (Ed. ), The World Trade Organisation - The 
Multilateral Trade Framework For the 21" Century and US Implementing Legislation, American Bar 
Association, Washington D. C., 1996, p. 413-14. The criteria, set forth to be used in making the injury 
determination, are found in Article 4. On the case law, see also BHALA, R. and GANTZ, D., "WTO Case 
Review 2000", 18 Ariz. J. Intl & Comp. L., Spring 2001, p. 1-101; and LEE, Y., "Review of the First 
WTO Panel Case on the Agreement of Safeguards: Korea - Definitive Measures on Imports on Certain 
Daily Products and its Implications for the Application of the Agreement", 33 J. World Trade, December 
1999, p. 27-45. 
s" Under GATT 1947, Article XIX did not expressly address the principle of non-discrimination. See, e. g., 
BRONCKERS, o. c., supra note 511. A traditional reading of GATT Art. XIX suggests that a safeguard 
measure should apply against imports of any like or directly-competitive products of any origin. 51$ See, e. g., GATT Analytical Index, o. c., supra note 510, p. 519; PESCATORE, P., DAVEY, W. and 
LOWENFELD, A., Handbook of GATT Dispute Settlement, Boston, Kluwer, 1991, p. 48; KOULEN, M., 
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of imposing selective measures, especially against certain Asian countries. If they were 
non-selective, EC measures would inevitably hit a number of US products519. The EC 
argued it was more dependent on selective safeguards, because it had reduced tariffs to a 
lower average level than certain other countries, which had consolidated their customs 
duties at a high level, thus keeping a significant level of protection 520. As a result quota 
shares can be allocated among supplier countries in a selective manner, if (i) the 
percentage increase in imports from certain Members has been disproportionate to the 
overall increase in imports; (ii) the reasons for the departure from the general rule of non- 
selectivity are justified; and (iii) the conditions of such a departure are equitable to all 
suppliers of the product concerned521. 
The obligation to grant compensation was another issue unacceptable to the EC522. 
According to the text of Article XIX the member invoking the safeguard measure must 
compensate in the form of concessions. The EC, however, was concerned that this might 
lead to intra-community trouble. Indeed, compensation in the form of concessions or 
another product necessarily involves lower protection of another Community industry or 
Member State523. The EC therefore favoured a compromise. Trading partners would 
renounce their right to compensation, at least for a certain period524. 
The developing country members wanted the adjustment criterion of Article XIX to stand 
as a very important principle. The EC granted some support to this view by admitting 
that, if an injury had not been removed within a given deadline, continuation of the 
measures should only be permitted where accompanied by a restructuring-of-industry 
adjustment process525. In particular, a measure may be extended only if it is found, 
"The Non-Discriminatory Interpretation of Article XIX GATT -A Reply", 9 LIEI, 1983, p. 87; For an 
opposite view, see BRONCKERS, o. c., supra note 511, p. 13. s 
OF 
DIDIER, P., WTO Trade Instruments in EU Law: Commercial Policy Instruments, London, Cameron 
May, 1999, p. 297. 
520 Ibidem. The EC also felt that the set of "grandfather clauses" invoked by the US allowed them legally to 
take unilateral measures without being bound by Art. XIX GATT disciplines. 521 See Art. 5(2)(b) Safeguards Agreement. In such cases of quota modulation the safeguard measure is not 
subject to extension. See NUZUM, o. c., supra note 516, p. 417. 
522 DIDIER, supra note 519, p. 298. 
523 Ibidem. 
524 This period is limited to three years. Article 7 Agreement on Safeguards deals with the duration of 
safeguard measures. 
525 See DIDIER, o. c., supra note 519, p. 298. 
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through a new investigation, that the industry is adjusting, and if evidence shows that its 
continuation is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury 526. 
Another principal achievement of the Agreement on Safeguards is the decrease by stages 
of the measures, and it provides for a "sunset clause"527. Safeguard measures in place for 
longer than one year must be progressively liberalised at regular intervals. This was 
supported by the EC, because it realised that a concession on this point was unavoidable 
to win on the non-selectivity issue, and on the absence of compensation S28. It was further 
agreed that if the measures take the form of a quantitative restriction, the level should not 
be below the actual import level of the most recent three representative years based on 
past market shares, unless there is clear justification for setting a different, lower, level529. 
The Agreement, however, provides no guidance as to how the level of a safeguard 
measure in the form of an increase in the tariff above the bound rate should be set, except 
that measures can only be applied to the extent necessary to remedy, or prevent serious 
injury, and to facilitate adjustment 530 
The history of Article XIX suggests that the emergency safeguard clause has gone 
unused, precisely because it was not a back door to protection, at least not as efficient a 
method as VERS used during the 1970s and 1980s or as antidumping procedures. The 
following sections will attempt to discuss the use of the emergency safeguard clause in 
the EC as a trade policy instrument to address the adjustment problem with regard to 
China, but only after a short introduction of the European trade policy vis-a-vis third 
countries. 
B. EC in the Field of Trade 
Articles 131 and 134 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC) confer the 
general power in the field of trade directly to the EC. Other specific powers, such as to 
take autonomous measures to regulate import tariffs and agricultural trade are derived 
526 Art 7 Safeguards Agreement. 
527 Ibidem. 
528 DIDIER, supra note 519, p. 299. 
529 Departure from uniform application is allowed only in circumstances of serious injury (not threat 
thereof) and only pursuant to satisfactory consultations with the Committee on Safeguards, which must 
include clear demonstration that the conditions of Art. 5(2)(b) apply. See supra note 521, and 
accompanying text. 
530 Art. 5 Safeguards Agreement. 
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from other articles. Since the early days of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed this concept of powers531. The EC has 
exclusive powers with regard to its commercial policy as far as goods are concerned532. 
The ECJ, however, did not retain the Commission's arguments in support of its 
contention of the exclusive competence of the EC for the GATS and TRIPS 
agreements533. Upon ratification by all Member States of the Treaty of Nice the exclusive 
Community competence will be extended and also apply to negotiations of WTO 
Agreements that concern services (with certain exceptions), and the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property rights 534 
As far as trade is concerned, the customs union is the cornerstone of EC trade policy 535 
The most comprehensive trade policy instrument is the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) 
for it applies to all trade in goods 536 However, both ad hoc and structural exceptions 
apply. Ad hoc exceptions may occur if during a particular calendar year autonomous 
alterations or suspensions of duties of the CCT are granted. Decisions on tariff increases 
for the application of GATT Article XIX also fall hereunder. Structural exceptions are 
built on "special and differential treatment". It should be noted that structural 
discrimination is not a marginal feature of the European commercial policy. The EC has 
created a complex pyramid of carefully controlled and delimited preferences 537. Basically 
331 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 532 On the development of the Common Commercial Policy, see Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355; Joined 
Cases 21 - 24/73, International Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219; Joined Cases 37 and 38/73, 
Diamantarbeiders v. Indiamex [1973] ECR 1600; Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921; and 
EECKHOUT, P., The European Internal Market and International Trade -A Legal Analysis, Oxford, 
Oxford Clarendon Press, 1994. 
s" On the limits and boundaries of these powers to conclude the WTO agreements, see Opinion 1/94 
[1995] ECR 5267. See further BOURGEOIS, J., "The WTO in the EC and Opinion 1/94: an Echternach 
Procession", 32 CML Rev., 1995, p. 3; BOURGEOIS, J. (Ed. ), The Uruguay Round Results: A European 
Lawyers' Perspective, Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1995; and also VERMULST, E. and 
INAMA, S., Customs and Trade Laws of the European Community, The Hague, Kluwer, 1999, p. 3. The 
Court admitted that certain specific provisions of these agreements fell within the exclusive competence of 
the EC (namely cross-frontier suppliers of services in the case of CATS and the section of TRIPS relating 
to means of enforcement of intellectual property rights). However, all other competences were jointly 
shared by the Community and its members. 
534 Ten members had ratified the Nice Treaty by May 2002. 
535 See VERMULST and INAMA, o. a., supra note 533, p. 5. 
536 See, e. g., VÖLKER, E., Barriers to External and Internal Community Trade, The Hague, Kluwer, 1993, 
Soff. 
37 WOLF, M., The Resistible Appeal of Fortress Europe, Washington D. C., AEI Press, 1994, p. 24-25. 
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there are only a handful of suppliers whose exports face the MFN tariff538, most countries 
face lower tariffs, although many of these face other barriers, often themselves 
discriminatory and steeper than tariff barriers. Nonetheless, the MFN tariff is often the 
least-favoured tariff. Whereas in terms of economic weight about 60% of the total EC 
imports were accorded MFN treatment and about 40% were awarded preferential 
treatment in the early 1990s539, this relation has somewhat reversedsao. 
Traditionally there have been two major structural exceptions to the MFN principle 
embodied in Article I GATT, consisting of Part IV on Trade and Development54' and 
Article XXIV on the formation of free trade areas and customs unions542. The former 
provides for the legal existence of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) allowing 
more favourable tariff treatment for developing nations as well as preferential trading 
arrangements among developing countries543. It can be argued that the EC trade policy, 
through the conclusion of bilateral or plurilateral contractual and non-reciprocal trade 
agreements, has added a third exception, as far as these agreements are not acknowledged 
under Article XXIV GATTS. 
Of all the EC's trading partners the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
have seen the most dramatic changes in trade relations. Originally the import regime for 
products originating from state-trading countries was laid down in Regulation 1765/82 on 
the common rules for imports from state-trading countries545, which established quotas at 
the community level; and, in Regulation 3420/83 on import arrangements for products 
538 In 2002, nine WTO members were subject to exclusively MFN treatment in all product categories: 
Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the 
United States. 
539 WOLF, o. a., supra note 537, p. 24-25. 
Sao The countries listed in footnote 538 account for 45.2% of the EU's total merchandise imports in 2001. 541 Decision of the Contracting Parties of 28 November 1979 (GATT document 265/203). Before the 
adoption of Part IV, the GSP was allowed through waivers based on Art. XXV GATT (see Decision on the 
Generalised System of Preferences of 25 June 1971, GATT document 2/3545,185/24). 542 Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994. 
543 See generally HUDEC, R., Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Aldershot, Brookfield, 
1987. 
°44 See VERMULST and INAMA, o. a., supra note 533, p. 46f. See also CREMONA, M., "Rhetoric and 
Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a Multilateral Context", 38 CML Rev., 2001, p. 359-396. 545 Regulation 1765/82/EEC of 30 June 1982 on the common rules for imports from state-trading countries, 
OJ L195,9 February 1982, p. 21. 
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originating in state-trading countries, not liberalised at community level546, which 
provided for a series of Member States' quotas547. However, with the entry into force of 
the Europe Agreements548 and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements549 the trade 
regime with these countries has undergone substantial changes. Also the Baltic States and 
Slovenia benefit from agreements on free trade and trade-related matters"°. 
546 Regulation 3420/83/EEC of 14 November 1983 on import arrangements for products originating in 
state-trading countries, not liberalised at community level, OJ L346,8 December 1983, p. 6. 
547 For a detailed account on how the national quantitative restrictions evolved into community-wide 
quantitative restrictions, see EECKHOUT, o. c., supra note 532, p. 149ff. 
548 These are the so-called Association Agreements concluded with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe wishing to accede to the EC and constitute a kind of waiting room for full membership. See, e. g., 
Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part, OJ L348 (1993); Europe Agreement 
establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States on the one part, 
and the Republic of Hungary, of the other part, OJ L347 (1993); Europe Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States on the one part, and the Czech 
Republic, of the other part, OJ L360 (1994); Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States on the one part, and the Slovak Republic, of the other 
part, OJ L359 (1994); Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States on the one part, and Romania, of the other part, OJ L357 (1994); and Europe 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States on the 
one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part, OJ L358 (1994). 
sag See, e. g., Council Decision 95/414/EC on the conclusion by the European Community of the Interim 
Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the EC, the ECSC and Euratom, of the one part, and 
the Russian Federation, of the other part, OJ L247 (1995); Council and Commission Decision 
97/800/ECSC, EC, Euratom on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
EC and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian federation, of the other part, OJ L327 (1997); 
see Council Decision 95/541/EC on the conclusion by the European Community of the Interim Agreement 
on trade and trade-related matters between the EC, the ECSC and Euratom, of the one part, and Ukraine, of 
the other part, OJ L311 (1995); Council and Commission Decision 98/149/ECSC, EC, Euratom on the 
conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EC and their Member States, of the 
one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L9 (1998); see Council Decision 96/161/EC on the conclusion 
by the European Community of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the EC, 
the ECSC and Euratom, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, OJ L40 (1996); see 
Council Decision 96/365/EC on the conclusion by the European Community of the Interim Agreement on 
trade and trade-related matters between the EC, the ECSC and Euratom, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, of the other part, OJ L147 (1996); see Council Decision 97/301/EC on the conclusion by the 
European Community of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the EC, the 
ECSC and Euratom, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, OJ L247 (1995); see Council Decision 
97/300/EC on the conclusion by the European Community of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade- 
related matters between the EC, the ECSC and Euratom, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of 
the other part, OJ L129 (1997); and see Council Decision 97/567/EC on the conclusion by the European 
Community of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the EC, the ECSC and 
Euratom, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part, OJ L235 (1997). sso Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the EC, Euratom and ECSC, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part, OJ L373 (1994); Agreement on free trade and trade-related 
matters between the EC, Euratom and ECSC, of the one part, and the Republic of Latvia, of the other part, 
OJ L374 (1994); Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the EC, Euratom and ECSC, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania, of the other part, OJ L375 (1994); Agreement on free trade and 
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The Europe Agreements provide for the establishment of a free trade area in ten years 
time comprising the EC and each of the Central and Eastern European countries. They 
allow for a gradual phasing out of tariffs and quotas but with an asymmetrical timetable, 
in which the EC timetable for liberalisation is shorter than that of the Eastern European 
trading partners. The most important difference with other trade agreements concluded by 
the EC, beside the creation of a free trade area, is that their scope extends well beyond 
trade in goods. The Europe Agreements include detailed provisions on the movement of 
workers, freedom of establishment, supply of services, payments, competition law and 
approximation of laws. It is clear that the final objective is the preparation for future 
membership of the EC551. 
As far as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the CIS countries are 
concerned, they provide for a transitional legal framework for trade relations among the 
contracting parties by inserting in these agreements references to GATT articles. For 
those CIS countries in the process of acceding to the WTO, as happened e. g. to Ukraine, 
certain provisions will cease to apply from the date of their accession552. 
The relationship between the EC and China is, at the moment of writing, still governed 
by the 1985 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 553, which replaces the 
previous Trade Agreement of 3 April 1978554. The first part of the Agreement concerns 
matters of bilateral trade, following the rules of the 1978 Agreement. The provisions 
relating to trade include an MFN clause555, a safeguard clause556, a price clause, 557 and a 
balance of trade clause558; both parties making similar commitments as in the 1978 Trade 
Agreement as almost the same wording is used. However, Article 13 of the 1985 
trade-related matters between the EC, Euratom and ECSC, of the one part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of 
the other part, OJ L344 (1996). These countries also wish to accede the EU. 
551 For a more detailed description, see VERMULST and INAMA, o. c., supra note 533, p. 55ff. 
552 VERMULST and INAMA, o. c., supra note 533, p. 62ff. 553 See Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EEC and the PRC, OJ L250,19 
September 1985, p. 2; and Council Decision 2616/85/EEC of 16 September 1985 concerning the 
conclusion of a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the People's Republic of China, OJ L250,19 September 1985, p. 1. 
554 Agreement between the EEC and the PRC on Trade, OJ L123,11 May 1978, p. 1. For a thorough 
discussion of the 1978 Agreement, see YUE, X., The EC and China, London, Butterworths, 1993, p. 21. 
sss Art. 3 Trade Agreement (1985). 
556 Art. 6 Trade Agreement (1985). 
557 Art. 8 Trade Agreement (1985). 
558 Art. 4 Trade Agreement (1985). 
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Agreement adds that in view of the difference in the two parties' levels of development, 
the EC is prepared to undertake development activities in China. This provision does not 
mean that the EC will classify China as a developing country, nor does it change the 
Agreement from a non-preferential into a preferential one. It merely addresses the 
problem of financial cooperation and EC aid activities, rather than a problem of trade 
relations. The EC also continues to treat China as a non-market economy despite the 
changing economic structure in China, and still allows quantitative restrictions on a 
number of products originating in China559. 
The MFN clause is more restrictive than the MFN clause of the GATT 560, which is the 
result of China's non-membership of the WTO/GATT at the time of the conclusion. It 
also reflects the Community's worries about the possibility that China could produce 
massive amounts of low-priced products, which would then flood the European market. 
Reciprocity is also stressed, because China's economic system might create problems for 
European producers in penetrating the Chinese market notwithstanding the MFN 
treatment offered by China561. Even though China is awarded MFN treatment according 
to WTO standards after 11 November 2001, it is in fact still in a relatively 
disadvantageous position compared to most of the Community's other trading partners. 
To attain a balance of trade, it was agreed that, were an obvious imbalance to arise562, the 
Joint Committee, established by the Agreement563, should examine the matter so that 
measures could be taken to improve the situation based on its recommendation. The 
effect of this clause has been fairly limited. Whereas from 1984 until 1986 China 
incurred a large deficit with the EC, it is more recently the Community that has incurred 
an enormous trade deficit with China. Notwithstanding the doubtful useful effects of this 
clause, it allows either party to demand that the other take steps to remedy the situation, 
e. g. to demand that the other increase its imports in order to attain a trade balance. More 
559 YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 56. On quantitative restrictions, see further below, p. 144. 
56° The MFN clause does not confer upon China the same degree of benefits as GATT/WTO members 
afford to each other. For possible reasons, see YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 23f 
561 Idem, p. 23. 
562 Art. 4 Trade Agreement (1985). 
563 Art. 15 Trade Agreement (1985). The EC has established a number of different kinds of joint institutions 
in various types of agreements concluded with third countries. The emphases and the functions of the 
institutions established depend largely on the category of the treaty, i. e. whether it is an association, free 
trade or ordinary trade and cooperation agreement. See YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 33ff. 
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importantly, it also allows reducing imports from the other party, as China did in 1987 to 
reduce its trade deficit with the ECSM. The legal effect of this clause is even more 
doubtful after the Chinese WTO accession, because the first paragraph of Article 4 is 
drafted in language that suggests unilateral and discretionary action may be taken565. This 
discussion, however, is largely academic and less practical. It is unlikely the EC will 
make use of the clause in future; and, in any case, its use should not interfere with 
established WTO principles now China has become a member. But the academic 
question remains, as to how such safeguard clauses in bilateral trade agreements relate to 
multilaterally agreed ones. 
Interesting is also the price clause in Article 8, specifying that "trade in goods and the 
provision of services between the two Contracting Parties shall be effected at market- 
related prices and rates". "Market-related price" is a very flexible term, the clause lacks 
any practical procedure as to how to decide it, and a detailed provision to control 
prices, 566 which occurred in the 1979 Sino-European Textiles Agreement, 567 was 
abandoned in the 1984 Textile Protocol568, because the Chinese considered it 
discriminatory 569 The clause can also be viewed as a protective measure designed to 
prevent the Chinese from selling in the Community at prices below market value570. 
Finally, in Article 9 the 1985 Agreement, it also provides that payments for transactions 
54 YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 28. 
565 It reads: "The two Contracting Parties will make every effort to foster the harmonious expansion of their 
reciprocal trade and to help, each by its own means, to attain a balance in such trade". Emphasis added. 566 The price of Chinese made textile products sold to the Community should take particular account of the 
prices usually governing similar products that were sold under normal trade conditions by other exporting 
countries in the EC market. See also below note 568. 
567 Agreement between the EEC and the PRC on Trade in Textiles initialled in 1979 as extended and 
modified, OJ L389,31 December 1986, p. 3. The textiles trade between the EC and China is governed by a 
separate legal regime, although certain principles of the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement may 
apply. Textiles are dealt with separately in later sections. 
5 
apply. 
In the textile agreement there was, until the changes in 1984, a price clause under which imports of a 
textile product would be suspended, should the price of the product fall below a fixed level. If textile 
products from China were sold at prices lower than prices sold under normal trade conditions by other 
exporting countries, then the interested party could request consultations, and in certain circumstances, the 
EC could suspend delivery of import documents or licences. But there were still difficulties in determining 
what prices are usually governing normal trade conditions. 
569 In effect the Community had complete freedom to suspend imports, if it regarded suspension to be 
necessary. YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 72. 
570 This was definitely the effect of the price clause in the 1979 Textiles Agreement. It excluded the 
possible application of anti-dumping rules to imports of Chinese textiles. The problem of low-priced 
imports could easily be eliminated through consultations and/or unilateral action. Ibidem. 
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will be made in convertible currencies accepted by the two parties concerned in the 
transactions. This reflects the intention to tackle the problem of foreign exchange controls 
in China. 
So far the pyramidal trade policy maintained by the EC was introduced and the 
framework of Sino-European trade set. It is beyond doubt that against the background of 
China's WTO accession some of the provisions in the 1985 Trade Agreement are dated, 
and that these should be brought up to date with WTO/GATT evolutions. What is of 
interest in the Sino-European trade relation is the employment of safeguards against 
products, and especially against' products originating from China. This is elaborated 
further below. The following sections first focus on the common regime on safeguards, 
then the attention will move to safeguards, and how they are applied to state-trading 
countries, and finally, the regime as it is applied to China in particular will be discussed. 
C. EC Regime on Imports and Safeguards 
An EC Council Decision571 approved the WTO Safeguards Agreement, and it was 
transposed by EC Regulation 3285/94 of 22 December 1994572. This Regulation is the 
last in a long row of safeguard Regulations 573. The Regulation applies to all products 
covered by the common commercial policy, except for textile products covered by 
Regulation 517/94574, and products originating in certain third countries listed in 
Regulation 519/94575. Apart from these exceptions576, products originating in third 
571 OJ L336 of 23 December 1994, p. 184. 
572 Regulation 3285/94/EC of 22 December 1994 on the common rules for imports and repealing 
Regulation 518/94, OJ L349 of 31 December 1994, p. 53. 573 See Regulation 1025/70 OJ L124 of 8 June 1970; Regulation 1439/74 OJ L159 of 15 June 1974, p. 1; 
Regulation 926/79 OJ L131 of 29 May 1979, p. 15; Regulation 288/82 OJ L35 of 9 February 1982, p. 1, as 
amended by Regulation 1243/86 OJ LI 13 of 30 April 1986; and Regulation 518/94/EC of 7 March 1994 on 
common rules for imports and repealing Regulation 288/82, OJ L67,10 March 1994, p. 77. These 
Regulations concern trade with market-economy countries and corresponding regulations governing 
relations with non-market economies were adopted. See further BRONCKERS, M., Protectionism and the 
European Community, The Hague, Kluwer, 1983, p. 56. Apart from setting up common procedures for 
GATT Art. XIX's application, these Regulations ensured progressive transfer of Member States' trade 
restriction competencies to the EC. The completion of the internal market and the political changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, including the USSR, and the creation of the WTO resulted in an updating of 
the EC common import regime. 
574 Regulation 517/94/EC of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports of textile products from certain 
third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or by other specific 
Community import rules, OJ L67,10 March 1994, p. 1, as amended. 
573 Regulation 519/94/EC of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries, OJ 
L067,10 March 1994, p. 89, as amended. 
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countries will take place freely, and will not be subject to any quantitative restrictions577, 
with the exception of measures taken under Title V of the Regulation578. As far as the 
scope of these Regulations is concerned, they concern only the liberalisation of imports 
of goods, coming from third countries into Community territory, and that they do not 
affect the subsequent marketing of the goods within that territory, which is therefore 
covered by national legislation or other applicable Community rules579. 
Titles IV and V of the Regulation refer to surveillance and safeguard measures 
respectively. The WTO Safeguards Agreement does not refer to surveillance measures, 
but because of their restrictive effects, the EC Regulation regards them as safeguard 
measures in their own right580. Safeguards may, thus, be preceded by surveillance 
measures. The latter may be taken any time, when the trends in imports on the market in 
respect of a product covered by the Regulation threatens to cause injury to Community 
producers581, and become invalid at the end of the second six-month period following the 
six months in which the measures were introduced582. With respect to safeguard 
measures, the same conditions apply as in the WTO Safeguards Agreement583. However, 
unlike negotiations on the Antidumping Agreement, those on the Safeguards Agreement 
did not call for a public interest test584. Nonetheless, Regulation 3285/94 provides that, 
both for surveillance and safeguard measures, the Community's interest must be taken 
into account585. The Community authority should, thus, balance the affected industry's 
interests with those of the consumers and users of the product concerned, and those of 
576 Art1(1) Reg. 3285/94. 
sn It should be noted that although the safeguard provisions are worded so as to enable also tariff measures 
to be taken, the EC always preferred quantitative quotas to be applied to these goods. 578 Art. 1(2) Reg. 3285/94. 
379 The sole objective of Regulations 519/94 and 3285/94 is to achieve greater uniformity in the rules for 
imports by eliminating the exceptions and derogations, which result from national measures of commercial 
policy in force prior to their adoption. Placing products on the market is a stage subsequent to importation. 
The lawful importation of a product does not imply that it will automatically be allowed onto the market. 
See Case C-296/00, Prefetto Provincia di Cuneo v. Carbone [2002] ECR 0 (not yet reported). 
580 Art. 11 Reg. 3285/94; see further DIDIER, o. c., supra note 519, p. 336. 
S81 Art. 11(1) Reg. 3285/94. 
582 Art. 11(3) Reg. 3285/94. 
583 For a detailed discussion, see DIDIER, o. a., supra note 519, p. 312ff. Art. 5(3)(a) Reg. 3285/94 provides 
us with definitions of the conditions. 
584 DIDIER, o. c., supra note 519, p. 318. 
5s5 See Arts. 11 and 17 Reg. 3285/94. 
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other industries susceptible to be concerned by compensations586. The procedures for 
obtaining a hearing by the Commission are contained in Article 4. Those interested 
parties, which make themselves known, may have access to part of the information made 
available to the Commission by the complainants 587. 
The determination of the need to enact a safeguard or surveillance measure is based on 
the criteria found in Article 10588. Before the introduction of a surveillance or safeguard 
action, consultations may be taken at the initiative either of the Commission or of a 
Member State589. These consultations take place in the Advisory Committee mentioned in 
Article 4. If, after the consultations, the Commission has obtained sufficient evidence it 
may initiate an investigation, which will be announced accordingly in the Official Journal 
containing details of the information on the basis of which was decided to open the 
investigation, and will state the period within which interested parties may make 
themselves known590. The Regulation sets clear time limits for the duration of the 
safeguard measures as well591. 
The Safeguards Agreement provides that, when a quantitative measure is applied, the 
quota is allocated among all the supplying countries. In principle such quotas will be 
agreed with other WTO members having a substantial interest in supplying the product. 
A second option is to allocate the quota between members, dividing it by shares based on 
a previous representative period. Article 5 (2)(b) of the Safeguards Agreement introduces 
the "selectivity clause", or "quota modulation", whereby a member may depart from 
these rules592. These restrictions have been reproduced in Article 16 of the Regulation, 
596 This can only be done when hearing all interested parties, including users and consumers. Yet the 
Commission's investigation is foreseen to concern the increase in imports and the injury, rather than the 
Community interest (Art. 5(2)). See also Art. 18 Reg. 3285/94. 
597 Art. 6 Reg. 3285/94. 
588 They comprise: (a) the volume of imports, where there has an absolute or relative increase; (b) the price 
of the imports, where there has been a significant price undercutting; (c) the consequent impact by trends in 
certain economic factors, such as production, capacity, stocks, sales, market share, prices, profits, return on 
capital, cash flow, and employment; (d) other factors. In case of threat of serious injury: (a) rate of increase 
of exports to the Community; and (b) the export capacity in the country of origin. 
569 Art. 3 Reg. 3285/94. 
390 Art. 6(1)(a) Reg. 3285/94. 
591 Art. 20 Reg. 3285/94. 
592 See supra, p. 129fff. 
141 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Three 
which allows departure from non-selectivity in case of serious injury. Departure is not 
permitted in the case of threat of serious injury 593. 
The slightly different wording in Article 16 appears to allow EC institutions more 
flexibility in adopting quota modulation, but this cannot escape multilateral supervision 
by the WTO Safeguards Committee. It remains to be seen how large or how narrow the 
quota modulation will be interpreted. It should be mentioned that this selectivity only 
applies to quotas and not to tariffs. The administration of quotas among importers is 
further governed by EC Regulation 520/94594. 
Although Regulation 3285/94 treats products originating from WTO members and non- 
WTO members similarly, with the exception for products originating from those 
countries subject to Regulation 519/94, as amended. Basically the difference is that for 
non-WTO members the safeguard can be triggered either on the basis of such greatly 
increased quantities, or on the basis of imports made on such terms or conditions as to 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury, whereas for WTO members both these 
conditions have to be met595. It may suggest that the EC would not rigidly apply such 
criteria to a non-WTO member when adopting a safeguard measure, or would use only 
one of the indicators596. In the following section, I will focus on state-trading countries, 
many of which are not members of the WTO yet. 
D. Imports from State-Trading Countries and China 
It was Regulations 1765/82597 and 1766/82598, which provided for common rules on 
imports from state-trading countries and China respectively. These Regulations contained 
the rules applicable to goods, not subject to quantitative restrictions, and liberalised at 
Community level". The quantitative restrictions maintained at the national leve1600 for 
593 Art. 5(2)(b) Safeguards Agreement; and Art. 20(2) Reg. 3285/94. 
594 Regulation 520/94/EC of 7 March 1994 establishing a community procedure for administering 
quantitative quotas, OJ L66 of 10 March 1994, p. 1, as amended. 
ss Art. 16(2) Reg. 3285/94. 
596 VERMULST and INAMA, o. a., supra note 533, p. 25. 
597 Regulation 1765/82/EEC of 30 June 1982 on the common rules for imports from state-trading countries, 
OJ L195,9 February 1982, p. 1. 
598 Regulation 1766/82/EEC of 30 June 1982 OJ L195,9 February 1982, p. 21. 
599 An annex to the Regulations listed the products, which could be imported into any part of the 
Community from these countries free of quantitative restrictions. See VERMULST and INAMA, o. c., 
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these countries, including China, were contained in Regulations 3420/83601, and 
3421/83602. Since the entry into force of trade agreements with many of the Central and 
Eastern European countries, these transition economies came under the scope of the 
general import regime as described in the previous section603. And a new set of rules 
dealing with imports from the remaining state-trading economies was created in 
Regulation 519/94604, which repealed Regulations 1765/82,1766/82 and 3420/83. This 
Regulation eliminated the exceptions and derogations resulting from the remaining 
national commercial policy measures605, and thus completed the common commercial 
policy. Like the regime for market economies, the starting point is the absence of any 
trade restrictions with the exception for safeguard measures pursuant to Title V. 
However, for a limited number of products originating in the PRC, owing to the 
sensitivity of certain sectors of Community industry, quantitative quotas and surveillance 
supra note 533, p. 26. For a detailed discussion, see generally VÖLKER, E., Protectionism and the 
European Community, Deventer, Kluwer, 1987, Chapter Two. 
600 Each year before 1 December the Council laid down the Member States' import quotas for the following 
year in respect of the various state-trading countries. Ibidem. 
601 Regulation 3420/83/EEC of 14 November 1983 on import arrangements for products originating in 
state-trading countries, not liberalised at community level, OJ L346,8 December 1983, p. 6. 
602 Regulation 3421/83/EEC of 14 November 1983 laying down certain detailed rules for the 
implementation of the Trade Agreement between the Community and China, OJ L346,8 December 1983, 
p91. ö3 See, e. g., Regulation 517/92/EEC of 27 February 1992 amending the autonomous arrangements for 
products originating in Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, OJ L56 (1992) p. 1; 
Regulation 3859/91/EEC of 23 December 1991 to liberalise or suspend quantitative restrictions in respect 
of Albania, extending the suspension of certain quantitative restrictions in respect of countries of Eastern 
and Central Europe and laying down the import arrangements applicable to products originating from the 
Baltic States, OJ L362 (1991) p. 83. 
604 OJ L67,10 March 1994, p. 89. For the list of State-trading countries, see Annex I, it contains Albania, 
Armenia, Azarbaijan, Belarus, China, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 
605 This package involved the unilateral elimination of 6.417 national quantitative restrictions (of which 
4700 concerned Chinese products), see EC Commission, 60' Report from the Commission on the 
quantitative quotas and surveillance measures applicable to certain non-textile products originating in the 
PRC, COM (2001) 84 final. It should be noted that many national quantitative restrictions had already been 
abolished, see Commission Decision 84/12/EEC of 21 December 1983 changing the import arrangements 
established by Council Regulation 3420/83 and applied in the Benelux countries, in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in the United Kingdom and in Greece in respect of the PRC, OJ L16,19 January 1984, p. 32; 
Commission Decision 82/912/EEC of 15 December 1982 changing the import arrangements established by 
Commission Decision 81/248/EEC and applied in the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Greece in respect of China regarding various industrial products, OJ L381,31 December 1982, p. 26; 
and Commission Decision 82/45/EEC of 14 January 1982 changing the import arrangements established by 
Commission Decision 81/248/EEC and applied in the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom in respect of China regarding various industrial products, OJ L20,28 
January 1982, p. 40, as amended OJ L58 2 March 1982, p. 30. 
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measures applicable at the Community level are incorporated in this Regulation. The 
Regulation lays down a procedure for reviewing and checking these measures in order to 
adapt them to changes in the situation. Although the recitals claim that there no longer 
exists a justification for maintaining two separate sets of Community rules for state- 
trading countries and the PRC, by abolishing the duality that existed in the two separate 
Regulations 1765 and 1766, the Community de facto continued to treat China separately 
from other state-trading nations, because the quotas in Annex II, and the surveillance 
measures in Annex III of the Regulation, only concern Chinese products. I will first 
spend some time on these quantitative restrictions and then- discuss the safeguard 
measures vis-ä-vis China. 
a. EC Quotas on Products from China 
Regulation 519/94 introduced quantitative restrictions on seven categories of products 
originating in the PRC, namely, gloves, footwear, porcelain tableware, ceramic 
tableware, glassware, car radios and toys, and certain surveillance measures606. The 
introduction of such measures had been agreed by the Council in December 1993 as part 
of a global package including acceptance of the Uruguay Round results, as a 
reinforcement of the trade policy instruments, and completion of the common 
commercial policy. The introduction depended on the sensitivity of the Community 
industry concerned, and on the increasing threat posed by imports from China, made 
more acute by the particular characteristics of the Chinese economy. As a result of the 
bilateral Agreement reached with China on 19 May 1999 in Beijing and the finalisation 
of China's Accession Protocol to the WTO, the remaining quantitative restrictions will be 
phased out progressively by the year 2005607. 
As indicated earlier Council Regulation 520/94 of 7 March 1994 established a 
Community procedure for administering quotas 608. The Commission accordingly adopted 
606 Since their entry into force in March 1994, the quotas have been modified on a number of occasions in 
order to balance the objective of ensuring an appropriate protection of the Community industry concerned, 
with that of maintaining trade flows with China. The last change happened as a result of Regulation 
1138/98 of 28 May 1998, OJ L159,3 June 1998, p. 1. See also, Case C-150/94, UK v. Council [1998] ECR 
1-7235; and Case C-284/94, Spain v. council [1998] ECR 1-7309. 
607 See Annex VII of the Chinese Protocol of Accession, WT/L/432. The surveillance measures already 
ended upon China's accession. 
608 See supra note 594. 
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Regulation 738/94609, laying down general rules for the implementation of Regulation 
520/94. Both these Regulations apply- to the administration of the quotas for certain 
products originating in the PRC as listed in Annex II to Regulation 519/94. Any problems 
regarding the administration of the quotas, until the end of 2004, will be dealt with in the 
context of the Committee established by Regulation 520/94 and the Community 
procedure for administering these quotas. In the management of the quotas, the 
Commission has been guided by two principles, viz. that administrative quotas should not 
add to the intended effect of the quotas on trade, and that the available quantities should 
be fully used; and, that non-discrimination among all Community importers, no matter 
where they are established, and no matter where they submit a licence application, would 
be ensured. 
In conformity with these two principles, the Commission resorted to the first method of 
allocation provided for in Regulation 520/94, i. e. the method based on traditional trade 
flows, which guarantees that traditional importers receive at least a part of their previous 
trade performance realised during a reference period, while ensuring a fair access to the 
quotas to non-traditional importers. The method used for the allocation of the part of the 
quotas set aside for this category of importers, is the third method provided for by 
Regulation 520/94, i. e. the method of proportional allocation to the quantities requested. 
In order to exclude speculative applications, a maximum quantity, which may be applied 
for by non-traditional importers is set. Over the years the portion of the quotas reserved 
for non-traditional importers was gradually increased, while at the same time the 
maximum individual quota quantity entitlement was increased for some products as well 
in 1999610. 
For the quota year 2000,27.247 applications were submitted, while for 2001 the 
applications reached 58.524. This extremely high number may result in each individual 
non-traditional importer being allotted very limited quantities, which in turn may lead to 
609 Regulation 738/94/EC of 30 March 1994 laying down general rules for the implementation of 
Regulation 520/94, OJ L87,31 March 1994, p. 47, as last amended by Regulation 983/96, OJ L131,1 June 
1996, p. 47. 
610 See COM (2001) 84 final, supra note 605. 
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under-utilisation of the quota. Any unused portions of the quotas must be redistributed 611. 
Traditional importers are asked to prove that they imported products originating in China 
subject to the relevant quotas in the course of a reference period. This reference period 
was either 1998 or 1999 for applications made in 2001612. For non-traditional importers, 
only those who participated and made use of at least 80% of their import licences under 
the annual quota year allocation can have access to these unused quotas. 
The EC quantitative restrictions regime towards China was partially liberalised for the 
last time in 1998. No EC quotas were removed in 1999 and 2000 in view of the situation 
of Community industries in the sectors concerned, and the lack of progress in the 
liberalisation of the Chinese quota regime. The progressive removal of quantitative 
restrictions on both sides is now part of China's WTO accession package, with quotas 
from both sides to be removed by 2005. However, the phase-out timetable for quotas as 
originally envisaged was not entirely met because China did only enter the WTO late in 
2001. This late Chinese entry meant that the implementation periods had to be mutually 
agreed prior to completion by the working party on Chinese accession of its Report and 
the attached protocols and annexes. Subsequently these changes had to be set out in a 
legislative proposal from the Commission to the Council as an amendment of Annex II of 
Regulation 519/94. Eventually, these quantitative restrictions will gradually phase out613. 
It should be made crystal clear that under normal circumstances after WTO accession no 
discriminatory quantitative restrictions can be taken against China, unless they are WTO 
compatible. Of course the abolition of existing discriminatory quantitative restrictions as 
bilaterally agreed with China, approved by all WTO members and then included in 
Annex VII of the Chinese Protocol of Accession, is allowed. Nonetheless, even as far as 
the imposition of new discriminatory measures are concerned, the EC and the US have 
secured the right for WTO parties to impose quantitative restrictions as selective 
safeguard measures against China. As for the right to impose selective safeguards on 
future Chinese imports, this is further discussed below. 
611 See Regulation 650/2001 of 30 March 2001 redistributing unused portions of the 2000 quantitative 
quotas for certain products originating in the People's Republic of China, OJ L91,31 March 2001, p. 51. 
62 Art. 4 Reg. 650/2001. 
613 See COM (2001) 84 final, supra note 605. 
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b. EC Emergency Safeguards and Products from China 
Although the provisions of Regulation 519/94 are similar to the provisions of Regulation 
3285/94, there are certain marked differences 614. For instance there is no language similar 
to that of Article 5 of Regulation 3285/94 determining and defining the injury criteria in 
Regulation 519/94. Further, Article 8 of Regulation 519/94, which mirrors Article 10 of 
Regulation 3285, includes a reference to the particular economic system of the countries 
whose products are subject to the regulation. Article 8 also seems to suggest that the 
Commission in its investigation is not specifically obliged to pinpoint "factors other than 
trend in imports which are causing or may have caused injury to the Community 
producers concerned", as this language is absent from Regulation 519/94. Also standards 
for the introduction of surveillance measures are less rigorous than under Regulation 
3285/94. Further, Regulation 519/94 requires only Community interest, whereas 
Regulation 3285/94, additionally, requires a threat to cause injury in Article 11. 
An important difference concerns the standards for applying the emergency safeguards. 
As discussed above, to undertake a safeguard action against WTO members, the two 
conditions in Article 16 of Regulation 3285/94 have to be met, whereas for safeguards to 
be applied against non-members only one of the two conditions would suffice. According 
to Article 15(1) of Regulation 519/94 these two conditions are not imposed, and only one 
of the two conditions is required to trigger a safeguard action without any difference as to 
whether the products originate from a WTO member. Moreover, Regulation 519/94 does 
not contain the detailed discipline on the duration of the measures as in Regulation 
3285/94. Once again, Regulation 519/94 is more lenient than Regulation 3285/94 in the 
sense that, for the application of provisional measures, Regulation 519/94 does not 
require a preliminary determination of cause and effect, i. e. increased imports and injury. 
There are further no corresponding disciplines on duration and the type of provisional 
safeguards. Finally, Regulation 519/94 does not contain any provisions regarding quota 
modulation either, and does not prohibit the selective application of safeguards to the 
countries listed in Annex I. 
614 For an overview of these differences, see also VERMULST, INAMA, o. c., supra note 533, p. 30. 
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As far as the countries listed in Annex I of Regulation 519/94 are members of the WTO, 
one can suspect that this Regulation runs contrary to the WTO Safeguards Agreement 
and Article XIX. However, the EC has embedded trade relations exceptions in bilateral or 
plurilateral trade agreements, such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with 
the CIS countries. Article 10 of those Agreements usually provides for a safeguard 
clause. This is no different for China, because the 1985 Sino-European Trade Agreement 
also provides a safeguard clause. This raises the academic question as to what will 
happen when these bilaterally or plurilaterally agreed safeguards are applied in 
conformity with their respective treaty provisions, but in conflict with the multilateral 
WTO safeguards Agreement. First, both Regulation 519/94 and Regulation 3285/94 state 
that they will not preclude the fulfilment of obligations arising from special rules 
contained in agreements concluded between the Community and third countries. This 
means that the bilaterally or plurilaterally agreed safeguards will take precedent over the 
one described in the Regulations, even when the safeguard clause of Regulation 3285/94 
is the only one which really implements the WTO Safeguards Agreement. Second, as far 
as China is concerned, Regulation 3421/83 of 14 November 1983 laying down certain 
detailed rules for the implementation of the Trade Agreement between the Community 
and China seems to have survived. According to this Regulation the procedures of 
adopting safeguard actions as laid down in Regulation 519/94, formerly Regulation 
1766/82, in respect of products subject to the Regulation, can`only be adopted once the 
consultations with China provided for in the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
have been completed. This means that the Joint Committee still has to meet beforehand to 
discuss the matter. Further, even where the Chinese Protocol of Accession allows for the 
application of selective measures against the country, the Joint Committee will still have 
to be consulted. Although the application of a safeguard against products from Chinese 
origin according to the 1985 treaty or according to Regulation 519/94 theoretically is 
possible, it is in practice very unlikely that the Joint Committee will allow the application 
of a safeguard measure that is not conform the WTO. 
Notwithstanding the limited and unlikely practical use of an emergency safeguard action, 
it should be noted that Regulation 519/94 is a liability for the EC. The scope of 
application of the Regulation should be reconsidered and its safeguard provision should 
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be brought up to date with WTO standards as far as WTO members are concerned. It 
would further be appropriate for the EC to allow China to graduate from the scope of 
application of Regulation 519/94, because the application of its safeguard provision may 
well contravene the multilateral safeguard rules. Instead, it will be possible for the EC to 
implement Section 16 of the Chinese Protocol of Accession, and apply another product- 
specific transitional safeguard mechanism, which is dealt with in the paragraphs below. 
In this regard the EC should clarify the role of Regulation 3421/83 and the Joint 
Committee for the application of this new safeguard, based on market disruption. In my 
opinion the EC should renegotiate the 1985 Trade Agreement to bring it up to date with 
WTO obligations. 
c. Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism 
The Chinese Protocol of Accession in Section 16 spells out the conditions for measures 
taken by WTO trading partners in case of "market disruption". Market disruption exists 
"whenever imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an article produced by 
the domestic industry, are increasingly rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be 
a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury to the domestic 
industry"615. The term "market disruption" reminds of a special provision for relief from 
increasing imports from state-controlled economies, which became law in the US as 
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974616. Specifically, Section 406 authorises relief 
against imports of an article from a state-controlled country when such imports are 
causing market disruption. According to the statute, "[m]arket disruption exists within a 
domestic industry whenever imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an 
article produced by such domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or 
relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof, to such 
domestic industrys617. This language is identical to that used in Section 16. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the US interpretation of this language also will prevail at 
the WTO level. 
615 Protocol of Accession, Section 16(4). 
6`6 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No 93-618, § 406,88 Stat. 2062 (1978) (Codified at 19 U. S. C. & 2436 
1976 
617 See 19 U. S. C. § 2436 (e)(2). 
149 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Three 
The criteria for relief under Section 406 and Section 16 are more relaxed than those under 
the WTO Safeguards Agreement and Article XIX, which are implemented by Section 
201 in the US Trade Act of 1974618, and EC Regulation 3285/94 as discussed above. 
Under Section 406 and Section 16, injury to the domestic industry must be "material", as 
compared to "serious" under Article XIX GATT, and the increasing imports must be a 
"significant" cause of such injury, compared to its US counterpart in Section 201, which 
demands for a "substantial" increase, and whereas Article XIX GATT chooses not to 
qualify the increase of imports with an adjective619. The US may want to read its own 
lesser standards of Section 406 in Section 16, but it should be warned that the Committee 
on Safeguards, and eventually the Appellate Body of the WTO, might not agree with this 
interpretation620. "Material" injury is interpreted by the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) in the US as the level of injury required in an antidumping or countervailing duty 
case investigation 621. With regard to the "significant" cause of injury requirement, the 
ITC interprets this as imposing a lesser standard than the "substantial" cause requirement 
of Section 201, but a greater causation requirement than under the antidumping and 
countervailing statute622. Because there is no close relative to a `market disruption' clause 
in EC trade policy laws, such as Section 406 in US trade law, it is hard to know how the 
EC Commission will gauge this transitional safeguard mechanism. For the time being we 
will have to wait and see how the EC will implement this provision, if at all. To 
determine market disruption objective factors such as the volume of imports, the effect of 
618 19 U. S. C. §§ 2251,2436. For a detailed account on the operation of GATT-WTO Safeguards in US law, 
see BHALA. and KENNEDY, ox., supra note 510, Chapter 9. 
619 The qualification of the increased imports should be read in the "unforeseen developments" and the 
effect of GATT obligations. 
620 The US has not been particularly successful in employing safeguard measures. In its Steel Line Pipe 
report of 15 February 2002, the Appellate Body once again found that the US had acted in violation of 
WTO safeguard rules (see United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R) after the Lamb case of 1 May 2001 (see United 
States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and 
Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R and WT/DS178/AB/R) and the Wheat Gluten dispute of 22 December 2000 
(see United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European 
Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R). 
621 See, e. g., Certain Ceramic Kitchenware and Tableware from China, USITC Pub. 1279, TA-406-8 
(1982); Ferrosilicon from the USSR, USITC Pub. 1484, TA-406-10 (1984); and S. REP. NO. 93-1298,93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1974). 
622 See, e. g., Clothespins from China, Poland, and Romania, USITC Pub. 902, TA-406-2-3-4 (1978). Under 
the dumping and countervailing duty laws, injury must be "by reason of' unfairly traded imports, which is 
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imports on prices for like or directly competitive articles, and the effect of such imports 
on the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products623. 
Apart from the injury and causation differences between the safeguard regimes of Article 
XIX GATT and Section 16 of the Protocol, the latter is a selective safeguard clause. It 
therefore allows to investigate imports from China only, and to apply measures with 
regard to Chinese products only. This selectivity simply follows from the fact that the 
Protocol of Accession, which contains the safeguard clause, is by nature country specific. 
However, this selectivity undermines the WTO Safeguards Agreement, of which non- 
selectivity is a central feature. Moreover, by allowing selectivity in trade relations with 
China, it can be asked whether it would be possible for trading partners to agree on 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) with China. In so far affected WTO members may 
request consultations with China with a view to seeking a mutually satisfactory solution, 
and of course with China's agreement that imports of Chinese origin are a significant 
cause of material injury, the preferred outcome for the trading partners could be a 
negotiated deal in the form of a VER. At least one author mentions the possible use of 
VERS in this respect624. This would undermine the general prohibition on VERS in the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement, and brings into memory the many VERS with Japan. Of 
course any such action will have to be notified immediately to the Committee on 
Safeguards, but many trade economists would not like the idea of VERs to slip in through 
the backdoor again. 
It should be noted, however, that measures taken pursuant to Section 16 are not entirely 
without retaliatory effect. If a measure is taken as a result of a relative increase in the 
level of imports, China has the right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent 
concessions or obligations, if such measure remains in effect more than two years. 
However, if a measure is taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports, China has a 
interpreted by the ITC to mean that imports must have only some causal relationship to injury. See, e. g., 
Menthol from China, USITC Pub. 1151,731-TA-28 (1981). 
623 Section 16(4) Protocol and paragraph 246(c) Working Party Report 
624 His interpretation is based, however, on the Sino-US Bilateral Agreement of 15 November 1999, and 
not on the text of the Protocol of Accession. See BHALA, R., "Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's 
WTO Accession Saga", 15 Am. Univ. Int'1 L. Rev., 2000, p. 1469-1538, at p. 1515. 
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right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or obligations, if 
such measure is in effect for more than three years625. 
Measures can be applied only for such period of time as may be necessary and the 
application of Section 16 will be terminated twelve years after the date of accession626. 
Probably the transitional nature of Section 16 did not urge negotiators to deal with the 
maximum duration of the measures. Further, no investigation under Section 16 of the 
Protocol on the same subject matter could be initiated less than one year after the 
completion of a previous investigation 627. The period of application could be extended, 
provided that the competent authorities of the importing WTO member determines that 
the action continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy market disruption628. A unique 
feature to the transitional safeguard provision is that WTO members are allowed to limit 
imports from China as a result of significant trade diversions caused by other members' 
measures taken pursuant to Section 16629. This could possibly lead to a cascade of trade 
restricting measures against China. The Chinese representative's worries in this respect 
were noted in paragraph 245 of the Working Party Repor t630. 
The question is whether it was really necessary to adopt an eclectic relief provision 
modelled on Section 406 of the US Trade Law dealing with market disruption. In the past 
such selective safeguard clauses, as e. g. in the Polish Protocol of Accession, proved to be 
of very limited use, just as Section 406 itself. Moreover, as was demonstrated in the 
previous Chapter, Chinese state trading has become far too decentralised and this 
decentralisation makes it virtually impossible for the Chinese central government to take 
concerted action, and to target a Western industry so as to cause market disruption. The 
type of market disruption Western countries feared during the Cold War era, with state- 
controlled enterprises deliberately mass-producing goods, and to flood them onto the 
international markets so as to wipe out Western market share, really belongs to the past. 
625 Section 16(6) Protocol. 
626 Section 16(9) Protocol. 
627 Paragraph 246(g) Working Party Report. 
628 Paragraph 246(f) Working Party Report. 
629 Section 16(8) of the Protocol of Accession. 
630 ,(... ) [T]he representative of China expressed particular concern that WTO members provide due 
process and use objective criteria in determining the existence of market disruption or trade diversion, 
because WTO members did not have wide experience in implementing the provisions of Section 16 of the 
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Instead, it would have been a much better exercise if Section 16 of the Protocol had 
specifically allowed for quota modulation to be applied to China with relaxed criteria for 
a number of years. This alternative would have resulted in greater conformity with the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement, and China would not have to be treated as a state-trading 
economy. 
So far only the import regime dealing with products other than textiles was discussed, 
textile products is the subject of further study in the paragraphs below. 
IV. Textiles Regime 
Textiles are undoubtedly one of the main products traded between the EC and China. As I 
briefly mentioned above, the textile regime is subject to a separate trade regime, which is 
currently based on the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). From the onset 
of Sino-European trade relations in the 1970s textiles were treated differently. Next to the 
1978 general Sino-European Trade Agreement the two parties concluded a separate 
Textile Agreement in 1979631. In 1984 at the time of China's accession to the Multilateral 
Fibre Agreement (MFA), the 1979 Textile Agreement was expanded with a 
Supplementary Protoco1632. A couple of years later, when China had become one of the 
top textile suppliers to the Community, the 1988 Textile Agreement was negotiated and 
concluded633. In 1995 the two trading partners concluded an Agreement on Trade in 
Draft Protocol. " As a result the WTO members reiterated and specified in paragraph 246 the requirements 
on implementing the provisions on market disruption. 
631 See supra note 567. Before the conclusion of the first textile agreement, the Community had a great deal 
of discretion in regulating textile trade between the EC and China. Council Decision 74/652/EEC, OJ L358, 
31 December 1974, p. 1, laid down the import quotas applicable in the Member States to imports of textiles 
from China. The following year the Council issued Council Decision 75/210/EEC on unilateral import 
arrangements for various products (including textiles) from state-trading countries, OJ L99,21 April 1975, 
p. 7. This Decision stated in article 8 that before 30 November each year the Council would decide the 
following year's quota. See YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 67 and 68 (noting that the negotiations proved to 
be very difficult and protracted, and although China was not yet a member of the MFA at the time, the 
terms of the 1979 Agreement were more favourable than normal MFA bilateral agreements concluded 
between the Community and other developing countries). 632 OJ L198,27 July 1984, p. 1. See YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 75ff (noting that in practice the parties 
simply continued to follow the 1979 Agreement, it tightened up restrictions on imports of textiles from 
China and in return for these additional restrictions the Community agreed to increase the amounts of some 
quotas). 
63 Agreement between the EEC and the PRC on trade in textile products, OJ L380,31 December 1988, p. 
2-73 (hereinafter 1988 Agreement). See YUE, o. c., supra note 554, p. 82ff (noting that while the 
Community offered to increase the amount of quotas for Chinese textiles, including those of very sensitive 
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Textile Products not covered by the 1988 Textile Agreement634. Finally, both textile 
agreements were amended635 and last extended636 in 2000 to prepare for China's WTO 
Accession. I will come back to these amendments in later sections, but will first discuss 
briefly the WTO textiles regime and the European implementation thereof. Then I will 
turn to the specifics of trade in textiles with state-trading countries and China. 
A. WTO Textiles Regime637 
Since 1 January 1995 textiles and clothing has been governed by the ATC. This was one 
of the hardest-fought issues in the WTO. For more than thirty years, this sector was 
governed by special regimes. First, there was the Short Term Cotton Arrangement in 
1961, followed by the Long Term Cotton Arrangement between 1962 and 1973, and 
finally, the MFA from 1974 to 1994. This arrangement provided, up to the end of the 
Uruguay Round, for the application of selective quantitative restrictions when surges in 
imports of particular products caused, or threatened to cause, serious damage to the 
industry of the importing country638. The ATC replaced this selective mechanism with a 
transitional process for the ultimate removal of these quotas639. Under this Agreement 
WTO members have committed themselves to remove the quotas by 1 January 2005, 
products, it also introduced quantitative restrictions on a number of textile products which were not subject 
to quantitative restrictions under the previous textile agreement). 
634 Agreement between the EC and the PRC on trade in textiles products not covered by the MFA bilateral 
Agreement on trade in textile products initialled on 9 December 1988 as extended and modified, OJ L104, 
6 May 1995, p. 1 (hereinafter 1995 Agreement). 
635 Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the EC and the PRC initialled in Beijing on 
19 May 2000 amending the Agreement between them on trade in textile products and amending the 
Agreement between them initialled on 19 January 1995 on trade in textile products not covered by the 
MFA bilateral Agreement, OJ L314,14 December 2000, p. 14 (hereinafter 2000 Agreement). 
636 See OJ L314,14 December 2000, p. 14, supra note 635. Their application was extended to 31 December 
2001. 
637 For an introduction, see HOEKMAN and KOSTECKI, o. c., supra, note 497; JACKSON, o. c., supra 
note 495; and TREBILCOCK, M. and HOWSE, R., The Regulation of International Trade, London, 
Routledge, 1995. 
638 The MFA was thus a major departure from the basic GATT rules and particularly the principle of non- 
discrimination. The quotas were the most visible feature and conflicted with GATT's general preference for 
customs tariffs over measures that restrict quantities. 
639 The ATC is a transitional instrument with the following key elements: (1) the product coverage 
encompasses yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products and clothing; (2) a programme for progressive 
integration of these products into GATT 1994 rules; (3) a programme to progressively enlarge existing 
quotas until their ultimate removal; (4) a transitional safeguard mechanism; (5) the establishment of a 
Textiles Monitoring Body to supervise implementation; (6) tighter provisions for the circumvention of 
quotas, their administration etc. 
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after having implemented a 10-year transitional programmeTM0. These programmes are 
monitored by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) created under the AgreementTM1 . 
The Agreement provides for the phased liberalisation and elimination over the transition 
period of quotas on the importation of textiles and apparel from countries that are WTO 
members through two mechanisms. Article 2 ATC provides first that each country should 
declare the products covered by the Agreement, which it chooses to subject to GATT 
1994. This is the "integration" mechanism. In three successive tranches, on the date the 
Agreement takes effect642, three years later 643, and at the beginning of year eight644, 
products listed will henceforth observe full GATT disciplines. This means that, once a 
product is "integrated" into the GATT, a WTO member may not impose or maintain 
import quotas on that product other than those under normal GATT procedures, such as 
Article XIX and the WTO Safeguards AgreementTM5. Each country is free to select the 
precise products to integrate in each tranche, however, goods from each of the following 
categories must be included: tops and yams, fabrics, made-up textile products, and 
clothing 646. 
640 Art. 3 ATC. Any quotas that were in place on 31 December 1994 were carried over into the new 
agreement. For this purpose all quantitative restrictions were to be notified in detail. Restrictions not 
notified within 60 days of the date of entry were terminated (Art. 2(1) and 2(4)). For products, which had 
quotas, the result of integration into GATT will be the removal of these quotas over time. X41 Art. 8 ATC. The TMB is a quasi-judicial body consisting of a chairman and ten members on an ad 
personam basis, and taking all decisions by consensus. The ten members are appointed by WTO member 
governments according to an agreed grouping of WTO members into constituencies. The TMB also deals 
with disputes under the ATC. If they remain unresolved, the disputes can be brought to the WTO's regular 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
642 1 January 1995. 
643 1 January 1998. 
644 1 January 2002. 
645 Before it integrates a product, a country may continue to maintain a quota on imports of that product if 
the quota was negotiated or notified under the MFA before the entry into force of the ATC, or may 
establish new quotas pursuant to the transitional safeguard mechanism. Each quota must be notified to the 
TMB, including the growth rate and flexibility provisions for that quota contained in relevant bilateral 
agreements (Art. 2 and Art. 3 ATC). 
6 The integration will operate as follows: when the ATC enters into force, each WTO member must 
integrate products by either textile category or tariff line number accounting for at least 16 percent by 
volume of that country's 1990 imports of textile and apparel products covered by the Agreement. Three 
years later that country must integrate an additional 17 percent by volume of 1990 covered imports of 
textile and apparel products. After seven years, that country must add a further 18 percent. All remaining 
products will be integrated at the close of the transition period, ten years after the WTO goes into effect. 
Nine members (Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Chile, Cuba, Hong Kong, Iceland, Macau, New Zealand 
and Singapore) decided not to maintain the right to use the ATC transitional programme. They are deemed 
to have integrated 100 percent at the outset. 
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The second mechanism through which textile quotas will be liberalised is the 
"acceleration" of the rate at which individual quotas for each country grow. All existing 
quotas have percentage rates, specified in bilateral agreements, at which the quotas grow 
annually. Those growth rates allowed under each bilateral agreement will increase in 
three successive stages over the course of the transition periodTM7. For major supplying 
countries, the growth rates will be increased by 16 percent when the ATC takes effect. 
They will be increased for those countries by an additional 25 percent after the third year 
and by a further 27 percent at the beginning of the eighth yearTM8. For countries that 
qualify as "small suppliers", the Agreement provides for an accelerated growth rate, or a 
mutually agreed alternative equivalent with respect to a different mix of base levels, 
growth and flexibility provisionsTM9. Article 3 ATC provides that quantitative restrictions, 
which cannot be justified under a GATT provision, must be either brought within 
conformity of GATT, or phased out according the ten-year transitional period650. 
During the ten years that the Agreement is in force, Article 6 ATC allows WTO countries 
to limit imports of textile or apparel products by applying a "transitional safeguard". This 
safeguard may be applied only to products that are neither subject to quotas in the 
importing country nor integrated into the GATT 1994 pursuant to Article 2 of the ATC. 
This safeguard recognises that some importing countries may need a special mechanism 
for avoiding serious damage to their domestic textile or apparel industries during the 
transition period. The transitional safeguard may be invoked in the same way as Article 
XIX, namely when a particular product is being imported into its territory in such 
increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic 
industry producing like and/or directly competing products. In making this determination 
the importing country is also required to examine the effect of the imports on the state of 
647 Art. 2, paragraphs 12-16 ATC. Quotas will be eliminated either when the products concerned are 
integrated into GATT at one of the stages or at the end of the transition on 1 January 2005. There are 
additional provisions in Article 2 for early removal of quotas and integration of products. 648 The actual formula for import growth under quotas is: by 0.16 x pre-1995 growth rate in the first step; 
0.25 x step 1 growth rate in the second step; and 0.27 x step 2 growth rate in the third step. The increased 
quota levels they entail are automatic and will in absolute terms be smaller or larger depending on the 
starting point, which are the quota levels and the growth rates under the MFA bilateral agreements as they 
existed on 31 December 1994. 
649 Special treatment is also awarded to new market entrants and least developed countries. 650 A plan is to be submitted to the TMB not later than six months after the date of entry into force. 
Otherwise they must be brought into conformity within one year after entry into force. 
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the industry as reflected in changes in relevant economic variables, such as output, 
productivity, utilization of capacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, 
employment, domestic prices, profits, and investment. However, contrary to the 
established principle of non-selectivity in Article XIX GATT and the WTO Safeguards 
Agreement, the transitional safeguard of Article 6 is selective and thus applicable on a 
country-by-country basis 651 . 
Before applying a transitional safeguard, an importing country must first attempt to reach 
agreement with the relevant exporting country or countries on a mutually satisfactory 
quota leve1652. If sixty days after requesting consultations, no agreement has been 
reached, the importing country may impose a quota653. This quota may not be lower than 
the actual level of imports for the exporting country during a recent twelve-month 
period654 and it may remain in effect for up to three years655. It must be removed before 
that time, however, if the product is integrated into the GATT. 
B. EC Textiles Regime 
The EC imports of textile products are also subject to the ATC, and previously the MFA, 
and are governed by Regulation 3030/93 on common rules for imports of certain textile 
products from third countries656, which in view of the single European market abolished 
the subdivision of the Community quantitative limits into Member States' shares657. 
Regulation 3030/93 is complemented by Regulation 517/94 on common rules for imports 
of textile products from certain third countries, not covered by bilateral agreement, 
631 Provided that a sharp and substantial increase from the specific export country can be identified and the 
damage can be attributed individually (Art. 6(4) ATC). This is actually the second step in a two-tier 
approach. First the importing member must determine that a particular product is being imported in such 
increased quantities from all sources in examining the effects of the imports on the state of its industry (Art. 
6ý2) and 6(3) ATC). 
65 Ar. 6(7) to 6(9) ATC. 
653 Art. 6(10) ATC; but at the same time the matter must be referred to the TMB for prompt review. In very 
specific cases, described in the Agreement as "highly unusual and critical circumstances where delay would 
cause damage which would be difficult to repair" (Art. 6(11)), it is possible to impose a restraint 
provisionally, on certain conditions. Agreed restraints will be subject to TMB review. Some exporting 
countries can be given more favourable treatment when applying this transitional safeguard (Art. 6(6)). 654 Art. 6(8) ATC. 
655 Art. 6(17) ATC. 
656 Regulation 3030/93 of 12 October 1993 on common rules for imports of certain textile products from 
third countries OJ L275,8 November 1993, p. 1, and as last amended by Regulation 27/2002, OJ L9,11 
January 2002, p. 1. 
657 On this earlier reform, see EECKHOUT, o. c., supra note 532, p. 186ff. 
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protocols or other arrangements, or by other specific import rules658. It is these two 
regulations as modified together with the bilateral agreement(s) concluded by the EC 
with the supplier country in question that regulate the import regimes of textile products 
in Europe 659 Following the conclusion of the ATC, Regulation 3030/93 was amended by 
Regulation 3289/94660, which implemented the commitments made under WTO 
agreements and transposes the integration and acceleration mechanisms in EC law. 
Regulation 3030/93661 now applies to imports of textile products listed in Annex I as last 
amended in 2002662, which originate in the countries with which the Community has 
concluded bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements. These are listed in 
Annex II of the Regulation, as amended in 2001663. Also falling within its ambit are the 
textile products, which have not yet been integrated according to Article 2(6) or 2(8) 
ATC as far as they originate in third countries members of the WTO. These products are 
listed in Annex X. The Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission, will amend Annex X in order to integrate these products according to the 
three stages identified in the previous section. As a result on 1 January 1998, products, 
which in 1990 accounted for not less than 17 percent of the total volume of 1990 imports 
into the Community of all textiles and clothing products covered by the ATC were 
integrated. On 1 January 2002 products accounting for not less than 18 percent of that 
volume were integrated and on 1 January 2005 all remaining products will be. All the 
products coming within the Regulation's scope are in principle not subject to quantitative 
restrictions or measures having equivalent effect 664 . 
Textile products covered by bilateral agreements with the EC, including products 
originating from WTO members, which are listed in Annex X, are in principle allowed to 
enter and to circulate freely in the EC. However, as far as these products have not yet 
been integrated in GATT 1994 and appear in Annex X of the Regulation, the transitional 
658 OJ L67,10 March 1994, p. 1. 639 With regard to China, see the Agreements quoted above. 
660 Regulation 3289/94/EC of 12 December 1994, OJ L349,31 December 1994, p. 85. 
661 See especially amendments made by Regulation 3289/94/EC, OJ L349,31 December 1994, p. 85 and 
Regulation 824/97/EC, OJ L 119,8 May 1997, p. 1. 
662 Regulation 27/2002/EC, OJ L9,11 January 2002, p. 1. 663 Regulation 1809/2001/EC, OJ L252,20 September 2001, p. 1. 
 Art. 1(4) Regulation 3030/93. 
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safeguard in Article 6 ATC as transposed in Article 10 of the Regulation665 is applicable. 
More restrictive is the legal regime concerning products listed in Annex V of the 
Regulation as amended and which originate in one of the supplier countries listed there. 
These products, a fortiori not integrated in GATT 1994, are subject to annual quantitative 
restrictions as listed in Annex V666. The products listed there are subject to the 
acceleration mechanism as stipulated in Article 2 ATC. The acceleration growth rates 
will be applied automatically to remaining Community quantitative limits on imports 
from WTO members for a period of maximum 10 years following the entry into force of 
the WTO. Because these products are already subject to quotas, it should be reminded 
that they cannot be subjected to further quantitative measures under the transitional 
safeguard mechanism of Article 6 ATC667. 
The quantitative restrictions referred to in Annex V do not apply to the cottage industry 
and folklore products specified in Annex VI668 as far as on import they are accompanied 
by a certificate issued by the competent authorities of the country of origin in accordance 
with the provisions in that Annex and which fulfil the other conditions laid down 
therein669. However, this exception does not exist for Brazil, Hong Kong and Macao670. 
Where exports from China of these products reach 15 percent of any Community 
quantitative limit laid down in Annex V, China will refrain from issuing the necessary 
certificates 671. Other exceptions to quantitative limitations in Annex V include temporary 
imports, such as under arrangements governing customs warehouses, or inward 
processing672. If these products, however, are subsequently released for free circulation 
their release will become subject to the presentation of an import authorisation and will 
665 Art. 10 Regulation 3030/93 as amended by Regulation 3289/94. 
666 See Art. 2 Regulation 3030/93 as amended by Regulation 3289/94. 667 As confirmed in Art. 10 Regulation 3030/93 as amended. 
668 As last amended by Regulation 339/98/EC, OJ L45,16 February 1998, p. 1. 
669 Art. 3 Regulation 3030/93 as amended. If similar machine-made products are subject to quantitative 
limits, the release for free circulation of the handloom and folklore substitutes is granted only when 
accompanied also by an import document issued by the competent authorities of the Member State. With 
regard to China, this used to come under Art. 4(3) of the 1988 Agreement and Protocol B and its Annex. 
670 Vietnam also used to be short listed in this respect. 
671 Art. 3(4) Regulation 3030/93. 
672 Note however that Regulation 3030/93 Appendix A of Annex V listed 33 products of Chinese origin, for 
which an import authorisation is nevertheless required in these circumstances. Art. 4 of both the 1988 and 
the 1995 Agreements provided that products declared to be for re-export outside the Community in the 
same state or after processing, were not subject to quantitative limits. 
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be charged against the quantitative limits established for the year for which the export 
licence was issued673. Also excused from Annex V quotas are re-imports into the 
Community of textile products after processing in the countries listed in Annex VI1674 
and subject to the conditions laid down in that Annex. To benefit from this exception it is 
also necessary that the re-imports be effected in accordance with the Community 
legislation on economic outward processing675. 
Traditionally, imports of a textile product from China could be suspended should the 
price of the product fall below a fixed level. This was briefly discussed above676. Article 
6 of Regulation 3030/93 still contains a price clause to be used in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the bilateral arrangements concerned677. Where imports into the 
Community of textile products listed in Annex 1678 are effected at abnormally low prices, 
the Commission or a Member State may request consultations with the supplier country 
in question679. Any measure to remedy this situation must be taken in accordance with the 
terms and conditions in the relevant bilateral agreement and Article 17 of the 
Regulation680. 
Article 7 of the Regulation deals with flexibility provisions681. There are usually three 
possible areas of flexibility available to an exporting country within the restraint levels. 
These are known as swing, carry forward and carry over. Swing is an adjustment between 
the restraint levels for different products during a particular year682. When the level of 
export of a product is likely to exceed the restraint level in a particular year there is a 
673 Art. 4 Regulation 3030/93. Note that imports of textile products charged against a quantitative limit as 
laid down in Annex V and which have subsequently been exported outside the Community must be 
notified. This is reflected also in Art. 4 of both the 1988 and 1995 Agreements with China. 674 As last amended by Regulation 1809/2001/EC, OJ L252,20 September 2001, p. 1. With regard to China 
this was especially considered in Art. 11 of the 1995 Agreement in which China and the Community 
recognised the special and differential character of re-imports of textile imports into the Community after 
processing in China. They were exonerated from the quantitative restrictions when they were made 
according to the specific arrangements laid down in Protocol B to the 1995 Agreement. 
675 Art. 5 Regulation 3030/93. With regard to China, see supra note 674. 
676 See supra note 568 and accompanying text. 
677 With regard to China these price clauses have been omitted. Instead the Community uses antidumping 
proceedings. 
678 As last amended in Regulation 1809/2001. 
679 See Art. 16 of Regulation 3030/93, as amended by Regulation 824/97. 680 As amended by Regulation 391/2001/EC, OJ L58,28 February 2001, p. 3 (adding Art. 17(a)). 
681 With regard to China, see Art. 5 of the 1988 Agreement and Art. 8 of the 1995 Agreement. 
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provision for borrowing from the quota of the same product in the next year. This 
provision is known as carry forward683. Similarly, when the restraint level of a product in 
a particular year is not fully utilised by the actual export level of that product, there is a 
provision for utilisation of the unused level in the next year, i. e. carry over684. The extent 
to which supplier countries may affect transfers between the quantitative limits listed in 
Annex V is stipulated in Annex VIII. 
Under particular circumstances, the Commission may open up additional opportunities 
for imports during a given quota year, in spite of the existence of Annex V restrictions. 
This provision in Article 8 of the Regulation must prevent possible shortages of particular 
textile products685. These additional opportunities are not taken into account for the 
purpose of applying Article 7. This emergency shortage clause is not the same as a 
guaranteed supply clause, the latter being an unusual feature of the 1988 Sino-European 
Textiles Agreement686. 
Article 9 of Regulation 3030/93 embodies an anti-surge clause, which was introduced in 
the MFA687. This clause is to ensure that exports of textile products subject to quotas are 
682 Art. 5 of the 1988 Agreement allowed for swings between certain categories of products, which were 
allowed up to 7%. For the products that come under the 1995 Agreement, Art. 8 allowed also for swings 
between certain products up to 6%. 
683 Art. 5 of the 1988 Agreement allowed for an advance use of up to 5% of the quantitative limit of the 
current year. Art. 8 of the 1995 Agreement allowed for only 1%, with a possibility to reach 5% after 
consultations. See, e. g., Regulation 501/2001/EC, on the authorisation of transfers between the quantitative 
limits of textiles and clothing products originating in the People's Republic of China, OJ L73,15 March 
2001, p. 13. 
684 Carry over to the corresponding quantitative limit for the following year of unused amounts is 
authorised for each category up to 7% as far as Art. 5 of the , 1988 Agreement is concerned. This was only 
3% according to the 1995 Agreement, with the possibility to reach 7% after consultations between the 
parties (Art. 8). See, e. g., Regulation 1479/2001/EC, OJ L195,19 July 2001, p. 36; and Regulation 
2195/2001/EC, OJ 295,13 November 2001, p. 8, authorising transfers between the quantitative limits of 
textiles and clothing products originating in the People's Republic of China. 
685 For certain tariff lines spelled out in Art. 3, the 1988 and 1995 Agreements explicitly provided that 
respectively 50 and 23% of the quantitative limits will be reserved for industry users during respectively 
150 and 90 days from 1 January each year. 686 Art. 11 of the 1988 Agreement provided for a guaranteed supply of minimum annual quantities as laid 
down in Annex IV of the Agreement. It concerned raw silk, waste silk, angora, and cashmere. Each year 
the parties will examine the needs of the Community industry and China's export possibilities. The 
Community may submit a list of interested manufacturers and processors, which China will undertake to 
give favourable consideration. Art. 12 of the 1995 Agreement provided that the Chinese supply to the 
Community industry of raw materials will be made at conditions not les favourable than to Chinese 
domestic users. This is not so much a guaranteed supply clause, but an interesting MFN clause, which was 
exlained in a separate Protocol attached to the 1995 Agreement. 
687 Art. 10 of the Protocol of Extension of the Arrangement regarding International Trade in Textiles, 
GATT, BISD, 28 Supp p. 6. 
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distributed as regularly as possible over the year, taking particular account of seasonal 
factors. Article 9 allows the Commission to seek for a solution in the case of a sudden 
and prejudicial change in the traditional trade flows of products subject to quantitative or 
surveillance measures from a supplier country resulting in a regional concentration of 
direct imports into the Community. It appears that the EC is more concerned about the 
equal geographical distribution of the quota by supplier nations than about a possible 
seasonal surge. These seasonal surges appear nonetheless in bilateral agreements, such as 
the Sino-European one688. 
The allocation of quotas to specific countries for selected categories of products, as set 
out in Annex V as amended, is accompanied by a complex system of administration. 
When quantitative limits on imports of certain categories of textile products are applied, 
the competent authorities of the Member States mayIissue permits only after receiving a 
confirmation from the Commission that there are still quantities available for that specific 
category of products originating in a specific country689. As far as quotas under Annex V 
of the Regulation are concerned, the administration thereof is carried out through the 
establishment of a double-checking system690. Under the double-checking system, the 
competent authorities of the supplier countries will issue an export licence in respect of 
the textile products subject to the measure691. At the time of importation the authorities of 
the Member States will issue an import authorisation following the afore-mentioned prior 
confirmation by the Commission692, and the presentation by the importer of the 
corresponding export licence693. 
When according to Article 13 of the Regulation a system of a priori surveillance is 
introduced on certain categories of products, which are not subject to quantitative limits, 
double-checking will only be applied if the products originate from the supplier countries 
689 Art. 8 of the 1988 Agreement provided that exports should be spaced out as evenly possible over the 
year, and that, should there be an excessive concentration of imports, the Community may. request 
consultations according to Art. 16 of the Agreement. There was a similar provision in Art. 5 of the 1995 
Agreement, which also served as a Trade Balance clause. 689 Art. 12 Regulation 3030/93, as amended by Regulation 391/2001. 
690 See Annex III Regulation 3030/93, as amended by Regulation 339/98, OJ L45,16 February 1998, p. 1; 
and Regulation 391/2001. With regard to China, see Art. 3(1) of the 1988 and 1995 Agreements. For 
administrative provisions, see Art. 15 of the 1988 Agreement and Art. 6 of the 1995 Agreement. 691 Art. 11(1) Annex III of Regulation 3030/93 as amended. 
692 Art. 12(1) Regulation 3030/93. 
693 Art. 14(1) Annex III of Regulation 3030/93 as amended. 
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listed in Table A of Annex 111694 . Textile products coming 
from supplier countries listed 
in Table B will be subject to a system of single prior surveillance, which means that they 
will only need a surveillance document from the competent authorities of the Member 
State695. The textile products from countries listed in Tables C and D will be subject to a 
system of posterior statistical surveillance 696. In case of surveillance, the issuing of an 
import document does not require the prior authorisation of the Commission, as in the 
case of quantitative restrictions. 
So far three different regimes with respect to textiles have been discussed. First, there are 
those textile products, which have already been fully integrated in GATT 1994 according 
to the successive stages provided for in the ATC. These products are to be treated 
according to GATT, and can be made subject to quantitative restrictions under Article 
XIX GATT and the corresponding WTO Safeguards Agreement. Therefore they should 
be subject to Regulation 3285/94. Second, there are those products, which are covered by 
Regulation 3030/93, as amended, in its Annex I- originating from countries listed in 
Annex II, which have concluded a textile agreement with the EC - and Annex X- as far 
as they originate from WTO members. This complicated wording entails that Regulation 
3030/93 will also apply to imports from countries, with no mention of their being WTO 
members or not, as long as they have concluded some bilateral textile arrangement with 
the EC and the products mentioned herein. This includes certain textiles from transition 
economies such as CIS countries, non-WTO members, and included China before it 
became a WTO member. These textile products are not yet integrated according to the 
ATC. As far as they do not appear in Annex V of the Regulation, these products can be 
imported freely, but they can be made subject to the transitional selective safeguard of 
Article 6 ATC as transposed in Article 10 of the Regulation. Finally, the textile products 
listed in Annex V are for the time being still subject to selective quantitative restrictions, 
which are to be phased out by 2005. 
However, Regulation 3030/93, as amended, is complemented by Regulation 517/94697, 
with amendments698, which established common rules for imports of textile products 
694 Art. 18 Annex III of Regulation 3030/93 as amended. 
695 Art. 25 Annex III of Regulation 3030/93 as amended. 
696 Art. 27 Annex III of Regulation 3030/93 as amended. 
697 See supra note 658 and accompanying text. 
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from certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other 
agreements, or by other specific common import rules. The aim of this Regulation is to 
suspend the national commercial policy measures and to complete the common 
commercial policy in accordance with the results of the GATT Uruguay Round 
negotiations. Obviously specific import regimes such as those contained in Regulation 
3030/93 as amended remain entirely valid, because they are regarded as lex specialis 
derogating from the common import regime in Regulation 517/94. Textile products listed 
in Annex I of Regulation 517/94699, and which do not originate in one of the countries 
listed in Annex II of that Regulation70° are in principle free to enter the Community. This 
is with the exception of safeguards taken under Title III of the Regulation, the measures 
taken under specific common import rules such as Regulation 3030/93, the annual 
quantitative measures listed in Annex III A (the remaining national quantitative 
restrictions as suspended 701), and the annual quantitative restrictions listed in Annex III B 
applicable to textile products originating in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to Article 3 (1) and (2) 
imports of certain textile products from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(North Korea) and China are subject to the annual quantitative limits provided for in 
Annex IV and must on import be presented with an import authorisation 702. In the case of 
textile products referred to in Annex V and originating in China and North Korea as 
provided for in Article 3 (3), their importation into the Community is also subject to 
specific annual quantitative limits. The latter restrictions in Annex V of Regulation 
517/94 may be imported provided an annual quantitative limit is established according to 
the procedure laid down in Article 25. All other textile products originating from the 
countries listed in Annex II are free to enter the Community subject to Title III measures 
except those as specified in Article 3 (1) and (3) and listed in Annexes IV and V. 
698 Last amended by Regulation 2878/2000/EC, OJ L333,29 December 2000, p. 60. 
699 This Annex lists all categories of textile products. 
70° This Annex lists following countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, People's Republic of China, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, The 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 701 Art. 2(2) Regulation 517/94. 
702 Art. 3(2) Regulation 517/94. 
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C. Quantitative Restrictions on Textiles from China 
Chapter Three 
The quantitative restrictions of Annex V in Regulation 3030/93, as well as the amount of 
quotas and their administration laid down in Regulation 517/94, have been subject to 
major modifications. In particular quotas for Chinese textiles were opened or increased 
following the request by Member States under the procedure provided for by Article 
25703. But it is especially the 2000 Agreement that set the stage for bringing the Sino- 
European textiles trade into the realm of the WTO704. The restrictions in force under the 
1988 and 1995 Textile Agreements are phased out in the framework of the WTO ATC, 
and China's Protocol of Accession to the WT0705 
For the purposes of Article 2 ATC, and thus as far as products are concerned that are 
covered by the MFA, the European Union will notify to the TMB the quantitative 
restrictions maintained under the MFA Agreement as far as they have not yet been 
integrated under stages 1 and 2, at the levels agreed for the year during which China 
accedes to the WTO as being the restraint levels706. The European Union will notify to 
the TMB the growth rates applicable to the restraint levels, and the relevant parts thereof, 
being those growth rates applied for the renewal of the MFA agreement for the year 
2000707. These growth rates will be increased by the growth on growth provisions of the 
ATC for the second stage of integration beginning from 1 January of the year following 
accession, and, after 1 January by the growth on growth provisions for the third stage of 
integration 708. Needless to say that China became a member later than the EC expected 
and thus the third stage of ATC integration should be applied to China. Regarding the 
flexibility provisions contained in Article 5 of the 1988 Agreement, the EC will notify 
these flexibility rates, save for the cap in paragraph 5 of that Article709. 
Concerning the notifications in respect of the restrictions under the 1995 non-MFA 
Textiles Agreement, the EC will notify to the TMB the quantitative restrictions 
maintained under the 1995 Agreement at the levels specified for the year during which 
703 See VERMULST, INAMA, o. c., supra note 533, p. 43. 
704 See supra note 635. 
705 Paragraph 3 of the 2000 Agreement. 
706 Paragraph 4(a) of the 2000 Agreement. 
707 Paragraph 4(b) of the 2000 Agreement. 
708 Paragraph 4(c) of the 2000 Agreement. 
709 Paragraph 4(d) of the 2000 Agreement. 
165 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Three 
China accedes to the WTO as being the restraint levels for the purposes of Article 3 ATC. 
These notifications will detail the remaining quantitative limits contained in Annex II of 
that Agreement, as well as the separate quantitative limits reserved for outward 
processing traffic. Pending the liberalisation of these quantitative restrictions in line with 
Article 3 ATC the growth rates applicable to them will be included in the notification, as 
well as the flexibility provisions in Article 8 of the Agreement. A programme to phase 
out these quantitative restrictions progressively in accordance with Article 3 (2) ATC was 
attached in Annex I of the 2000 Agreement. Upon the Chinese accession the 
administration of the quotas will also be harmonised710. 
Because China did not become a WTO member until after 31 December 2000, the parties 
agreed that both the 1988 and 1995 Agreements would be automatically extended for a 
further period of one year to 31 December 2001, on the basis of the quantitative limits for 
the year 2000, together with all the relevant parts thereof including the quantities reserved 
for European industry, the quantities set for outward processing traffic and for European 
fairs, increased by the growth rates, if any, applied to the quantitative limits, and the 
relevant parts thereof, on the renewal of 1988 and 1995 Agreements for the year 2000. 
Should China become a WTO member before the date of expiry, 31 December 2001, 
which it did on 11 December 2001, the restrictions in force under those Agreements are 
phased out in the framework of the ATC and China's Protocol of Accession. In this sense 
Regulation 3030/93 was amended on 28 December 2001 to provide that quantitative 
limits for the year 2001 for China in respect of the categories covered would not be 
maintained as of 11 December 2001, its date of accession to the WT0711. Earlier, 
immediately following China's accession to the WTO on 11 December 2001, the EC and 
China agreed to implement the removal of the quantitative restrictions on textile 
categories related to the first and second stage of integration on the same day712. As of 
that date, these categories will no longer require the issue of export licences and will fall 
under the general provisions concerning the certificates of origin. As a result these 
710 Paragraph 6 of the 2000 Agreement. 
711 Regulation 27/2002/EC, OJ L9,11 January 2002, p. 1. 712See China's accession to the WTO - First and Second Stage of Integration under the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing, OJ C356,14 December 2001, p. 4. 
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products will no longer require import authorisations for customs clearance, regardless of 
the date of shipment. 
However, it seems that the provisional 2000 Agreement did not address the phase out of 
the quantitative restrictions on Chinese textiles that fall under the provisions of 
Regulation 517/94. This may be challengeable under the WTO texts, if the EC persists in 
keeping these quantitative restrictions unchanged, and as far as these quotas have not 
been notified in accordance with Article 3 ATC, which demands that these quotas should 
be phased out as well. 
To bring Chinese textile products within the ATC, and thereby to phase out the 
quantitative restrictions, is good news for a country that has been a member of the MFA 
since the mid-eighties. However, it does not necessarily mean that these products will be 
subject to the same safeguard clause as products from all other WTO members. This 
needs to be examined further below. 
D. Transitional Textiles Safeguard 
The safeguard clause of Regulation 3030/93 was amended by Regulation 3289/94713 to 
bring the safeguard clause provisions in line with Article 6 ATC with regard to imports 
from WTO -members. The amended Article 10 provides that if imports into the 
Community of products within any given category, not already subject to quantitative 
limits set out in Annex V (MFA quotas) and originating in a country listed in Annex 
IX714 exceed, in relation to the preceding calendar year's total imports into the 
Community of products in the same category, the percentages appearing in Annex IX, 
such imports may be made subject to quantitative limits as set forth in that article715. This 
is a departure from the normal WTO safeguards rule that imports should have increased 
in such great quantities so as to cause serious damage or actual threat thereof to the 
Community's production. Instead this article triggers a safeguard investigation whenever 
a supplier country listed in the Annex concerned exceeds - for any group of products, 
713 Regulation 3289/94/EC of 22 December 1994 amending Regulation 3030/93, OJ L349,31 December 
1994, p. 85. 
714 These include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Laos, Nepal, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and 
Vietnam. 
713 Annex IX was last amended by Regulation 1809/2001. 
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which is not yet subject to quotas -a certain percentage calculated on the basis of the 
preceding year. As soon as that threshold is triggered consultations have to be held by the 
Commission with the supplier country in accordance with the procedure of Article 16 to 
reach a mutually satisfactory solution716. Pending such mutually satisfactory solution, the 
Commission may request the supplier country to limit exports of the product in the 
category concerned for a provisional period of three months from the date on which the 
request for consultations is made. Such provisional limit shall be established at 25% of 
the level of imports during the previous calendar year, or 25% of the level resulting from 
the application of the formula based on Annex IX, whichever is the higher717. It may, 
pending the outcome of the consultations, also apply quantitative limits identical to the 
export limits in the previous sentence, and this without prejudice to the definitive 
arrangements after successful consultations 718. If successful, these consultations may lead 
to an arrangement between the Community and that country on the level of quantitative 
limits, which will be administered in accordance to the double-checking system719. 
Should the parties be unable to reach a satisfactory solution within sixty days following 
notification of the request for consultations, the Community may, pursuant to Article 10 
(9), have the right to introduce a definite quantitative limit at an annual level. This annual 
quantitative limit cannot be lower than the formula set out in Article 10 (9)(a) as far as 
countries in Annex IX are concerned. 
As far as WTO members, such as China, are concerned, Article 10 (5), (6) and (9)(c) 
provide for the imposition of transitional safeguard measures. Products not yet integrated 
into the GATT 1994 coming from WTO members and not subject to any of the 
quantitative restrictions in Annex V of Regulation 3030/93 may be subjected to a 
safeguard action where it is demonstrated that a particular product is being imported into 
the Community in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or actual threat 
thereof, to the domestic industry producing like and/or directly competitive products. 
This is language almost identical to Article 6 ATC and Article XIX GATT. Paragraph 
5(a) requires further that serious damage or actual threat thereof must demonstrably be 
716 Art. 10(3)(a) Regulation 3030/93 as amended by Regulation 3289/94. 717 Art. 10(3)(b) Regulation 3030/93, as amended by Regulation 3289/94. 718 Art. 10(3)(c) Regulation 3030/93, as amended by Regulation 3289/94. 719 Art. 10(8) Regulation 3030/93, as amended by Regulation 3289/94. 
168 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Three 
caused by such increased quantities in total imports of that product and not by such other 
factors as technological changes in consumer preference. In making this determination 
Paragraph 5(b) lists the same factors to be examined as Article 6 ATC. Paragraph 5 also 
follows the two-tiered test of Article 6 ATC, which allows first to determine the increase 
of imports from all sources and then allows a selective safeguard action if a sharp and 
substantial increase, actual or imminent, can be attributed to particular individual 
members720. If the conditions of paragraph 5(b) seem to apply, the Commission opens 
consultations as specified in Article 16 of the Regulation with the WTO member 
concerned. Provisional quantitative limits are also possible, but only if the stringent 
conditions of paragraph 6(b) in Article 10 apply. The actual level of the imports from the 
WTO member subjected to a transitional safeguard may not be lower than the level 
during the twelve-month period terminating two months preceding the month in which 
the request was made. This is again in line with Article 6 ATC, which also requires, as 
transposed in Article 10 (12) of Regulation 3030/93 as amended, that transitional 
safeguard actions taken with respect to WTO members may only remain in place for up 
to three years without extension, or until the product becomes integrated into GATT 
1994, whichever comes first. 
A peculiar position is taken by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania 
and the Slovak Republic. Article 10 (4)(a) and (b) of Regulation 3030/93 as amended, 
sets forth special rules for imposing a safeguard by referring to the conditions laid down 
in the additional protocols inserted in the Europe Agreements concluded with those 
countries. In so far as these countries are WTO members, one could argue that this 
contravenes the WTO MFN clause, but these agreements have been notified to the WTO. 
With regard to the products that do not fall under Regulation 3030/93, the safeguard 
provisions of Regulation 517/94 will apply. It concerns the textile products not covered 
by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or other specific import 
regulations, and originating from third countries. Where it concerns textile products 
originating in state-trading countries listed in Annex 11721, the Commission may, acting at 
720 Art. 10(5)(c) Regulation 3030/93, as amended by Regulation 3289/94. Other factors to attribute the 
damage to individual members include the domestic prices at a comparable stage of the commercial 
transaction. 
721 See supra note 700. 
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the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, alter the import rules722 for the 
product in question by providing that these products may only be put into free circulation 
on production of an import authorisation 723, the granting of which will be governed by 
such provisions and subject to such limits as the Commission will lay down724. The 
Commission can do so if imports take place in absolute or relative increased quantities or 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the Community 
industry 725. It can even do so if Community interest requires it726, thus leaving large room 
for discretion. The exact procedure is laid down in Article 25 of Regulation 517/94. The 
same safeguard is applied to products from any other country not listed in Annex II of the 
Regulation, but it leaves less room for discretion, as it will require the absolute or relative 
increase of imports in combination with the actual or imminent threat of injury to the 
Community industry in the case of WTO members727. 
Whereas in Regulation 3030/93 as amended, and with the exception of some Eastern 
European transition economies, the difference in treatment is marked by whether the 
country is a WTO member or not, it seems that the different treatment regarding 
safeguards in Regulation 517/94 is more due to the old legacy of state-trading countries. 
As far as these state-trading countries have become WTO members this different 
treatment should end. It is also no longer appropriate for the EC to treat some Chinese 
products the same way as products from North Korea. As far as this treatment 
discriminates China and other WTO members, this Regulation is challengeable under 
WTO texts. The EC should at least overhaul Regulation 517/93 and repeal the 
discriminatory treatment of China under this Regulation. Differences between Regulation 
3030/93 and 517/94 also exists regarding the decision-making procedures, but I choose 
not to analyse these further728. Instead I briefly wish to add that both Regulations also 
722 This alteration of import rules does not necessarily entail the establishment of quantitative limits, but 
according to Art. 13 Regulation 517/94 this belongs to the possibilities. 
'23 See Art. 14(b) Regulation 517/94. 
724 Art. 12(2) Regulation 517/94. 
ns Idem. 
7261dem. 
72 Art. 12(1) Regulation 517/94. 
728 Compare Art. 25 Regulation 517/94 with Art. 17/17a Regulation 3030/93, as amended. 
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contain detailed provisions concerning surveillance measures729. Finally, it should be 
noted that the Regulations allow for the application of regional safeguards as we11730. 
However, as if it were not enough to have a transitional safeguard in Article 6 ATC, the 
Working Party Report on China's Accession in paragraph 242 reveals details of a 
transitional safeguard to be applied to imports of Chinese origin of textiles and apparel 
products covered by the ATC due to market disruption until 31 December 2008. Despite 
full integration of Chinese textiles into the GATT 1994 by 2005, Chinese textiles will 
remain subject to a selective transitional safeguard mechanism based on market 
disruption for a full three-year period beyond 2005. It will be very interesting to see how 
the WTO Dispute Resolution Body (DSB) will interpret the relationship between the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement and Article XIX on the one hand; and Section 16 of the 
Protocol and paragraph 242 of the Working Party Report on the other hand. 
Basically paragraph 242 allows for a VER as soon as a member requests consultations 
with China with a view to easing or avoiding market disruption. The member requesting 
these consultations would have to provide China with a detailed factual statement of 
reasons and justifications to show the existence or threat of market disruption and the role 
of products of Chinese origin in that disruption731. Upon request for consultations, China 
will hold its shipments to the requesting member of textile or textile products in the 
category or categories subject to these consultations to a level no greater than 7.5 % (6 % 
for wool product categories) above the amount entered during the first twelve months of 
the most recent fourteen months preceding the month in which the request for 
consultation was made. If no mutually satisfactory solution is reached during the ninety- 
day consultation period these limits could continue732. But the term of any restraint limit 
established would be effective for twelve months maximum733. Reapplication of 
measures can only take place when agreed between parties; and measures could not be 
applied to the same product at the same time under this provision and Section 16 73a 
729 See Art. 11,14(a) and 15 Regulation 517/94 and Art. 13 Regulation 3030/93. 73o See Art. 16 Regulation 517/94 and Art. 9 and 11 Regulation 3030/93. With regard to China, see also 
Art. 6(6) of the 1988 Agreement and the inserted Protocol C. 731 Paragraph 242 (a) and (b). 
732 Paragraph 242 (c) and (d). 
733 Paragraph 242 (d) and (e). 
734 Paragraph 242 (f) and (g). 
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V. Note on Agricultural Products and ECSC Products 
Although developing countries were keen to have all products brought under Article 
XIX's scope, and thus Regulation 3285/94, the developed countries, including the EC, 
were keen to keep exceptions to Article XIX735. The Safeguards Agreement does not 
affect other special safeguards, such as for agricultural products. With regard to 
agricultural products GATT Article XI (2)(c) allows quantitative restrictions necessary to 
ensure stabilisation of production and of trade in an identical, or substitute, national 
product736. This was further developed by derogations granted on the basis of GATT 
Article XXV (5)737. However, this system of restrictions was thought to be insufficient, 
and the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture allows additional safeguards. In Article 5 of this 
Agreement a special agricultural safeguard clause allows additional duties to be imposed 
for one year in case the volume of imports exceeds, or the price falls below, a triggering 
level. Regulation 3285/94 will be applied without prejudice to the more specific 
instruments that concern the agricultural markets738. Indeed, each basic agricultural 
regulation contains its own safeguards clause, which after the Uruguay Round will have 
to be used in respect of obligations arising from the agreements concluded during that 
round. The general safeguard in Regulation 3285/94 operates by way of complement to 
those agricultural trade instruments 739. For the steel sector it is provided in Article 26 of 
Regulation 3285/94 that the residual national restrictions relating to products covered by 
the ECSC Treaty will be gradually dismantled in accordance with the WTO provisions, 
that is at the end of the Uruguay Round implementation period in 1999. As a 
735 See DIDIER, o. c., supra note 519, p. 303. The French text of the Safeguards Agreement makes it clear 
that it establishes some ("des") rules, not the ("les") rules. This suggests that other rules may coexist, 
though the last paragraph of the Agreement's Preamble emphasises the need for agreement on all aspects of 
safeguards. 
736 See GATT Analytical Index, o. c., supra note 510, p. 315-348. 737 DIDIER, o. c., supra note 519, p. 306. See also USHER, J., "The Common Agricultural Policy and 
Commercial Policy", in MARESCEAU, S. (Ed. ), The European Community's Commercial Policy after 
1992 - The Legal Dimension, The Hague, Kluwer, 1993, p. 135-156. 738 Art. 25 Regulation 3285/94. 
7391dem. 
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consequence these products now fall under the general application of the Agreement of 
Safeguards740 and Regulation 3285/94 has become applicable to these products741. 
VI. Final Observations 
This chapter started with addressing the concerns WTO members, and especially Western 
trading partners, have about increased competition from China. This increased 
competition undermines the balance of trade, and as a result, Western governments, to 
ward off protectionist industries, have embraced specially designed safeguard measures 
in China's Protocol of Accession and the Working Party Report to alleviate these 
concerns. Because quantitative restrictions and other NTBs are in principle prohibited, 
emergency safeguard measures are the only realistic option which countries can lawfully 
take to combat fair import competition from China. As a result, the EC phases out its 
remaining quota restrictions on Chinese products and integrates Chinese textiles into the 
GATT regime through the transitional ATC. 
However, as far as certain Regulations are concerned, the EC still maintains restrictions 
on trade with China along the historical lines of traditional state-trading countries. 
Moreover, the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism provided for in Section 
16 of the Protocol of Accession also makes clear reference to the historical divide 
between market economies and state-controlled economies in that it borrows the exact 
language from Section 406 of the US Trade Law of 1974. It was argued that the allusions 
on market disruption actually belong to the past, because China's decentralised state 
economy, as can be inferred from Chapter Two, is no longer in a position to inundate 
Western or international markets by way of concerted action under a planned economy. It 
will therefore be interesting to see how the DSB will interpret market disruption and the 
relationship between, on the one hand, Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, and 
the Protocol of Accession, on the other hand, because its interpretation of market 
740 Efforts to adopt a specific multilateral agreement failed in 1993. At the end of 1996, the EC started 
discussions with the US on an agreement, possibly extendable to other WTO members. The intention is to 
deal with structural excess capacity and over-supply problems. DIDIER, o. c., supra note 519, p. 307. 741 For the imposition of safeguard measures, see Art. 74 (3) ECSC Treaty. See also Regulation 
2914/95/EC of 18 December 1995 introducing prior Community surveillance on imports of certain iron and 
steel products covered by the ECSC and EC treaties, OJ L305,19 December 1995, p. 23. This regulation 
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disruption, and the lesser injury standard that is derived from it, might be quite different 
from the American interpretation in Section 406. It should be acknowledged that the type 
of market disruption Western countries feared during the Cold War era, with state- 
controlled enterprises deliberately mass-producing goods to inundate the international 
markets and to wipe out Western market share, belongs to the past. Therefore, it would 
have been more appropriate, had the Protocol of Accession used an express reference to 
allow quota modulation as specified in Article 5 (2)(b) of the WTO Safeguards 
Agreement to be used vis-a-vis China, and relaxed the criteria for the use of such 
selective safeguards, instead of introducing market disruption modelled on Section 406 of 
the US Trade Law. 
Secondly, the conclusion can be reached that the safeguard provisions in Regulations 
519/94 and 517/94, as far as they are still applicable to products originating from China, 
are discriminatory, and prevent China from being treated as a full member of the WTO. 
The same goes for the products originating in China, which are restricted according to 
Article 3 and listed in Annexes IV and V of Regulation 517/94. It is believed that these 
Regulations go beyond what is allowed by the Protocol of Accession, and that the EC 
should at least make proper adjustments so as to phase out these quotas in accordance 
with Article 3 ATC, and should exclude China from its scope as far as the treatment 
under this Regulation is discriminatory and challengeable under WTO provisions. 
Thirdly, the critical question remains though, whether the trade imbalances resulting from 
China's export-oriented development strategy, and the transitional character of its 
economic and legal system can adequately be addressed by the WTO `s safeguard 
mechanisms. The next Chapter will address this question with regard to anti-dumping 
law. Although Article XIX and the WTO Safeguards Agreement may be too narrow in 
scope to deal with the unique economic position China is in, it seems that unless Europe 
and America are willing to make adjustments in line with their comparative advantage, 
and give up market share in certain industries, these specially designed safeguards are not 
going to curb China's economic growth. What the EC needs is a liberal economic policy 
that will allow Europeans to stay ahead of Chinese competition instead of the rhetorical 
deals with the supervision of imports, from all countries except EFTA or members of the European 
Economic Area, of certain tubes and steel fittings. 
174 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Three 
language of market disruption. It would be wise as well for the EC to take this a step 
further and to harmonise its many safeguard provisions. Treating China differently and 
applying safeguards is not going to make the Chinese economy less competitive. Tough 
policy decisions will have to be made over the next couple of years. 
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We Final Observations 
As the previous Chapter has demonstrated, trade imbalances challenge Europe's and 
America's role in the global economy; and, reprocity-based trade policy is considered to 
be an answer to this. In a normal adjustment process, to correct trade imbalances, there 
should be devaluation, but generally key export countries do not allow appreciating their 
currency sufficiently. Nonetheless, open trade should also be balanced trade, if not de- 
industrialisation might be the result, and this can undermine the national security of a 
country in the long-term. An extreme solution to trade imbalances would be to 
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discontinue MFN treatment until disproportionate trade surpluses are eliminated742. 
Fortunately, there are less extreme and more temporary solutions, such as emergency 
safeguards and antidumping (AD). Historically, emergency safeguard measures have 
been dwarfed by AD measures, and it seems AD has become the weapon of choice743. 
The WTO Appellate Body (AB) does not seem to like emergency safeguards very much, 
as Reports, such as Korean Dairy Products744 and Argentinean Footwear74S, have shown. 
The important difference between emergency safeguards and AD is that the latter deals 
with imports considered being "unfair", and are therefore believed easier to justify, 
whereas emergency safeguards protecting markets from "fair" imports, should come at a 
higher injury standard. 
Notwithstanding the strong case for temporary safeguards, and the plea for "fair and 
equitable commerce"746, it is argued here that the only long-term strategy to keep a sound 
trade balance, and to remedy chronic trade deficits, is the case for continuing industrial 
rejuvenation efforts and competitive adjustment. It is in this regard that emergency 
safeguards and AD should be treated with extreme caution, because the continuous use of 
AD and administered protectionism remains a threat to the huge potential for economic 
growth that the liberalisation of trade has on offer 747. 
The widespread use of AD in the European Community (EC) raises doubt about the 
future, especially in relation to Asian trading partners748, such as China. In the last 
decade, European trade policy has become more pro-active. Whereas in the late eighties, 
to early nineties, the EC was primarily focused on the creation of the internal market, its 
focus has become more international, especially because it thinks to link market opening 
in third countries with access to the European market and to reduce possible trade 
742 Words of Benjamin Franklin, in LOVETT, W., ECKES, A., and BRINKMAN, R., US Trade Policy - 
History, Theory and the WTO, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 143. 'a' On the use of AD measures and other trade policy instruments, see infra, note 771, and accompanying 
text. 
744 Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R. las Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS 12 1 /AB/R. 746 ECKES, A., Opening America's Market - US Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776, Chapel Hill, University 
of North Carolina, 1995, p. 219. 
747 KRUEGER, A, American Trade Policy-A Tragedy in the Making, Washington DC, AEI, 1995, p. 103. 
748 See HIZON, E., "Virtual Reality and Reality: The East Asian NICs and The Global Trading System", 5 
Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., Spring 1999, p. 81-161; and ACHARYA, R., Making Trade Policy in the EU 
-Between 'Managed Liberalisation' and 'Cautious Activism'?, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Discussion Paper 61,1996, p. 1-2. 
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deficits749. This issue of market access remains problematic, because the EC does not 
always reconcile bilateral preferential trade with multilateral trade very well750. Although 
the EC models its trade policy on preferential trade, it has also been formed often in 
reaction to US trade policy in which `fairness' is much more emphasised751. Nonetheless, 
the EC remains at the same time uneasy with the US unilateral approach752. 
The real question remains, however, whether AD can really address the actual problem of 
declining competitiveness in European industries. At least the future enlargement of the 
EC may introduce further pressures to liberalise certain sectors of Community industry 
and they may look for increased protection against products from elsewhere. This 
concern about Europe's competitiveness influences attitudes. Views differ on how far 
intervention, by governments or by the Community will help to make European industry 
better able to compete, either in less sophisticated products or in high technology. Still 
more discussion exists as to whether European industry really requires increased external 
protection, and to what extent it should be applied753. This level of protection is also 
relevant in the context of transition economies and the recent WTO accession of China. 
Nearly all countries in transition have gone through a cycle that started with the attempt 
to create an open liberal market economy. They streamlined their laws and procedures, 
both for domestic economic activity and for international trade. Barriers to trade were 
reduced sharply or removed as quickly as the authorities could act. However, it was 
quickly discovered, that despite the spirit of GATT/WTO, the trade practices of many of 
the large industrialised countries are protectionist and restrictive, yet legal, because WTO 
rules are loosely worded. These practices are not centred so much on customs duties, but 
rather on non-tariff barriers involving quotas, minimum import prices, licensing and 
749 ACHARYA, o. c., supra note 748, p. 28. See in this regard the so-called "Trade Barrier Regulation", 
Regulation EC/3286/94 of 22 December 1994, laying down community procedures in the field of the 
common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the community's rights under international 
trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the WTO, OJ L349,31 December 1994, p. 
71. 
750 ACHARYA, o. c., supra note 748, p. 31. See in this regard the long-standing "Banana dispute" between 
the EC and the US. For further reference, see SALAS, M. and JACKSON, J., "Procedural Overview of the 
WTO EC - Banana Dispute", 3 DIEL, March 2000, p. 145-166. 751 ACHARYA, o. a., supra note 748, p. 8. 752 ACHARYA, o. c., supra note 748, p. 10. 75' PEARCE, J. and SUTTON, J., Protection and Industrial Policy in Europe, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, Routledge, 1986, p. 54. 
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monitoring of imports, technical requirements and standards, and not in the least, AD 
procedures. Such a pattern prompts the authorities in economies in transition to imitate 
the sorts of protective measures applied in the industrialised countries. The pressure for 
protection in home markets intensifies as domestic producers begin to learn how to lobby, 
and their influence in the political process grows stronger754. The fact that the 
international economy is less liberal than the ideals of GATT/WTO is thus a factor 
leading to more protectionist policies in economies in transition than otherwise would be 
the case755. 
The fact that China is a transition economy and, at the same time, has adopted the export- 
oriented growth policy of a traditional Newly Industrialised Country (NIC) makes it very 
vulnerable to AD proceedings. The country has therefore been a very frequent victim of 
administered protectionism. This administered protectionism in the case of China is 
justified by at least one scholar, because free trade in the context of China is very difficult 
to achieve with a country that has a cultural resistance of imports and foreign 
influence756. However, it should be noted that by examining the AD treatment China 
receives as a Non-market Economy (NME), this chapter will show that despite the efforts 
of AD authorities, there does not exist a satisfactory solution to the problems of pricing 
production factors in NMEs. The view is taken that the AD practice involving China does 
not allow the country the full benefits of a WTO member. Moreover, the use of AD 
proceedings against transition economies, and China in particular, may harm the process 
of market reform by reducing market access and hence aggravate Chinese cultural 
resistance to further trade liberalisation. Market access is vital for the implementation of 
market reforms, which require transition economies such as China to export. It is argued 
further that the theory and practice of AD is inconsistent in its application to China. It is 
based on unexamined assumptions of categories of markets, for which the criteria are 
loosely worded and which, if AD is to be used as a possible interface between different 
economic systems, should not complicate matters. Before this Chapter suggests some 
75' PIETRAS, J., "The Role of the WTO for Economies in Transition", in KRUEGER, A. (Ed. ), The WTO 
as an International Organisation, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 353-61, at p. 358. 755 PIETRAS, o. c., surpa note 754, p. 359. 
756 MASTEL, G., The Rise of the Chinese Economy - The Middle Kingdom Emerges, New York, M. E. 
Sharpe, 1997, p. 67. 
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adjustments to the AD Regulation as far as NMEs are concerned, it first, however, 
introduces briefly the economic and legal context of AD. 
I. The Economic Context of Dumping 
The concept of dumping in international trade has a long history. Jacob Viner makes note 
of discussions by Alexander Hamilton in 1791 US debates about foreign country 
dumping so as to undersell competitors in other countries, and mentions practices that 
Adam Smith called "dumping"757. When a firm sells an identical product in two different 
markets for different prices that, by definition, is called price discrimination. If it so 
happens that the firm sells in the export market at a price lower than the price it charges 
its customers for the like product in its home market, this form of price discrimination is 
called dumping758. Price discrimination implies some departure from the ideal of perfect 
competition, because a perfectly competitive firm would sell all its output in the market 
with the higher price. However, many will agree that dumping is quite a natural economic 
phenomenon, as is price discrimination759, and although one can argue correctly that price 
discrimination would be impossible if some sort of barrier to imports did not protect the 
exporting firm from competition in its domestic market, this is hardly what those who 
seek protection under the AD laws have in mind. They are usually looking for a higher 
price with which to compete, and would be dismayed if the only effect of their actions 
were to open up foreign markets to greater competition 760. 
Apart from price discrimination, another standard defence of AD laws is that they are 
necessary to prevent international predatory pricing. But such practices only make sense 
if the practitioner of predatory pricing can later raise prices to recoup any profits lost 
during the period of the low pricing. This can occur only when there are significant 
barriers that prevent the firms driven out of the market or possible new entrants from 
coming into the market to compete as soon as prices have indeed been increased. In any 
757 VINER, J., Dumping: A Problem in International Trade, New York, Kelley, reprinted 1966, p. 38-50. 
758 Reverse dumping, when the export price is higher than the price in the home market, is not objected to. 
This is usually attributed to transport costs. Note also that dumping is often circumscribed as "selling below 
cost", which may be the case, however, is legally inaccurate. 
759 See DEARDORFF, A., "Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law", in JACKSON, J. and 
VERMULST, E. (Eds. ), Antidumping Law and Practice -A Comparative Study, New York, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989, p. 23-39, at p. 24 and 26 (noting that price discrimination is a fact of economic life). 
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event, the European AD laws do not direct government investigators to determine 
whether imports reflect a predatory pattern. The inquiry mandated by the AD laws is a 
purely mathematical exercise 761 
Over the years many eminent scholars have carefully argued that AD laws are illogical762. 
They note that dumping itself is not harmful to the economy of the importing nation. A 
view that relies predominantly on consumer gains outweighing producer losses. They will 
argue that the imposition of AD duties actually injures the importing nation by placing a 
tax on imports, which inevitably becomes a tax on exports763. The transfer of wealth from 
consumers in the importing country to the possibly inefficient domestic industry of the 
importing country is considered to be simple protectionism by these critics. However, 
some accept that AD rules are a necessary evil, on balance being better than any practical 
alternative7M. The imperfect success with which domestic interests have pursued unfair 
trade remedies suggests perhaps the only principled reason for the AD laws, viz. as a legal 
safety valve for channelling the strongest claimants for protection away from less 
transparent forms of protection765. Because completely liberal markets are non-existent, 
some form of protection should be there, and in the sense that AD laws may successfully 
prevent more unjustified protection than it hands out, it can indeed be regarded as the 
760 See DEARDORFF, o. c., supra note 759, p. 28. 761 BOLTUCK, R. and LITAN, R., "America's `Unfair' Trade Laws", in BOLTUCK, R. and LITAN, R. 
(Eds. ), Down in the Dumps - Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws, The Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC, 1991, p. 1-21, at p. 9-10. 762 See, e. g., EHRENHAFT, P., "Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States 
Countervailing and Antidumping Duties", 58 Colum. L. Rev., 1958, p. 44; BARCELO, J., "Antidumping 
Laws as Barriers to Trade: The United States and the International Antidumping Code", 57 Cornell L. Rev., 
1972, p. 491; LOWENFELD, A., "Fair or Unfair Trade: Does It Matter? ", 13 Cornell Int'1 L. J., 1980, p. 
205; DAVEY, W., "Antidumping Laws: A Time for Restriction", in HAWK, B. (Ed. ), North American 
Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws: Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
New York, Matthew Bender, 1988, chapter 8; and SYKES, A., "The Economics of `Injury' in Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Cases", in BHANDARI, J. and SYKES, A. (Eds. ), Economic Dimensions in 
International Law - Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1997, p. 83. 
763 See in this regard STEGEMANN, K., "Anti-Dumping Policy and the Consumer", 19 J. World Trade L, 
1985, p. 446. Similarly, see SCHUHKNECHT, L., Trade Protection in the European Community, Reading, 
Harwood, 1992, p. 137 (who refers to the cascading effect of AD, whereby the input producer's protection 
causes downstream producer losses, making it eligible for its own AD protection). 
76' See, e. g., VERMULST, E., "Injury Determinations in Antidumping Investigations in the United States 
and the European Community", 7 N. Y. L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L., 1986, p. 301ff, at p. 304; and CASS, R., 
and NARKIN, S., "Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: The United States and the GATT", in 
BOLTUCK and LITAN, l. c., supra note 761, p. 200-38, at p. 201. 
765 BOLTUCK and LITAN, o. c., supra note 761, p. 13. 
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lesser evil766. Besides alternatives to AD are limited, and these days much is expected 
from competition law policy to render AD superfluous767. These criticisms of AD 
measures collide, however, with the widespread and growing political support for AD 
actions768. Apparently the EC and the US even tried to water down sections of an OECD 
report 769 that were critical of AD measures before allowing it to be published770. 
In a world where tariff and non-tariff barriers decrease rapidly, AD measures are 
becoming increasingly important in protecting domestic manufacturers 771. Historically, 
the US, EC, Canada772 and Australia773 have been the primary users of AD law. This 
small number of countries has successfully used AD to protect national industries for 
years. Developing countries have learned well from this experience and, to the 
consternation of the traditional users group, have begun to make great use of the AD 
weapon774 themselves. Developed countries will have a hard time complaining about the 
acquisition and use of this weapon by others775. Also Japan, South Korea, Taiwan776 and 
China777, which have been most frequent victims of AD actions, are emerging users of 
AD legislation 778. And although it is often noted that trade restrictions are 
766 See, e. g., CASS and NARKIN, o. c., supra note 764, p. 201. 
767 See, e. g., ROSENTHAL, D., "Equipping the Multilateral Trading System with a Style and Principles to 
Increase Market Access", 6 George Mason L. Rev., Spring 1998, p. 543-572. 
768 CORK, C., "Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures", 18 
Northwestern J. Int'1 Trade L., Fall, 1997, p. 49-110, at p. 102. 769 INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DIVISION, Trade and Competition: Friction After 
the Uruguay Round, OECD, Paris, 1996. 
no CORP, o. c., supra note 768, p. 102. n' See BHALA, R., "Rethinking Antidumping Law", 29 Geo. Wash. J. Intl & Econ., 1995, p. 1-144, at p. 
3. A view that is apparently also shared by China, see WALKER, T., "Beijing in Tough Line on Dumping", 
FT, 4 February 1997, quoting the Deputy Director General, Zhang Yugling, of the Chinese Ministry of 
Trade. 
772 MAGNUS, P., "The Canadian Antidumping System", in JACKSON, J. and VERMULST, E. (Eds. ), 
Antidumping Law and Practice, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1989, p. 167. 
73 STEELE, K., "The Australian Antidumping System", in JACKSON, J. and VERMULST, E. (Eds. ), 
Antidumping Law and Practice, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1989, p. 223. 
74 The Economist described it as "(... ) the chemical weapons of the world's trade wars", see BHALA, o. c, 
sutra note 771, p. 4. 
77 CORR, o. c., supra note 768, p. 55-6. 
776 See, e. g., OHNESORGE, J., "States, Industrial Policies & Antidumping Enforcement in Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan", 3 Buff J. Int'1 L., Winter 1996-97, p. 289-411. 
"7 DONG, Y., XU, H. and LIU, F., "Antidumping and the WTO - Implications for China", 32 J. World 
Trade, no. 1,1998, p. 19-27. SHEN, J., "A Critical Analysis of China's First Regulation on Foreign 
Dumping and Subsidies and Its Consistency with WTO Agreements", 15 Berk J. Int'l Law, 1997, p. 295- 
328. 
778 ZHANG, S., ZHANG, Y., and WAN, Z., Measuring the Costs of Protection in China, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington DC, and Unitale Institute of Economics, Beijing, 1999. 
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disproportionately imposed against the exports of developing countries, some argue that 
many of the "biases" in developed countries' trade restrictions against exports from 
developing countries are also found in many developing countries' trade restrictions 779. 
AD is no longer an exception to that. 
II. The Legal Context of Dumping 
The legal definition of dumping follows the economics of international price 
discrimination, not necessarily below cost. Dumping is not illegal unless it is injurious, 
and in contrast with emergency safeguards, deals with unfair imports, but the question 
remains what is or should be considered unfair. This seems to be a matter of perception 
and culture rather than economics or law780. According to one authoritative Japanese 
source trade friction between countries is confused with so-called unfair trade, an 
expression for which there is no established definition781. From this perspective the 
Japanese prefer the term trade friction, which they consider to be a more dispassionate 
and constructive term. AD measures themselves do not represent unfair practices if 
applied in accordance with international agreements, but create serious problems when 
they are abused or arbitrarily applied782. 
According to John Jackson the term "unfair", when describing AD or countervailing duty 
(CVD) cases as responses to "unfair trade", is inappropriate as far as imports from state- 
trading countries are concerned. He believes it would be better to designate the problems 
generated by trade between a "market-oriented" society and a "state-trading" economy or 
a government-owned enterprise, as a problem of "interface"783. He further argues that 
779 See FINGER, M. and LAIRD, S., "Protection in Developed and Developing Countries - An Overview", 
21 J. World Trade L., no. 6,1987, p. 9-23. 
780 See generally BHAGWATI, J. and HUDEC, R. (Eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites 
for Free Trade?, Cambridge, MIT Press, Vol. 2,1996. In this context especially CASS, R. and BOLTUCK, 
R., "Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Law: The Mirage of Equitable International Competition", in 
BHAGWATI and HUDEC, l. c., p. 351ff. 
781 Industrial Structure Council Japan, "1992 Report on Unfair Trade Policies by Major Trading Partners - 
Trade Policies and GATT Obligations", JETRO, 1993, p. 6. 
782 Idem, p. 10. 
783 JACKSON, J., "United States Policy Regarding Disruptive Imports from State Trading Countries or 
Government Owned Enterprises", in WALLACE, D., SPINA, G. et al (Eds. ), Interface One - Conference 
Proceedings on the Application of US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws on Imports from State- 
Controlled Economies and State-owned Enterprises, The Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, 
Washington DC, 1980, p. 1-20, at p. 1. 
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countervailing laws, and to a lesser extent AD laws, are shouldering most of the 
interfacing responsibility 784. 
Interestingly, the question should also be raised whether the investigations themselves are 
fair. Do the AD procedures punish truly unfair trade, or do they punish only trade that the 
country initiating the investigation deems to be unfair? Unfair practice investigations are 
designed to ensure their obscurity and to insulate them from the highly charged political 
atmosphere that surrounds trade disputes. The investigation is more like a judicial contest 
than a political event, so that politicians can say trade matters are "out of their hands" and 
thus out of the political arena. If foreigners complain about the outcome, it should be 
because they are guilty of offending the internationally accepted rules of the game785. 
There probably is at least some coloration in AD practice of an effort to protect domestic 
producers, and to tilt the field slightly in favour of the home market. But this should not 
go out of control. 
Some authors, such as Anne Krueger, would like to alter administered protection 
procedures in ways that could make them less conducive to seizure for protectionist 
purposes, and nonetheless permit them to perform their intended functions against 
practices deemed to be unfair786. Raj Bhala considered how to deal with the problem of 
protectionist abuse, and proposed a traffic-light system, similar to the one used in CVD 
cases, based on the micro-economic theory of the cost structure of a firm787. Alan 
Deardorff788 suggested redefining dumping as price discrimination below cost and to 
clarify the cost element, and also Edwin Vermulst suggested his changes in AD law to 
make the 21 st century789. All these suggestions each have their own merit, but are limited 
in use in the context of NME or transition economies, because the main problem there is 
784 Idem, p. 2. 
Iss BOLTUCK and LITAN, o. c., supra note 761, p. 2. 786 KRUEGER, o. c., supra note 747, p. 118. Suggested solutions are e. g. to raise de minimis standards, and 
to substitute `below average cost' with `below marginal cost'. 787 BHALA, o. c, supra note 771, p. 1-144, Part V. The system focuses on predatory behaviour. Unlawful 
red-light dumping occurs when an exporter sells merchandise at a price below its average total and variable 
cost of production. Yellow-light dumping occurs when an exporter sells at a price below its average total 
cost but above its average variable costs of production, and it leads to the issuance of a caution. Green-light 
dumping is defined as pricing above average total cost of production and is lawful. 
788 See DEARDORFF, o. c., supra note 759, p. 23-40. 789 See VERMULST, E., "Anti-dumping in the Second Millennium: The Need to Revise Basic Concepts", 
in BRONCKERS, M. and QUICK, It (Eds. ), New Directions in International Economic Law - Essays in 
Honour of John H. Jackson, Boston, Kluwer, 2000, p. 259-277. 
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that still no satisfactory solution exists for the determination of costs and prices in these 
economies. I agree with Raj Bhala that it should be our aim to circumscribe the law so as 
to minimise the risk of protectionist abuse. The profile of a protectionist abuser is a 
petitioner who has lost his comparative advantage in manufacturing merchandise to a 
respondent who makes the same or similar merchandise, and who is unwilling to reduce 
his cost structure to meet global competitive pressures, fails to incorporate technological 
innovations in his manufacturing process and product design, or is insensitive to changes 
in consumer tastes790. Unfortunately, AD methodology as applied to NMEs is rife with 
opportunities for protectionist abuse. 
AD measures are unilateral, and the WTO Antidumping Agreement (ADA) does not pass 
judgment on whether dumping is unfair competition, it focuses on how governments can 
or cannot react to dumping, but many governments do take action against dumping in 
order to defend their domestic industries. Broadly speaking, where there is genuine injury 
to the competing domestic industry as a result of dumped imports, the Agreement allows 
countries to act. The WTO principles on AD serve two distinct purposes. The first 
purpose is to provide procedural and substantive safeguards against the abuse of national 
AD rules. The second purpose is to liberalise trade movements, to attempt to rid the 
world of harmful distortions, such as the private act of price discrimination791. In 
particular some argue that AD measures may serve as a necessary trade-off to achieve 
further liberalisation in reducing global tariffs and duties. Many countries may have been 
willing and able to agree to the dramatic liberalisation that have rolled back import tariffs 
over the past twenty years, only if they were allowed discretionary use of AD measures 
as a fall back792. The WTO AD Agreement is discussed in greater detail below. 
A. WTO Antidumping Code 
Article VI of GATT 1994 explicitly authorises the imposition of a specific AD duty on 
imports from a particular source, in excess of bound rates, in cases where dumping causes 
or threatens to cause injury to a domestic industry, or materially retards the establishment 
790 BHALA, o. c, supra note 771, p. 21. 791 DENTON, R, "(Why) Should Nations Utilize Antidumping Measures? ", 11 Mich. J. Int'I L, Fall, 1989, 
224-272, at p. 225. 
752 BHAGWATI, J., Protectionism, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988, p. 485-530. 
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of an industry 793. The article does not contain much guidance as to criteria for 
determining dumping, whether injury exists, nor as to the methodology or procedure, so 
GATT Contracting Parties negotiated several detailed Codes relating to AD. The first 
such code, the 1967 Kennedy Round Code, was never signed by the US and the 
subsequent 1979 Tokyo Round Code, gave more guidance, and contained substantial 
detail covering procedure and due process requirements, but was only binding for the 27 
parties who subscribed to it. Finally, the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement 
(ADA), or in full the "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994", is 
the most complete international AD text. It calls in addition to its predecessors for 
notifications of legislation and AD actions as required by WTO guidelines, and clarifies 
the relationship between Article VI GATT and the ADA794. Although the latest 
Agreement significantly modifies certain aspects of prior law, it leaves other major areas, 
such as procedural aspects of preliminary and final determinations, relatively 
untouched795. 
The ADA establishes the basic principle that a member may not impose AD measures, 
unless it determines, according to an investigation 796 in conformity with the provisions of 
the ADA, that there are dumped imports797, material injury798 to a domestic industry 799, 
and a causal link800 between the dumped imports and the injury. A failure to respect these 
substantive requirements or any of the procedural requirements explained further in the 
following paragraph can lead to dispute settlement before the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB)801. 
793 On the evolution of Article VI GATT, see the study by BIERWAGEN, R., GATT Article VI and the 
Protectionist Bias in Anti-Dumping Laws, Boston, Kluwer Law, 1990. 
794 Art. 1 makes it clear that the AD Agreement is to be considered lex specialis with respect to Art. IV 
GATT. This relationship is therefore much clearer than that between Art. XIX and the Safeguards 
Agreement. 
79 For a discussion, see, e. g., HORLICK, G. and SHEA, E., "The World Trade Organization Antidumping 
Agreement", 29 J. World Trade, February 1995, p. 5-31; and PALMETER, D., "Commentary on the WTO 
Anti-Dumping Code", 30 J. World Trade, February 1996, p. 43-69. m Art. 5 ADA. 
797 On the determination of dumping, see Art. 2 ADA. 798 Art. 3 ADA. 
79' Art. 4 ADA. 
800 Art. 3 (5) ADA. 
8o1 It should be noted, however, that the standard of review in the 1994 ADA is limited. See, e. g., in this 
regard, AKAKWAM, P., "The Standard of Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code: Circumscribing the 
Role of GATT Panels in Reviewing National Antidumping Determinations", 5 Minn. J. of Global Trade, 
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It is a principal objective of the procedural requirements of the Agreement to ensure 
transparency of proceedings, a full opportunity for parties to defend their interests, and to 
give adequate explanations by investigating authorities of their determinations 802. 
Detailed procedural requirements exist relating to investigations to ensure that meritless 
investigations are not investigated through minimum information and `standing' 
requirements 803. And additional procedural requirements relate to the offering, 
acceptance, and administration of price undertakings 804 by exporters in lieu of the 
imposition of AD duties. Further, the ADA demands public notice and explanation of 
determinations805, it also establishes rules for the timing of the imposition of duties, the 
duration thereof, and obliges members to periodically review the continuing need for 
duties and price undertakings806. Other detailed provisions guide the imposition and 
collection of duties under various duty assessment systems, intended to ensure that duties 
in excess of the margin of dumping are not collected807. The Agreement also requires 
members to provide for judicial review of final determinations in investigations and 
reviews808. Members may, at their own discretion, take AD actions on behalf of and at the 
request of a third country809, and recognise that "special regard" should be given by 
developed country members to the situation of developing country members when 
considering the application of AD duties810. The European AD legislation closely follows 
the principles spelled out in the ADA. 
Summer 1996, p. 277-310; and GOMULA, J., "The Standard of Review of Article 17.7 of the Anti- 
Dumping Agreement and the Problem of its Extension to Other WTO Agreements", 23 
PolYB, 1997-98, p. 229ff. Important in this regard is also Regulation 1515/2001/EC of 23 July 2001, on the 
measures that may be taken by the Community following a report adopted by the WTO DSB concerning 
AD and anti-subsidy matters, OJ L201,26 July 2001, p. 10. Recital 6 provides, however, that the 
recommendations in DSB reports only have prospective effect. 
802 Art. 6 ADA. 
803 Art 5 (4) ADA. 
804 Art. 8 ADA. 
805 Art. 12 ADA. 
e06 Art. 11 ADA. 
807 Art. 9 ADA. 
808 Art. 13 ADA. 
809 Art. 14 ADA. 
810 Art. 15 ADA. 
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B. EC Antidumping Legislation811 
The first European AD rules were enacted in 1968, along with the transfer of 
responsibility for commercial policy and tariff setting from the Member States to the 
Community authorities. Following the acceptance of the GATT AD and CVD Codes, 
legal instruments were adopted in 1979 with amendments in 1982. Reforms made in 1984 
were accompanied by the adoption of a more professional approach, including much 
fuller statements of reasons for decisions. In 1987 a controversial procedure was 
introduced to prevent circumvention of dumping duties by the establishment of assembly 
plants (screwdriver plants) within the Community. Further amendments were made in 
1988 in the course of a general consolidation. The last major modifications of the legal 
instruments occurred after the latest AD Code was adopted. The current legal framework 
for AD is laid down in Regulation 384/96/EC of 22 December 1995 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community812, as 
amended, and Commission Decision 2277/96/ECSC of 28 November 1996 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), as amended813, which will be disregarded for further purposes. In 
the following sections the three substantive requirements of AD are discussed. These are 
the determination of (1) dumping, (2) injury, and (3) the causation between dumped 
imports and the injury. 
811 On European AD law see, FARR, S., EU Anti-Dumping Law -Pursuing and Defending Investigations, 
London, Palladian Law, 1998; MÜLLER, W., KHAN, N. and NEUMANN, H., EC Anti-Dumping Law -A 
Commentary on Regulation 384/96, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1998; STANBROOK, C. and 
BENTLEY, P., Dumping and Subsidies - The Law and Procedures Governing the Imposition of Anti- 
Dumping and Countervailing Duties in the European Community, The Hague, Kluwer, 1996,3`d ed.; 
VERMULST, E. and WAER, P., EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996; 
VAN BAEL, I. and BELLIS, J., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection Laws of the EC, Bicester, CCH, 
1996; BESELER, J. and WILLIAMS, A., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law - The European 
Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986; and MONTAG, F. and FIEBIG, A., "The European 
Union", in STEELE, K. (Ed. ), Anti-Dumping under the WTO: A Comparative Review, The Hague, Kluwer, 
1996, p. 97-120. 
812 Regulation 384/96/EC of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not 
members of the EC, OJ L056,6 March 1996, p. 1(hereinafter Basic Regulation). 81 Commission Decision 2277/96/ECSC of 28 November 1996 on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the ECSC, OJ L308,29 November 1996, p. 11. 
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a. Determination of Dumping 
Establishing normal value is usually the first step in any AD investigation. The Basic 
Regulation gives the Commission a number of different methods for arriving at normal 
value814. There is a general rule and various exceptions, which normally apply when 
domestic sales are not in the ordinary course of trade, or do not allow a proper 
comparison815. The general rule is that normal value will normally be based on the prices 
paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the 
exporting country 816. Thus the prices used in sales to related customers will be deemed 
unreliable. This general rule will not apply in the following circumstances. First, it will 
not apply where the exporter does not sell the goods on his home market. This will be the 
case also where an exporter only sells small quantities, as less than 5% of the sales 
volume to the EC817. Second, exception will be made where sales on the domestic market 
are made between companies which are related or which have a compensatory 
arrangement with each other818. Third, the general rule does not apply in circumstances 
where sales at prices below unit production costs (fixed and variable) occur. The 
conditions laid down in such a case are that the sales must be made within an extended 
period not less than six months and in substantial quantities (20%)819. Finally, where the 
imports in question come from NME the general rule will not apply either820. This 
situation will be dealt with in greater detail later. 
Of the alternative methods of ascertaining normal value when the general rule does not 
apply, by far the most frequent method is the constructed normal value. Where the 
Commission chooses this method, the normal value of the like product will be calculated 
on the bases of the costs of production in the country of origin, plus a reasonable amount 
for selling, general and administrative costs (SGA), and for profits821. The Regulation 
contains detailed provisions on costs, SGA expenses, as well as profits822. 
$14 Art. 2 Reg. 3 84/96. 
815 Art. 2(3) Reg. 384/96. 
816 Art. 2(1) Reg. 384/96. 
81 Art. 2(2) Reg. 384/96. 
818 Art. 2(1) Reg. 384/96. 
819 Art. 2(4) Reg. 384/96. 
820 Art. 2(7) Reg. 384/96. 
$21 Art. 2(3) Reg. 384/96. 
1122 Art. 2(5) and (6) Reg. 384/96. 
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The second step in the investigation is to determine the export price based on the 
transaction price at which the foreign producer sells the product to an importer in the 
importing country 823. However, as is the case with normal value, this transaction price is 
sometimes not appropriate for purposes of comparison, as there may not be an export 
price if the export transaction is an internal transfer, or if the product is exchanged in a 
barter transaction; or the transaction price may be unreliable because of an association or 
a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party; in 
such a case, the transaction price may be manipulated for tax purposes824. In either of 
these cases a constructed export price may be calculated on the basis of the price at which 
the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or on any other reasonable 
basis 825 
Once the Commission has established normal value and export price, it must then make a 
fair comparison826 of these two values, establishing the dumping margin. This is the third 
step in the determination process. Prices being compared are those of sales made at the 
same level of trade, normally the ex-factory level, and of sales made at as nearly possible 
the same time; and due account must be taken of other differences which affect price 
comparability. Investigating authorities are required to inform parties, regarding 
adjustments, allowances, and currency conversion, and may not impose an unreasonable 
burden of proof. If the export price is lower than the normal value, the dumping margin is 
positive and dumping is taking place. 
In calculating the dumping margin, either the comparison of the weighted average normal 
value to the weighted average of all comparable export prices, or a transaction-to- 
transaction comparison of normal value and export price will be made827. A different 
basis of comparison can be used in case of targeted dumping, i. e. if a pattern exists of 
export prices differing significantly among different purchasers, regions or time 
periods828. 
623 Art. 2(8) Reg. 384/96. 
824 Art. 2(9) Reg. 384/96. 
925 Idem. 
826 Art. 2(10) Reg. 3 84/96. 
827 Art. 2(l 1) Reg. 3 84/96. 
829 Idem. 
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Finally, it should be noted that duties must be collected on a non-discriminatory basis, 
except when a price undertaking829 has been accepted. A dumping margin is calculated 
for each single exporter, except when sampling830 is used and for NME exporters831. 
Furthermore, the amount of the duty collected may not exceed the dumping margin, but 
in the EC this amount is even limited to the margin of injury. Injury is the second 
substantive requirement for the use of AD and is discussed below. 
b. Determination of Injury 
The objective of Regulation 384/96 is to prevent material injury being caused by dumped 
imports to the Community industry, which produces the like product. The sequence of 
events in an injury determination is as follows. First, it is considered whether the 
imported products and those of the Community producers are like products. Second, it is 
then examined whether the domestic producers fall within the definition of Community 
industry. And third, it has to be ascertained whether the Community industry is suffering 
material injury as defined in Article 3. 
Like product is defined as a product that is identical to, or in the absence of such product, 
one that has characteristics closely resembling those of the imported product under 
consideration 832. Community industry is defined as the Community producers as a whole 
of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products 
constitutes a major proportion, as defined in the Regulation833. Special rules exist for 
regional Community industry 834, and Community producers may also be excluded from 
consideration as part of a Community industry if they are related835, which is defined as a 
situation of legal or effective control to exporters or importers of the related product836. 
Injury means either material injury, threat of material injury or material retardation of the 
establishment of a Community industry 837. Determination of injury requires an objective 
829 Art. 8 Reg. 384/96. 
830 Art. 17 Reg. 384/96. 
831 See infra, p. 219. 
832 Art. 1(4) Reg. 3 84/96. 
933 Art. 4(1) Reg. 384/96. 
834 Art. 4(1)(b) Reg. 384/96. 
835 Art. 4(1)(a) Reg. 384/96. 
836 Art. 4(2) Reg. 384/96. 
837 Art. 3(l) Reg. 384/96. 
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examination, based on positive evidence of the volume and price effects of dumped 
imports and the consequent impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry 838. 
Article 3 contains further specific rules regarding factors to be considered in making 
determinations of material injury, while specifying that no one or several of the factors, 
which must be considered is determinative. 
c. Determination of Causality 
It is not enough to establish a dumping margin and injury if it cannot be demonstrated 
from all the relevant evidence that the dumped imports are causing the injury. This entails 
a demonstration that the volume and/or the price levels identified are responsible for an 
impact on the Community industry 839 and that this impact exists to a degree, which 
enables it to be classified as material840. To this end known factors other than the dumped 
imports, which at the same time are injuring the Community industry will also be 
examined to ensure that injury caused by these factors is not attributed to the dumped 
imports 841. A typical European feature of the AD legislation is that the Commission must 
show additionally that the action it takes under the Regulation is in the interest of the 
Community842. So far the three substantive elements of AD were introduced. The 
following paragraphs will elaborate dumping caused by imports from state-trading 
countries or NMEs. 
III. Antidumping and State-Trading Countries 
Since many years it has been very difficult to identify true dumping from state-trading 
countries, because of the irrationality of their internal price structure and the existence of 
foreign trade monopolies843. State-socialist countries may be thought of as particularly 
inclined to dump for a variety of reasons. Most obviously, state-wide monopolies are in a 
uniquely favourable position to engage in price discrimination while the resources of the 
state might theoretically be used to provide limitless finance for the purpose of predatory 
838 Art. 3 (2) Reg. 3 84/96. 
839 Community industry is defined in Art. 4 Reg. 384/96. 
&10 Art. 3(6) Reg. 3 84/96. 
841 Art. 3(7) Reg. 384/96. 
842 Art. 21 Reg. 384/96. 
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dumping. In addition it has been argued that state planning may result in periodic 
surpluses, which must be disposed of outside the domestic economy, as well as in 
occasional production shortfalls resulting in unplanned imports financed through low- 
priced exports. However, the task of arriving at a meaningful price comparison, for the 
purpose of determining whether or not price discrimination or below-cost sales are taking 
. place, presents the importing country with insuperable difficulties844 
The system of administered exchange rates adopted in centrally-planned economies tends 
to result in the overvaluation of their currencies vis-a-vis market economies. That means 
that, with international prices below domestic prices, virtually every transaction between 
a NME and a market economy can be characterised as dumping. This appearance is 
misleading, however, since the planned economy's export prices, too, will be abnormally 
low so that from the point of view of combined export and import transactions there need 
be no price discrimination. After all, if a SOE sells a commodity at two thirds of domestic 
cost in order to import another commodity purchased at one third of the cost this may be 
regarded as a legitimate commercial transaction, entirely in keeping with the principles of 
comparative advantage845. 
As far as the below cost aspect of the dumping problem is concerned, domestic prices in 
the NME do not reflect domestic production costs as understood in the market 
economies; and, it would be impossible in practice to unravel the system of subsidies and 
turnover taxes in order to arrive at a realistic estimate of cost. Even if it were possible to 
estimate production costs in NMEs it is not at all clear that this would be helpful in 
reaching a solution to the dumping problem. In terms of Viner's argument846 it is the 
temporariness of the dumping price that importing countries have to be on guard against, 
and in the case of NMEs there is no reason why exports should not be priced below cost 
for a prospectively permanent period. It may be in the best interests of market economies 
to accept the fact that these products are under-priced as a permanent fact of life847. 
843 See HOLZMAN, F., International Trade under Communism - Politics and Economics, New York, Basic 
Books, 1976, p. 38-39. 
844 DALE, R., Antidumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order, New York, St-Martin's Press, 1980, p. 172. 
843 DALE, o. c., supra note 844, p. 172-3. 
"6 VINER, o. c., supra note 757. 
947 DALE, o. c., supra note 844, p. 173. 
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There are strong objections, both on theoretical and practical grounds, to invoking AD 
legislation in such a context848. It is not clear why low-priced imports from planned 
economies should be considered objectionable, merely because they do not comply with 
the market concept of comparative advantage849. Nonetheless, AD action remains one of 
the favoured defences against low-priced imports from NMEs850. However, one can 
question the typical NME methodology in AD laws even more these days, simply 
because almost all these traditionally planned economies have embarked on serious 
economic reforms. This means that their market economy features should be taken into 
account, and the NME methodology actually should belong to the past. 
GATT, and nowadays the WTO, itself offers very little guidance as to how the price 
comparison problem should be dealt with in investigations involving NMEs or transition 
economy countries. The second interpretative note to Article VI GATT, in the particular 
situation of economies where the government has a complete or substantially complete 
monopoly of its trade, and where all domestic prices are fixed by the state, so that a strict 
comparison with home market prices may not be appropriate, allows importing countries 
to exercise significant discretion in the calculation of normal value of products exported 
from NMEs851. The question remains, whether transition economies still fall under these 
particular circumstances, since many have reformed their monopolies and not all prices 
are fixed by the state. In the case of China, however, the Protocol of Accession explicitly 
allows to continue the country's NME status for a number of years to come852. 
The Polish protocol of accession to the GATT, included in its Working Party Report the 
statement that `a Contracting Party may use as the normal value for a product imported 
from Poland the prices which prevail normally in its market, or alternatively, `a price 
constructed on the basis of a like product originating in another country i853. Similar 
understandings were recorded in the Reports of the Working Parties on the accession of 
848 DALE, o. c., supra note 844, p. 174. 849 DALE, o. c., supra note 844, p. 176. 850 DALE, o. c., supra note 844, p. 174. 851 The full text reads: "It is recognised that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special 
difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases 
importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict 
comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate. " 
852 Sections 15 and 16 of the Protocol of Accession. 
194 
Trade Policy Response - Antidumping 
Romania and Hungary, although the Protocols themselves do not make any reference to 
the price comparison issue854. At the GATT level, it was originally proposed that the 
Polish Protocol of Accession should tackle the problem of low-priced imports directly by 
including a clause on pricing855. Specifically, the suggestion was that Poland would 
endeavour to ensure that its exports would be offered at prices and on conditions in line 
with those prevailing in the markets concerned, and that contracting governments were 
free to levy duties on products offered at lower prices. This approach, which had been 
first adopted by Belgium, of course limits severely the possibility of mutual gains from 
trade between market economies and NMEs based on comparative advantage. 
Nonetheless a similar, albeit less explicit clause, was incorporated in the Report of the 
Working Party on the accession of Hungary S56. Because GATT and WTO texts do not 
offer much guidance on these problems, users of AD law, such as the EC, had to come up 
with their own solutions to the problem. The objective is to arrive at a pattern of trade 
based on comparative advantage as understood and applied in market economies, and 
their stated rationale that it is fair. The Chinese Protocol of Accession, despite China's 
continuing reform efforts to become a market-based economy, allows these NME 
methodologies still to be used for fifteen years after its accession, unless these countries 
decide to grant China market economy status before that time857. However, it should be 
repeated that there are no criteria to base China's graduation on, before the lapse of this 
fixed period. This is left to the discretion of the individual member. 
Up to April 1998, the EC AD legislation categorised third countries as either a `Market 
Economy' or a `Non-market Economy', this latter category comprised Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, 
Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam 858 . 
However, even if a country is not categorised as such in Regulation 519/94, it must, 
according to EC Case law, be regarded as a NME if prices are not the result of market 
$53 GATT, Basic Instruments, 15' Supplement, Geneva, 1968, p. 111. 954 For the relevant documents, see Chapter One, note 68. 
ass Such a clause existed, e. g., in the 1978 Sino-European Trade in Textiles Agreement. See Chapter Three, 
for a discussion of this price clause. 
856 DALE, o. c., supra note 844, p. 182. 
857 Section 15 Protocol of Accession. 
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forces, i. e., if there is a strong influence of the state on this process. This is in particular 
the case where trade in the product concerned is subject to a total or near monopoly of the 
state or if all domestic prices are fixed by the state. These conditions are met if, during 
the investigation period concerning dumping, market forces are eliminated due to the 
existence of a general system for the fixing of prices or at least one for the product 
concerned859. A country such as Cuba, which is not mentioned as a NME within the 
meaning of Article 2 (7), presumably would have to be considered as such a case860. In 
general, little guidance has emerged to indicate where the line between non-market and 
market economy status falls. 
In the US the term NME includes any foreign country that the Department of Commerce 
(DOC) determines "does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so 
that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the 
merchandise .,, 
861 The DOC's determination of NME status remains in effect until it is 
revoked862, and may make such determination at any time863. Unlike in the EC the 
determination is an administrative decision and not determined directly by law. The 
effect, however, is the same because in neither part of the world the determination is 
subject to judicial review864. This non-reviewability gives the impression that, both in the 
US and in the EC, the NME determination is a political one rather than a predictable and 
methodical one. This impression is even reinforced in the European context, because 
unlike the US statute, the EC legislation provides no criteria to be considered in 
determining whether a country is a NME865. As early as 1990, former USTR Charlene 
858 Regulation 519/94/EC of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries are 
non-market economies, OJ L67,10 March 1994, p. 89 as amended. 
959 Case C-323/88 SA Sermes v. Directeur des services des douanes de Strasbourg [1990] ECR 1-3027 
(paragraphs 23 and 24), Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v. 
Commission and Council [1990] ECR 1-2945 (paragraph 28). SA Sermes and Neotype concerned the same 
regulation imposing an AD duty and in both cases the Court came to the conclusion that the former 
Yugoslavia could be considered as a market economy country within the meaning of Article 2 (7). 
860 MÜLLER, et al., o. c., supra note 811, p. 154. 
86' Section 771 (18)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930,19 U. S. C § 1677(18XA) (1994). 
962 See 19 U. S. C § 1677(18)(C)(i) (1994). 
963 See 19 U. S. C § 1677(18)(C)(ii) (1994). 
864 See 19 U. S. C § 1677(18)(D) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). For the US, see also NEELY, J., "Nonmarket 
Economy Import Regulation from Bad to Worse", 20 Law & Poly in Intl Bus., 1989, p. 529-554, at p. 
549. 
865 These involve: (1) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible, (2) the extent to 
which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining between labour and 
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Barchefsky already pleaded to make these decisions judicially reviewable866. Making 
these determinations judicially reviewable in Europe would certainly be an improvement 
with regard to transparency, and would require an answer as to when exactly NMEs can 
be considered market economies for the purpose of AD legislation. However, this will not 
be a solution either if the criteria used to this end are different from those used in other 
WTO members. For instance Poland is considered a market economy in both the US and 
the EC, but in Brazil it is still considered a NME. Maybe a concerted effort on the WTO 
level could change that. 
In practical terms the difference between non-market and market economy status means 
that for the purposes of establishing normal value in dumping investigations concerning a 
NME, information on domestic prices and costs is considered unreliable, because of the 
significant distorting effect of state influence and control, and the absence of meaningful 
market signals due to state interference. Therefore in these cases normal value is based on 
information from companies in a market economy third country, i. e. the "analogue 
country"867. However, this situation did not recognise the ongoing economic and political 
reforms in countries, such as China and Russia. It was considered that the NME 
calculation method automatically applied in AD investigations concerning these two 
countries was no longer appropriate in each and every AD proceeding., As a result it was 
considered that there was clear economic justification to adapt European AD practice so 
as to accommodate the impact of the ongoing reforms on individual companies. In April 
1998, the Council amended the Basic AD Regulation to allow, on a case-by-case basis, 
individual Russian and Chinese companies the opportunity to prove that they operate in 
market economy conditions in accordance with certain criteria contained in the 
legislation 868. Where they prove this is the case, dumping allocations for the company are 
based on their own domestic prices and costs. The amendment did not grant full market 
management, (3) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign countries 
are permitted in the foreign country, (4) the extent to which government ownership or control of the means 
of production, (5) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the price and 
output decisions of enterprises, and (6) such other factors as the administering authority considers 
appropriate. For a discussion on these criteria, see LAROSKI, J., "NMEs: A Love Story of Nonmarket and 
Market Economies Under US Antidumping Law", 30 Law & Poly in Intl Bus., Winter 1999, p. 370-398. 
866 BARCHEFSKY, C., "Non-market Economies in Transition and the US Antidumping Law: Remarks on 
the Need for Reevaluation", 8 Boston Univ. Intl L. J., Fall 1990, p. 373-380. 
867 Art. 2(7)(a) of Regulation 384/96, as amended by Reg. 905/98. 
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economy status to Russia and China, and the analogue country approach is maintained for 
companies in those countries who do not meet the Market Economy Treatment (MET) 
criteria. The amendment became effective on 1 July 1998. 
Since July 1998, only a small percentage of companies who applied for MET were 
successful in proving their claim. However, according to the Commission this has more 
to do with the economic situation in Russia and China rather than with the criteria for 
MET being too strict869. The Commission argues its experience has shown the criteria to 
be a good framework to evaluate whether or not a company operates in a market 
economy environment 870. The Commission shares the view that, both Russia and China, 
have still some way to go before they can be considered market economy countries, and 
that the regime itself gives a certain impetus to the reform processes. For these reasons, 
the Commission considers it appropriate to continue applying this regime to AD 
proceedings involving Russia and China. 
In reviewing the situation in other countries classed as NMEs with a view to adapting 
their treatment in AD cases, the EC decided to automatically extend the ad hoe regime, 
previously only applicable to Russia and China, to any of the remaining NMEs that are 
WTO members, or as soon as they join the WTO in the future for current applicants871. 
The main argument for this change was the fact that membership of the WTO 
presupposes a certain level of economic reform872. Although NMEs now are treated alike 
as soon as they become WTO members, their respective Protocol of Accession should 
allow explicitly for AD treatment different from other market economy members. 
Otherwise, especially to the extent that these economies do not meet the definition of a 
centrally-planned economy873, it could be challenged whether this discriminatory 
treatment should still be allowed under the WTO texts. 
868 Regulation 905/98/EC of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation 384/96, OJ L 128,30 April 1998, p. 18. 
869 See Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against 
imports from countries not members of the European Community, Brussels, 15 June 2000, COM (2000) 
363 final, p. 3. 
870 Ibidem. 
871 See COM (2000) 363 final, o. c., supra note 869, p. 15. Regulation 2238/2000/EC of 9 October 2000 
amending Regulation 384/96, OJ L257,11 October 2000, p. 2. 
872 See COM (2000) 363 final, o. c., supra note 869, p. 15. 
873 As specified in the second interpretative note of Article VI GATT, see note 851. 
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In applying the ad hoc market economy regime to Chinese and Russian enterprises, one 
problem arose relating to an overlap between the market economy criteria, which 
essentially apply to the domestic situation of a company, and the criteria for so-called 
"individual treatment", which concern their export activities. Individual Treatment (IT) 
means that, for companies in NME who can prove that their exporting activities are 
determined by market forces, and are not affected by state influence, based on criteria set 
by the Commission, an individual dumping margin is calculated for them based on a 
comparison of their own export prices with the normal value from the analogue country. 
However, the overlap in the criteria created the anomaly that only those exporters that 
could fulfil the requirements for full MET could qualify for IT874. Given that the key 
issue for IT is that export transactions are not subject to state interference, the EC 
proposed to amend the criteria accordingly by focusing on those areas having a direct 
impact on the export activities of the exporting company875. 
The following sections will discuss the EC AD authorities' methodology in dealing with 
NMEs and in particular China. It should already be noted, however, that calculating the 
dumping margin for NMEs is a complicated exercise rife with opportunities for 
protectionist abuse. 
A. Determination of Normal Value 
As far as market economies are concerned, normal value may be determined on the bases 
of one of the three following normal value tests: (1) the prices paid or payable in the 
ordinary course of trade by independent customers in the exporting country; or (2) the 
constructed value; or (3) the export prices, in the ordinary course of trade, to an 
appropriate third country, provided that these prices are representative 
876. In AD 
investigations concerning imports from the Russian Federation, China, Ukraine, Vietnam, 
Kazakhstan and any NME which is a member of the WTO at the date of the initiation of 
the investigation, normal value will be determined in accordance with the methods 
874 See COM (2000) 363 final, o. c., supra note 869, p. 14. 
875 It was decided by the Council that in case of individual treatment, i. e. determination of the individual 
dumping margin as opposed to the single national margin, the Commission will comply with the criteria set 
out in the Annex to its communication to the Council (5070/98 COMER 4). 
676 Art. 2(1) to (6) Regulation 384/96. Note, however, that the Community authorities may determine 
normal value on any other basis where interested parties refuse to cooperate. 
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applicable to market economies. However, this will only be the case if it is shown, on the 
bases of properly substantiated claims, by one or more producers subject to the 
investigation, and in accordance with certain criteria and procedures that market economy 
conditions prevail for this producer or producers in respect of the manufacture and sale of 
the like product concerned877. A claim for such MET must be made in writing and 
contain sufficient evidence along the line of the following criteria set forth in the next 
couple of paragraphs. 
First, it should be proven that decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, 
including for instance raw materials, cost of technology and labour, output, sales and 
investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting supply and demand, and 
without significant state interference in this regard, and that costs of major inputs 
substantially reflect market values878. In certain electronic weighing scales from inter 
alia China879 the Commission found that two companies applying for MET were selling 
at more or less uniform, loss making prices in the PRC for several years. It is the 
Commission's practice to reject MET claims when domestic sales are restricted and 
where there is no price variation between customers. It is interpreted that this may result 
from centrally imposed price controls. Moreover, it was argued that prices at loss-making 
levels for several years were an indication that the producers did not operate under 
market economy conditions880. In zinc oxides from China88' MET was granted to some 
Chinese producers, but the Commission subsequently refused to use prices paid by the 
producer in question for the zinc raw material. The consistency of this decision is 
questionable, because if the main cost element, zinc raw material, did not reflect market 
value, MET should not have been granted in the first place. However, MET was granted 
before the Commission found that certain cost elements were unreliable, and therefore it 
882 adjusted the cost by basing them on zinc quotations on the London Metal Exchange. 
g" Art. 2(7)(b) Regulation 384/96, as amended. 
878 Art. 2(7)(c) Regulation 384/96, as amended. 
79 Regulation 2605/2000/EC of 27 November 2000, OJ L301,30 November 2000, p. 42. 
880 Imposing definitive AD duties on imports of certain electronic weighing scales from the PRC, Korea 
and Taiwan, OJ L301,30 November 2000, p. 42 (recital 46). 
881 Regulation 408/2002/EC of 28 February 2002 imposing a definitive AD duty on imports of certain zinc 
oxides from the PRC, OJ L62,5 March 2002, p. 7. 
882 Idem, p. 7 (recital 16). 
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As a second criterion, the applicant for MET should show that it has one clear set of basic 
accounting records, which are independently audited in line with international accounting 
standards and are applied for all purposes883. In certain iron or steel ropes and cables 
from Russia et aliud884, the cooperating exporting producer inter alia failed to prove the 
existence of a single set of accounts. In addition there was no evidence that any of the 
accounts had been independently audited in line with international accounting 
standards885. 
Other factors mentioned in the Regulation to investigate MET include that the production 
costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant distortions carried over 
from the former NME system, in particular in relation to depreciation of assets, other 
write-offs, barter trade, and payment via compensation of debts886. Barter trade was 
subject of discussion in urea from inter alia Belarus and Ukraine887 And triangular debts 
were discussed in iron or steel ropes and cables f om inter alia Russia888. The Regulation 
also mentions that the firms concerned should be subject to bankruptcy and property 
laws, which guarantee legal certainty and stability for the operation of firms889. And 
finally, exchange rate conversions should be carried out at the market rate890. It seems, 
however, that the Commission generally enjoys much discretion in applying these criteria 
and it is nowhere said that the list is exhaustive, or whether all criteria have to be used 
cumulatively to deny MET. Also the relative weight and importance of each factor is not 
clear from the Regulation. 
883 Art. 2(7)(c) Regulation 384/96, as amended. 884 Regulation 1601/2001/EC of 2 August 2001, OJ L211,4 August 2001, p. 1. 885 Definitive AD duties on certain iron or steel ropes and cables from the Czech Republic, Russia, Thailand 
and Turkey, OJ L211,4 August 2001, p. 1 (recital 79). The company submitted financial statements in US 
dollars prepared in line with international accounting standards but not audited. It presented also financial 
statements audited in line with Russian accounting standards and could not reconcile the discrepancies 
found in these different sets of financial statements. 
886 Art 2(7)(c)iii Regulation 384/96, as amended. 887 See also Regulation 92/2002/EC of 17 January 2002 definitive AD duties on urea from Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Libya, Lithuania, Romania and the Ukraine, OJ L17,19 January 2002, p. 1 
(recitals 32fß. Here the existence of barter chain arrangements and tolling agreements is discussed in light 
of MET. 
888 The existence of numerous triangular transactions was mentioned as problematic in Regulation 
1601/2001/EC definitive AD duties on certain iron or steel ropes and cables from the Czech Republic, 
Russia, Thailand and Turkey, OJ L211,4 August 2001, p. 1 (recital 79). 889 Art. 2(7)(c)iv Regulation 384/96, as amended. 
890 Art. 2(7)(c)v Regulation 384/96, as amended. 
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In the US, manufacturers will be treated as market economy producers when they meet a 
three-factor market oriented industry test expanding the DOC's inquiry to the market 
orientation of the industries that supply factor inputs as well as the industry under 
investigation89'. To be deemed a market-oriented industry; the DOC must find that there 
is virtually no government involvement in setting prices, and setting volume of 
production for the subject merchandise. Second, the DOC must also be satisfied that the 
entire industry is characterised by private or collective ownership. And third, it must be 
clear that all but an insignificant portion of all material and nonmaterial inputs have been 
purchased at market-determined prices. Only if all three factors are met, and the DOC has 
enough information available to calculate normal value, then the DOC may use the 
market oriented industry method to calculate normal value. If any one of these factors are 
not met, the manufacturers will be treated as NME producers and normal value will be 
derived by factors of production analysis, which means that the department will 
determine the normal value of the good by valuing each factor of production that goes 
into making the good based on the values of those factors in a market economy 
country 892. The reason why this test is so stringent is because giving in too easily to MET 
in the US would open the floodgates for CVD cases against NMEs, which in the US does 
not require an injury standard893. Eventually the administration will have to develop a 
new policy for administering US unfair trade laws in cases involving transition 
economies894. 
891 Sulfanilic Acid from the PRC, 57 Fed. Reg. 15.052 (Dep't Comm. 1992); and Chrome Plated Lug Nuts 
from the PRC, 56 Fed. Reg. 46.153 (Dep't Comm. 1991). See also LANTZ, R., "The Search for 
Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in Transition under United States Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws", 10 Am. Univ. J. Int'1 L. & Pol y, Spring 1995, p. 993-1073, at p. 1042-1043. 892 See LAROSKI, o. c., supra note 865, p. 370-398. 993 See HORLICK, G. and SHUMAN, S., "Nonmarket Economy Trade and US 
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws", 18Int'1 Lawyer, Fall 1984, p. 807-840; and LANTZ, o. c., supra 
note 891, p. 993-1073 
894 For further criticism and discussion, see RICHARDSON, D. and NIELSEN, R., "Recent Developments 
in the Treatment of Nonmarket Economies under the AD/CVD Laws", PLI Order No. B4-7013, October 1- 
2,1992, p. 151-167; BOGARD, L. and MENGHETTI, L., "The Treatment of Non-Market Economies 
under US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: A Petitioner's Perspective", PLI Order No. B4- 
7013, October 1-2,1992, p. 217-253; and KEARNEY, J. and WANG, J., "The DOC's Market-Oriented 
Industry Methodology for Nonmarket Economies in Antidumping Investigations: The Responding Party's 
Perspective", PLI Order No. B4-7013, October 1-2,1992, p. 257-284. 
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In Europe, the determination to allow MET will remain in force throughout the 
investigation, and should be taken within three months of the initiation895. However, in 
ferro molybdenum from China MET granted at the provisional stage was decided not to 
be justified at the definitive stage, because significant information had come to light896. It 
was established that the China Chamber of Commerce and Minmetals hosted a meeting 
shortly after the publication of the Provisional Regulation. The company that was granted 
MET was seen to be aligning its operations and business decisions, not only with 
companies that failed to satisfy the MET criteria, but also with SOEs that did not 
cooperate in the proceeding. Because it had modified its behaviour since it received its 
individual dumping margin, it became apparent that it was subject to state interference 
and a party to export constraints in terms of prices and quantities897. 
According to the letter of the Regulation, producers from countries eligible for MET 
explicitly have to apply for such treatment. To allow these producers to submit their 
claim the AD authorities send out an MET claim form. It must be asked, however, why 
the Commission cannot investigate such claims ex officio based on the general progress 
of the country's or the economic sector's reform efforts towards marketisation. The AD 
authorities have always claimed to be unable to investigate without having received 
detailed additional information for such purposes. But in practice, the authorities can 
always request supplemental information when the investigation gets stuck, e. g. by 
carrying out an onsite investigation. Of course an ex officio investigation whether MET 
can be granted does not guarantee that MET will be applied in a larger number of cases, 
but it should save the respondents in such countries from the initial hassle to claim the 
treatment. 
Additionally, it should also be questioned why in review cases of imports from countries 
eligible for MET the Commission does not ex officio examine whether the NME 
methodology used in the original investigation should be changed so as to enable the 
granting of MET. Under the present regulation NME producers have to launch an interim 
895 The determination whether the producer meets the criteria will be made after specific consultation of the 
Advisory Committee and after the Community industry has been given an opportunity to comment. See 
Art. 2(7)(c) Regulation 384/96, as amended. 
896 Regulation 215/2002/EC of 28 January 2002, OJ L35,6 February 2002, p. 1(recital 10). 
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review, sometimes parallel with a sunset review, simply because otherwise the 
Commission will not consider to investigate whether MET is applicable. In my opinion 
Article 11 (2) should be amended for that reason. Take for instance the expiry review of 
certain magnetic disks from inter alia China898 in which the Chinese producer objected to 
the fact that an analogue country had to be selected, and argued that normal value should 
instead be calculated on the basis of its own cost of production. It claimed that it met all 
the criteria to receive MET. However, the Commission did not accept this claim on the 
grounds that, under expiry reviews pursuant to Article 11 (2), measures must either be 
maintained or repealed, but not modified. The company was informed that it could claim 
MET in the context of an application for an interim review pursuant to Article 11 (3), 
which the company declined to do899. This undermines the function of sunset reviews, 
which should be able to take changing factors, such as MET, into account in order to 
investigate the likelihood of recurrence of dumping. Apparently, the Commission sits 
still, unless there is sufficient evidence for it to open a parallel review under Article 11 
(3) by the time the present expiry review is initiated. This was the case in bicycles from 
China900 in which producers also argued to operate under market economy conditions and 
that this justified a change in methodology from the one used in the original investigation. 
The change was not granted, however, and a parallel interim review was not opened for 
lack of sufficient evidence901. 
When a claim for MET cannot be substantiated, or for all those producers from other 
NMEs, which the Regulation cannot grant ad hoc MET, because they are not so 
privileged, the normal value will be determined on the basis of the price or constructed 
value in a market economy third country referred to as the "analogue country"902, or the 
price from such a third country to other countries, including the Community, or where 
those are not possible, on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or 
897 Definitive antidumping duties on imports of ferro molybdenum from the PRC, OJ L35,6 February 2002, 
1 (recitals 15 and 16). ý98 
Regulation 312/2002/EC of 18 February 2002, OJ L50,21 February 2002, p. 24. 
899 Imposing definitive AD duties on certain magnetic disks from Japan and the PRC (Expiry Review), OJ 
L50,21 February 2002, p. 24 (recital 19). 
900 Regulation 1524/2000/EC of 10 July 2000 imposing a definitive AD duty on imports of bicycles from 
the PRC (Expiry Review), OJ L175,14 July 2000, p. 39. 
901 Idem, p. 39 (recital 27). 
902 In the US this third country is referred to as a 'surrogate' country. 
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payable in the Community for the like product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to include a 
reasonable profit margin903. The aim is to avoid the use of prices and costs, which are not 
dictated by market forces904. An appropriate market economy third country will be 
selected for this purpose, and the selection is discussed in greater detail in the next 
section. Because only in few cases MET is granted, an analogue country still has to be 
elected in a majority of the cases. 
a. Selection of the Analogue Country 
According to the second subparagraph of Article 2 (7), the analogue country chosen must 
be "appropriate", and it "shall be selected in a not unreasonable manner". Due account 
must be taken "of any reliable information made available at the time of the selection". 
Account must also be taken of time limits905 and where appropriate a "market economy 
third country", which is subject to the same investigation, must be used. According to 
Article 2 (7) "[t]he parties (... ) shall be informed shortly after the initiation of the market 
economy third country envisaged and shall be given 10 days to comment". However, it is 
standard practice to inform the parties already at the time of the notice of initiation 
published pursuant to Article 5 (10)906. When it occurs that the producers in the analogue 
country have chosen not to cooperate in the end, although they had chosen to, the 
authorities will have to inform the parties of a new country envisaged907. Although non- 
cooperation is not in itself enough to vitiate the selection of the analogue country, the 
authorities should make every effort to obtain information from independent sources, and 
this includes that the Commission may have to approach again those producers, which 
did not comply with earlier requests for cooperation908. 
903 Art. 2(7)(a) Regulation 384/96, as amended. 904 Case C-26/96 Rotexchemie International Handels GmbH & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof 
[1997] ECR 1-000 (paragraph 9), Case C-16/90 Detlef NSlle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] 
ECR 1-5163 (paragraph 10), Case C-323/88 SA Sermes v. Directeur des services des douanes de Strasbourg 
[1990] ECR 1-3027 (paragraph 23), Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH 
v. Commission and Council [1990] ECR 1-2945 (paragraph 29), Joined Cases 296/86 and 77/87 
Technointorg v. Commission and Council [1988] ECR 6077 (paragraph 29). 
905 The time limits referred to are those as contained in Articles 6(9) and 7(1). 
906 MÜLLER, et al., o. c., supra note 811, p. 170. 
907 Ibidem. 
908 Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraph 69). 
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The criteria upon which the authorities base the selection are discussed in the section 
below. It should be noted that it is not a precondition for the selection of an analogue 
country that all the criteria are met with regard to such country. The ECJ has ruled that 
Community institutions enjoy wide discretion in the choice of an analogue country given 
the complex nature of the issue909. The review carried out by the ECJ is limited to the 
examination as to whether the institutions neglected to take account of essential factors 
for the purpose of establishing the appropriateness of the country chosen, and whether the 
information contained in the documents in the case were considered with all the care 
required, for the view to be taken that the normal value was determined in an appropriate 
and not unreasonable manner910. Moreover, the ECJ has held that Community institutions 
were not required to consider every analogue country suggested by the parties during an 
AD proceeding911 However, if certain doubts arose as to the appropriateness and 
reasonableness of the choice of an analogue country, such suggestions put forward by 
parties had to be examined in depth912. 
Community institutions are not bound by their selection of an analogue country, which 
was chosen for the purposes of imposing a provisional duty. They are free to choose 
another analogue country when imposing a definitive duty. A fortiori, the analogue 
country selected in a review investigation might be different to that selected in the 
original investigation, for instance if exporters in the original analogue country refuse to 
cooperate in the review investigation913. If an AD proceeding covers imports from two or 
909 Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraphs 66ft), Case C-26/96 
Rotexchemie International Handels GmbH & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1997] ECR 1-000 
(paragraph 10), Case C-16/90 Detlef Nölle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] ECR 1-5163 
(paragraph 11). 
9o Case C-16/90 Detlef Nö1le v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] ECR 1-5163 (paragraph 13), Case 
C-26/96 Rotexchemie International Handels GmbH & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1997] 
ECR 1-000 (paragraph 12). 
911 Alternative suggestions by parties concerning the selection must reach the authorities within the periods 
specified in the notice of initiation. See Article 5 (10) Reg. 3 84/96. 
9 
specified 
Case C- 16/90 Detlef Nölle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [ 1991 ] ECR 1-5163 (paragraph 32), Case 
C-26/96 Rotexchemie International Handels GmbH & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1997] 
ECR 1-000 (paragraph 21). 
913 Regulation 
. 1824/2001/EC of 12 September 
2001 imposing definitive AD duties on imports of certain 
non-refillable and refillable pocket flint lighters from China and Taiwan, OJ L248,18 September 2001, p. 2 
(recital 17). Thailand had served as an analogue country in the original investigation. In the subsequent 
review the Philippines had been used as the Thai producers refused to cooperate. 
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more NMEs the selection of an analogue country has to be justified for each of these 
14 NMEs9. 
b. Relevant Criteria 
There are about six relevant criteria, which the European AD authorities usually will 
consider when selecting an analogue country. Before to look into these relevant criteria it 
is also important to mention briefly which criteria the AD authorities usually do not 
consider relevant, though have sometimes been argued to influence the choice of the 
analogue country. Such arguments included, e. g. the size of the domestic market915, the 
fact that the cooperating producer has ceased production916, that the analogue country 
itself is not an importer of the product concerned917, and that the level of economic 
development the analogue country has attained does not match that of the NME918. This 
last criterion is, however, explicitly considered in the US919. 
914 Regulation 2998/95/EC of 20 December 1995 imposing provisional AD duties on imports of unwrought 
magnesium from Russia and Ukraine, OJ L312,23 December 1995, p. 37 (recital 21). 
915 Neither is the ratio between the production in the analogue country and the world production relevant 
with regard to the choice. See Regulation 95/95/EC of 16 January 1995 imposing definitive AD duties on 
furfuraldehyde from the PRC, OJ L15,21 January 1995, p. 11 (recital 6). A contrario the size of the 
Brazilian market was taken into account in Regulation 1100/2000/EC of 22 May 2000 imposing AD duties 
on silicon carbide from inter alia China, OJ L125,26 May 2000, p. 3 (recital 17). 
916 The cooperating producer ceased production after the investigation period. This was considered not a 
reason to consider the choice inappropriate. See Regulation 2674/94/EC of 31 October 1994 imposing 
definitive AD duties on furazolidone from the PRC, OJ L285,4 November 1994, p. 1 (recital 7). 
917 As long as there is sufficient competition on the market to ensure that the prices are representative, the 
absence of imports into the analogue country is not sufficient to render that market inappropriate. See 
Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v. Commission and Council [1990] 
ECR 1-2945 (paragraph 32). 
918 As was argued in, e. g., Regulation 467/98/EC of 23 February 1998 imposing definitive AD duties on 
imports of certain footwear from China, Indonesia and Thailand, OJ L60,28 February 1998, p. 1 (recital 
43). The defendant argued that Thailand was not an appropriate analogue country on the grounds that the 
economic levels of China and Thailand were dissimilar. Therefore Indonesia was believed a better 
alternative. The Commission did not decide against the argument, but there were other factors to prefer 
Indonesia. 
919 The Secretary of Commerce of the US is directed to find a surrogate country that is comparable to that 
of the home market country in per capita gross national product and infrastructure development. If no such 
surrogate exists, than a surrogate will be selected and deficiencies adjusted. The US is the least preferable 
choice as a surrogate country. See 19 C. F. R. § 353.52(b) (1990). Furthermore, 19 U. S. C. § 1677b(cX4) 
requires surrogate countries and those countries used for factors of production to be producers of 
comparable items in question and to be at a comparable stage of development. While the statute gives equal 
weight to economic comparability and merchandise comparability, the DOC gives priority to the former, 
but this preference does not apply in every case. See BOGARD and MENGHETTI, o. c., supra note 894, p. 
248-49. 
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Among the criteria that the Commission favourably has considered is first of all the 
comparability of the products produced. This means that for the selection of the analogue 
country it is asked whether or not the products originating from the NME concerned, and 
those produced in the analogue country, are identical or similar as far as physical 
characteristics and applications are concerned920. Minor differences do not, however, 
preclude the selection921. Also the argument that products sold on the domestic market of 
the NME and those sold on the domestic market of the analogue country were different is 
not accepted, because the comparison will usually be made between domestic sales in the 
analogue country and export sales to the Community originating in the NME922. 
A second criterion is the comparability of production volume in the exporting NME 
country and the analogue country. The importance of this criterion should not be 
overestimated. It is in itself of minor importance923. More important is the 
representativity of the domestic sales to independent customers in the analogue country 
as compared to exports concerned originating in the NME. The decisive factor is whether 
during the investigation period there were a sufficient number of transactions to ensure 
the representative nature of the market in relation to the exports in question. Generally 
this is sufficient if such sales account for more than 5% of the exports in question! 24. 
However, the export volumes of some exporters in NMEs can be so substantial that it 
might be impossible to find producers in third countries whose domestic sales meet the 
5% ratio. The question then arises whether the authorities would accept a figure clearly 
below this ratio. Some have suggested that at least the 5% ratio should be met with regard 
920 Regulation 2477/93/EEC of 7 September 1993 imposing provisional AD duties on photo albums from 
China, OJ L228,9 September 1993, p. 16 (recital 20). See also Regulation 3119/94/EC of 19 December 
1994 imposing provisional AD duties on ferro-silico-manganese from Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South 
Africa, OJ L330,21 December 1994, p. 15 (recital 13). 
921 Regulation 1748/95/EC of 17 July 1995 imposing provisional AD duties on peroxodisulphates 
(persulphates) from the PRC, OJ L169,19 July 1995, p. 15 (recital 15). See also imposing provisional AD 
duties on unwrought magnesium from Russia and Ukraine, OJ L312,21 December 1995, supra note 914, p. 
37 (recital 20). 
922 Regulation 550/93/EEC of 5 March 1993 imposing provisional AD duties on bicycles from the PRC, OJ 
L58,11 March 1993, p. 12 (recital 20). 
923 MÜLLER, et al., o. c., supra note 811, p. 157. 
924 However, the sole fact that the production volume of the analogue country is below this level does not 
necessarily signify that the choice of that country is inappropriate or unreasonable. See Case C-16/90 Detlef 
Nolle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] ECR 1-5163 (paragraphs 20 and 21), Case C-26/96 
Rotexchemie International Handels GmbH & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1997] ECR 1-000 
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to the ratio of export sales over domestic sales of the cooperating producers in the 
analogue country to comply with Article 2 (2)925. 'The reasoning of the Court in Nölle is 
not without ambiguities, because the test was first expressed as a ratio between exports of 
the NME and domestic sales in the analogue country and then as a ratio between exports 
of the NME and production in the analogue country926. A lack of representative sales may 
also result from the fact that the majority of domestic sales are made to related companies 
and only an insignificant amount of sales is made to independent customers. In such cases 
the authorities may give preference to choose a country where no such circumstances 
prevailed and cooperation is found927. It should be noted that a failure to meet the 5% 
representativity test does not necessarily prevent the authorities to select such a 
country928. It may mean that in such cases the normal value in the analogue country will 
have to be determined by an alternative method929. Nonetheless it is important to strike a 
balance between the provisions of Article 2 (2) and 2 (7). On that basis even when the 
ratio of 5% is not met, the determination of normal value based on prices in the ordinary 
course of trade should still be possible if this is more in line with the underlying rationale 
of Article 2 (7). 
Whether or not producers in the analogue country are subject to competition is another 
criterion considered by authorities in the selection process930. Usually a high number of 
(paragraph 23), and Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v. Commission 
and Council [1990] ECR 1-2945 (paragraph 31). 
m MÜLLER, et al., o. c., supra note 811, p. 158-9. See, Regulation 771/98/EC of 7 April 1998 imposing an 
AD duty on imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide from the PRC, OJ LI 11,9 April 1998, 
1 (recital 17). ý26 
See MÜLLER, et al., o. c., supra note 811, p. 158. The latter test was also applied in Regulation 
920/93/EEC of 15 April 1993 imposing provisional AD duties on magnetic disks from Japan, Taiwan and 
the PRC, OJ L95,21 April 1993, p. 5 (recital 23). 
927 Provisional AD duties on peroxodisulphates (persulphates) from the PRC, OJ L169,19 July 1995, supra 
note 921, p. 15 (recital 15), and Regulation 1783/94/EC of 18 July 1994 imposing provisional AD duties on 
furfuraldehyde from the PRC, OJ L186,21 July 1994, p. 11 (recital 13). 
928 See, Regulation 2011/2000/EC of 18 September 2000 imposing a definitive AD duty on imports of 
fluorspar from the PRC, OJ L241,26 September 2000, p. 5 (recital 20). The domestic sales of the South 
African producer were found to represent slightly less than 5% of the total Community imports from the 
PRC during the investigation period, while being generally above 5% during the period of enforcement of 
the measures. In light of these circumstances the Commission considered that the South African domestic 
sales were representative for Chinese imports. 
929 Take, e. g., Regulation 2003/97/EC of 13 October 1997 imposing a definitive AD duty on imports of 
Volyolefin sacks and bags from the PRC, OJ L284,16 October 1997, p. 1 (recital 17 and 18). 
3o Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraph 68). See also Regulation 
1878/95/EC of 28 July 1998 imposing provisional AD duties on refractory chamottes from the PRC, OJ 
L179,29 July 1995, p. 56 (recital 12), provisional AD duties on peroxodisulphates (persulphates) from the 
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producers are an indication of the existence of competition, which allows for reasonable 
but not excessive profits on the sales of the product concerned931. The sole fact of only 
two producers present in the analogue country does not in itself prevent prices from being 
the result of real competition932. And, of course, the existence of imports into the 
analogue country may also be an indication of competition 933. The existence of 
embargoes934, import quotas and the levels of customs tariffs may play a role in this 
context935. Under certain conditions the lack of competition in the envisaged analogue 
country did not preclude its selection. This was the case in dead burned (sintered) 
magnesia from China936. The costs of production were determined to be competitive, 
because of a widespread use of subcontractors, selected through a process of competitive 
tendering937. Another example is dihydrostreptomycin from China938. Because outside 
China there were only two other producers worldwide, one in Japan and one inside the 
Community, Japan had to be chosen due to a lack of other possibilities. The monopolistic 
situation was rectified by constructing a profit margin considered to be competitive 939. In 
Rotexchemie it was upheld that in the absence of other alternative countries, it was not 
unreasonable to select a country with only one producer, which was also partially 
PRC, OJ L169,19 July 1995, supra note 921, p. 15 (recital 17), and provisional AD duties on magnetic disks from Japan, Taiwan and the PRC, OJ L95,21 April 1993, supra note 926, p. 5 (recital 23). 931 See, e. g., Regulation 892/94/EC of 21 April 1994 imposing provisional AD duties on calcium metal 
from the PRC and Russia, OJ L104,23 April 1994, p. 5 (recital 14), and Regulation 2720/93/EEC of 28 
September 1993 imposing provisional AD duties on isobutanol from Russia, OJ L246,2 October 1993, p. 
12 (recital 14). 
932 Case C-16/90 DetlefNblle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] ECR 1-5163 (paragraph 19). See 
also provisional AD duties on peroxodisulphates (persulphates) from the PRC, OJ L169,19 July 1995, 
supra note 921, p. 15 (recital 17). 
93 Regulation 2463/93/EEC of 1 September 1993 imposing provisional AD duties on fluorspar from the 
PRC, OJ L226,7 September 1993, p. 3 (recital 13). 934 See provisional AD duties on furfuraldehyde from the PRC, OJ L186,21 July 1994, supra note 927, p. 
11 (recital 13). 
935 Regulation 2022/95/EC of 16 August 1995 imposing definitive AD duties on ammonium nitrate from 
Russia, OJ L198,23 August 1995, p. 1 (recitals 21-23), and provisional AD duties on isobutanol from 
Russia, OJ L246,2 October 1993, supra note 931, p. 12 (recitals 13- 14). 936 Regulation 2800/92/EEC of 25 September 1992 imposing provisional AD duties on dead burned 
(sintered) magnesia from the PRC and Japan, OJ L282,26 September 1992, p. 16 (recital 15). 937 Ibidem. 
938 Regulation 2054/91/EEC of 11 July 1991 imposing provisional AD duties on dihydrostreptomycin from 
the PRC, OJ L187,13 July 1991, p. 23 (recital 13). 939 Ibidem. 
210 
Trade Policy Response - Antidumping 
protected by AD duties9ao In glyphosate from China941, proposed analogue countries 
such as Argentina, Australia, India and Malaysia were not considered valuable 
candidates, because their markets were largely dominated by companies related to the 
main complaining producer located in the Community942. Nonetheless, in ferro-silico- 
manganese from China943 the Commission did not object that the two cooperating 
producers in the analogue country used for establishing normal value were owned by a 
mining company, which at the same time held shares in a European producer, because the 
sales were believed to be made on an arm's length basis944 . In certain aluminium 
foil 
from China and Russia945 Turkey was not considered a suitable analogue country because 
the cooperating producer did not have any domestic sales to unrelated customers 946 
The comparability of the production process or the structure of cost of production is 
another relevant criterion to be mentioned here947. It suffices to say, however, that the 
production process in the analogue country can be different, but this should not generate 
huge differences in the costs of production948. Even in cases where normal value in the 
analogue country has to be constructed, it is considered whether or not the cooperating 
producer has a reasonably efficient production process949. Cost efficiency in an analogue 
country should by no means be below world standards. Of course, the whole discussion 
about cost efficiency and price comparability between NME and market economy 
countries is turned upside down, if the only cooperating Indian producer is entirely state- 
owned and it can be argued that the prices of the product under investigation in the 
analogue country are controlled by the government. This was argued in magnesium oxide 
940 Case C-26/96 Rotexchemie International Handels GmbH & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof 
[1997] ECR 1-000 (paragraphs 21-25). Similarly, see definitive AD duties on furazolidone from the PRC, 
OJ L285,4 November 1994, supra note 916, p. 1 (recital7). 
941 Regulation 368/98/EC of 16 February 1998 imposing a definitive AD duty on glyphosate from the PRC, 
OJ L47,18 February 1998, p. 2. 
942 Idem, p. 2 (recital 15). 
943 Regulation 495/98/EC of 23 February 1998 imposing a definitive AD duty on imports of ferro-silico- 
manganese from the PRC, OJ L62,3 March 1998, p. 1. 944 
945 
Idem, p. 1 (recitals 55-56). 
ý Regulation 950/2001/EC of 14 May 2001 imposing definitive AD duties on certain aluminium foil from 
the PRC and Russia, OJ L134,17 May 2001, p. 1. 
946 Idem, p. 1 (recital 31). 
94' Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraph 68). 949 Provisional AD duties on calcium metal from the PRC and Russia, OJ L104,23 April 1994, supra note 
931, p. 5 (recital 17). 
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from China9S0. However, the Commission took the view that the Indian SOE did operate 
in a market economy context and its domestic sales were made in competition with a 
number of companies, which did not belong to the Indian government. It was thus found 
that the state ownership did not result in any distortion of costs or prices charged951. Of 
course this case proves that a SOE can operate in a market context, and this precedent 
could be turned around to claim MET for Chinese SOEs. However, this case is also a 
good example of how ironical the choice of an analogue country can be, if one takes into 
account that a NME traditionally is characterised by state-owned production. 
Furthermore, in certain aluminium foil from China and Russia952 the sole Chinese 
exporting producer was majority state-owned and the chairman of the board of directors 
was appointed by a state-owned entity. For these reasons it was concluded that it could 
not be granted MET953. In my opinion these last two examples show little consistency. 
The comparability of access to components954 used for the manufacture of the product 
concerned, as well as raw materials and energy955, is also a criterion. As far as raw 
materials are concerned, the ECJ addressed this in Nölle, where it was held that the 
advantages resulting from access to raw materials could not be ignored simply because 
there was no market economy in the exporting country 956. In casu it was argued that the 
analogue country, Sri Lanka, had to import a certain raw material necessary for the 
production of brushes, whilst China, the exporting country, accounted for practically 85% 
of the production of that raw material. Nulle rightly claimed that this would amount to 
differences in production costs. Nonetheless, differences in respect of access to raw 
949 Provisional AD duties on unwrought magnesium from Russia and Ukraine, OJ L312,23 December 
1995, supra note 914, p. 37 (recital 20). 
950 Regulation 1334/1999/EC of 21 June 1999 imposing a definitive AD duty on imports of magnesium 
oxide originating in the PRC, OJ L159,25 June 1999, p. 1. 951 Idem, p. 1 (recital 22). 
952 Definitive AD duties on certain aluminium foil from the PRC and Russia, OJ L134,17 May 2001, supra 
note 945, p. 1. 
953 Idem, p. 1 (recital 22). In particular the appointment of the chairman was important (recital 23). 954 Regulation 1645/95/EC of 5 July 1995 imposing provisional AD duties on microwave ovens from the 
PRC, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia, OJ L156,7 July 1995, p. 5 (recital 12), where fully integrated 
producers were found be benefiting from special cost advantages. ss Such as in provisional AD duties on refractory chamottes from the PRC, OJ L179,29 July 1995, supra 
note 930, p. 56 (recital 12); Regulation 2581/93/EEC of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional AD 
duties on ferro-silicon from South Africa and the PRC, OJ L237,22 September 1993, p. 2 (recital 17); and 
Regulation 2496/97/EC of 11 December 1997 imposing a definitive AD duty on imports of silicon metal 
from the PRC, OJ L345,16 December 1997, p. 1 (recital 16). 
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materials do not necessarily exclude the selection of an analogue country. In fluorspar 
from China the Chinese advantage with respect of access to raw materials was taken into 
consideration by making a downward adjustment of the analogue country's selling 
prices957. 
Finally, the readiness of producers in the analogue country to cooperate with Community 
authorities is indirectly mentioned in Article 2 (7) as a criterion to be considered. The 
ECJ, though, has ruled that a serious attempt to obtain information has to be made, and 
that the authorities should not induce non-cooperation by requesting information within 
very short delays958. Coumarin from China is a good illustration of the problems that non- 
cooperation may create959 As the producers in Japan and India refused to cooperate, the 
Commission finally had no other choice than to select the US as an analogue country, 
notwithstanding that the US producer was related to the only existing complainant in the 
Community. 
The need for selecting an analogue, or in the US surrogate, country has been prone to 
criticism960. The chief criticisms include that AD margins in analogue country cases are 
usually much higher than in standard AD proceedings. It is also often heard that the 
results of the case are absolutely unpredictable, and it is therefore impossible for a NME 
producer to price its goods to avoid the imposition of AD duties. Because analogue prices 
and costs are used, a NME with some demonstrable comparative advantage can never 
benefit in the price or cost computation from that advantage961. It is deplorable that 
authorities still return to this methodology after more than a decade of severe criticisms. 
956 Case C-16/90 DetlefNölle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] ECR I-5163 (paragraphs 24-26). 957 Provisional AD duties on fluorspar from the PRC, OJ L226,7 September 1993, supra note 933, p. 3 
(recital 13); and Regulation 486/94/EC of 4 March 1994 imposing definitive AD duties on fluorspar from 
the PRC, OJ L62,5 March 1994, p. 1(recitals 10 and 11). 958 Case C-16/90 DetlefNölle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] ECR 1-5163 (paragraph 34). 959 Regulation 2352/95/EC of 6 October 1995 imposing provisional AD duties on coumarin from the PRC, 
OJ L239,7 October 1995, p. 4 (recitals 14 and 15). 96° This is especially true in the US, see e. g. KEARNEY and WANG, o. c, supra note 894, p. 257-284; 
BARCHEFSKY, o. c., supra note 866, p. 373-380; and ALFORD, W., "When is China Paraguay? An 
Examination of the Application of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to 
China and other `Nonmarket Economy' Nations", 61 Southern California L. Rev., November 1987, p. 79- 
135. 
96' These criticisms are summed up very well by former USTR Barchefsky, see BARCHEFSKY, o. c., 
supra note 866, p. 375-76. 
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c. Methods of Determining Normal Value 
According to Article 2 (7) the authorities would normally use domestic selling prices in 
the analogue country to establish normal value. Where the use of this method is not 
possible, they will resort to a constructed normal value in the analogue country. The two 
remaining methods listed in the provision - export prices from the analogue country to a 
third country, including the Community, and any other reasonable basis, including the 
price paid or payable in the Community for the like products - are rarely used962. When 
selecting one of the different methods of establishing normal value, the authorities enjoy 
a certain margin of discretion963. The ECJ even held that all methods could be combined 
if that would lead in fact to obtain a more reliable and representative result9M. Such a 
combination of methods was used, e. g., in silicon carbide from inter alia China96s 
depending on the product type966. In contrast to the information regarding the selection of 
an analogue country, the authorities are not under an obligation to give out information to 
the parties of the method by which normal value is calculated when the proceeding is 
opened967. 
Producers in NMEs, based on antidumping practice in the US, have suggested other 
methods than those listed in Article 2 (7) of the Regulation. In magnetic disks from 
Japan, Taiwan and China, one Chinese producer argued that normal value should have 
been constructed by taking into account the real costs incurred by the Chinese producer 
concerned, as far as the components used to manufacture the product were sourced from 
related companies in market economy countries, in casu the US and Hong Kong. The 
962 See Regulation 761/90/EEC of 26 March 1990 imposing provisional AD duties on tungsten ores and 
concentrates from the PRC, OJ L83,30 March 1990, p. 23 (recital 11), which discussed but did not use the 
wholesale prices observed on international commodity markets. More often the price actually paid or 
payable in the Community for the like product is used, see Regulation 541/91/EEC of 4 March 1991 
imposing definitive AD duties on bariumchloride from the PRC, OJ L60,7 March 1991, p. 1 (recital 12); 
and Regulation 720/90/EEC of 22 March 1990 imposing provisional AD duties on silicon metal from the 
PRC, OJ L80,27 March 1990, p. 9 (recital 11). 963 Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraph 66ff), Joined Cases 296/86 and 
77/87 Technointorg v. Commission and Council [1988] ECR 6077 (paragraph 30). 964 Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraph 81ff). Although this judgment 
was delivered on the basis of the old Basic Regulation 2423/88, it can still serve as guidance under the new 
Regulation 384/96, as amended. 965 Imposing AD duties on silicon carbide from inter alia China, OJ L125,26 May 2000, supra note 915, p. 
3. 
966 Where for crystalline silicon the price in the ordinary course of business was used, but for metallurgical 
silicon normal value had to be constructed. 
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remaining costs should nonetheless be established on the basis of the analogue market 
economy. Sadly the Community authorities rejected these suggestions, as they were not 
compatible with the relevant provisions of the Regulation968. In a much more recent case, 
imports of urea from inter alia Belarus and Ukraine969, three Ukrainian producers argued 
also that their normal value should not have been based on the domestic prices and costs 
of an analogue country, but that the normal value based on domestic sales of a Ukrainian 
exporting producer, which was granted MET should have been used instead. However, 
again the Commission rejected. It argued that it is consistent practice, in line with Article 
2 (7)(b), to determine normal value on the basis of paragraphs 1 to 6 of Article 2 only for 
those producers that can show that they operate in line with market economy conditions. 
For all other producers in the same country, normal value is determined on the basis of a 
price or constructed value in an analogue country, or on any other reasonable basis970. 
The same request for such treatment was also made, but not granted in integrated 
electronic compact fluorescent lamps from China971. Such alternative approaches would 
certainly come close to the "bubbles of capitalism" methodology previously used in the 
US, and would definitely mean progress. This method is explained below and has been 
used by the Commission, to a certain extent, in zinc oxides from China972. 
The "bubbles of capitalism" approach or also referred to as the "mix and match" 
approach was used before the market oriented industry method by the DOC973. 
Recognising that certain market forces were at work in China, the DOC announced that, 
in calculating normal value under the standard factors of production methodology, it 
would include the cost of factor inputs purchased under market conditions, whether they 
were foreign or PRC sourced, and obtain from surrogate countries the remaining factor 
%7 Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraph 85). 968 Provisional AD duties on magnetic disks from Japan, Taiwan and the PRC, OJ L95,21 April 1993, 
supra note 926, p. 5 (recital 21). 
Imposing definitive AD duties on urea from Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Libya, Lithuania, 
Romania and the Ukraine, OJ L17,19 January 2002, supra note 887, p. 1. 
970Idem, p. 1 (recitals 44-45). 
971 Regulation 1470/2001/EC of 16 July 2001 imposing definitive AD duties on imports of integrated 
electronic fluorescent lamps from the PRC, OJ L195,19 July 2001, p. 8 (recital 11). 
972 Only to its own advantage though. See supra p. 199. 973 LAROSKI, o. c., supra note 865, p. 370-398; BELLOCCHI, L., "The Effects of and Trends in Executive 
Policy and Court of International Trade (CIT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Non-Market 
Economy of the PRC", 10 NYInt'l L. Rev., Winter 1997, p. 177-213; and LANTZ, o. c., supra note 891, p. 
993-1073. 
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inputs for costs that were not market-driven974. Where a NME producer proved that factor 
inputs were purchased from market economies, the DOC would value them at the 
purchase price975. Even when it could show that factor inputs were purchased within the 
NME under market conditions, those sourced inputs would replace the surrogate country 
prices in calculating normal value976. Although this methodology was a giant leap 
forward, happiness was short-lived, because the DOC soon began to question the 
theoretical underpinnings of this approach977. The reason behind this moving away from 
this methodology was the fact that it opened the door for CVD petitions without injury 
test in the US and challenging the view that due to their economic nature NMEs could not 
be subjected to CVD law978. This author believes the "bubbles of capitalism approach" 
should be supported, because it could lead in fact to obtain a more reliable and 
representative result. In the EC, there should not exist any objection to use this 
methodology. In the US it would have been unnecessary to stop using it, had the US 
introduced the same injury standard as applied to CVD cases against market economies 
for NMEs. Definitely, in a case where MET has been granted, nothing should object to 
the use of information from the recognised market economy producer in the NME as a 
substitute for information of a NME producer of the same country. 
According to the ECJ in Technointorg, the constructed normal value should be calculated 
in such a way that the results obtained are as close as possible to the normal value based 
on the analogue country's domestic prices. The differences in income levels and 
production methods in the NME and the analogue country in itself are not enough to 
make it necessary to construct the normal value instead of using the analogue country's 
domestic prices. Different production methods may require, however, adjustments when 
974 Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the PRC, 56 Fed. Reg. 25.664.25.667 (Dep't Comm. 1991). See 
also RICHARDSON and NIELSEN, o. c., supra note 894, p. 151-167. 975 Oscillating Fans, supra note 974, p. 25,667. 976 Idem. 
97 Chrome Plated Lug Nuts from the PRC, 56 Fed. Reg. 46.153 (Dep't Comm. 1991). See supra note 891. 98 HORLICK and SHUMAN, o. c., supra note 893, p. 807-840; O'BRIEN, K., "The Applicability of the 
United States Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries", 9 Fordham Intl 
L. J., 1985/1986, p. 596-633; and STRONSKI, J., "Antidumping, Constructed Value, and 
Noncountervailable Subsidies: A Proposed Inclusion of Subsidies in Constructed Value after Al Tech 
Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States", 11 Fordham Int'l L. J., Fall 1987, p. 208-231. 
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comparing normal value as established in the analogue country with the NME's export 
prices979. 
When the normal value is based on information derived from producers in the analogue 
country, which are related to complainant Community producers, it is absolutely vital for 
the authorities to check this information. The Community institutions should ensure that 
the link between the cooperating producer in the analogue country and the complainant 
industry does not influence the information on which the measures are based980. In 
Ferchimex there was only one cooperating producer in the analogue country, who was 
linked to the complainant industry. The ECJ found that the producer was not in a position 
to influence the sales prices because its production only represented 8.15% of the sales in 
the market under consideration, its sales were made at arm's length prices, and the market 
of that primary product was very competitive. It was further found that its prices were in 
line with those charged by competitors, and proper adjustments were made981. In a review 
proceeding concerning the measures before the Court in Ferchimex, the same sole 
cooperating producer was used by the authorities. It was established that its costs of 
production were increased due to exceptional depreciation. Since these costs were not 
incurred in the ordinary course of trade, Community institutions decided to deduct these 
costs as an adjustment982. Similarly, in gas fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters 
from China the only cooperating producer in the analogue country belonged to a group of 
companies of which a complainant Community producer was also member. The analysis 
of the costs of production as supplied by that cooperating producer showed that certain 
parts used for the production were bought from related parties and that additional costs 
were incurred. In order to make a reasonable and appropriate ordinary course of trade 
test, the additional costs in question were excluded in the cost of production983. 
97 Joined Cases 296/86 and 77/87 Technointorg v. Commission and Council [1988] ECR 6077 (paragraph 
26ff). 
980 Provisional AD duties on refractory chamottes from the PRC, OJ L179,29 July 1995, supra note 930, p. 
56 (recital 10), where two producers cooperated in the analogue country, one of them being related to the 
complainant. 
981 Case T-164/94 Ferchimex SA v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2681 (paragraph 71f). 982 Regulation 643/94/EC of 21 March 1993 reviewing AD duties on potassium chloride from Belarus, 
Russia and Ukraine, OJ L80,24 March 1994, p. 1 (recital 13). 
983 Regulation 1006/95/EC of 3 May 1995 reviewing AD duties on gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint 
lighters from the PRC, OJ L101,4 May 1995, p. 38 (recitals 22 and 23). 
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Another factor that is known to play a role determining the normal value based on 
domestic selling prices or a constructed normal value in the analogue country is the rate 
of inflation. Pursuant to Article 2 (10)(j) the effects of inflation in the analogue country 
can be eliminated by using the appropriate exchange rates, which reflect the fluctuations 
of the value of the currencies in question. The authorities in this context generally use the 
official exchange rates on the basis of which international commercial transactions are 
carried out984. 
As was already indicated in the previous section, the failure to meet the 5% 
representativity test pursuant to Article 2 (2) may lead to the use of an alternative method 
of determining normal value. In this regard the representativity test is applied to both the 
total export volume of each cooperating exporter in the NME and its export volumes of 
the various product types in comparison with the corresponding domestic sales volumes 
of the cooperating producers in the analogue country985. 
Finally, it has occurred that, when products sold domestically have many additional 
features as compared to those exported to the Community, the most practical method 
considered can be the constructed normal value986. 
B. Determination of Antidumping Duties 
Normally the calculation of the dumping margin is made for each cooperating company 
individually987. However, as a general rule AD authorities will not establish individual 
dumping margins, referred to as "individual treatment" (IT), for cooperating exporters 
located in a NME. They justify this practice on the grounds that NME companies have a 
very limited, if any, degree of independence in their relationship with importers in other 
countries, as they are unable to establish export prices and any other conditions or terms 
984 MÜLLER, et al., o. c., supra note 811, p. 167. 985 Regulation 1465/96/EC of 25 July 1996 imposing provisional AD duties on certain ring binder 
mechanisms from Malaysia and the PRC, OJ L187,26 July 1996, p. 47 (recitals 29-31). 986 Provisional AD duties on photo albums from the PRC, OJ L228,9 September 1993, supra note 920, p. 
16 (recitals 21 and 24). 
987 Regulation 384/96 addresses specifically the issue of whether individual or general duties may be 
imposed in two particular circumstances: (1) the situation of NME; and (2) where the Commission resorts 
to sampling. 
218 
Trade Policy Response - Antidumping 
of sales by themselves988. This may lead to circumvention of AD duties by channelling 
them through the NME producer with the lowest AD duty rate. 
a. Individual Treatment 
The concept of IT by calculating an individual dumping margin for cooperating exporters 
from a NME was initially introduced in small screen television receivers , 
from Hong 
Kong and China989, where individual duties were computed for two Sino-Japanese joint 
ventures which the AD authorities considered to enjoy a high degree of independence in 
so far as they were able to import components and export finished products without any 
control from the China Commercial Chamber or from any other body, and were able to 
transfer their profits out of China subject to certain requirements"0. The issue of IT was, 
however, reconsidered in bicycles ftom China991 where the Commission refused to grant 
IT to two Chinese producers with foreign investment participations. The argument was 
that IT is only appropriate in exceptional circumstances, because exports can be 
channelled by the state through whichever exporter has the lowest AD duty. In casu a 
Chinese manufacturer claimed to have become a joint stock company, and that the 
portion of its shares still owned by a state body had now fallen to only a minority 
shareholding by the state. The Commission considered, however, that even a minority 
shareholding confers on the state a significant influence on the management of the 
company, especially when combined with all other means of influence at the disposal of 
the state in China. Notwithstanding the difficulties for obtaining IT several importing 
producers were granted individual duty rates in later cases, such as e. g. in leather 
handbags from China992. In that case the companies under investigation were 
incorporated in Hong Kong, but exported leather handbags manufactured at operations in 
the PRC controlled by them. These operations were either entities without a legal identity 
988 See VAN BAEL and BELLIS, o. c., supra note 811, p. 228. 989 Regulation 2093/91 of 15 July 1991 imposing definitive AD duties on small screen televisions from the 
PRC and Hong Kong, OJ 1991 L195,18 July 1991, p. 1. 
990 Idem, p. 1 (recitals 19 and 20). 
99' Provisional AD duties on bicycles from the PRC, OJ 1993 L58,11 March 1993, supra note 922, p. 12; 
and Regulation 2474/93/EEC of 8 September 1993 imposing definitive AD duties on bicycles from the 
PRC, OJ 1993 L228,9 September 1993, p. 1 (recitals 17-21). 992 Regulation 1567/97/EC of 1 August imposing definitive AD duties on leather handbags from the PRC, 
OJ L208,2 August 1997, p. 31, as amended by Regulation 2380/98/EC of 3 November 1998 amending 
Regulation 1567/97, OJ L296,5 November 1998, p. 1. 
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of their own, producing on the basis of a so-called `processing with foreign materials' 
agreement, or foreign-invested enterprises (FIE), such as sino-foreign cooperative joint 
ventures or wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE). It was considered that the 
authorities in the PRC would not have enough leverage to effectively influence the 
commercial behaviour of the exporters concerned, because the costs and procedures 
involved closing down the manufacturing operations are very limited. Consequently there 
was no genuine risk of circumvention via possible channelling 993. Generally, the question 
whether an exporter in a state-trading country is acting with sufficient independence of 
the state for IT to be granted to him involves an assessment of complex factual situations. 
Judicial review of such an assessment is limited to whether the relevant procedural rules 
are complied with, whether the relevant facts have been accurately stated, and whether 
there has been a manifest error of appraisal of the facts or the misuse of power994. 
Since 1998, certain changes occurred, which were already discussed earlier, and which 
allowed NME producers to apply for MET. However, there was considerable overlap 
between the traditional IT criteria and the full market economy criteria995. This created 
the situation that only those exporting producers who could fulfil the requirements for 
MET could also qualify for IT. Given that the important issue for IT was that export 
transactions were not subject to state interference, it seemed logical and fair to refocus the 
criteria for IT on those areas having a direct impact on the export activities of the 
exporting producer, and not to make it solely dependent on MET. 
Pursuant to the Commission's proposal996 the exporter has to show that he is free to 
determine export prices and quantities, as well as their terms and conditions. The claim 
must be submitted together with the reply to the questionnaire. In this respect the 
following criteria are considered to be relevant in determining whether an exporting 
producer should be granted individual treatment: (1) exporters are free to repatriate 
capital and profits (as is usually the case for WFOEs and FIEs); (2) export prices and 
quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely determined, and the majority of the 
993 Definitive AD duties on leather handbags from China, OJ L296,5 November 1998, supra note 992, p. 1 
(recitals 11-14). 
994 See Case T-170/94, Shanghai Bicycle Corporation v. Council [1997] ECR I1-1383, paragraph 110. 995 See COM (2000) 363 final, o. c., supra note 869, p. 14. 996 See COM (2000) 363 final, o. c., supra note 869. 
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shares belong to genuinely private companies. State officials appearing on the board or in 
key management positions should be in a clear minority. The presumption is that a state- 
controlled enterprise cannot guarantee its independence from state interference, and the 
burden rests with the exporter to prove otherwise; (3) exchange rate conversions are 
carried out at the market rate; (4) state interference is not such as to permit circumvention 
of measures if exporters are given different rates of duty. As such, the proposal creates an 
option open to exporting producers who may not be able to meet the criteria for full 
MET, which can only be granted where an exporting producer can show that neither its 
domestic nor its export activities are subject to state interference. 
In certain footwear with uppers of leather or plastics from inter alia China997 one 
exporting producer was granted IT. Again it was a legal entity incorporated in Hong 
Kong, but with a manufacturing facility in mainland China that could persuade the 
Commission that the management and control of the factory, both in terms of production 
and marketing, was clearly in their hands and that their operations were sufficiently 
independent from the Chinese authorities. It was also established that export prices and 
marketing policies were determined by the Hong Kong company without interference 
from the Chinese state998. Likewise, in solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate from inter 
alia Belarus, Russia and Ukraine999 one cooperating Russian exporter advanced the 
arguments that it determined the conditions and terms of its export sales freely, that the 
company's supervisory board was elected by the shareholders and all but one of the 
members were independent from the state, and that exchange rate conversions were 
carried out at the market rate. On these grounds the Commission reviewed the claim for 
IT and considered that the arguments were valid. Especially since the level of state 
interference was not such as to permit circumvention of AD measures if exporters are 
given different rates of duty, the company's claim was accepted, despite strong objections 
looo 
. 
from the complainant industry 
9" Regulation 467/98/EC of 23 February 1998 imposing definitive AD duties on imports of certain 
footwear from inter alia the PRC, OJ L60,28 February 1998, p. 1. 
99" Idem, p. 1 (recitals 44-46). 
"9 Regulation 1995/2000/EC of 18 September 2000 imposing definitive AD duty imposed on imports of 
solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate from Algeria, Belarus, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine, OJ L238,22 
Setember 2000, p. 15. 
10' Idem, p. 15 (recitals 21-23). 
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To ensure that circumvention is not taking place the Commission, e. g., will have to check 
the exporter's capacity, because if its exports are higher this could be an indication that 
circumvention is taking place. Particular attention will be paid to exports made via 
traders. Any change in the business license may also indicate circumvention and must be 
reported by the companies concerned. If necessary a withdrawal of IT could ensue 
through an investigation'00'. For the risk of possible future circumvention it is the 
Commission's practice not to grant IT when export transactions are made via trading 
companies '002. This reasoning has, however, not prevented the AD authorities from 
accepting undertakingsloo3 from NMEs or from resorting to sampling'ooa. 
Generally speaking, IT like MET is still the exception rather than the rule in cases 
involving NMEs. On the basis of the information supplied, most companies are unable to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that they are sufficiently independent 
from state control or interference and, accordingly, see their claim for IT rejectedloos. 
Perhaps it would not be a bad idea to reverse the presumption, and to allow IT in all 
cases, except if the Commission can demonstrate that there is actual state interference, 
that there is no factual or legal independence because of questions regarding ownership, 
management control and determination of commercial and business policies. This would 
change the burden of proof and would improve the position of transition economies. 
10°1 See COM (2000) 363 final, o. c., supra note 869, p. 15. See Regulation 192/1999/EC of 25 January 
1999 imposing definitive AD duties on pocket flint lighters from the PRC, OJ L22,29 January 1999, p. 1. 1002 See, e. g., Regulation 2402/98/EC of 3 November 1998 imposing AD duties on unwrought unalloyed 
magnesium from China, OJ L298,7 November 1998, p. 1 (recital 17); ferro-silico-manganese from China, 
OJ L62,3 March 1998, supra note 943, p. 1 (recital 54); and Regulation 1784/2000/EC of 11 August 2000 
imposing definitive AD duties on certain malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings from inter alia China, OJ 
L208,18 August 2000, p. 8 (recital 58). 10°' See, e. g., Commission Decision 2001/602/EC of 26 July 2001 accepting an undertaking in connection 
with certain steel or iron ropes from inter alia Russia, OJ L211, (2001) p. 47; Commission Decision 
2001/381/EC of 16 May 2001 accepting an undertaking in connection with aluminium foil from the PRC, 
OJ L134 (2001) p. 67; Commission Decision 2000/137/EC of 17 February 2000 accepting an undertaking 
in connection with seamless pipes and tubes from inter alia Ukraine, OJ L46 (2000) p. 34; Commission 
Decision 2000/523/EC of 10 August 2000 accepting an undertaking in connection with malleable cast iron 
tube or pipe fittings from inter alia China, OJ L208 (2000) p. 53; Commission Decision 2000/70/EC of 22 
December 1999 accepting an undertaking in connection with certain seamless pipes and tubes from inter 
alia Russia, OJ L23 (2000) p. 78; and Commission Decision 1999/572/EC of 13 August 1999 accepting an 
undertaking in connection with steel wire ropes, OJ L217 (1999) p. 63. 
10°4 See, e. g., Definitive AD duties on leather handbags from China, OJ L296,5 November 1998, supra 
note 992, p. 31. 
1005 See, e. g., ferro-silico-manganese from China, OJ L62,3 March 1998, supra note 943, p. 1; certain 
aluminium foil from China, OJ L134,17 May 2001, supra note 945, p. 3; and imports of urea from inter 
alia Belarus and the Ukraine, OJ L17,19 January 2002, supra note 887, p. 4. 
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Besides, as was discussed in the second chapter, the distinction between SOE and other 
types of enterprises has become increasingly blurred. Economic reforms have 
decentralised central government control over SOEs, though the enterprises remain state- 
owned in name. In the US the DOC accepted that the de iure control of exporting 
companies have shifted from the central government to the companies themselves. 
However, based upon information that these laws and regulations have not been 
implemented on a uniform basis, a de facto analysis is necessary in order to ascertain 
1006 whether the companies are in fact free of government control. 
b. Dumping Margin and Adjustments 
Actually there are no specific provisions governing adjustments when export prices from 
a NME are compared with the normal value established in the analogue country. 
However, in some of the cases mentioned in the sections above, the authorities, where 
necessary, take into account the fact that the method to establish normal value in an 
analogue country has shortcomings. However, for differences in the cost of production, 
which have their very origin in the fact that factor costs in NMEs are controlled by the 
state, is not compensated. An example of this are the lower wages in the NME. The ECJ 
has ruled that differences concerning wage and salary levels in the NME and analogue 
country as well as higher costs for components in the analogue country did not justify 
allowances'007. One can argue though whether the use of an analogue country should not 
truly reflect the comparative advantage of the NME. Definitely for a country like China, 
where low-skilled labour and certain components are abundant, the refusal to make such 
adjustments may come across as unfair. Nonetheless, at least one author agrees that 
comparative advantages, which are independent of the NME status and have a bearing on 
the comparison of the normal value with the export price, should be taken into 
'°°8 account. 
1006 See ALAGIRI, P., "Reform, Reality, and Recognition: Reassessing US Antidumping Policy Toward 
China", 26 Law & Poly in Int'1 Bus., Summer 1995, p. 1061-1091. 10°7 Joined Cases 296/86 and 77/87 Technointorg v. Commission and Council [1988] ECR 6077 
(paragraphs 34-35), see also Regulation 2861/93/EEC of 18 October 1993 imposing definitive AD duties 
on magnetic disks from Japan, Taiwan and the PRC, OJ L262,21 October 1993, p. 4 (recital 12), and 
provisional AD duties on bicycles from the PRC, OJ L58,11 March 1993, supra note 922, p. 12 (recital 
29). 
1008 MOLLER, et a1., o. c., supra note 811, p. 174-5. 
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Adjustments are made for differences in physical characteristics' 009, such as in coumarin 
from China10'0, a case in which the product concerned was of lower quality than the one 
sold by the cooperating producer in the analogue country. Similarly, in dead burned 
(sintered) magnesia from China10", it was found that importers and users of the Chinese 
product had to carry out themselves operations, such as an analysis of the product, 
monitoring of loading of the product, and removal of impurities. Exports from the 
analogue country did not require such operations. As a result an allowance of 6% was 
made 1012. However, other factors may outweigh the differences in physical 
characteristics. For example the length of the production process and a higher 
consumption of raw materials may outweigh the cost benefits of using another type of 
'°13 raw material 
Access to raw materials and energy efficiency, which have nothing to do with the specific 
determination of costs and prices in a NME, are taken into consideration when making a 
comparison'0'4. However, in urea from Russia, Ukraine, Slovak and Czech Republic'0'5, 
the argument by Russian producers that adjustment for different prices in gas should be 
made was refused, because in the analogue country, in casu Slovakia, producers paid the 
market price, while Russian producers paid a price, which was not the result of market 
forces. It was argued that it is the very purpose of using an analogue country to eliminate 
the effect of such costs and prices 1016 In one case, the authorities refrained from making 
any adjustment, because the cooperating producer in the analogue country was one of the 
most efficient in the world and it was considered that full account was taken of any 
1009 See, e. g., unwrought unalloyed magnesium from the PRC, OJ L298,7 November 1998, supra note 
1002, p. 3. 
1010 Provisional AD duties on coumarin from the PRC, OJ L239,7 October 1995, supra note 959, p. 4 
(recital 22). 
101 Regulation 3383/93/EEC of 6 December 1993 imposing definitive AD duties on dead burned (sintered) 
magnesia from the PRC, OJ L306,11 December 1993, p. 16 (recital 12). 
10121bidem. 
1013 Review of AD duties on gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters from the PRC, OJ L101,4 May 
1995, supra note 983, p. 38 (recital 36). 
1014 Definitive AD duties on fluorspar from the PRC, OJ L62,5 March 1994, supra note 957, p. 1 (recitals 
10 and 11). 
1015 Regulation 477/95/EC of 16 January 1995 amending the definitive AD duties on imports from inter 
alia Russia and Ukraine, OJ L49,4 March 1995, p. 1 (recitals 48-49). 
'°'61bidem. 
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comparative advantage'0'7. Cases in which due account were taken for differences in 
access to raw materials and energy include, e. g., dead burned (sintered) magnesia from 
China1018 and espadrilles from China s019. 
IV. Final Observations 
The European Commission has considered the April 1998 regime an adequate framework 
for case handlers to do an analysis against a background of the reform process in China. 
However, based on the case review in this chapter it should first of all be concluded that 
still only a minority of Chinese companies are successful in demonstrating that the 
criteria for MET and IT can be met. For those companies who are refused MET the main 
reasons are the many restrictions on selling on the domestic market. This, so argues the 
Commission, has proven to be one of the main tools employed by the Chinese 
Government to protect inefficient domestic industry from competition and this is more 
extensive than originally thought. Even where such restrictions are no longer specified in 
legal documents, the Commission believes they are still found to exist in practice in many 
. 
instances'020 
More Chinese companies should be able to meet the MET criteria in the future. It is 
difficult to establish an exact point in the reform process at which countries could be 
considered for inclusion under the regime currently applied to China, it was therefore a 
wise move to extend such treatment to every WTO member. But it should also be 
questioned whether it is still necessary to continue NME treatment in se. The categories 
of different markets are, after all, based on unexamined assumptions. It seems that they 
are not based on economic structure anymore, but rather on economic performance, and 
whether countries can indefinitely graduate from NME treatment is, above all, a political 
decision to be taken by the Council amending the relevant legislation. Frankly, there is no 
satisfactory solution to the problem of pricing production factors in NMEs. And the way 
1017 Regulation 1808/92/EEC of 30 June 1992 imposing provisional AD duties on ferro-silicon from Poland 
and Egypt, OJ L183,3 July 1992, p. 8 (recital 13). 
101s Provisional/Termination of AD duties on dead burned (sintered) magnesia from the PRC and Japan, OJ 
L282,26 September 1992, supra note 936, p. 16 (recitals 16 and 19). 1019 Regulation 1812/91/EEC of 26 June 1991 imposing definitive AD duties on espadrilles from the PRC, 
OJ L166,28 June 1991, p. 1 (recital 13). 
1020 See COM (2000) 363 final, o. c., supra note 869, p. 7. 
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these methodologies are now used on transition economies such as China will harm the 
process of market economic reform, because it reduces the market access for these 
countries, for which export is nonetheless absolutely vital to implement further domestic 
economic reforms. 
To a large extent, market reform has introduced market determined prices in China, 
though there still are market distortions left and communist holdovers, it should be added 
that market distortions also exist in mature market economies. Besides, the continued use 
of these non-market AD methodologies are preponderantly protectionist, based on 
politics rather than sound economics and should therefore be phased out soon. Moreover, 
AD is not a preferred method to enforce market access. AD should only be applied if the 
industries protected prove that in turn they are willing to adjust to increasing competition 
from China. China in the meantime should not be treated differently from other WTO 
members. Nowadays it still seems that the country is not given the full benefits of WTO 
accession. 
For the time being, it is necessary to examine the consistency of MET and IT and to make 
some allowances or improvements. First, it would be better, e. g., to allow the bubble of 
capitalism or mix and match approach so as to use directly as many data as possible from 
the NME, instead of referring too easily to a third country. Especially should it be 
allowed to rely on data from companies in the NME, which are granted MET and to use 
these data on companies from the same NME, which are not eligible for MET. Second, 
the AD authorities should start an ex officio inquiry, as whether the NME producers under 
investigation deserve MET, instead of demanding claims for such treatment from the 
producers under investigation themselves. This should definitely be so in expiry review 
cases, where it should be possible to adopt a changed and more market-oriented AD 
method than the method used in the original investigation, without question whether a 
parallel interim review may be needed. Finally, as far as IT is concerned, the EC 
authorities should automatically award IT to NME producers, unless it can prove that 
circumvention is highly likely. This would reverse the principle that NMEs as a general 
rule are awarded a single country duty rate, and would ease the burden of proof for NME 
producers, which under the current legislation have to convince the AD authorities that 
they deserve IT. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
From the onset in the first Chapter, one of the underlying sub themes has been that the 
integration of transition economies into the economic and legal international order 
presents special challenges to the Bretton Woods institutions. More specifically, one such 
challenge is the implementation of the WTO's multilateral trade rules in the domestic 
regulatory framework of transition economies, such as China, of which its recent 
accession to the WTO is one of the most significant international economic events in 
post-World War II history. This accession is unprecedented, because the Chinese market 
is massive and certain economic sectors, such as textiles, are well developed, whereas for 
other sectors China is still a developing country. China's accession is also special because 
of its often politically sensitive relationship with the West in both trade and non-trade 
issues, and above all, because of the state character of its economy. China has its own set 
of initial conditions and cannot escape its own historical and cultural environment replete 
with pre-existing social institutions. As a result, this country stands culturally remote 
from the Western legal and economic values that have traditionally underpinned the 
WTO, and differs in the practical application of legal and economic principles at home. 
Therefore, in order to allow a smooth integration of China in the WTO, and the 
"Multilateral Trading System" it embodies, it is necessary to reconcile the Chinese 
economy in transition with the economies of its most important trading partners. To this 
end, transition countries, such as China, are currently in the process of creating a 
regulatory framework to support the development and maintenance of a transparent and 
stable economic environment conducive to efficient private sector activities, and a 
transparent legal system with effective access to the judicial system. These domestic 
economic and legal-related reforms should be able to alleviate the possible trade friction 
that can arise between nations when their economies do not converge sufficiently. 
Against this background, China accepted that the country should comply with rules, 
formulated with a particular Western economic and legal structure in mind. According to 
many Western, but also some Chinese scholars, China's economic, legal and political 
structures do not operate as yet in a manner the WTO contemplates how a country's 
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economic, legal and political institutions should operate. This, according to some 
scholars, is due to the fact that the `old' state-track economy has not withered entirely 
away to create an entirely private economy due to the heavy social costs involved and the 
danger of creating political instability in such a process. In the opinion of this author, 
there should not be any problem, however, with continuing public ownership in the 
economy, as long as the legal system and corporate governance in the country can 
guarantee that state enterprises work according to market considerations by disentangling 
the government bureaucracy from vested business interests. Public ownership of the 
economy was once popular in many Western European countries a few decades ago and 
may work well in certain sectors of the economy. Besides, it is a sovereign right of each 
country to organise its economy according to its own political principles. In its continued 
efforts to create a "socialist market economy", the Chinese government tries hard to 
rationalise the remains of its state economy. Numerous legal measures have been 
designed to establish financially autonomous and competitive SOEs independent from 
bureaucratic overreaching, and to permit SOEs to make commercial decisions in line with 
market considerations as required by Article XVII GATT. In this process, it has been 
pointed out that weaknesses in China's corporate governance remain; but, because of the 
decentralisation in the Chinese economy, there no longer exists a significant danger for 
concerted economic policy action to undermine GATT/WTO obligations in view of 
Article XVII. GATT. This does not mean, however, that bureaucratic interference is 
completely "rooted out" on the micro-economic level, because various levels of 
government still have vested business interests. Because of economic decentralisation, 
the danger for a deliberate centrally-planned economic action to disrupt Western markets 
has receded. Market disruption, in this context, is understood to be a centrally-planned 
economic action to inundate Western markets, with the purpose to "out compete" certain 
tactical Western industries, or to amass foreign exchange. 
However, for the divestiture of state assets, for the disentanglement of the government 
bureaucracy from business interests, and for making public ownership of the economy 
work in a market economy setting, it is important for China to embrace the rule of law. 
As far as the implementation of the rule of law in China is concerned, a review of authors 
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has revealed that it is necessary to remain vigilant. Creating a legal system is more than 
increased legislative activity: the law and the legal system, as a whole, should also 
permeate the legal consciousness of the people living in the region under transition. 
Moreover, economic troubles often compound the problem of popular acceptance of the 
rule of law. And Western influence on this point also raises the concern of 
"transplantability" of Western social and political institutions in post-communist state 
building. Likewise, WTO integration is not just about the formulation of international 
economic law and the acceptance of international, liberal trade policies; but, it is for 
China enormously important to cast the foundations suitable to implement, monitor and 
possibly enforce the WTO standards. In this sense Article X GATT and related WTO 
provisions are important to show the way for China's implementation process. 
As much as these reform efforts are helping the Chinese integration into the Multilateral 
Trading System, trading partners, such as the EC and the US, have taken the view, 
however, that these efforts may, for the time being, be insufficient to cabin the risks and 
the costs of integration, because they need time to take root. These trading partners, thus, 
may need a sufficient amount of flexibility to make swift adjustments to changing 
circumstances in their commercial relations with China, and the WTO also may need 
opportunities and time to find compromises when necessary. It is against this background 
that flexible safeguards come into play to ward off the possible risks and dangers of 
integration. The rise of new and large economies in Asia, Latin America and the former 
"Soviet block" may create new trade tensions with mature economies. The constant 
search for new export markets on international markets may pose a serious problem. The 
expansion of exports is often seen as the only factor in the long-term that determines the 
import prospects of any economy; and, the low cost structure of emerging and transition 
economies as a threat to more mature economies may slow down international co- 
operation. China's accession, in this regard, draws our attention to the tension between, 
on the one hand, the institutionalisation and rationalisation of world trade, and the 
empirical reality of global protectionism, on the other hand. In this regard, flexible WTO 
safeguards might serve as a "buffer zone" among opposite economic systems. Flexibility, 
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in this context, means a rule-oriented approach but with ample opportunity for 
negotiation-based action. 
The WTO, as a rule-oriented institution, has certain safeguards in place, such as Articles 
VI and XIX GATT, to alleviate part of this tension. But the, risk of damage to liberal 
trade in employing these safeguards remains immanent. This risk of protectionist abuse 
also emerges from certain provisions in EC trade policy instruments. These provisions 
are mostly holdovers from the Cold War, during which imports from non-market 
economies or state-trading countries were treated differently for fear of market 
disruption. Despite some changes in 1998, especially in antidumping legislation, these 
holdovers may still offer opportunities for protectionist abuse and may prevent China to 
benefit fully from its WTO accession. Because the transformation process from centrally- 
planned economy to market economy is built on illusive principles, which use long lists 
of preconditions for economic and legal guidance, and because there are no apparent and 
clear graduation criteria that mark the successful completion of the transition to a market 
economy, the risk exists that WTO members will continue to use state-trading or non- 
market economy methodologies for protectionist purposes. This thesis has argued that 
this bifurcated system, as far as China is concerned, should be thoroughly revised and 
abolished where necessary. Principally, the West should also open its markets to imports 
from transition economies, such as China's. It would be a mistake for Western countries 
to take the opening of the Chinese market to be nothing but an opportunity for increasing 
exports. However, the success of China's domestic economic and legal-related reforms is 
directly relevant for the application of these non-market economy policies. It is around 
the degree of the success of these reforms that much of the debate revolves. 
International norms, like those created in the WTO framework, have played an important 
role in guiding the remodelling of the legal and economic system in China. The question 
remains, however, whether it is still necessary to apply a non-market economy trade 
policy vis-ä-vis China. And more in particular, the question remains as to whether the EC 
trade policy instruments of antidumping and safeguards should be adjusted to the new 
economic circumstances. This non-market economy trade policy, a holdover from the 
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Cold War, and its continued application to China for a number of years to come is 
addressed in Sections 15 and 16 of the Protocol of Accession. These Sections allow the 
discriminatory treatment of Chinese imports by means of special safeguard actions and 
the use of nonmarket economy methodologies as far as antidumping and subsidies are 
concerned. With regard to textile products in particular, the prolonged use of a transitory 
safeguard on Chinese imports is justified in the Working Party Report. There are no clear 
criteria to let China graduate from this selective and discriminatory treatment other than 
that these provisions in the Protocol of Accession and in the Working Party Report will 
have to phase-out after a certain number of years. Nonetheless, It would be wrong for 
WTO members to apply nonmarket or state-trading methodologies to China over the next 
decade, if the country has completed its transition in the meantime. It is not inconceivable 
for WTO members to acknowledge China's progress and to treat the country's economy 
as a market economy before the transitory period has lapsed. 
As far as safeguard provisions are concerned, the EC still uses discriminatory language 
along the historical lines of traditional state-trading countries. The safeguard provision in 
Regulation 519/94 is discriminatory and prevents China from being treated as a full 
member of the WTO. Even if it can be argued that this discrimination is largely 
academic, because it is unlikely to be ever applied against China, the language is there. 
The EC authorities should remove China's name from the list of countries in Annex II of 
that Regulation, and allow all imports from China to fall within the scope of Regulation 
3285/94, dealing with imports from market economies, or subject the list of countries in 
Annex II to judicial review. In this regard, selective safeguard measures against Chinese 
exports would still be allowed under Article 5 (2) of the WTO Safeguards Agreement, or 
Article 16 (4)(b) of Regulation 3285/94, as far as "quota modulation" is concerned. In so 
doing, it would in the future not be necessary to rely on the Transitional Product-Specific 
Safeguard Mechanism as foreseen in Section 16 of the Chinese Protocol of Accession. 
Besides, it would have been more appropriate, had the Protocol of Accession used an 
express reference to allow quota modulation, as specified in Article 5 (2)(b) of the WTO 
Safeguards Agreement, to be used vis-a-vis China, and relaxed the criteria for the use of 
such selective safeguards, instead of introducing this Transitional Product-Specific 
Safeguard clause modelled on Section 406 of the US Trade Law. This Transitional 
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Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism still makes clear reference to the historical divide 
between market economies and state-controlled economies by borrowing the exact 
language from Section 406 on market disruption of the US Trade Law of 1974. It will be 
interesting, however, to see how the WTO Dispute Settlement Body will interpret market 
disruption and the relationship between, on the one hand, Article XIX and the Safeguards 
Agreement, and the Protocol of Accession, on the other hand, because its interpretation of 
market disruption and the lesser injury standard that is derived from it might be quite 
different from the American interpretation in Section 406. This allusion on Cold War 
market disruption in the Chinese Protocol of Accession actually should belong to the 
past, because, as already mentioned, China's decentralised state economy is no longer in 
a position to inundate Western or international markets by way of concerted action under 
a planned economy. 
With regard to quantitative restrictions on textiles, the EC, as a result of China's WTO 
accession, is phasing-out remaining quota restrictions on Chinese textiles, and is 
integrating Chinese textiles into the GATT. regime through the transitional ATC. 
However, as far as Regulation 517/94 is concerned, the safeguard provisions in Title III 
of that Regulation are also discriminatory vis-ä-vis China, in that they too use a different 
standard for state-trading countries mentioned in Annex II, including the PRC. It would 
be appropriate here too to remove China from this list, or subject that list to judicial 
review. Besides, as far as the quantitative restrictions in Annex IV of that Regulation are 
concerned, these were not notified to the Textiles Monitoring Body as of 1 August 2002. 
Article 3 ATC nonetheless requires that all quantitative restrictions, whether consistent 
with GATT or not, should be notified. These quantitative restrictions should be phased- 
out as soon as possible, because it does not befit the EC to treat certain Chinese imports, 
economically and politically, on the same footing with imports from North Korea. 
Although Article XIX and the WTO Safeguards Agreement may be too narrow in scope 
to deal with the unique economic position China is in, it seems doubtful, however, that 
the safeguards designed in the Protocol of Accession will be reliable legal instruments to 
protect the European economy from undesired Chinese competition, as some pressure 
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groups may wish. Foremost, the EC needs a liberal economic policy that will allow 
Europeans to stay ahead of Chinese competition, instead of the rhetorical language of 
special safeguard provisions. It would be wise for the EC to take this a step further and to 
harmonise its many safeguard provisions. Treating China differently and applying 
safeguards is not going to make the Chinese economy less competitive, and European 
economic sufferance much lighter. Tough policy decisions will have to be made over the 
next couple of years, if European industries do not want to stay frozen in existing 
inefficiencies, as the result of increased protectionism. It would be better to continue the 
search and the struggle for remaining competitive strength. The relevant Community 
industries should realise that there is no turf that can be preserved forever for any country 
or group of countries. Only if the EC continues to respond to change, it need not fear of 
being converted into an industrial desert. To advance this aim, it is also crucial to alter 
trade policies instruments, such as antidumping legislation, in ways that would make 
them less conducive to seizure for protectionist purposes. 
This volume has argued that a further relaxation of the EC trade policy instruments is 
timely, and the EC should further continue to phase-out the discriminatory treatment of 
Chinese imports. The absence of clear graduation criteria should not prevent this 
relaxation. Especially as far as antidumping is concerned, the nonmarket economy 
methodology is rife with opportunities for protectionism. In this regard it is already 
1021 hopeful that the practice of "zeroing" was condemned in the Bed Linen Report 
Although this practice was not limited to imports from nonmarket countries, it was a 
reprehensible practice whereby the Community did not take fully into account the 
entirety of the prices of some export transactions, namely, those where negative dumping 
margins were found. 
As far as antidumping is concerned, the EC has considered the April 1998 regime as an 
adequate framework for the Commission to do an analysis against a background of the 
reform process in China. This framework allows the antidumping authorities to treat 
Chinese companies as market economy producers on a case-by-case basis and is already 
1021 European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen From India, 
WT/DS141/AB/R. 
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a relaxation of the previously existing trade policy. However, based on a case review it 
should first of all be concluded that still only a minority of Chinese companies are 
successful in demonstrating that the criteria for Market Economy Treatment (MET) and 
Individual Treatment (IT) can be met. For those companies who are refused MET the 
main reasons are the many restrictions on selling on the domestic market. This, so argues 
the Commission, has proven to be one of the main tools employed by the Chinese 
government to protect inefficient domestic industries from competition, and this is more 
extensive than originally thought. Even where such restrictions are no longer specified in 
legal documents, the Commission believes they are still found to exist in practice in many 
instances. It can be argued, however, that as far as the EC authorities do not take into full 
account the present economic success of Chinese domestic enterprise and legal-related 
reforms, its antidumping strategies are protectionist. 
More Chinese companies should be able to meet the MET criteria in the future. As it is 
difficult to establish an exact point in the reform process at which countries could be 
considered for inclusion under the regime currently applied to China, it was a wise move 
to extend the April 1998 regime to every WTO member. But, it should also be questioned 
whether it is still necessary to continue special treatment for so-called nonmarket 
economies per se. Most of these countries have profoundly changed and have moved 
away from the central plan. Besides, the categories of different markets along the 
historical divide of communism and capitalism are, after all, based on mostly unexamined 
assumptions, since no country can be identified with a strict market economy or strict 
planned economy. It seems that the divide between market and planned economies is not 
based on economic structure anymore, but rather on economic performance and export 
capacity. The maintenance of the categorisation of the Chinese economy as an overall 
nonmarket economy is protectionist and is maintained out of fear of heightened Chinese 
competition. Whether countries, such as China, can indefinitely graduate from nonmarket 
economy treatment is above all a political decision to be taken by the European Council, 
amending the relevant legislation. Frankly, there is no satisfactory solution to the problem 
of pricing production factors in nonmarket economies. And the way these methodologies 
are now used on transition economies, such as China, may harm the process of market 
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economic reform, this is so, because retention of this methodology reduces the market 
access for these countries, for which export is nonetheless absolutely vital to implement 
further domestic economic reforms. Although, in the opinion of this author, the use of 
antidumping measures should not be abolished altogether, it should be noted that 
antidumping is not a preferred method to enforce market access. Antidumping should 
only be applied if the industries protected prove that, in turn, they are willing to adjust to 
increasing competition from China. 
In anticipation of further Chinese domestic reforms and the end of China's nonmarket 
economy status, which will have to end at the latest when the time periods in Sections 15 
and 16 of the Protocol of Accession have lapsed, this thesis made some recommendations 
and suggestions for adjusting the European trade instruments. 
As far as the antidumping provisions are concerned, it is necessary to examine the 
consistency of MET and IT and to make some allowances or improvements for a gradual 
relaxation of the European antidumping regime. First, it would be just to introduce the 
"bubble of capitalism" or "mix and match" approach so as to use as many data as 
possible from the nonmarket economy, instead of referring too easily to a third market 
economy country, or "analogue country". More in particular, it should be allowed to rely 
on data from companies in the nonmarket economy, which are granted MET, and to 
apply these data on companies from the same nonmarket economy, which are not eligible 
for MET. Second, the antidumping authorities should conduct an ex officio inquiry, as 
whether the nonmarket economy producers under investigation deserve MET, instead of 
demanding claims for such treatment from the producers under investigation. This should 
definitely be so in expiry review cases, where it should be possible to change the 
antidumping method used in the original investigation, if in the meantime a market- 
oriented change in the industry occurred, without question whether a parallel interim 
review may be needed. Finally, as far as IT is concerned, the. EC authorities should 
automatically award IT to nonmarket economy producers, unless they can prove that 
circumvention is highly likely. This would reverse the principle that nonmarket 
economies, as a general rule, are awarded a single country duty rate, and would ease the 
235 
Jan Hoogmartens Chapter Five 
burden of proof for nonmarket economy producers, which under the current legislation 
have to convince the antidumping authorities that they deserve IT. In a couple of years 
time a similar approach to reverse the burden of proof could work for MET, whereby the 
EC antidumping authorities would automatically extend MET to Chinese producers, 
except in circumstances where evidence suggests that serious market distortions still 
exist. Over time, MET and IT should be considered to be the norm, where the 
Community institution is seeking to depart from the standard method of calculation, it 
should state its reasons for doing so in a manner sufficient to enable the courts to exercise 
its power of review and interested parties to ascertain the circumstances in which the 
Community antidumping rules were applied. In this regard the recent opinion of 
Advocate-General Jacobs in Petrotub is important l°22. In overall terms the EU should 
show restraint in the employment of antidumping measures. 
As far as safeguards are concerned, the EC already uses restraint in employing 
emergency safeguard measures for non-agricultural products. Safeguard action was taken 
in March 2002 on fifteen steel products, in response to the US safeguard action on steel 
imports. Notwithstanding the fact that European safeguard actions are very rare, this 
author would suggest to harmonise the multitude of safeguard provisions and clauses that 
exist today in EC trade policy instruments. First of all there are safeguard clauses in 
bilateral trade agreements between the EC and other trading partners, such as China. 
Secondly, there are the safeguard clauses in several of the EC import regulations. With 
respect to China in particular, it is important that some of these clauses are not a correct 
transposition of Article XIX GATT and the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards, or Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. They are neither 
correct transpositions of the relevant sections of the Protocol of Accession and the 
Working Party Report on the Chinese accession. As a result these clauses should be 
revised or harmonised. In this context, it would also be useful to negotiate a new bilateral 
trade and cooperation treaty with China to replace the 1985 bilateral agreement. 
1022 Case C-76/00 P, Petrotub and Republica v. Council [2002] ECR (not yet reported). According to this 
case, the EC antidumping authorities have to state clearly the reasons, for which they wish to use a 
particular calculation method. 
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With these suggestions for adjustments of the EC trade policy instruments in mind, it can 
be concluded that a nonmarket approach vis-a-vis China, as approved in the Chinese 
Protocol of Accession, should be gradually extinguished. The application of special 
safeguard measures and nonmarket methodologies in antidumping investigations are only 
a partial response to the insecurity of certain Community industries, and to the balance of 
trade deficit with China. In the end, the EC needs a liberal trade policy vis-ä-vis China. 
Prolonged protectionism would run the risk for the EC of being frozen in existing 
inefficiencies, whereas it would be better to continue the struggle for competitive 
strength. Protected industries should realise that they cannot preserve their turf, unless 
they too face adjustments. The suggested adjustments to the EC trade policy instruments 
hopefully will make them less conducive to protectionist purposes. Of course, it should 
not be forgotten that the integration of China in the Multilateral Trading System needs a 
multi-faceted and dynamic response. In this regard, the response strategy of the EC 
should be one of many cooperation objectives, which should also encompass non-trade 
issues, such as education, environment, poverty, labour rights and human rights, because 
seeking sustainable development is linked to more issues than just trade. 
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